PATRIMONIALISM IN MODERNISATION: A COMPARATIVE ESSAY TO INTERPRET RUSSIAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURES

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ABSTRACT

The concept of patrimonialism, improved for describing the legitimate political authorities of pre-modern societies, has recently begun to attract top social science scholars with its appearances in modern societies. In this article the political cultures of Russia and Turkey which have similarities relating to history, geography and political behaviors are analysed within the scope of patrimonialism as well. Both political structures that have been world-systems-in-themselves in history, have also transferred the patrimonial culture of their imperial past to modern state-building. Even in the radicalization phases of modernization in both states' histories, patrimonialism has manifested itself in the behaviour of political elites and the popular acceptance of them. It would be useful to consider patrimonialism as a dominant factor in approaching the actual problems like democratization in such political cultures.

Keywords: Legitimacy, Modernization, Patrimonialism, Political Authority, Political Culture.

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MODERNLEŞMEDE PATRİMONYALİZM: RUS VE TÜRK POLİTİK KÜLTÜRLERİNİ AÇIKLAMAK İÇİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR DENEME

ÖZ

Modernite-öncesi toplumlarının meşru politik otoritelerini tanımlamak için geliştirilmiş olan Patrimonyalizm kavramı, modern toplumlardaki görünümleri nedeniyle son zamanlarda önde gelen sosyal bilimcilerin dikkatini çekmeye başlamıştır. Bu makalede de Rusya ve Türkiye gibi tarih, coğrafya ve politik davranışlara ilişkin benzerliklere sahip iki ülkenin modern politik kültürü patrimonyalizm çerçevesinde çözümlenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Tarihte kendi içinde birer dünya-sistemi olmuş bu iki politik yapı, imparatorluk geçmişlerinin patrimonyal kültürünü modern devlet inşasına da taşımışlardır. Her iki devletin tarihinde modernleşmenin radikalleştiği evrelerde dahi patrimonyalizm, politik seçkinlerin davranışlarında ve bunlara yönelik toplumsal kabulde kendini göstermektedir. Bu tarz politik kültürlerde, demokratikleşme gibi güncel sorunlara yaklaşımda patrimonyalizmin başat bir etken olarak dikkate alınması yararlı olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Meşruiyet, Modernleşme, Patrimonyalizm, Politik Otorite, Siyasal Kültür.

INTRODUCTION**

Although there isn't a certain date that indicates when modern history began, one can have a comprehensive perception that there are differences between modern and traditional (pre-modern) time periods. Nevertheless, recent research and explanations which hadn't been satisfied with modernist narratives have begun to discover traditional continuities in modern structures, especially in the political science world. Max Weber's "patrimonialism" in this recent process attracted the attention of of academics, especially to explain the policy-making style in "non-Western" states. Patrimonialism is a current issue in two different ways: One of them employs the term by snatching it away from its authentic meaning that had been given to it by Weber and invents a new concept as "neo-patrimonialism"; it used to be applied by mostly post-colonial states in order to explain their illegitimate style of governing. The other one uses the term with its authentic characteristic to be applied by the states which had had a long administrative tradition before modernization and have continued it with modern adaptations. The latter will be the main interest of this study.

Russia and Turkey were chosen in this work due to their inheritances from a long history of imperial administrative tradition. Their process of modernisation came from a similar foundation and continued during the process of building their states. The modern political institutionalisation in both of these countries used patrimonial mechanisms because of their historic political orientations (for Russia see Murvar, 1971; Pipes, 1974; White, 1979; Joyce, 1984; Keenan, 1986; Burant, 1987; Daniels, 1987; Tucker, 1987; Gill, 1990; Jowitt, 1992; Hosking, 2000; Walker, 2002; Gel'man, 2004; Getty, 2013; for Turkey

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see Avcıoğlu, 1974; Küçükömer, 2010; Mardin, 1973; Trimberger, 1978; Mardin, 1981; Keyder, 1987; Köker, 2016; Özbudun, 1995; İnsel, 1996; Öğün, 2004; İnsel & Aktar, 2005; Hanioğlu, 2012; Kazancıgil, 2014). The patrimonial factor of modernization explains how the state elites maintained their privileged traditional authority over the entire social stratum controlled by them with legal and ideological adaptations into modern structures and why the revolutions from the above were given credit even though decentralist thoughts were alienated. There are some important similarities between both of the countries which makes them convenient for a comparative study: Both have a past of late-modernization and a similar position like being Eurasian. Both have a revolution which led the societies into radical transitions (Lenin-Stalin era in Russia; Atatürk era in Turkey) at the first half of the 20th century. Both emphasized a distinction between their modern structures and the ancient regimes. In both countries the pre-modern patrimonial factor of political authority and the people's acknowledgments of such a style manifest themselves very often throughout the whole process of radical political modernization.

1. PATRIMONIAL MODERNIZATION

Weber describes patrimonialism as a developed and institutionalized type of legitimacy of traditional authority, especially in pre-modern societies (Weber, 1964). It is very important here to emphasize an aspect of the concept, "authority"; thus one can avoid to misuse of the term in order to mark some regimes like modern dictatorships of "failed-states" or to justify the theory of "Oriental despotism" in which the whole society is reduced into the conditions of general slavery. According to Weber (1964: 324), an authority relationship means "the probability" of voluntary obeying to "certain specific commands" by a group of people. In traditional authority, peculiarly in patrimonialism the people have a belief that they should obey the commands of the leader because his order is sanctified, his power has always existed and has been "handed down from the past", his rules have been "traditionally transmitted", the relations between him and the administrative staff and the cooptation are based on "personal loyalty" (Weber, 1964: 341-343). So if any resistance occurs, "it is directed against the person of chief or of a member of his staff", but not against the system, and on the account of the fact that they go over the traditional limit (Weber, 1964: 342). Weber describes "Sultanism" as an advanced level of patrimonialism in which arbitrary rule of the

chief is "free of traditional limitations", although in patrimonialism the claim of personal power is attributed to the tradition (Weber, 1964: 347). Patrimonial authority gets decentralized and localized "through the appropriation of governing powers" in order to manage the lands and the people (Weber, 1964: 353). Otherwise it may have not been possible to establish a regular administration, if the pre-modern conditions of technology are considered. The important economic resources are "in the hands of the chief and the members of his administrative staff", productive actions are "diverted in the direction of political orientation" and the two factors of rationalization of economic action, "calculability of obligations" and freedoms for "private acquisitive" are lacking (Weber, 1964: 355). One reason for such a deliberate political interference to economic relations is to satisfy the subjects in order to maintain the legitimacy (Weber, 1964: 357).

After this brief description, the main characteristics of patrimonialism can be specified here: The people believe that the rule of political power is based on its immemorial rights and the most appropriate administrative system established with this in mind. In the facts of cooptation and of the way of dealing with administrative works, especially between the administrative staff and the people, personal relations are rather preferred instead of official procedures, since personal loyalty is the most important key to unlocking all the doors. Legitimacy of political authority is expanded from top to bottom of the administrative hierarchy in order to make governing the whole country possible, so the members of the administration gain their legitimacy for governing from the top, the main resource of legitimacy. Interference to economic relations by just political motivations are assumed as a right for the political authority, although this is assumed as an anomaly in modern free-market economy. These are almost the opposite to the conditions of legal-rational authority of Weber. In the latter obedience is directed to only law and public administration that is rationalized by that law in very detailed instructions which describe its tasks strictly, as well as its limits, incomes, authorisations and responsibilities (Weber, 1964: 330). For Weber (1964: 331-332) the most important element of this modern authority is "bureaucracy" which improves in an attempt to meet the necessities of capitalism for a consistent, calculable and strictly limited rule. As the detriment of personal effectiveness of the central or the local notables, with its very specialized, centralist and egalitarian way

of cooptation bureaucratization causes a sample of democratization (Freund, 1968: 236). As it is seen here, patrimonialism, in theory, is very contradictory with modern ways of rule, especially in economic life. But the real life is more intricate than the theory.

First of all, development theories dealing with the problems of modernisation in various societies has been criticized satisfactorily today. Although their suggestions to "non-Western" and "non-developed" societies for gradual moves toward the ideal of the "Western" civilization, a more recent stream of social scientists (see Moore, 1968; Amin, 1977; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1992; Frank & Gills, 1993; Wallerstein, 2006) asserts different ways of modernization in the history of societies when considering the archaic characteristics, the geographies, the beginning time of modernization, the style of political interference on labor or on production process, their places in the world economy and in the militaristic contentions, the capacity of administrative staff to challenge with the international competitions, etc… When following them it is possible to say that drawing a clear border between tradition and modernity and evaluating some experiences of modernization which are not equal to the sample of "Westerner" as a deviation without any consideration of the global division of labor and unequal development are definitely nonsense. Political culture studies with emphasis on continuity during the change provide a comprehensive perception on the originalities of societies in during modernization. They allege the "oriented action" of political actors, which means the "actors do not respond directly to 'situations' but respond to them through mediating 'orientations'" (Eckstein, 1988: 790). Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, an explanation for the cultural reproduction process, provides a reason for such orientations. It expresses that the dispositions acquired from experienced practices in the past adapt present practices on a similar route (Bourdieu, 1990: 54; Bourdieu, 1995: 82). It says something significant about why a political society chose a way that was different from the others in its modernization and why the traditional political behaviors can be observed in this process.

Patrimonialism as an imperial-inherited political tradition gains the attention of some scholars (see Charrad, Adams, 2015) and in their works a new perception for the rational-legal and modern capitalist systems with patrimonialism which they try to develop in order to achieve a new perspective on the problems in the contemporary

political economy (see Adams, Charrad, 2015: 3). Through this way one can easily see that patrimonialism was never completely abolished by the modern state-building and it is possible to follow patrimonial appearances hidden under modern capitalist process. Even in the history of the USA which has been very strict on the principles of the free market economy, it is very striking to find patrimonial dispositions (see Hall, 2015). Here the political authority in the 19th century interfered with the free market economy in favor of public interest in order to overcome inadequacy of the private sector to construct the railway network (Hall, 2015). The state provided some monetary advantages and monopoly rights for entrepreneurs and expropriated the private properties on the route of the railway to assign them (Hall, 2015: 28-32). It shows that the modern state can revert to its primordial patrimonial rights when needed for public interest and patrimonialism, adapted to modern legal procedures this time, can exist right beside the modern free market economy as an "oxymoron" (Hall, 2015: 36-37).

Although it seems like an oxymoron, a study to discover modern appearances of patrimonialism may be a key for a comprehensive interpretation of the modern struggles of the states, especially in the case of democratization. The historical modernisation of Russia and Turkey with their positions between "the East" and "the West", their imperial-patrimonial classical past and contemporary democratization problems provide abundant patterns for such a study.

A last note must be stated here in order to eliminate the usage of patrimonialism as "neo-patrimonialism". A detailed study about the main characteristics of such regimes was made in an edition by Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz (1998). Except the neo-patrimonial rule of Shah Mohammed Reza in Iran, all the states examined in the articles are post-colonial states in Latin America and Africa where the non-institutional and extremely personal political rule exists and distorted capitalism prevails (Chehabi & Linz, 1998: 13-25). These are the countries where a chieftain who is powerful enough reaches the political power and rule by the brutal force instead of an institutionalized bureaucratic authority (for some views see Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994: 458-60). In some examples for such regimes (see Smith, 1997) the national resources are personalized by powering person or groups, so-called "state" is adhered into the business relations as the main supplier and customer, and public

administration is stated as organized corruption. Explaining such an administrative style (if there is one) in reference to culture and tradition is not possible. This phenomenon was witnessed in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990's in the absence of any public order provided by a state authority illegal gangs dominate the business relations as an alternative order (Taylor, 2012: 144). If Weber's usage of patrimonialism as a traditional type of legitimacy is considered, it is not easy to use this term by adding "neo" on the head in order to correlate with this kind of "failed-states". In its authentic concept, patrimonialism implies sophisticated administrative style of great continental empires in pre-modern times, not any crimes or every kind of constrain of "pathological leaders" or groups (Pitcher et. al, 2009: 142-49). So here the term of patrimonialism will be used with no relation to the term of neo-patrimonialism which doesn't apply any continuity in political cultures from old empires to modernized states, such as Russia and Turkey.

2. RUSSIAN CASE

Academic literature regarding Russian political culture concentrates on the political behaviors of Soviet public administrators and of the citizens in a large extent as reflecting the main concerns of the Cold War Period. The discussions are formed with the arguments about either continuities in change which dominate Russian political sphere or significant changes cut off every continuities. One can easily see that the key criterions in these discussions are the liberal-democratic values. The authors emphasizing on "the change" (Hough, 1980; McAuley, 1984; Lewin, 1988; Lapidus, 1989; Hahn, 1991) assert that the high levels of industrialization, education, urbanisation, and civic society in the Soviet Union of the late 20th century led the people's political culture into a liberal-democratic way where they could no longer tolerate the communist regime. Here the authors emphasizing on "the continuities" are criticized as they assume the past is more effective than actual life of the people (McAuley, 1984: 22).

The members of the latter group (Brzezinski, 1976; Brown, 1984; Brown, 1989; Brzezinski, 1992; Laqueur, 1990; Rigby, 1999; Knight, 2000; Lukin, 2000; Gel'man, 2004), however, are more deliberative or sometimes desperate with regard to the liberal-democratic criterions too. Archie Brown gives notice on political culture as the most resistant factor among the others like ideology and institutional

change (Brown, 1989: 32). Walter Laqueur (1990: 19, 156-157) criticizes the thesis about the change from the bottom to top and says that throughout the history reforms have been imposed on the people by only a narrow group of political elites or a single-man and he adds: "Given the specific character of Russian society and political institutions, there might not have been another way" (Laqueur, 1990: 157). For Zbigniew Brzezinski (1976: 346; 1989: 204) there is no reason in Russia to expect a more liberal economy and more democratization in politics just because of the high level of industrialization, urbanization and technological advancement, since with these developments the pressure instruments of the state have become more sophisticated as well. Both Laqueur (1990: 171) and Brzezinski (1976: 351; 1989: 204) estimate that the political reforms in the Soviet Union will fail, because in the interregnum caused by these reforms the immanent forces of political culture will take action to move the state back in its centralist attitude for the sake of good order. The political developments in post-Soviet Russia justify these projections. The overwhelming majority of political elites in the new regimes are the same people of the former (Rigby, 1999). T. H. Rigby (1999: 323) points out this situation and says "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is died but the *nomenklatura* rules on". The people still continue to handle their works with public administration by the way of personal relations instead of official procedures, as it happened throughout Russian history (Gel'man, 2004: 1036). The greatest liberal movement which was led by Yeltsin, these "Democrats" are also not so consistent with their democratic ideas. According to Alexander Lukin who studies on the political culture of this group, democracy for them only means rejecting the Soviet rule and they couldn't improve any sense to challenge the majority, brutal pressures of non-governmental groups (Lukin, 2000: 259-262) and the political culture of the people that led them away from democratic values in any chaotic situation (Lukin, 2000: 284). Finally Putin, a past time *apparatchik* who is tough, aggressive and anti-Western was welcomed by the people bored with dysfunctional democracy of Yeltsin and horrified by the Chechen attacks (Knight, 2000: 35-36).

These post-Soviet patterns implicate some setbacks for democratic expectations. Nevertheless, this cannot be counted as a surprise if some studies on political culture of Soviet people are considered. The results of Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer's (1959) surveys with Soviet emigrants living in the USA, European countries and Israel in

1950's draw a very detailed picture of this culture. A good majority of the respondents approve the basic functions of New Economic Policy (NEP) of Lenin such as nationalization of heavy industry, full state responsibility on the services of education, healthcare and culture, giving permission for a limited private sector (Inkeles & Bauer, 1959: 233-342). They generally think that the system is bad because of the "bad" political leaders, like Stalin, and their policies on terror and collectivization of agriculture; but if any "good" leader who were generous, a protector of social values and paternalistic had acceded to presidency then everything would have been nice (Inkeles, Bauer, 1959: 252-254, 291-293, 336-337). The impression left by the Soviet refugees on Inkeles and Bauer (1959: 381) was that they had neither a perception of constitutional warranties, rights and responsibilities nor any need for them; they evaluated a regime not with its system, but personal qualifications of the leaders.

These all demonstrate that throughout the long history of Russian modernization, modern state building went on a very different way from the criterions of legal-rational models. Their preference on which way they would go reflects their patrimonial *habitus*, meaning their experience for such a long period of time with the same dispositions throughout their long history of modernization. Personalization of the rule, political interference on economy, choosing personal relations in order to handle administrative works, and maybe the most important factor, the people's approval of the system, mainly the legitimacy of authority can be seen here. Even under a Marxist regime (such a radical modernization!) traditional facts of politics are very clear in its history.

Even at the very beginning, the Bolshevik Party, according to Ken Jowitt (1992: 125), was established as a combination of legal-rational procedures of modern party structure and patriarchal chiefdom. It creates a heroic party image with its "great men" that bring the society heavy industrialization, machinery and heavy weaponry, just like a patriarchal chief who is a heroic warrior that showers his followers with booty and game animals (Jowitt, 1992: 126-127). Not only at the beginning of the regime, but at the later traditional way of politics inherited from Tsardom to the Bolsheviks appears in several facts and occasions, such that one cannot easily find consistency between the texts they referenced and their practices. For instance, a cult of personality and public rituals on that cult, grouping of party

elites to provide themselves with a prerogative inner circle as oligarchs out of the society and their will to keep their office until they die, xenophobic attitudes of the people against the other nations are not any relevance with Marx, but with the traditional features of Russia (Daniels, 1987: 170). What happened is that "Russia has russified Communism more than Communism has communized Russia" (Daniels, 1987: 171). The concepts and practices of Orthodox Christianity can also be observed with their new formulations as Marxist-Leninist "scientific atheism" (Tucker, 1987: 202). Lenin's usage of some metaphors like *uklon* (Christian deviation) for anarchists and trade unionists, and their criminalization by Stalin (Tucker, 1987: 203) are some examples. Lenin's public appearance as a personal cult, according to Robert C. Tucker (1987: 35-36), is a secularized version of messianism in the millennium. Such traditional continuities are not only observed at the level of political superstructure, but also some other categories of the society. "*Kruzhok*" circles of Russian traditional literary world in which writers had given their literary works depending on a patron-client network and the works gained their value by the appreciation of that network, found a place in Soviet literary world as well, by adapting themselves for their new political patrons (Walker, 2002). They supplied loyalty, adulation, propaganda and self-censorship for their patrons (the Bolshevik leaders) and received an easy access to material interests and to prerogative networks in exchanged, which moved themselves and their works up in socially high stratums dependently on the positions of their patrons (Walker, 2002: 122-123).

The Bolsheviks' political culture inherited from the Tsardom can be summarized in some points (Brzezinski, 1976: 340; White, 1979: 64-65): Political decision-making process possessed by a very narrow, extremely centralist-bureaucratic and authoritarian group; domination of the political authority on properties and economy; a very large scope of the state even in the business enterprising, religious or moral affairs and judicial processes to regulate and control; reforming from above; keeping the official truth more than any other interpretation and seeing opposition as betrayers; institutionalized patronages; weakness of representative institutions and minimum level of public participation; the high level of peasantry and a very communitarian society.

These are the facilitators used by the Bolsheviks to constitute their rule, especially in Stalin's era. At his time the only source of legitimacy was himself with his absolute capacity of appointment and discharge, even of claim the people's lives and bureaucracy shares his legitimacy almost in the same way in their terrains (Gill, 1990: 325). According to Graeme Gill (1990: 317-327) such a regime is not a reluctant result imposed from above, but a demand from the *nomenklatura* of the periphery for a patrimonial style of the power to legitimate their own positions in local administrative areas, although most of them was purged in the terror period of 1936-38. Arch Getty (2016) also provides enough examples of such patrimonial behaviors of Stalinist bureaucracy and its people from the bestowed titles and medals, which determine the social status of a person to the image of Stalin as "the father of peoples". Even on the top party chiefs set family relations with intra-clan marriages of their children (Getty, 2016: 89, 138). The etymology of the word of *gosudarstvo*, meaning "state", implies the head of the household and in Russian political culture the body of the ruler is the same thing with the state (Getty, 2016: 135). It explains the legitimate position of the ruler's personality for the Russians. This patrimonial image of "the good Tsar" reflects the popular image of Stalin as an authoritarian leader who sometimes uses grim methods just for a good society in the eyes of mostly peasant Soviet people at that time (Brown, 1984: 102). The cult of a person was the only way the Russian peasantry could express their respect and loyalty to their rulers since Tsardom and the Soviet elites deliberately let it go on just because they knew there was no other way for the people to practice their loyalty (Burant, 1987: 290). The routines of *mir*'s, the decision-making commutes of Russian peasantry, still work with the higher decision-making organizations like Politburo in their style of incontestable consensus on their final decision (Burant, 1987: 289). Such political structure, for some observers (see Joyce, 1984: 150) somehow "remnants of Russian peasant culture".

The works of Vatro Murvar (1971), Edward Keenan (1986) and Richard Pipes (1974; 2005) provide a historical frame for such a patrimonial political culture. By following them it is possible to find out historical reflections of how Russian people and politicians have set a relation with the nature and the geography and with themselves. Keenan analytically separated the political culture in three groups. The first one is the culture of the peasantry who don't seek for justice

or welfare for themselves, but only staying alive in very hard natural conditions of the geography; therefore individualism to break with common interests and innovativeness in production are not welcomed by the peasant community in order to maintain stability; the style of *mir* is to decide with consensus and to deal with the administration in the base of personal relations (Keenan, 1986: 125-28). The second one is the culture of the Moscovite court which has almost the same character to avoid risk, innovation and inter-elites struggles after the Time of Trouble (in 1598-1613) of pre-Romanov periods and it improves a tendency to decide every little regulation for local works from its center and uses disproportionate force in order to keep the vast country in secure and prevent any famine in the conditions of scarce resources of the land (Keenan, 1986: 130-135). The last one is the culture of bureaucracy which is a very large group to handle with every works of the vast land and the people, politically weak and totally depends on the tsar/tsaritsa and his/her appointee for social status, properties and incomes of its members (Keenan, 1986: 137-138). Keenan sees a resemblance between the political structure of Tsardom and an atomic nucleus with its electrons in which the nucleus represents the tsar and the electrons, political elites who are in competence to approach the nucleus (Keenan, 1986: 139-140).

This is a patrimonial structure in which the property depends on political authority and there is no contractual reciprocity as different from the feudalism (Pipes, 1974: 22-23; Murvar, 1971: 503-506, 522). For Pipes (1974: 23), it is different from despotism, because in a patrimonial system arbitrary interference of political authority to the properties might not be compared to a brutal force or some kind of corruption since there is no such a perception that the subjects have a contractual right on their properties. Pipes (1974: 65) gives only two examples in the history of Europe for such a political regime that any Western European people cannot consent: Russia and Turkey. Both Pipes (2005: 1) or Murvar (1971: 513-514) emphasize that the deliberate efforts for modernization from literature to military since Petrine era don't involve the political zone. Even in the mid of 19th century when private law and public law had already been divided the Russian tsars were still continuing to leave the state to their successors as a private legacy and it was seen as an issue of private law (Pipes, 2005: 16). According to Pipes (2005: 9), such a political culture is caused by an inversely proportional relationship between the need of security of a vast country with too many foreign enemies and having civic rights

and freedoms for the people. During modernization the main stream of Russian political ideologists (from Karamzin and Pushkin to Slavophiles) have a significant contribution to such a patrimonial legitimacy since they think Russia could be splintered otherwise (Pipes, 2005: 184).

3. TURKISH CASE

The history of modern Turkish politics has rarely been evaluated in the framework of patrimonialism specifically, but there are many works focusing on traditional continuities. Halil İnalcık (1992) examines patrimonialism as the main structure of the political body in the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, but he doesn't follow the topic until the modern times. Patrimonialism in modernity is used in the work of Ahmet İnsel (1996) as a key to explain Turkish political life and economic policy, especially during the time of a crisis. According to him (İnsel, 1996: 43) patrimonialism in modern Turkey inherited from the Ottoman past shapes the legitimate base of the revolutions against the society from the above for the sake of public order and it makes sure main stream politics keep following the *Kemalist* way which is its modern appearance. Thus for Turkey, unlike Russia, in order to reconstruct a theory of patrimonial political culture one should focus on the works which have been written on traditional continuities in modern Turkish political life.

Turkish political culture from the Ottoman Empire to contemporary Turkey has generally been based upon the struggle between the authoritarian bureaucracy and the others who have not been involved in that. İdris Küçükömer (2010) explains this dichotomy because of semi-colonization of Turkey. As long as Turkey was involved in capitalism, state elites who were taking the lion's share of the surplus and modernizing the country in a direction to maintain this privileged status couldn't create enough productive power to meet the necessities of the international competition. So it caused the popular masses to react which intensified the cultural division (Küçükömer, 2010: 59, 88). One side represents the "Westernist/secularistic" central bureaucracy who has supported *status quo* since the period of *Tanzimat* (Reformation in 1839-76) to the Kemalists of the early Republic, and the other side represents the popular discontent caused by economic crisis but manifested in a cultural/religious language since the upheavals of *janissaries* (regular Ottoman army before the

modernization) to the Democrat Party rule (1950-60) (Küçükömer, 2010: 86). Küçükömer's interpretation on the economic base is no doubt very useful, but it doesn't explain why the popular discontent has also appeared under the bureaucracy too like *janissary/ulama* or bureaucratic elites of the Democrat Party rule.

Şerif Mardin (1973) points out a cultural rupture between the political and local elites throughout the history of the Empire and the early Republic as a reason for this struggle. Unlike feudalism there has never been a mediating actor between these central administrators and the local notables of periphery in the Empire. Therefore the central elites appointed by the sultan have seen only legitimate policy-making actors without an alternative and their confrontations with the local elites have caused conflicts, but not any reconciliation (Mardin, 1973: 170-175). The process of modernisation in the state in 19th century focused on reforming its administrative stuff and their education system and it expanded the cultural gap between the bureaucracy and the local notables (Mardin, 1973: 179-180). In the Republic era of the 20th century the privileged status of the bureaucracy has continued in order to overwhelm the "backwardness" of the society and the demands from periphery assumed as reactionary and they have been marginalized (Mardin, 1973: 182-184). Mardin (1973: 186) asserts the *coup d'état* of 1960 was due to the result of Democrat Party's appearance as a representative of the local elites more than central bureaucracy. Metin Heper (2010: 27-28) employs Berki's term of "transcendentalism" for Turkish politics as a political tradition in which the political decision is given by a supreme collective mind, total will has a priority to the individual one and social engineering is very important as being different from "the instrumentalism" one, in which the deliberative way of decision-making, individual will, and differences are considered in politics. He also emphasizes that this tradition is inherited from the Empire and in the Republic the central bureaucracy has always readopted it in order to keep the society in an aggregate at the cost of political plurality (Heper, 2010: 41).

Patrimonialism can be taken as a vantage point here to provide some satisfactory interpretations why the Turkish political actors didn't choose the decentralist/deliberative/"instrumentalist" way of state-building, but the centralist-"transcendentalist" way. The political *habitus* can be observed in the main concerns of the actors if the

classical past is considered. Making some inferences from the history gave us some answers not only about the behaviors of the politicians, but the people's acceptance of these behaviors.

In the patrimonial system of the Ottoman classical age (14th to 18th centuries) the whole country and its population were seen the legacies of the sultan from his ancestors and every legitimate status, offices and prerogatives were only assigned to a person by him; so essential principles of the system were "allegiance, loyalty and obedience" (İnalcık, 2004: 238). When the administration became more complicated in 15th century, the central power put the *kul*'s (sultan's slaves who converted to Islam) forward against the others, especially the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) and the main executive offices in addition to the military affairs were assigned to the formers (İnalcık, 2006: 84). There was also a kind of epistemological break between the *kul*'s and *ulama*, caused by their educational background (*kul*'s from the *enderun*, the palace school, *ulama* from the *madrassa,* Islamic religious school) which is based on the principles of *din-ü devlet*, meaning the political authority is necessary for the continuity of religious life and of *hikmet-i hükûmet*, meaning the political mind has a privileged position in every kind of social affair (Mardin, 1983: 142-143). Thus, the secular and powerful central bureaucracy has begun to be separated from the other authorities, they didn't tolerate any attempts of *ulama* to become more autonomous in politics and such attempts were punished and disrupted by the central forces (for an attempt of *Kadizadeliler* in 17th century as an instance see Çavuşoğlu, 2001). Actually there were only two legal status in classical system: *Askerî*, containing of secular and religious officers and *reaya*, sample people (Ortaylı, 2004: 17). But it is understood that like in any ceaseropapist political system, the power of the religious office has been eroded and it has fallen behind the secular bureaucracy. It also explains the actual position of the Turkish religious office, which is working under the governmental authority in the contemporary Republic of Turkey. Such dispositions make Atatürk's (1923-38) position of laicism more familiar with Turkish political life rather than assuming it as a historical break (see Mardin, 1981).

This bureaucracy in Turkey is either the pioneer of modernization or the protector of its patrimonial rights even in its modern structure. It is mostly accepted that the Turkish modernization as a conscious policy to adapt the modern institutions has begun at the beginning of

19th century. The events followed by the political modernization displayed the main characteristic of the style of modernisation in Turkey. In 1808 after a catastrophic riot in İstanbul, the central government was forced to sign a law declaration, *Sened-i İttifak*, that decentralized the political authority among the *ayan*'s, the local notables. But it didn't last so long, because when the sultan (Mahmud II between 1808-1839) gained enough strength for the central political authority he eliminated all the *ayan*'s (Ortaylı, 2004: 36-37) and re-constructed the state by adapting the modern institutions. Thereby the possibility of any mediation between the center and periphery by the decentralist authorities like *ayan*'s disappeared in modern history even though they had had enough financial facilities to become a real social class (Keyder, 2015: 27-28). This attempt by local actors to take advantage of the center while it was in a vulnerable position caused a violent backlash by a more despotic modernist policy of the latter (the political center) and the formers who could still survive became civil servants of this central bureaucracy (Hanioğlu, 2016: 16).

According to Süleyman S. Öğün (2014: 305-306), the main position of centralist state-building policy shows that Hegelian paradigm of "state-building" is the preeminent factor in Turkish modernization although it coexists and challenges with Herderian paradigm of "nation-building" in its contemporary Western Europe. Therefore the modernization of the state relies on a kind of cameralism to sustain its centralist power in order to overwhelm the problems of disentangled social and economic relations imposed by the capitalist world system (Öğün, 2004: 12-13). *Devletlû*'s, the class of statesmen, improve self-directed solutions for this crisis and they reform primarily administrative instruments to maintain their legitimacy as a main group who appropriate the surplus (Keyder, 2015: 38-40). The modern schooling for bureaucratic cooptation, especially in Abdülhamid II era (1876-1909), employed the positivist way of education and it led the modern bureaucrats who were also the political elites of the Republic after 1923 to isolate themselves from the rest of the population with their bookish truths (Mardin, 1981: 206).

The main concern and the discourse of Turkish modernist politicians from the statesmen of *Tanzimat* to the *Juenes Turcs* was "saving the state" throughout the 19th century. It was to express their efforts to improve modernist policies in order to stop the fragmentation of the Empire without giving up their privileged status (Keyder, 2015: 73). It

leads to a political perception in which the liabilities to the state are more important than the civic rights, political interference to economy is normal and bunching up with a powerful leader is more attractive than democratic participation (Keyder, 2015: 239). More interestingly the main oppositions against the central power came from the same bureaucratic class too. The opposition against Abdülhamid II contained of a group from higher bureaucracy with salaries and they didn't rely on the people, but themselves (Avcıoğlu, 1974: 243).

The positivist rationalism, a constitutionalism which aims at unifying of the state rather than political plurality and social engineering to enlighten the people are continuities under the Kemalist single-party regime of the Republic (Köker, 2016: 136-38). Especially in 1930's, the Kemalist principles of "Populism", "Revolutionism" and "Etatism" were used as safety valves for the regime and the political authority legitimised itself and maintained the bureaucratic *status quo* to interfere the society in order to avoid any class autonomy as a result of modernization (Köker, 2016: 167, 216, 245-46).

Of course the changes in the political sphere were undeniable. Since the War of Independence (1919-1922) the central and the peripherial elites have had to meet on several occasions, especially for mobilizing of mostly peasant population in the wartimes. With democratic institutionalization the local notables have inevitably gained an autonomy and became more visible in public sphere, especially after the multi-party system established (in 1946 and thereafter). It makes the cultural dualism visible between secular bureaucracy and traditional local elites throughout the history of the republic (Sunar, 1974: 75-77). This dualism led the bureaucracy to interfere with the democratic institutions with a *coup d'état*, at the first time in 1960 in order to avoid more status deprivation (Szyliowicz, 1966: 279). The similar interferences can be observed several times afterward.

Here some perceptions of the actors who played more or less important roles in Turkish politics can be displayed in order to achieve a final analysis. Behaviors of the bureaucratic elites have previously been stated above. Briefly this was a bureaucratic tradition in which the central elites assume that they dominate the society as the real servants of the state, the only protector of the public good and the main actor who can modernize the state (Özbudun, 1995: 9). It is one aspect of the *habitus* of Turkish political life. It explains why

Turkish modernizers didn't choose the Anglo-American way of state-building which based on decentralism and civic rights, but the Continental European one which based on central power and communitarianism (Öğün, 2004: 17, 26). These all are because of their patrimonial perception which has historically isolated them from the society as their status comes from their offices, and of their style of revolutions above that based upon this traditional status (Trimberger, 1978). But it is not enough to completely describe a *habitus* without considering the perceptions and behaviors of the other actors out of the bureaucracy inside this tradition.

In Turkish modernization, these actors out of the bureaucracy cannot easily be observed as autonomous from this patrimonial relation. Mostly independent peasantry of Turkey (see Tütengil, 1975: 134-136; Keyder, 2015: 165) whose only contact with the state until the multi-parties competitions had been their mandatory relations to the gendarmeries and the tax collectors (Szyliowicz, 1966: 274-275) have participated politics of democratic periods in a clientalistic way (Szyliowicz, 1966: 277, 283; also for the Turkish style of clientalism in mentioned years see Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 84-87). Even in the 70's it was possible to find someone among the peasantry who understand the word of *siyaset*, translated as "politics" in modern times, with its equivalent meaning as "death sentence" due to political reasons in the Ottoman past; and one could think that Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister in Democrat Party governments, was executed (in 1961 after the *coup d'état* of 1960) for he had interfered in the state affairs (Ozankaya, 1971: 136-140).

The business class was already a group which were called "national bourgeoisie" and substituted by the state apparatus for the place of Greek and Armanian capitals of the last centuries of the Empire (Keyder, 2015: 86-92). This bourgeoisie class was very different from its models in the West, because they were not enthusiastic about competition, entrepreneurship and taking risks, and they were always depended on their patrons, the bureaucracy (Keyder, 2015: 107; Heper, 1976: 486, 498). This subordinated status of the business class can also be observed in bureaucratic and popular use of the terms related to the businessmen with pejorative meanings (see Avcıoğlu, 1974: 548). This "Etatist bourgeoisie" who used their political connections to take business from the government (Sunar, 1974: 77-78) continued to support the policies of the right wing governments in

1950's, 60's and 70's that offered them interest guarantee enterprises in cooperation with the public sources, time extensions for these guarantees, market regulations as a monopoly or oligopoly, expropriation and land allocations (Sunar, 1974: 112-121). In the 1980's the businessmen-politicians became government members with the help of a neo-liberalist wave from the Motherland Party with an expectation from them to provide an economic development. But something went wrong and they began to use every possibility within the state to rescue the companies of their relatives, to get benefit with land speculations, to provide easy access for their clients to the public funds (Arat, 1991: 168-170). Therefore, the power of central political body and its patronage relations have always been favoured by the business class.

But maybe the most interesting fact is the political positions of cultural oppositions, like the religious groups that complain about the attitudes of bureaucracy and *Kemalist* laicism. The political movement of "National Vision" lead by Necmettin Erbakan represented this side. It began to appear on the political sphere with its parties in 1970's. Their priorities in cultural affairs were very simplistic, like to evolve the bureaucracy into a position where they won't be the patron of the people, but their servant who respects their moral values (Sarıbay, 1985: 112). But their offers in economic affairs were a little bit complicated. They offered public facilities, guild, coordination, financing and control for the private sector to make investment for heavy industrialization (Sarıbay, 1985: 125). The logical result of such far-reaching political interference on economy was to enlarge bureaucracy and feed the image of the state as "father". While they were in government as a partner in 70's again, they showed it with their effective spoil system in bureaucracy (Çakır, 2002: 24) and continued the clientalistic relations as well. In 1990's it was observed that the National Vision began to get political authority in front of religious authority (Çakır, 1994: 56). The result of politicization of non-governmental religious groups was almost the same. Some groups became integrated with the state by the way of their members employed in bureaucracy (Çakır, 2002: 312). So the popular Islamic groups who had opposed secular modernization have easily fallen onto the gravitational field of the state tradition and have lost the chance to institutionalize a civic society.

They were some examples of Turkish social attitudes against the traditional authority relations. Approaches of the enormous actors who are outside of the bureaucracy to the patrimonial system seems not a rejection of it, but an approval with effort to become a part of it.

CONCLUSION

Changing the political perceptions in need of modernization may not be easy for a cultural system, especially if this system had been based on a historical "world-system" (in the meaning of the word as Wallerstein uses) in itself like Russia, Turkey, China, Japan etc. Of course, every political decision cannot be reduced into cultural continuities (for an objection on the cultural approach to the Soviets see Gray, 2007), but there is also no reason to assume a historical break with all the acquired ways in the lives of societies. Patrimonialism is one of these acquired reflexions for the old empires which have improved the modernist ideas and institutions not from their inner praxis, but by constraining the international competition. They have adopted their institutions to modern ones, but it doesn't mean that they have also changed their style of policy-making. As it is seen above, even in the Marxist period Russian political elites could still use the patrimonial way of governing and the people's perceptions tended to accept and continue with it. There are enough works regarding Russia with patrimonialism as stated above, but for the Turkish case we need to reconstruct such a political cultural interpretation. Here it is emphasized that the patrimonialism is not only a pressure of political elites on ordinary citizens, but based on a bilateral acceptance to continue such relations. As in the description of the legitimate authority, there is a common perception of the ruler and the ruled on that the way of governing must be like that.

So what we are talking about here are the kinds of perceptions and the patterns and their relation to how Russia and Turkey follow this model. Patrimonial legacy in modern state manifests itself in some ways: Popular belief that the right of political authority to rule are not based on any democratic approval, but on the historical resources from immemorial times. The area where the political authority legitimately dominates are immense, unlike its constitutionally restricted liberal counterparts. Therefore the legitimacy of any bureaucratic position of the state is assumed as derived from the top to the down; so any bureaucrat can't feel that he/she owes anything

to any popular will. In cooptation or in transaction with bureaucracy to work up with personal connections are preferred rather than the official procedures. In promotion the personal loyalty has priority to any merit. Interference to the economic affairs with political motivations by the political authority is assumed to be normal; so the essential principles of the free market economy are alienated to such political systems.

Here we can easily detect some similarities between Russia and Turkey in a frame of patrimonialism. In any time of trouble or complicated dualist situation the immanent central forces of the both countries take actions in order to strengthen the centralist body around a person of leader. After the interregnum at the end of the 16th century Russian political elites re-constructed the central authority around the Romanov dynasty; when it collapsed in the World War the Bolsheviks moved the system to a more centralist way with Leninism and Stalinism; when Yeltsin's "democracy" failed, Putin's authoritarian way prevailed. In Turkey throughout the imperial history the secular body of the empire used to gain strength against any popular decentralist movements. *Sened-i İttifak* in 1808 failed in a short term and with Mahmud II the center dominated the whole system again. The attitudes of *Tanzimat*, Abdülhamid II, and then Atatürk were almost the same. Any political oppositions to this central body comes from its own members as well, not for any decentralist or democratic project, but for strengthening the central apparatus more. Both countries' oligarchs and intellectuals from the imperial past to the modern regimes of 20th century follow the traditional way of rule. They contribute to the cult of personality, dominate and interfere with the economic, judicial, religious and moral affairs to avoid any possible autonomy which can be gained by any social class. Their constitutionalism aims to keep the state in unity rather than providing warranties to the individuals; so they assumed possessing rights to constrain the system several times from the top, just to keep it in their historically prerogative ways when any popular will appears to alternate it. Either central reflexions against representative movements in Tsardom and Soviet period or several *coup d'état*'s in Imperial and Republic periods of Turkey can be accounted as some samples of that. The reflexion of the central political elites against the periphery generally are expressed with the term of "deviation" (Orthodox term of *uklon* in Lenin's speeches), "reactionary" (*İrticaî* in several Turkish cases) or

"counterrevolutionism" all which means that the political demands from the periphery are out of the official truth. Those demands are assumed as harmful because, as in the principle of *hikmet-i hükûmet* in Turkish traditional politics, the mind of central secular political body has priority to any other minds of society on public affairs.

These are the legacies of the governing elites in those states from their patrimonial background, but there is also popular approval of such legacies in both countries and it gives the legitimacy to this kind of authority relations. As it is seen in the work of Inkeles and Bauer, Russian people approve the state's control over the heavy industrialization, important public services and private sectors and they consider the political system based upon the personality of the leader. The same can be said for Turkish people as well. Popular expectation from the political parties in Turkey is to facilitate the advancement of personal interests by providing them an easy access to the public resources (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001: 62). Most of the political participation and public cooptation affirms that. In both countries the state is considered as the main regulatory actor of every cell of the social body. So in the historical weakness of representative institutions and constitutional warranties this situation leads the people to work up with the public affairs in a very personal way. At this juncture a misinterpretation for Turkey can be restored here. Unlike some analysts claim like Küçükömer, there are no two distinct sides in Turkish political life which one is the centralist secular governing elites and the other one is the popular periphery against them whose discontent can lead the system into a more decentralist or democratic way. As stated above the opposition of the periphery against the classical regime in Turkey is not against its centralist-patrimonial tradition which covers whole social area, but their own exclusion from this political body. So the political perceptions of historical governing elites and of the popular side about a good administration are the same and this is a patrimonial state.

This approach to find out patrimonial continuities in modern states would be very useful to interpret the actual political problems of such political cultures, especially democratization processes. It provides a key for scholars to understand the traditional and modern contradictions in praxis of such societies and for policy-makers to build their projects on a more realistic way.

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Patrimonialism in Modernisation: A Comparative Essay to
Interpret Russian and Turkish Political Cultures

ÖZET

Modernitenin başlangıcı için kesin bir tarih verilemese de günümüzde akademisyenler modern olan ile geleneksel (modernite-öncesi) olan arasındaki farkı analitik düzeyde ortaya koyabilmektedirler. Bununla beraber modernleşme süreçlerine ilişkin olarak genellikle "Batılı olmayan" toplumlar için ortaya konulan ve geleneklerden keskin bir kopuş ile aşamalı biçimde "Batılı" modellere yaklaşılacağını öngören modernist anlatılar günümüzde fazlasıyla eleştiriye tabi tutulmuştur. Modernleşmenin içsel bir süreç olarak yaşandığı "Batılı" tabir edilen toplumlarda dahi tek bir örnekten bahsedilememektedir. Toplumların gelenekleri, coğrafyaları, uluslararası kapitalist rekabetteki konumları, iş gücünü ve üretimi yönlendirme alışkanlıkları, iç ve dış siyasal krizlerle başa çıkma yöntemleri, kısacası *habitus*ları modernleşme sürecine katılırken nasıl bir yol izleyeceklerini de belirlemektedir. Bu nedenle modern olduğu varsayılan toplumlarda, modern kurumların işleyişinde hâlen geleneksel ögelerin kendini göstermesi yadırganmamalıdır.

Tam da bu bağlamda, son yıllarda sosyal bilimlerde, Weber'in meşru politik otoritenin geleneksel biçimi olarak tanımladığı patrimonyalizme ilişkin ögelerin modern politik kurumların işleyişindeki görünümlerini tespit etmeye yönelik bir ilgi başlamıştır. Burada kastedilen, bağlamından koparılarak günümüz "batık-devlet" (*failed state*) tabir edilen ve politik açıdan devlet olmaktan çok mafya benzeri bir yapıyı andıran rejimler için kullanılan "neo-patrimonyalizm" kavramı değildir. Patrimonyalizm, Weber'in ona kazandırdığı anlamda, her biri döneminin kendi içinde dünya-sistemleri olan geleneksel imparatorlukların gelişmiş ve meşru politik üst-yapısını ifade etmektedir. Türkiye, Rusya, İran, Çin ve Japonya'nın modernleşmeye başlamadan önceki politik yapıları, patrimonyal imparatorluklara verilebilecek örneklerdir. Bunların politik modernleşmeleri, modern devleti sıfırdan kurmaya yönelik bir süreç olmamış, patrimonyal kurumlarını buna uyarlamalarıyla şekillenmiştir.

Patrimonyalizmin modernleşme süreçlerinde kendini gösteren belli başlı ögeleri şöyle özetlenebilir: Halk politik otorite konumundaki kişinin yönetsel haklarının kadim zamanlardan devralındığına ve en uygun yönetim biçiminin bu olması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Kişiye olan sadakat sistemin en önemli unsurlarından olduğundan idareye ilişkin işlerin resmî prosedürlerle değil, kişisel ilişkiler vasıtasıyla yürütülmesi yaygındır. İdarede yasal mevzuattan ziyade makam sahibi kişiye itaat esastır. Ülkenin idaresini sağlayabilmek adına atanan idarî görevliler, meşruiyetlerini yukarıdan alırlar, kendi idarî bölgelerinde bu meşruiyeti paylaşırlar. Modern serbest piyasa ekonomisi için kabul edilemez olan ve hesap edilebilirlik ile güvenli servet birikimi önünde bir engel olarak görülen ekonomiye politik amaçlarla müdahale yaygındır. Bütün bunlar Weber'in modern meşru otoriteye ilişkin

olarak tanımladığı yasal-ussal tipinkilere zıt özelliklerdir. Bununla beraber gerçek dünyada, özellikle bahsi geçen imparatorluk geçmişine sahip yapıların modernleşmesinde patrimonyalizm sürdürülmüştür. Bu bağlamda Rusya ve Türkiye iki örnek ülke olarak ele alınabilir.