



**T.C.
BURSA ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**QATAR-TURKEY RELATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GULF
TENSION**

(Master Thesis)

Malaz Abdelaziz Zakaria Hassan

BURSA 2022



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(Yüksek Lisans)

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KÖRFEZ KRİZİ BAĞLAMINDA KATAR-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ

Körfez krizi, Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi'nde yaşanan en kötü diplomatik krizlerden biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Yaşanan bu durum Katar ile abluka uygulayan ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilerin ekonomik, politik ve hatta sosyal olarak kesilmesine yol açtı. çünkü Katar çoğu malın gelişine güveniyordu. Katar Suudi Arabistan'dan kara sınırı boyunca gerçekleşen ithalat ihracat bağımlıdır. Katar'ı çevreleyen tehdit, Katar'ın güvenliğe ulaşmak için yerel ve uluslararası ittifaklara açık olmasına yol açtı.

Bu tez, Körfez krizi sırasında her iki ülkenin dış politika davranışının temel faktörleri ve belirleyicileri ışığında Katar Devleti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, tez, tehdit altında hisseden devletlerin dış politika davranışlarını açıklamada temel bir yaklaşım olarak "tehditlerin dengelenmesi teorisini" kullanır. Ayrıca Katar Devleti ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dış politikasını oluşturan belirli faktörleri inceleyecek ve iki şehrin ablukacı ülkelerle ilişkisine bakılacaktır.

Çalışma, Türkiye'ye karşı başarısız darbe girişimi, Türk lirası krizi ve Körfez krizi gibi her iki ülkenin yaşadığı krizlere ilişkin Katar ve Türkiye'nin pozisyonlarının analizini ana odak noktası olarak sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, kaçınılmaz veya potansiyel tehdidin ülkeler arasındaki ittifakların oluşumunda önemli bir unsur olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Körfez krizi sırasında Katar ve Türkiye'nin ittifakı, tehditlerin dengelenmesine ve diğer birçok ideolojik, kültürel, ekonomik ve askeri mülahazalara dayanan bir davranıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Katar dış politikası, Türkiye dış politikası, Tehditlerin dengelenmesi, 2017 Körfez diplomatik krizi

ABSTRACT

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QATAR-TURKEY RELATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GULF TENSION

The Gulf crisis is considered one of the worst diplomatic crises in the Gulf Cooperation Council. This situation led to the economic, political, and even social interruption of relations between Qatar and the blockading countries, because Qatar relied on the arrival of most goods. Imports across the land border from Saudi Arabia to Qatar are export-dependent. The threat surrounding Qatar has led Qatar to be open to local and international alliances to achieve security.

This thesis aims to explain the relationship between the State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey in light of the main factors and determinants of the foreign policy behavior of both countries during the Gulf crisis. Therefore, the thesis uses "threat balancing theory" as a basic approach to explaining the foreign policy behavior of states that feel threatened. In addition, certain factors that make up the foreign policy of the State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey will be examined and the relationship of the two cities with the blockade countries will be examined.

The study presents as the main focus the analysis of the positions of Qatar and Turkey regarding the crises experienced by both countries, such as the failed coup attempt against Turkey, the Turkish lira crisis, and the Gulf crisis. This study concludes that inevitable or potential threat is an important element in the formation of alliances between countries. The alliance of Qatar and Turkey during the Gulf crisis is a behavior based on balancing threats and many other ideological, cultural, economic, and military considerations.

Keywords: Qatar foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy, Balancing threats, 2017 Gulf diplomatic crisis

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CONTENTS

ÖZET.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
CONTENTS.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	2
2. HYPOTHESES.....	2
3. METHODOLOGY.....	3
4. CHAPTER'S BREAKDOWN.....	3

CHAPTER I

1. NEO-REALISM.....	5
2. ANARCHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.....	9
3. BALANCING.....	14
4. BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY.....	18
5. BANDWAGON.....	23
6. WHEN DO STATES BALANCE? WHEN DO THEY BANDWAGON.....	24
7. THE SOFT POWER OF SMALL STATE.....	29
7.1 DIPLOMACY.....	31
7.2 MEDIATION.....	32
8. BALANCING THREATS THAT DETERMINE STATE BEHAVIOR.....	33
8.1 QATAR'S BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO THE THREAT OF BALANCE THEORY.....	34
8.2 TURKEY'S BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO THE THREAT BALANCE THEORY.....	35
9. THEORY SELECTION.....	37

CHAPTER 2

THE GULF CRISIS, BACKGROUND, AND REPERCUSSIONS

1. QATAR'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY STRUCTURE.....	38
1.1. QATAR'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE.....	38
1.2. QATAR'S MILITARY STRUCTURE.....	41
1.3. THE BRITISH ROLE IN QATAR.....	44

1.4 HISTORY OF THE TURKISH PRESENCE IN QATAR	46
1.5 QATAR- US MILITARY RELATIONS	49
2. QATAR FOREIGN POLICY	51
3. QATAR-GULF RELATIONS	55
3.1 QATAR-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS	56
3.2 QATAR-BAHRAIN RELATIONS.....	57
3.3 QATAR-UAE RELATIONS.....	58
4. GULF CRISIS	58
4.1. RIYADH DOCUMENT.....	58
4.2 AMBASSADORS WITHDRAWAL CRISES	59
4.3 THE DEMANDS	60
4.4. DISCUSSING THE DEMANDS.....	62
5. REPERCUSSIONS OF CRISES ON QATAR	64
6. THE QATARI BLOCKADE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW	68
7. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE QATARI BLOCKADE	72
7.1 TURKISH RESPONSE	72
7.2 USA RESPONSE	74
7.3 IRANIAN RESPONSE.....	75
7.4 RUSSIAN RESPONSE	77
7.5 EUROPE RESPONSE	79
8. THE QATARI BLOCKADE AND THE GULF ECONOMY	79
8.1. THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE ON THE QATARI ECONOMY	79
8.2 THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE ON THE ECONOMIES OF THE BLOCKADING COUNTRIES.....	84
9. THE TURKISH ROLE IN THE CRISES	87
10. RECONCILIATION.....	93
CHAPTER 3	
1. REASONS FOR TURKEY’S SUPPORT TO QATAR DURING THE CRISIS.....	96
1.1. REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS	97
1.2. CONJUNCTURAL FACTORS	100

1.3. ECONOMIC FACTORS	111
2. IMPACT OF TURKEY’S SUPPORT.....	116
2.1. POLITICAL IMPACT	118
2.2. ECONOMIC IMPACT	119
2.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.....	127
3. REACTIONS OF THE THIRD COUNTRIES TO TURKISH SUPPORT.....	128
3.1. GULF COUNTRIES’ REACTIONS.....	129
3.2. EXTERNAL ACTOR’S REACTIONS	132
4. CONSEQUENCES OF TURKEY’S SUPPORT TO QATAR.....	133
4.1 ECONOMIC ASPECT.....	133
4.2 POLITICAL ASPECT.....	134
4.3 SOCIAL ASPECT.....	135
5. CHALLENGES FOR TURKEY AND QATAR DURING THE CRISIS	136
5.1. CHALLENGES FOR TURKEY	137
5.2. CHALLENGES FOR QATAR	137
6. TURKEY-QATAR RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL RECONCILIATION.....	138
6.1. OPPORTUNITIES.....	140
6.2. RISKS.....	141
6.3. REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROSPECTS.....	143
6.3.1.REGIONAL (GULF) DYNAMICS.....	143
6.3.2. GLOBAL DYNAMICS.....	146
CONCLUSION.....	148
BIBLIOGRAPHY	154

INTRODUCTION

The global and regional political developments in The Middle East constituted the process of changing the balance of power especially the traditional model in the area such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt alters it with a new emersion such as Qatar. Recently, Qatar has become a strong country in The Middle East with influence worldwide. This appearance of the State of Qatar led to a great dispute between it and the Gulf States. The blockade on the State of Qatar has led to the strengthening or emergence of new relations with Qatar, for example, Turkey, Iran, and others.

The realist school believes that conflicts existed in the world since ancient times, to maintain security and survival. Therefore, the disagreements between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the past mainly focused on the geopolitics conflict. Saudi Arabia demanded to include Qatar in its Al-Ahsa region.¹ As for Bahrain, had a dispute with Qatar over the ownership of islands and wells such as (Hawar Islands and Fast al-Dibal) in the 1990s.

The withdrawal of the ambassadors in 2014 is considered an earlier Gulf crisis, the three countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, asked their ambassadors to leave Doha, which continued for 9 months. This came due to a difference of opinions on several issues, such as the coup in Egypt. Add to, in 2017 Saudi Arabia, UEA, Bahrain, and Egypt have cut relations with Qatar air, sea, and land blocked. The four countries claim that Qatar is supporting terrorism plus having good relations with Iran and meddling in their internal affairs.

This study aims to examine Qatar- Turkey relations in the context of Gulf tension. To clarify relations between both, it is necessary to explain it through several theories such as soft power, anarchy system theory but the most important theory is the balance of power. From the point of view that Qatar is a small state the balance of threat theory will be the closest theory for explaining Qatar's behavior. The balance of threat theory is also explained Turkey's behavior.

¹ Al-Harastani, Mahmoud: Citizen of the Islamic Peoples in Asia - Part 14: Bahrain (Al-Ahsa, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar), the Arabian Peninsula for Publishing (2009). <https://www.noor-book.com>

1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study seeks to answer several questions to analyze Qatari-Turkish relations before, during, and after the siege, in the context of the balance of threats. The blockade affects Qatar State in the political, economic, and social aspects, and consider its effects on Qatar and its allied countries. Therefore, this study contains the main question and four sub-questions.

- What is the shape of Qatar-Turkish relations in the context of the Gulf crisis?
- What are Qatar and Turkey's convergent policies' impacts on some issues such as the Arab Spring on the relationship between them?
- How did Qatar withstand the blockade in the context of a small country?
- Is Qatar's rapprochement with Turkey has been increasing tension between the Gulf States and Qatar?
- What is the form of the relationship between Qatar and turkey after the end of tension?

2. HYPOTHESES

This study debates that the theory of balance of threats is the main determinant in the relationship between Qatar and Turkey. Accordingly, it proposes several hypotheses, the most important of which are:

- Regional political dynamics, inoperative the balance of power in the region such as the Arab Spring, the Syrian war, and the Gulf Crisis, have brought Turkey and Qatar closer and led to the development of significant political and economic relations.
- Qatar and Turkey pursued military cooperation to support issues of mutual concern such as terrorism and instability in the region.
- Turkey has exerted great efforts to frustrate the blockade targeting Qatar.

- Balance of threat is the realistic and rational theory of the Qatar-Turkey relationship.

3. METHODOLOGY

The comparative and case study methods are common in international relations studies. The case study method, which considers a part of the qualitative method, has a significant impact on the analysis of this study. The case generally is defined as a phenomenon. Starman defines case studies as explanations of individuals, groups, or phenomena.² The term case study refers to studies based on the assumption of neo-positivism, so the case study attempts to obtain a causal explanation of the cases under study.³ To sum, a case study is the most proper method to be used in this study.

4. CHAPTER'S BREAKDOWN

This research will examine the Qatar-Turkish relationship in the context of the Gulf crisis through the perspective of the threat balancing theory as the main theory. Framework, the analysis will be conducted in three chapters;

The first chapter will discuss the theoretical framework of the theory of balancing the threat as behavior that the two states take as driving behavior, neo-realism, the anarchy of the international system, the soft power of the small state, diplomacy, mediation, balance, and bandwagon.

The second chapter will study the Gulf crisis, its dimensions, and its impact on Qatar and discuss the Turkish role in the crisis.

The third chapter will examine the consequences of Turkey-Qatar relations and prospects, in the form of six main points, first, reasons for Turkey's support to Qatar during the Crisis. second, is the impact of Turkey's support. third, the reactions of the third countries to Turkish support. fourth, the consequences of Turkey's support to Qatar. fifth, the

² Starman, Adrijana (2013). The case study as a type of qualitative research, JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL STUDIES <file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/casestudy.pdf>

³ Bartlett, Lesley, Vavrus, Frances, Rethinking Case Study Research. University of Wisconsin - Madison (2017) file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Rethinking_Case_Study_Research.pdf

challenges for Turkey and Qatar during the crisis. Sixth, the Turkey-Qatar relations in the context of regional reconciliation. The relationship between the two countries will be analyzed based on the theory of balancing the threat. To determine whether the actual behavior of the two states is explained by this theory.

CHAPTER I

THE FRAMEWORK

This study applies several theories to analyze Qatar- Turkish relations in the context of tension such as neo-realism, Anarchy of the international system, balancing, the balance of threat theory, soft power for the small state and related it with mediation and diplomacy.

1. NEO-REALISM

The neo-realist theory is one of the most important theories of international relations that explain the state's foreign policy and focus on the concept of security and power. Power is a major issue in realism and neorealism theory. The intellectual variables and models of the science of international relations led to the emergence of neorealism. Accordingly, the policy of detente that the United States pursued towards China and the Soviet Union in the early eighties of the twentieth century led to the emergence of structural theoretical ideas of realism that depended on systems theory with its multiple concepts based on the idea of interaction between units of elements, structures, and systems⁴.

Neorealism states that the nature of the international structure is determined by its ordering principle, which is anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system). The anarchy ordering principle of the international hierarchy is decentralization, which means that there is no formal central authority and all independent states are formally equal in this system. These states operate according to the logic of selfishness, which means that states are looking for their interest and will not make this interest subordinate to the interests of other states.

Countries are considered similar in terms of needs rather than their ability to achieve them. The situation of countries in terms of their capabilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities limits cooperation between countries due to concerns about the relative gains achieved by other countries, and the possibility of dependence on other countries.

According to democratic peace theory, the spread of democracy helps mitigate the effects of anarchy, with sufficient democracy in the world. Bruce Russett believes that "it is

⁴ Baldwin, David: NEOLIBERALISM, NEOREALISM, AND WORLD POLITICS. [Neoliberalism.pdf](#)

partly possible to replace the realist principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated their practice since at least the seventeenth century.⁵

Waltz Kenneth has systematically renewed realism and removed it from its intellectual fallacies of the concept of power by presenting the method of the chaotic structure of the international system based on the mechanism" of interaction between its parties for peaceful coexistence and democratic peace.⁶

Buzan Barry believes that neo-realism means new constructive thinking that expresses the peculiarities of the scene during the Cold War phase and is consistent with the nature of the American-Soviet conflict, as it adopts special conceptual tools such as "power and rationality" structural and hypotheses.⁷

New realism portrays itself as an attempt to organize the ideas of classical realism to make them into a coherent and strong theoretical framework, which is confirmed by Nye Joseph in his saying: "The outstanding work of Waltz is not in creating a new theory, but in organizing and structuring realism."⁸

Waltz focused on explaining the concept of power towards focusing on capabilities. He believes that capabilities can be classified according to the extent of the state's strength and entrenchment in the following fields: population size and area, availability of resources and economic energy, military strength, political stability, and efficiency.⁹

Therefore, according to 'Waltz Kenneth', power in its broad concept is related to the idea of the state's ability to create a position of influence and control in a field that is not necessarily conflictual. This is what Waltz confirms in his book "The Theory of International Politics" on the necessity of power in the world of politics between states.¹⁰

⁵ Bruce, Russett, Layne, Christopher, Spiro, David, Doyle, Michael. The Democratic Peace. Volume 19, Number 4, Spring 1995. 1531-4804 published by Harvard college

⁶ Waltz, Kenneth (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War, Vol. 25, No. 1, p26, The MIT Press <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772>

⁷ Buzan, Barry: The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism », <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/buzan/auth.html>

⁸ Nye, Joseph: Soft power, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC, No. 80, p181 (1990), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580>

⁹ Pels, John, Smith, Stephen: The Globalization of World Politics, aforementioned reference, p. 241.2017

¹⁰ Martin Griffiths, A reinterpretation: Realism, Idealism, and International Politics, p77.

Waltz believed that peace and stability were underpinned by nuclear weapons and the gradual maturation of great powers that had become increasingly hampered in interrelationships.

According to Waltz, states armed with nuclear weapons have to avoid war, unlike armed states in a traditional way. Both the United States of America and the Soviet Union became more experienced, as in the years 1940 - 1950, each of them found it difficult and difficult to live with each other more than exchange Experiences and access to ideological areas where they sometimes made peace more or less at the international and global level.¹¹

Waltz also believes that the factors promoting stability are first "bipolarity", "global power", and secondly "nuclear weapons." He argues that both factors are important although he believes that nuclear weapons reinforce the constraints of bipolarity.¹²

Based on the theoretical construction of neo-realism and the basic assumptions it presented regarding international politics, it can be stated that its security perspective is based mainly on the chaotic state of the international system, which is synonymous with the state of war and is the central postulate of structural realism, especially if we consider that violence remains an inherent dimension in global politics. From here, the security perception of neo-realism was formed, which was based on two postulates:

1 - Increasing degrees of security conflict, even in a non-war situation, which makes the possibility of wars always expected.

2 - The inadequacy and decline of cooperative frameworks, in contrast to the continuous tendency to power on the part of states. From these two elements, the realistic approach to security studies was established in its new form, which adopted the structural interpretation pattern based on focusing on the structure of the international system in the analysis of existing security policies, by researching the conditions and systemic data in the light of which the security dilemma is formed.¹³

Through these premises, structural realism is based on a set of basic assumptions that raise the desire of states to act aggressively towards each other, namely:

¹¹ Waltz, Kenneth: Neorealism, and Foreign Policy, 11:3, 160-165, DOI: 10.1080/714005344

¹² Martin Griffiths; op, city, p125. 2002

¹³ Waltz, Kenneth, Smith, Adam: The Limits of Science: Hard choices for neoclassical realism, 50, pages180–182(2013)

1- Political systems take two basic forms, hierarchical or chaotic.

Anarchical, and international systems always take the latter form. The neo-realists do not mean by that to say that it is necessarily confusing, but rather that chaos means that there is no central authority capable of controlling the behavior of the state.

2 - The mistrust that leads to a loss of confidence is inherent in the international system. States cannot be sure of the intentions of their neighbors, and therefore they must always be vigilant.

3 - States desire to preserve their sovereignty and independence, and as a result, the desire to survive remains the main driving force that influences their behavior.

4 - Despite the rationality of the state, there is always room for error in estimation. In a world that suffers from a lack of information, one of the potential opponents resorts to misleading about his capabilities, leaving his other opponents to prey to speculation about his capabilities, which leads to an error in estimating the true interests of the state.¹⁴

5- Countries want to increase their security above all else. They consider other factors only when ensuring security.

The assumptions that "the state is the most important actor", "rationality" and "the pursuit of power" alone do not provide us with a comprehensive explanation about many international affairs, such as the conditions of the security dilemma, balance, the effect of polarization, determining the balance of defense and attack, and others. To fill this explanatory gap, Kenneth Waltz offers a solid alternative to realism, arguing that the pursuit of power alone is insufficient to explain the most important feature of international politics as the security dilemma, and to overcome this theoretical shortcoming he proposed two new hypotheses: anarchism, and survival.¹⁵

The intellectual interests of the neo-realist thinkers are based on the concepts of structure, chaos, self-help, survival, and the balance of power, an important part of the intellectual concerns of the neo-realist thinkers. It occupies great importance in studying the behavior of the units of the international system that take certain forms according to the

¹⁴ Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, Owens, Patricia The Globalization of World Politics 8e Instructor Resources,) Oxford University Press, p417, (2017)

¹⁵ Waltz, Kenneth: Structural Realism after the Cold War, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2002)
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

dictates of the international structure on the various actors, in light of a chaotic system that requires states to submit to the principle of self-help, and security becomes the supreme goal.

2. ANARCHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The term chaos in international relations is used to describe the international system when political behavior and political phenomena such as wars, discourse, political instability, and political problems are prevalent in that system.¹⁶

The organizing principle of the international system takes the form of anarchism. Chaos is the absence of an international authority, and this situation “not only allows wars to occur but also makes it very difficult for countries to reach their goals, as long as there are no institutions or a supreme body that can impose and enact international laws.”¹⁷

Hedley Paul says: “The feature of chaos, and not of an order, is the prominent feature of international politics. Talking about the order in international relations is nothing but a utopian, ideal, and future desire that is not realized now and has never existed.”¹⁸

Threats to the concept of security in the structural realist theory:

Barry Buzan believes that security at the level of the nation-state seeks freedom from threats, while at the international level, it is related to the ability of states and societies to preserve their independent identity and practical coherence.¹⁹

In addition, threats of a military nature, such as threats of “attack and invasion” by one state against another, are always presented as a primary concern for governments, but at the same time, it is important to ensure that national security can be supported in other sectors such as economic, political, and environmental planning.²⁰

For this, Barry Buzan put forward a model that differs in characteristics for the field of security threats, which consists of five dimensions. In addition to the military dimension, a political, economic, environmental, and societal dimension.²¹

¹⁶ Iman Ahmed Ragab, Concepts of Analyzing the Collapse of Political Systems, International Politicians Journal, Cairo, Theoretical Attitudes Supplement, April 2011 No. 184 p.13

¹⁷ -Robert Jervis: cooperation under the security dilemma, world politics, vol30, n°2, (Janvier 1978) p167

¹⁸ Heddy Bull: the anarchical society; a study of order in world politics, London, macmillan,1977, p12.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan: people, states, and fear; the national security problem in international relations, Brighton, Harvester wheatsheaf, 1990, pp 142-212.

²⁰ Wolfram Lecher; Actually, Existing Security; the political Economy of the Saharan threat, security dialogue 2008, p 378.

²¹ Ibid, p389.

1 - Political security: focused on the organizational stability of states and is based on the legitimacy of the regime and its ideology.

2 - Economic security: through regular access to market and financial resources to withstand acceptable levels of luxury and official power.

3- Environmental Security: It is concerned with maintaining the local and international biospheres as the necessary support system for all other humanitarian projects.²²

4- Societal security: defined by continuity within acceptable conditions of development, traditional methods, language, culture, and national and religious practices.²³

Thus, the state no longer represents the only reference for security studies, nor the main source of threat, as the reference may be taken from the community, group, or institution, but the goal of this expansion is to permanently maintain the state and maintain its stability in light of a world that always remains chaotic, and in the conflicting interests of states continued to lead to the continuation of the state of the security impasse. Power is no longer confined to its military dimension but has become the basis of its goal, and thus it has become linking the military and political forces, as there is no diplomatic/strategic force without wealth.²⁴

Therefore, it sought neo-realism based on a comprehensive vision and based on a realistic proposal that considers the political and economic interactions and influences in determining security, so that security can be achieved by a large variety of means²⁵.

There is no doubt that the assumption of the current of the neo-realists has been overtaken by the anarchic domain “a political structure on the structure of the international system - as the system within it is not imposed by a higher authority - lead them to the recognition that the behavioral rules or working rules that constitute the behavior of international units stem mainly from the interactions that take place between international actors of equal strength and the problematic of the structure of the system.”²⁶

²² - Buzan, Barry, Hasan, Line: the evolution of international security studies, New York; Madrid, Cambridge university press, 2009; www. Cambridge. 9780521872614.

²³ Al, Marie: Societal security, International Relations of Paris, p 452(2003)

²⁴ - Touraine, Marisol: The upheaval of the world: the geopolitics of the 21st century, Paris, p323. (1995).

²⁵ Baldwin, David: The concepts of security (Review of international studies), No.23, 1997, pp 25-26.

²⁶ Donnelly, Jack; Realism in: Burchill, Scott (ed.); Theories of International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition, 2005).

In this regard, Waltz points out that the balance of power is the rules of the game that decision-makers must consider, as it rises to the level of a governing standard for interactions between states within the international system or a tool capable of reducing the motivation to fight wars or decisive conflicts.²⁷

One of the most important ideas that the structuralists came up with is their recognition that international chaos, and the rules of action that the structural nature entails - which is a constraint on the behavior of states - impose on international actor's "states". Three things which are: -²⁸

1- Achieving the goal of survival: it is a major goal and precedes all the goals of the state in the international field, despite their plurality.

2- Help-Self: This is a necessity for all countries to remain on the international scene and an urgent necessity to enable the state to occupy an international position or position that would secure it from the oppression of other countries.²⁹

3- Adopting a "Balancing" policy: it may be internal or external.³⁰

Hence, the proponents of this trend have two phenomena that constitute the effect of structural realism, namely the sameness effect and the balancing politics.

Many realist thinkers believe that, in a chaotic environment, the state - to rely on itself - seeks to increase its relative strength in the face of its opponents to maintain its security. The threat posed by the increase in the power of the former, and if this occurs, the state's fears increase, which pushes it once again to double its power; Which raises the concerns of its opponents. Which also prompts her to simulate the former to double her power, and so on. Hence, it can be said that the state of mutual fear between states and their opponents pushes each one of them to try to double their strength against each other. This leads to a

²⁷ Onuf, Nicholas: Realism and world politics Routledge, New York, First published. (2011).

²⁸ Zhimin, Chen; soft balancing and reciprocal engagement: International structures and China's foreign policy choices, in: Zweig, David and Zhimin, Chen; China's Reforms and International Political Economy (Routledge, Abingdon, 2007).

²⁹ Donnelly, Jack Realism, Theories of International Relations Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition. (2005).

³⁰ Zhimin, Chen (2007). Soft balancing and reciprocal engagement: International structures and China's foreign policy choices, in: Zweig, David and Zhimin, Chen; China's Reforms and International Political Economy (Routledge, Abingdon).

growing sense that states threaten their national security, which would give rise to what was known - in realist thought - the security dilemma.³¹ To identify the security dilemma, the concept of security must be defined in the field of international relations.

The concept of security is one of the concepts that have witnessed conflicting definitions in the field of international relations, as in a chaotic environment and the absence of a supreme authority capable of achieving global security, the dominant forces in the system set limits that correspond to their national interests. Given the correlation of the concept of security in a chaotic environment with force, security in that environment expresses that state in which states feel the minimum levels of fear for their survival, and at the same time possess the capabilities that enable them to ward off the state of fear stemming from their sense of threat.³²

Bellamy links security and war, for security, is for the state to distance itself from engaging in war and its dire consequences.³³ Mroz thinks of it as the state in which the country lives in a relative expanse of extremely dangerous threats. McMillan explains that the concept of security is closely related to the psychological directives of decision-makers.³⁴

security dilemma arises for the structuralists as a result of some countries feeling fear of the intentions of some other countries to use their national capabilities to threaten their national security, which leads this group of countries to race to increase their armament systems or increase their power to excel over others in possessing factors Power. This competition is increasing power and fear of the intentions of some countries to use their power to threaten the security of other countries and countering that with reactions by other countries creates the so-called security dilemma.³⁵

³¹ Layne, Christopher (1993). "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise" in: *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4.

³² Mushtaq, Sadia: "Analysis and Interpretation of Security Perception: Themes and Models" in *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, Vol. 31, No. 2. P31-32 (2011)

³³ Bellamy, Alex: *Security and the War on Terror*, Taylor & Francis group publication, November 2007, ISBN: 9780203028094

³⁴ Mushtaq, Sadia: "Analysis and Interpretation of Security Perception: Themes and Models" in *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, Vol. 31, No. 2. (2011)

³⁵ Mushtaq, Sadia: "Analysis and Interpretation of Security Perception: Themes and Models" in: *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, Vol. 31, No. 2. (2011)

This dilemma is due to the complex relationship between the capabilities of states and their intentions: “A misunderstanding or misperception of states’ intentions - even peaceful states seeking to increase their power solely to defend or defend themselves - may increase feelings of insecurity.”; Given the perception of many countries that building a state, which they considered patriotism to defend itself, is as if it were a kind of strike of possible aggressive behavior since it is not conceivable for realists that states or a group of states interact - under the umbrella of a system dominated by the values of self-reliance, and the leaders of A pessimistic nationalist bearing the responsibility to preserve the survival of their countries before their peoples - without any international intentions or behaviors that carry aggressive signs with it.³⁶

John Mearsheimer points out that in the chaotic environment as a result of the absence of a central power, in light of the great powers’ possession of military capabilities, and light of the constant questioning of each other’s intentions, and in light of the belief of countries that survival is their main goal,³⁷ and in the context of rational international units, the endeavor of one state to increase its strength to protect its security will push other states to increase their strength as well; Which would lead to the emergence of the security dilemma³⁸

Waltz believes that the persistence of countries in their competition to increase their power may plunge them into many international wars. At other times, this may cause the system's stability through the mechanism of the work of the balance of power.³⁹

Waltz also explains that the state of insecurity that a chaotic environment imposes on states may give some opportunities to achieve their interests and at the same time it may impose restrictions on others that hinder the achievement of their goals. Incurred by some other countries, the situation here is similar to the market situation in which some may win and others lose over the same sale.⁴⁰

³⁶ Chris Brown: *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition. 2005

³⁷ Tickner, Arlene (2013). Core, periphery and (neo)imperialist International Relations, *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3) 627–646

³⁸ Kienle, Eberhard, Louër, Laurence (2013). *Understanding the Social and Economic Aspects of the Arab Uprisings*, Volume 61, Issue 4, pages 11 to 17

³⁹ Weber, Cynthia; *International Relations Theory: A critical introduction* (Routledge, London and New York, Fourth Edition, 2014).

⁴⁰ Gourevitch, Peter; "The Second Image: The international Source of domestic politics" in: *International Organization* (Vol.32, No.4, 1978)

3. BALANCING

The balance of power arises when a country can gain a huge superiority in its forces, which threatens the freedom and independence of other countries. This is what drives countries with limited power, to confront power by force by allying with coalitions and counter forces. This is one of the ways to create an international balance, and not the only way. Balance is not a policy in itself that states seek to achieve and reach. The state does not seek balance, but rather seeks to excel and increase its strength and dominance. This leads to the emergence of a balance of power.

Randall Schuyler and Jack Levy agree that the concept of “Balancing” is an obscure concept whose definition is not agreed upon. Despite this, many studies that have dealt with this concept, agree that it expresses the weaker state’s quest for balancing – especially in the military aspects. - The existing threat represented the danger of the strong overrun or invasion of the weaker.⁴¹

Balancing is generally defined as a strategy to counter the threat state. Balancing strategies are classified into two types: “external balancing,” and “internal balancing. External balancing is defined as an alliance with others to confront the state that is the source of the threat, while internal balancing means building and mobilizing state resources to confront the state that is the source of the threat.⁴²

For Waltz, the structure system with self-reliance, international anarchy, and security maximizing states drive states to adopt strategy balancing: the weaker states ally themselves with others to counteract the hegemony of the stronger in the system. Waltz believes that the balances of power recurrently form, a phenomenon that rises to the level of law.⁴³

To implement this strategy, Waltz requires a chaotic system, which should consist of rational units that seek to maintain their survival. It is worth noting that both structural realists

⁴¹ Layne, Christopher: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-25

⁴² ÇAĞLAR, Turan: ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL BUILDER'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS APPROACH 1998- TURKEY-SYRIA RELATIONS BETWEEN 2011 AND AFTER 2011, AYDIN FACULTY OF ECONOMICS JOURNAL VOLUME 2 ISSUE.1, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/390245>

⁴³ Paul, T. V.; Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance in; Paul, T. V. and Others; *Balance of power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2004)

led by Waltz agree with traditional realists led by Morgenthau on the possibility of great states using balancing policies to counter the military capabilities of emerging powers, but proponents of the two differ on the position of “second-order international powers” on emerging powers, as Some (Waltz, Morgenthau, and others) assert that the policy of the first towards the second is positional, while others assert that the chaotic nature of the international structure pushes the weaker states - the powers of the second degree - to ally with the great powers to balance the threats of the emerging powers.⁴⁴

offensive-minded neo-realists argue that power maximization for a great power is inevitable, as Mearsheimer discussed in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* in 2014, the reasons for the great powers to seek hegemony, and discussing its balanced behavior against the emerging great powers by analyzing its economic power its population, military power and so on. Compared to how this may lead to conflict. All great powers seeking hegemony will clash with each other to reach the top.⁴⁵

In the balance of threat theory, waltz (1987) debated that the threat approach sets balancing behavior. This theory depends on the relation between the amount of grounded power, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity, understanding the threats as a determination of strategic behavior of the state. (Walt 1987; 1996). The concept of threat is connected with the definition of indentations. Indentations refer to the process made in particular circumstances.⁴⁶

Each country's relative willingness and ability to maximize relative power constrain one another, causing a "balance of power" that gives international relations their shape.

The concept of the security dilemma is related to the major countries; It mainly results from the struggle of states over increasing their power, while the insecurity dilemma is related to third world countries or weak states: it means those strategies adopted by weak states or

⁴⁴ Robert S. Ross; “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia” in: *Security Studies* (Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall. 2006).

⁴⁵ Steinsson, Sverrir: *John Mearsheimer’s Theory of Offensive Realism and the Rise of China*, *E-International Relations* ISSN 2053-8626, MAR 6 2014

⁴⁶ Jervis, Robert: *War and Misperception*, *the Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988: P 680

their regimes to adopt or adapt to the conditions or pressures that they face from the international environment.⁴⁷

The foundations of the balance of interests.: the concept of the national interest:

The national interest is the needs and desires that a sovereign state realizes and its relationship to other sovereign states that constitute the external sphere of this state. The National Interest Table depicts the essence of the general intellectual framework for defining the national interest. The table includes four basic national interests and four levels to the degree of importance of each interest. The first term is “national interest.” This definition contains the following main elements:

- * The importance of the element of awareness of the needs of the state.
- * There is a boundary between the external sphere and the internal sphere of states.

The government, which deals with its internal sphere, is usually described as working in the public interest. While the government, which deals with its external sphere, is described as working in the field of the national interest.

Types of national interests:

1. Defense Interest: the defense of a state (group of states) and its citizens from any threat of physical violence by another state or group of states, and protection from any potential external threat, direct or indirect, against the national political system.

2. Economic Interest: The maximization of the economic welfare of a country or group of countries about other countries.

3. World-Order Interest: the maintenance of an international political and economic order in which the country can feel secure, and its commercial activity can extend freely outside the geographical scope of the country.

4. Ideological Interest: the protection and consolidation of a set of values shared by citizens, the state, or a group of states, and the belief in their validity throughout the world.

The relationships between these four basic interests can be summarized in the fact that these four interests do not replace one with the other, and the decision-makers must accept the balancing of these interests to achieve the national interest. For example:

⁴⁷ Mushtaq, Sadia; "Analysis and Interpretation of Security Perception: Themes and Models" in Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) (Vol. 31, No. 2, December 2011).

sometimes the economic interests of the state may be sacrificed in favor of the interest of the international system, which includes another state whose friendship and cooperation the state needs for the sake of stability is an important part of the world.⁴⁸ A clear example of this is the Japanese exports of cars and televisions to the United States of America. The state's ideology constitutes an important part of its national interest, which may not be as strong as the other three interests, but it is generally considered important in determining the government's response to international issues. The four basic national interests are dynamic elements that determine the behavior of states, and changes in the degree of their precedence Between them, it is often measured in years. Determining the basic national interests, which exist in external crises, is the first step in defining a country's foreign policy. The next step is to properly analyze the degree of importance of these interests, or national gains, that the political leaders of a country believe exist.⁴⁹ The state may have great interest in the possibility of a change of the political system by force in another friendly state, but the degree of importance of this interest will depend on several factors, including the distance of the friendly state from the borders of this state, the formation of new government trends, investments and trade with it, and historical relations Between them (eg the communist coup in Sudan, during the seventies, and Egypt's support for the legitimate government). Therefore, the foundations upon which the determination of the issues of the degree of importance of interest is based are:

1. Survival: The basic existence of the state becomes in immediate danger for the following reasons:

a. Either as a result of an open military attack on its territory.

B. or as a result of the threat of an imminent attack, if the state rejects the demands of its enemy.

The true measure of the degree of interest is the immediate threat of comprehensive physical harm, by one country, and against another. Thus, the defensive interest is the only

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/article-subervie-final.pdf>

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/article-subervie-final.pdf>

interest, which may advance in the degree of its importance. This becomes even clearer if it includes the possibility of the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The superpowers believe that the importance of the issue reaches the level of survival, which justifies the actual use of strategic nuclear weapons against the enemy.

4. BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY

Stephen Walt challenged Kenneth Waltz's assumption in his book "The Origin of Alliances", revised the traditional balance of power theory, and introduced the "balance of threat" theory to explain the formation of alliances. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally themselves with or against a foreign power that poses the greatest threat.⁵⁰ According to this opinion, he considers that the behavior of forming alliances is a response to threats and appears from calculations of total strength, and in his studies of the formation of alliances in the Middle East, Walt considers that the origins of alliances in the region go back to: First: External threats are the most common cause of international alliances. Second: - Balancing is much more common than bandwagon. Third: States do not only seek to achieve a balance against force, the balance may be against threats.⁵¹ Although the great powers choose alliance partners in the first place to balance against each other, regional powers largely differ from the global balance of power. Rather, countries in the Middle East often formed alliances in response to threats from other regional parties. Fourth, offensive capabilities and intentions increase the likelihood that others will join forces in the opposition.

Balancing and bandwagon are more accurate and clearer in response to threats, so the threat balancing. It suggests four sources of threat to consider for a better understanding of the balance:

1- Aggressive power: the assumption here is that the greater the total resources of a state (for example, military capacity, population, social solidarity, industrial and technological development, etc.), the greater the potential threat it can pose to others.

⁵⁰ Walt, Stephen: *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell university press, London. p.21(2016).

⁵¹ Stern, Robert. *British and American Productivity and Comparative Costs in International Trade*, New Series, (Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 275-296 1962). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2661740>

However, states with great power can punish enemies or reward friends. So, it may provide overall strength for balancing or bandwagon.⁵²

2- Geographical proximity: The assumption here is that forces that are close pose a greater threat than forces that are far away (if all other factors are equal). Proximity threats can also cause other nations to either adopt a balanced response or hesitant behavior, especially when the proximity threat demonstrates its ability to compel obedience.

3- Offensive power: countries with large offensive capabilities are more likely to pose a greater threat that relies on defensive capabilities (if all other factors are equal). Most likely, offensive power counterbalances the response to counter it, however, in some cases, collective action becomes the only way when other nations are too vulnerable to hope for resistance.

4- Aggressive Intentions: All other things being equal, perceptions of intentions are likely to play a major role in choosing an alliance. Countries perceived as aggressive are more likely to provoke others to balance them out. However, when a country is believed to be aggressive and immutable, other nations may prefer to use bandwagon as a precaution (Finnish syndrome).

The four sources of threat mentioned above do not answer the important question: When do countries tend to balance? And under what circumstances do they prefer bandwagon? The Threat Balance Approach presents three criteria in this regard.

First, strength and weakness: the stronger the state, the more it tends to balance rather than a bandwagon, and vice versa. However, the balance of weak states can be expected when they are threatened by states of roughly equal capabilities, but tend to bandwagon when they are threatened by a great power.

Second, is the availability of allies: When nations are threatened by a superpower, they will choose bandwagon if they fail to find potential allies who share the same interests.

Third: Peace and War: Countries tend mostly to achieve bandwagon in peacetime or the early stages of the war, as they seek to deter threatening forces. But when the outcome of the war emerges, some nations tend to move with the victorious side.

⁵² Walt, Stephen (2016). The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, <https://archive.org/details/TheOriginsOfAlliances/page/n17/mode/2up>

To achieve balance or bandwagon, it is suggested to add to the above three elements. First, the structure of the global system: the distribution of power among the various international actors influences states' decisions to achieve equilibrium or bandwagon. In a bipolar or multipolar world order, states are more likely to balance when trying to take advantage of great-power competition. Whereas in the unipolar world system, nations tend to move.

Second, the weakness of state: states are more likely to be on the bandwagon, the less democratic they are, the more dependent they are on the economy. Balance is a type of difficult and aggressive situation that requires rational social support for its continuation and revision. Effective democracy is the only way to secure such popular support that can be reconsidered. Likewise, balancing requires a kind of interdependence between threatened and threatened nations.

The balancing behavior is the essence of this theory, as states enter into alliances to protect themselves from other states or alliances that represent a threat to them. 2 - Joining the weaker side brings greater advantages than joining the stronger side.⁵³

Through an analysis of the Gulf crisis, Qatar historically has always been surrounded by threats from its neighbors, the Gulf states, and you have always threatened to be annexed to the territory of Saudi Arabia. For this reason, it resorted to British and Ottoman protection in a period, even after it gained its independence in 1971. It is being pressured to join the Saudi dependency, depending on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia being dominant in the region. Here the balance of power is embodied. Qatar's resorting to other alliances such as the Turkish ally and the Iranian ally is inevitable and logical given this theory.

Walt assumes that alliances that are formed to balance threats may take several distinct forms, and in the most typical and logical form, states seek to confront threats by adding the power of another state to its power, and thus the great powers seek to the alliance to confront threats from each other, or to prevent states the other side sought to expand its influence, and the regional countries, in turn, sought to obtain foreign aid, sometimes from

⁵³ Emad Gad, *NATO: New missions in a changing security environment*. Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt, 1998, p. 55

one of the great powers, but from time to time they sought help from other regional parties when they entered into a conflict.⁵⁴

Walt also considers that there are two types of balancing: 1- The balance that is carried out by military means and for specific military objectives, or the balance that is carried out by political means and targets the stereotype and legitimacy of the determination, but it is clear that both types have the goal of obtaining support from others in response to an external threat.

Balancing means that international units seek balances and move towards them, whether those international units pose a real threat or not, i.e. the goal of balancing is to maintain the existing international order and not to violate it. While the threat equilibrium does not look at the supreme power of the international unit as a force owned by an international actor, but rather at the actual or potential threats posed by that force: that is why some have pointed out that there is a change in the concept of balancing, the classic meaning of balancing means a measure of separation between units, so that each of them is measured separately and the process of comparison is done between them.⁵⁵ Whereas the new meaning of “balance of threat” looks at the extent to which that force or part of it constitutes the plurality, that is, it does not look at the size of the force owned by the international actor or the international unit, but rather to the extent of the actual, actual or potential plurality that that force constitutes, and this What prompted the emergence of the term Asymmetrical War. This is the danger or threat that less powerful international actors pose to more powerful actors to others, or in more accurate terms, the threats that a smaller power poses to great powers, and how these forces behave about those threats. The international units don’t seek to the extent of the power, but rather to the threat or impact of that power, this is what happened in the attacks of September 11, 2001, when a small power appeared and done what a great international was able to do it.

The important difference between the balance of power and the balance of threat is that the balance of power is related to a general understanding of international units and aims

⁵⁴ Waltz, Kenneth, Smith, Adam: *The Limits of Science: Hard choices for neoclassical realism*, p149 (2013)

⁵⁵ Imad Fawzi Shuaibi, *Transformations and Reflections in the Concept of Power in the Arabian Gulf and the Region*, *Journal of Opinions on the Gulf*, Gulf Research Center, February 2008, Issue 41, p. 36

to maintain or change the existing state of balance to achieve balance. While the "balance of threat" is directly related to the perceptions of the decision-maker in the international unit of threats, and therefore the "balance of threat" is preceded by an important step, which is the threat perception,⁵⁶ which constitutes an element in achieving the balance of the threat, and awareness, as some specialists indicate that there are elements that contribute In shaping the individual or group such as religion, language, culture, ethnicity, socialization, collective historical memory, experience, and personal skills. They are the factors that form the mental image and thinking patterns of the individual and the group.⁵⁷

The effects of the threat balance in the international system, its stability, and the extent to which international peace and security are achieved are strategies that govern the state of conflict between its units. The basic logic of the concept of equilibrium multiplicity is "perception" or "misperception", both of which constitute the basic logic of perceiving threats. The premise of the existence of a balance of threats is the existence of a party (the offender) and the party (the victim). The relationship between units and the interactions between those parties can be either cooperative, confrontational, or neutral. The response of the international unit to threats depends first on the international perception and reality and the amount of power possessed by the parties, and since the threatening condition is fulfilled, it does not require that the threatening party be the strongest - unlike the state of the balance of power - but rather requires the presence of the ability to influence through that force in the absence of the September 11 attacks on the lands, Therefore, the probability of the threat equilibrium theory increases under chaos theory, more than the stable international situations. Therefore, it is possible to understand the strategy adopted by the United States of America after 9/11, which is the strategy of preventive war to eliminate any potential threat against the United States of America.

From the threat balance theory, it is expected that Qatar's security behavior toward the GCC states will reflect primarily a combination of overall strength and perception of intent, and in second place, the balance between attack and defense and geographic

⁵⁶ Nadia Saad El-Din, The faltering patterns of regional cooperation from the perspective of integration, *International Politics Journal, Theoretical Attitudes Supplement*, April 2015, Issue 200, p.29

⁵⁷ Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, *Contemporary Structuralism in International Relations*, *Journal of Political Science*, University of Baghdad, College of Political Science, July 2013 No. 46, p. 51

proximity. While Qatar's overwhelming relative strength is a cause for concern for the Gulf states, the effect of perception of intent is less transparent on the other hand.

5. BANDWAGON

Bandwagon in international relations occurs when a state aligns with great power.⁵⁸ The alliance with the threatening state or force includes the "source of the threat". The small states usually take the initiative to join under the threatening force in the hope of dispersing the threat and extending it to other states or meeting their demands, and the assumption here is that the force attracts allies, so that this allows the small state to maintain its independence and stay on the winning side in the event of a conflict.

So the strategy of bandwagon is more reasonable if there is a conflict, and allies are not available to the small state, such that the state is weak and its security is vulnerable to penetration, and it cannot achieve and protect it considering that its military, economic and political components are limited in light of its comparison with other countries that may be bandwagon A bias towards the stronger, and the strong state may become more threatening, and there are those who believe that the weak states will not benefit from the bandwagon.

In general, the policy of bandwagon can be understood and explained in the event of a threat coming from a force other than the world's dominant power. In this case, the other concept of "Stephen Walt" who came up with the idea of balancing the threat can be included.⁵⁹ which requires balancing the offensive physical capabilities and intentions of each power is considered to be under threat, especially if it is geographically close, and this idea that applies to the policy of both France, Britain, and Germany who joined the United States during the Cold War to confront the communist threat explains the policy of bandwagon and whether this strategy is analyzed as The behavior of a country satisfied and convinced that the rules of the game set by the dominant power serve its interests, or as the behavior of a secondary power that is afraid of a major power threatening its interests. There

⁵⁸ Saïdy, Brahim: Qatari-US military relations: context, evolution and prospects, evolution and prospects, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 10:2, 286-299, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2016.1244902

⁵⁹ Rozmarin Leon: Is Russia balancing China: if not now, when. PHD thesis in international; relations. Boston university. Graduate school of arts and sciences.2001. p 68.

is no doubt that such behavior is not a division of material forces among the nations that make up the international system.⁶⁰

Randall Schuyler explains that the main argument for countries to pursue the policy of bandwagon isn't the fear of facing a dominant force or threats, but with their convinced that there is a chance to make gains.

Schuyler opposed Walt's ideas, arguing that the behavior of the coalition of countries is not only motivated by achieving the greatest degree of security, the bandwagon is not considered surrender to the threat, but an opportunity to achieve gains. What is motivated by seizing opportunities to achieve gains, as well as by threats?

6. WHEN DO STATES BALANCE? WHEN DO THEY BANDWAGON

Bandwagon and balancing are not mutually exclusive behavior, only the motivation behind Bandwagon is fundamentally different from balancing, as follow-through is usually done in the expectation of gain: while balancing is pursued the sake of security and always has costs, in practice, even the great powers have chosen to remain on the sidelines. In the hope that it will avoid the high costs of achieving a strong balance against powerful aggressive countries.

Bandwagon and balancing share opposite methodological conditions. Balance with Stagnation and Stagnation, Bandwagon with Change Accordingly, countries that have pursued bandwagon respond when the system is in a state of constant change: either when the status quo begins to collapse or when a new order is imposed.

In the balance of threat, State behavior is interpreted as a response to perceived threats. He states that relative aggregate power is an important element in the threat perception of most states, but balance-of-power realists argue that "the power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is, what it can do, and how it is used. He also argues That power is important, but it is only one element in the threat calculation that states make when deciding who to ally themselves with and against whom to ally themselves.

⁶⁰ - Ibid. p 69.

In addition to having power, other nations' perceptions of how one intends to use that power are very important. States whose intentions are perceived to be aggressive will be seen as more threatening than those whose intentions are perceived to be benign: "If a state is believed to be unusually aggressive, potential victims will be more willing to use force to reduce its power, to mitigate its aggressive aims, or to eliminate It's all over.

This may lead to the formation of a coalition of other states in response, because "perceptions of intent are likely to play a particularly critical role in alliance choices to ensure survival. The balance of states against other states that are believed to be static is violent. This uncertainty may lead to the "vortex of doubt" that eventually leads to war where it seems that a settlement is not possible and the two sides begin to search for some way to eliminate the threat.

Assumptions about the possession of power and perceptions of intentions are supplemented by assumptions about the projection of energy. Two factors are important here: the balance between defense and offense and geographical proximity. The balance between offensive and defensive weapons, the so-called balance of offensive defense, is important because "States will be less secure when it is easy for them to harm one another and when it is easy to obtain a means to do so⁶¹. Thus, nations with offensive power enable to threaten the territory of Other states are more likely to pose a threat than states unable to attack, this will balance behavior but threatening states may resort to the bandwagon, such as an alliance with the threatening state.⁶²

Geographical proximity is the final component of the balance of threat theory. Power diminishes with distance, so it can be argued that countries that are close to them are likely to pose a greater threat than countries that are far away. Accordingly, states are expected to be more concerned with responding to near threats than to distant ones. Although proponents of the theory tend to present all four variables as equally important, overall strength and the perception of intent play the greatest roles when the theory is applied. Visualizing intent is crucial when explaining why nations go to war, and why some nations balance out rather

⁶¹ Snyder, Glenn: Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay, Published By: The MIT Press, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 149-173

⁶² Saidy, Brahim: Qatari-US military relations: context, evolution and prospects, evolution and prospects, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 10:2, 286-299, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2016.1244902

than others; Overall strength is crucial when nations decide potential allies to choose from at a systemic or regional level. Total relative strength tells foreign policy decision-makers which actors are important, while intentions tell them how important they are.

This feeling of insecurity about the use of force is problematic for at least three reasons:

(1) Conflicts The interests between the great power and other states will continue to emerge, in an anarchic international system the weakest actor in an unequal system A relationship characterized by conflicting interests will inevitably lead to adjustments in policy It reflects the interests of the most powerful actor.

(2) Other nations are unsure of how threatening powers will use their power in the future.

(3) Even a superpower of purely benign intentions may harm other nations because the greater you are, and the more freedom you enjoy, the greater the damage, that is, you can cause even if you do not mean to do so.

Balance of threat suggests that states adopt balancing if they unipolar possesses a great deal of overall power, is aggressive, endowed with offensive capabilities, and is geographically close to others. A unipolar can't be a neighbor of all the remaining states; Hence the geographic factor in defining the threat applies in well-defined neighborhoods. If the unipolar does not have aggressive intentions or is geographically remote and endowed with defensive capabilities, it can attract allies.⁶³

Countries can also adopt a unipolar bandwagon approach to protect against regional threats and the degree of order and public goods that unipolar generates, that is, they use their power with restraint, they engage only in defensive actions and adopt cooperative policies that benefit others, there is no reason to oppose them. If states view the unipolar as a benign actor engaged in such global strategies, the balancing against it becomes almost meaningless. Thus, countries can deal with a non-aggressive unipolar that protects the status quo and opts for restraint.

1- ⁶³ Rozmarin Leon: Is Russia balancing China: if not now, when. PHD thesis in international relations. Boston university. Graduate school of arts and sciences.2001. p 80.

Theoretical and empirical views recognize that movement constitutes an alignment option available to states in a unipolar system. Regarding balancing, he argued that problems of collective action hinder the formation of a common front against unipolarity. The resource gap between unipolar allies and potential allies may complicate coordination efforts between states. It is difficult for allies to agree on how to share coalition costs and how much to contribute to foreign budget efforts.

Countries that do not contribute will enjoy security benefits; So, there are strong incentives for free rides in the system. Countries may avoid cooperation if their partners gain higher advantages since an individual's increased resources can subsequently be used to the detriment of others, indicating the problem of whether states maximize absolute or relative gains in unipolar regimes. However, the debate over absolute and relative gains takes erroneous implications for reasons.⁶⁴ One cannot simply assume that states maximize relative or absolute gains no matter what situations states find themselves in: states' concerns about absolute and relative gains vary depending on systemic changes to strategic environments. Unipolar systems are structurally different from bipolar and multipolar systems, and as we will discuss later, not all unipolar systems have equivalent environments.

The most fundamental question is whether it is possible to form a global counter-alliance against unipolarity. If a country is unipolar and its resources are too large to be compared even if all the countries at the second level pool their resources, then the global front does not constitute any counterweight. Hence, external balancing in unipolar systems is almost impossible. The question "Who wins the most?" Then it loses its meaning; Relative gains fears fade with no prospect of anti-unipolar cooperation—perhaps revived in regional interactions. Accordingly, countries can choose either the internal balancing.

Bandwagoners mainly get unipolar protection and technology transfer. Support and assist the unipolar representative with local security problems and improve defense levels through direct military and economic assistance that supports the division's domestic resources in a complex manner. However, Bandwagoners are expensive for two reasons. First, Bandwagoners lose their freedom of action. Alignment with a great power provides a

⁶⁴ Arjun, Shawqi: The balance of power theory (ies) in international relations a reading in theoretical ramifications, ELBAHITH for Academic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2021ö ISSN: 2352-975X

significant increase in security at the expense of a limited set of foreign policy options. The interests of states and unipolarity will not be compatible in any case. Second, residents of the Bandwagons face the prospect of sharing the costs of the unipolar representative's interventions around the world. Thus, Bandwagoner's resource improvements and costs depend on the unipolar type.

Unipolar is assumed to be either benign, voluntarily limiting its power, or malignant, that is, it pursues its ideals about international order. Benign unilateralism operates in a way that does not threaten states: it determines its actions in the conduct of international politics, does not take advantage of its superior position, and encourages actions and institutions for common gain.

In turn, the malign pole intervenes around the world and these processes threaten states. It also takes advantage of its superior position by not placing restrictions on its actions. It does not necessarily enhance procedures and institutions for mutual gain. Therefore, global unipolar management determines the fitness size of bandwagons.⁶⁵

The distribution of resources across states, in turn, determines the balancer resource optimization: Balancers rely on private resources. The higher levels of development, technology, and capabilities of higher states become their resource gains through internal budgeting efforts. However, internal balancing is less resource-enriched than collective action: no country can obtain the same quantity and quality of resources through domestic efforts as those resources and aid that a unipolar can provide. Unipolar support and assistance are supposed to be more effective in boosting resources. Although balancers have one advantage: they are not subject to the cost of mass transit by definition.

Thus, bandwagons resource optimizations and balancing can be high or low, and the transfer cost can be high, low, or even zero. Each group means a different class of unipolar environments. There can be a unipolar system where unipolarity is benign and thus helps states resolve local conflicts and improve defense levels through their direct military and

⁶⁵ Zeiler, Thomas: The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Mar., 2009), pp. 1053-1073

economic aid. Bandwagoners then benefit from higher resource levels improvements.⁶⁶ They will also suffer negligible costs provided that the benign unit does not make global interventions that seek the help of states and do not limit the scope of the pole's foreign policy options. Suppose also that countries benefit from high levels of sophistication, technology, and capabilities in the system. Such an environment is in sharp contrast to one in which pernicious unipolarity forces states to act in their favor and pursue policies against their national interests, and states have a low level of sophistication, technology, and capabilities. Therefore, unipolar systems are structurally identical but can also be environmentally different. Unipolar environments produce constraints that alter states' resource improvements through balancing and impulse.

7. THE SOFT POWER OF SMALL STATE

Small state term refers to the states with a small size geographically with 1.5 population maximum according to commonwealth and world bank. it's related to the concept of power in the international system. Power and balance of power are the most important terms in politics; therefore, quantitative definitions of some articles describe small states in general by having low role and influence comparing it with big states due to the small size, low population, low economic level, powerlessness of military, and the possibility of getting foreign attacks. For that reason, it appears on the foreign policies of small states which they need security guarantees from big states and needs to be in an international pace system because it is difficult to defend their selves. On the other hand, to increase its power and influence it may pay attention to diplomacy, meditation, and any other behavior that led to creating and maintaining pace⁶⁷. Besides the necessity of being on an open economic system. The qualitative definition of some articles has more another view toward small states in the context of power is that power is relatively concept and linked to culture, qualification of state and the bureaucracy, the influence of the state, and...etc. Good management and with

⁶⁶ Hecht, Jessica: What Bandwagon? Diplomatic History Today, The Journal of American History, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Mar., 2009), pp. 1083-1086

⁶⁷ Cooper, Robert: Sovereignty and the Small State, Published By: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1999) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4496108>

qualification of state, state able to take advantage of the small size, for example, Switzerland and Singapore became in the first and second level in.⁶⁸

Qatar has been able to overcome the danger of small size by employing soft power elements to overcome its geographical and demographic weaknesses. Peterson sees that Qatar has been able to overcome its geographical and demographic weakness by adopting some strategies, including First: the strategy of good neighborliness. Second: The strategy of regional and international alliances. Third: The strategy of creating a national feature to build a unique position, by providing services or goods that benefit neighbors, the region, or the world. Because this in the first place enhances legitimacy, and in the second place it shows others the value and usefulness of the state.⁶⁹

The term soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye. Nye explains that both military power and economic power are an example of hard power, which can be used to persuade others to change their attitudes, by force. Hard power can be based on the carrot and stick policy, i.e. intimidation and threat. The power of the hard state remains mainly focused on the following elements: - The quality and quantity of the population; geographical location; natural Resources; technical and industrial capabilities of the population; military capabilities; The system of governance and management, to measure the strength of any country in the international arena, the six elements are considered.

However, the components of state power have changed over time. However, the components of state power have changed over time. In the twenty-first century, information technology, as seen by Kohn and Nai, becomes one of the most important sources of strength. This aspect of power is soft power, which refers to the ability to achieve the desired goals because others want what you want, which is the ability to achieve goals through coercion, not coercion. It succeeds in persuading others to follow the rules that produce desired behavior or getting them to agree to it. Soft power can be based on the attractiveness of one's ideas or culture, or the ability to define topics by norms and traditions favored by others.

⁶⁸ (2015-2016 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index).
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/Media/GCR15/WEF_GCR2015-2016_NR_AR.pdf

⁶⁹ Peterson, Qatar and the world: branding for a microstate.

Joseph Nye defined soft power in 1990 as the ability of a nation to influence other nations and reflect its general choices to the people, based on the attractiveness of its social and cultural system, rather than on coercion or threat. This attraction, according to Joseph Nye, can be spread in several ways: popular culture, private and public diplomacy, international organizations, and the entirety of corporations and businesses. Nye lists the essential elements of soft power in three points:

- general culture
- Political values and the extent of the commitment, whether at peace or war.
- The adopted foreign policy and the degree of its legitimacy and voluntary acceptance by the countries.

Soft power is the ability to reach the desired end by attracting others. Among the most important tools of soft power are diplomacy, mediation, and foreign aid.

7.1 DIPLOMACY

The concept of public diplomacy is one of the old concepts that takes modern connotations, it is the activities that address the masses by popular means, creating direct relations between peoples and gaining their support.

(Hans) differentiates between traditional and public diplomacy, in that traditional diplomacy is the establishment of relations between states through interactions between governments and foreign ministries, and therefore requires a degree of privacy and confidentiality; Whereas public diplomacy is an open process that aims to reach the masses.⁷⁰

The security objectives of public diplomacy, as it plays a role by the concept of the United States of America in preventive security, as in the era of globalization and interdependence, and due to the huge revolution in the means of communication, it has become difficult for countries to maintain their security by traditional means of armies and weapons, as the concept of security extended to include Non-military elements, such as social, cultural and communication elements. The diplomacy of persuasion based on culture, information, and communication with the masses have become one of the most important

⁷⁰ Ulusoy, Kıvanç: Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual Assessment, SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, 27(2): 133–148

first lines of defense on which the US security strategy can be based, due to its ease and low cost.

As for LEONARD Mark, he believes that public diplomacy can achieve a set of goals, including:

1-Familiarity Increasing, via making individuals think about the state and develop its positive image.

2-Appreciation Increasing, by building positive feelings for the state, by making others look at issues from the point of view of that state.

3-People Engaging i.e. encouraging people to view the state as the best place for tourism, study, to buy products, and to embrace their values as well.

4-Influencing the attitudes of individuals by encouraging companies to invest, and encouraging individuals to support the state's position.

7.2 MEDIATION

Mediation is a process that involves a significant effort by a third party independent of the dispute to resolve it. Mediation is a voluntary action to prevent war by negotiated and peaceful means with impartiality. The mediator identifies the barriers to communication between the conflicting parts by creating a peaceful and respectful dialogue. Mediation is a conflict management process that requires the parties to the conflict and the mediator to be an integral part of trying to find solutions without the use of force and power but by peaceful means.

Jose Luis Cancellla explained that mediation is a highly developed mechanism in the field of preventive diplomacy. This preventive diplomacy in and of itself requires flexibility to settle disputes before the outbreak of conflict.⁷¹

Cancellla also addressed another aspect related to the concepts of preserving and building peace through preventive diplomacy, which is the need to strengthen national and local capacities in preventing and resolving conflicts. Mediation and facilitation of dialogue as essential elements of social cohesion at the national or local level can create an

⁷¹ Salehijam, Maryam: Mediation Clause Decoded: A Systematic Content Analysis, McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, Volume 5 (2018-2019), Number 6

environment conducive to reconstruction and peacekeeping in the event of any possible conflict.⁷²

For Mr. Kim Bungyun, he sees the need for the United Nations and the Security Council is trying to maintain security to find ways to ensure that the proper regional and sub-regional context is integrated into the mediation process when there are no relevant regional or sub-regional organizations.⁷³

Qatar conveys a strong impression of being an active broker. The State of Qatar uses the mediation tool to achieve its foreign policy, which is diplomacy and the major role in the international community. For example, between (2008-2016) the State of Qatar mediated about ten regional and international files and issues and made diplomatic and political efforts at the regional and international levels in mediation between entities and states, at the request of the concerned parties, and without interfering in the internal affairs of states, to bring views closer and find sustainable solutions to conflicts and disagreements.

8. BALANCING THREATS THAT DETERMINE STATE BEHAVIOR

The actual behavior of states can be shaped according to several determinants. The first assumption is that states that face an external threat will align or ally themselves with the states that are causing the threat, while others oppose the states that pose the threat. But in general, it is in line with the countries that cause the threat because they suffer from a threat and danger, so the protection and preservation of their security are carried out by the alliance.

The second assumption is that the greater the overall power of the state making the threat, the more likely it is that other states will be biased against it. Because the collective behavior of states leads to the idea of the reverse argument, which means that if a certain state increases its strength and states align itself with it, this generates the idea of competition in the increase in strength.

⁷² Salehijam, Maryam: Mediation Clause Decoded: A Systematic Content Analysis, McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, Volume 5 (2018-2019), Number 6

⁷³ Hawaii Newspaper Obituaries January 1 - December 31, 2005, <https://library.byuh.edu/0000017b-41d0-d55c-a7fb-cdf25b740000/c-2005-pdf>

The third assumption is that the closer a powerful country is to one country, the more likely it is that other countries will lean against it. Therefore, it is unlikely that states will be in an alliance with states that are separated by at least one other power.

The fourth assumption indicates that the greater the offensive capabilities of a country also increases the possibility of other countries' inclination against it. Therefore, countries with military capabilities may try to form defensive formations and other defense alliances in anticipation of any emergency.

The fifth assumption explains that the more the conceptual intentions of a state are in any way aggressive, the more likely other states are to be against that state, and the mechanism for knowing the conceptual intentions of a state is through measuring the tools and actions that the state does to prepare itself for any possible attack and increase the military capacity.

The sixth assumption indicates that the alliances that arise during wartime are alliances limited by the duration of the existing danger, meaning that the alliances end as soon as the enemy for whom the alliance was established is eliminated or defeated.

8.1 QATAR'S BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO THE THREAT OF BALANCE THEORY

The permanent constitution of the State of Qatar affirms the important constants and principles in foreign policy that determine the form of its relations with other foreign countries through the State of Qatar maintaining its principle of sovereignty and independence, defending the identity of Arab and Islamic countries, respecting international covenants and charters, consolidating international peace and security, and defending public and private freedoms and human rights⁷⁴. Therefore, Articles Six and Seven of the Constitution stipulate the following:

According to Article VII of the permanent constitution of the State of Qatar, the state's foreign policy is based on the principle of consolidating international peace and security by encouraging the peaceful settlement of international disputes, supporting the right of peoples to self-determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and

⁷⁴ <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/>

cooperating with peace-loving nations. The path that Qatar has chosen to survive in light of the chaotic nature of the world is according to the chaotic system, and accordingly, the country respects international covenants and covenants and works to implement all international agreements, charters, and covenants to which it is a party. Article VI, Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar.⁷⁵

According to the balance of threats theory, Qatar's foreign policy depends mainly on it, based on the idea that Qatar is a small country with a limited population density, and that historically it has been subjected to pressure and attempts to annex it to Saudi influence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is a regional power in the region and plays the overall and supreme role, and that Saudi Arabia is the guardian and custodian of the Gulf states, the isolation of Qatar and its non-acceptance of the border or intellectual and orientational accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia led to its rejection by Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf. Therefore, Qatar is trying to prepare itself militarily, economically, and politically through benign endeavors, mediation, soft power, and external assistance to distinguish itself. To protect itself from any expected future wars, which made Saudi Arabia and its allies, such as the Emirates and Bahrain, take sides against Qatar.

8.2 TURKEY'S BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO THE THREAT BALANCE THEORY

The balance of threat, states that the behavior of the coalition is determined by the threat they see from other countries. Ensuring that states will balance against a threat to their security, weak states are likely to be balancing against the threat to their security. The balance of power in neorealism is to separate power from threat

The "new" Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party government, based on the balance of threats, is to form a model for the Turkish role in the Middle East, the European world, and the world in a more general way. For example, the Turkish role in the Middle East is represented in the task of the modern Islamic model and the stability of peace. Although Turkey was trying to build a "new collective consciousness" in the region by prioritizing popular demands, peaceful coexistence, and just order, the

⁷⁵ <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/>

radical transformation of the regional context and fundamental changes Internationally acclaimed forces us to scrutinize the revisions and changes in Turkey's foreign policy; The issue of the vitality of Turkish discourse and foreign policy practices towards recent developments in the Middle East requires an analysis of the new mechanisms and Turkey's quest to redefine its position in the face of the developments provoked by the Arab Spring.

The explanation of the Turkish alliance's behavior stems from the balance of threats. Given the Syrian file, it is considered the most important file related to Turkish foreign policy in the current circumstances for several aspects, most notably the security aspect of Turkey⁷⁶. Despite Turkey's desire for a military solution, the opposition of Russia and Iran prompted international parties to Focus on the political solution, despite its ineffectiveness in the current circumstances. This facilitated the secret of Turkey's support for Syria and its attempt to facilitate a solution to the crisis, given the border security threat. As for the Iraqi file, the Iraqi file is linked to the activity of the PKK, which is considered the most prominent security threat to Turkey in the current circumstances, and despite the coordination between the Iraqi and Turkish governments to mitigate the threat of the Kurdish movement, its impact on Turkey's security still exists.

The Middle East files. This file is considered one of the most complex issues facing Turkish foreign policy as a result of the complexity of relations between it and pivotal countries in the Middle East, especially after its stance on the military coup in Egypt, which was considered an interference in the internal affairs of some Arab countries.⁷⁷

Considering the European relations file: This file is considered one of the oldest files that fall within the competence of the Turkish foreign policy, as it began since the establishment of the Republic. Bickering since Turkey applied for membership in the European Union from 1952 until now, and what has further strained relations is the issue of Syrian refugees, which put this file to the test.

The file of relations with Russia and Iran, since Turkey adopted a policy of zeroing in on problems, has opened up to the other despite the fundamental differences in interests

⁷⁶ Walt, Stephen: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security, Published by: The MIT Press, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43

⁷⁷ <https://www.turkpress.co/node/34260>

and different political positions. However, its association with NATO imposed limits on it in its relationship with Russia, and the Iranian position towards the Syrian file is the size of the relations between the two countries, but the relationship between Turkey, Russia, and Iran witnessed a remarkable development despite the previous estrangement, due to their positions regarding the July 15 coup, in contrast to the position of the European ally.

9 THEORY SELECTION

The balance of threat can be applied at different levels through the local and international levels. Therefore, this theory can explain the behavior of countries, whether small or large, and this is the main reason for choosing the balance of threat to explain the foreign policy behavior of the State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey. The behavior of the foreign policy of the State of Qatar was described in previous studies as open and intelligent, and the behavior of the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey was described as leadership. The foreign policy behavior of both countries has followed the energetic behavior of competing powers striving to be a regional hegemon, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular the new dynamics in the Gulf region after the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.

The balance of threat provides explanations for the behavior of the State of Qatar as a small country that seeks to protect its independence and increase its role in the world in peaceful ways. Qatar does this by implementing many tools and strategies to achieve these goals. On the other hand, assessing the behavior of the Republic of Turkey through its adopted foreign policy as a zero-problem policy with neighboring countries to reduce the surrounding threats from the border countries with it.

In the first chapter, this paper focused on the balance of threat as a theory, interpretation of state behavior as a result of surrounding and perceived threats. In the second chapter, this research will attempt to analyze the causes of the Gulf crisis and the consequences that led to it, discuss the Turkish role during the crisis and then look at Gulf reconciliation.

CHAPTER 2

THE GULF CRISIS, ,BACKGROUND AND REPERCUSSIONS

1. QATAR'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY STRUCTURE

Qatar is located in the middle of the coast of the Arabian Gulf and it is a flat peninsula. Ruling in the Emirate of Qatar is hereditary in the Al Thani family, Qatar was accepted into the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on 11/09/1971. The area of Qatar is 1437 km², and the total population of Qatar is 2,793.⁷⁸ Qatar is located in the middle of the west bay in the Arabian Gulf, which is peninsula lengthen to the north and followed by lots of islands. Its measurement is 11437 k.m2.

1.1. QATAR'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Qatar has a special geographic location in the terrestrial transportation within the west and east, it was famous with merchant navies such as plunger and pearl elicitation also certificated with fancywork cane art until the discovery of the oil when Qatar became as their neighbors oily Gulf countries. Qatar starts to divers its industry base to the GPD it focuses on producing natural gas, patrol, ironworks, chemical production, electricity production, desalination, and encouraging investments. Accordingly, they created a technical center for developing industries to expand in the diver's industry field

Qatar's economy is highly dependent on its hydrocarbon resources, with oil and gas accounting for 83.8 percent of total government revenue. Qatar has been the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas since 2006, and this gas represented 61.5 percent of the country's total exports in 2018.⁷⁹ In addition, Qatar is the fifth largest gas producer and the second-largest gas exporter in the world⁸⁰. In January 2019, Qatar terminated its nearly 60-year membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and withdrew from the organization, due to its determination to focus on its plans to increase

⁷⁸ <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/QAT>

⁷⁹ Qatar Central Bank. 2018. Forty-second annual report. [ONLINE] Available at [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. <http://www.qcb.gov.qa/arabic/publications/reportsandstatements/pages/annualreports.aspx>

⁸⁰ The World Bank. April 2020. Qatar: Economic Prospects. [Online] Available at [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. <https://www.worldbank.org/ar/country/gcc/publication/qatar-economic-update-april-2020>

liquefied natural gas production.⁸¹ Qatar's position as the largest gas exporter has allowed it to be the richest country in the world relative to its population, with a per capita GNI (PPP) of 124,410 USD.⁸²

Over the past few years, Qatar has faced economic difficulties due to the collapse of energy resource prices between 2014 and 2016, and more recently due to the outbreak of the new Coronavirus (Covid-19). According to Qatar Central Bank data, real GDP growth declined from 3.7 percent in 2015 to 1.4 percent in 2018.⁸³ In 2019, the Qatari economy recorded a slow growth of 0.07 percent, according to the latest statistics mentioned in the "Global Economic Outlook" report issued by the International Monetary Fund.⁸⁴ This slow growth reflects the stagnation in the oil and gas and non-oil sectors. The GDP of the hydrocarbon sector also contracted to -1.5 percent in 2019, mainly due to the voluntary moratorium on the development of the largest natural gas field in the world and the reduction of oil production. Real growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector declined to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019 from 3.2 percent in 2018,⁸⁵ reflecting a contraction in the construction and manufacturing sectors as a result of the completion of a large number of infrastructure projects related to the FIFA World Cup. 2022, Hamad Port, Hamad International Airport, as well as road and bridge construction projects. Growth is expected to decline to -4.3 percent in 2020 due to the double shock of the coronavirus outbreak and the sharp drop in hydrocarbon prices. Growth is expected to rise again in 2021 to reach 5%, which is the highest percentage among the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, driven by stronger activity in the services sector due to hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). December 3, 2018. Press releases 2018: Qatar submits notification of its withdrawal from OPEC. [Online] Available at: [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/5261.htm

⁸² The World Bank. 2020. World Development Indicators. [Online] Available at: [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>


⁸³ Jean-Francois Seznec, "Sharing a Pot of Gold: Iran, Qatar, and the Pars Gas Field," Middle East Institute, 22 August 2016 accessed 7 Feb 2021), p.2; Justin Dargin, "The Dolphin." <https://www.mei.edu/publications/sharing-pot-gold-iran-qatar-and-pars-gas-field>

⁸⁴ Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.158

⁸⁵ Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.158

⁸⁶ International Monetary Fund. April 2020. World Economic Outlook Database. [Online] Available at: [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending>

On the financial front, the public finances witnessed many fluctuations. According to data issued by the Qatar Central Bank, the state budget recorded a deficit of 9.2 and 6.6 percent of GDP in 2016 and 2017, respectively, which prompted the government to accelerate financial reforms and stimulate economic diversification as planned in the “Qatar National Vision.” 2030”. The rise in total revenues, driven by the rise in energy prices in 2018 and the decrease in government expenditures, led to a surplus of 15.1 billion Qatari riyals, or 2.2 in GDP.⁸⁷ Despite the economic turmoil caused by the novel coronavirus pandemic, Qatar is expected to be the only country in the Arab region to record a fiscal surplus in 2020 and 2021, according to the International Monetary Fund. This surplus is expected to constitute 5.2 percent of GDP in 2020.



©IMF, 2021, Source: World Economic Outlook (October 2021)

The chart also shows the actual growth of the Qatari economy from 1985 to 2021, in which high growth is observed at certain periods, which are periods of natural gas boom and

⁸⁷ Qatar Central Bank. 2018. Forty-second annual report. [Online] Available at: [Accessed 8 Feb 2022]. <http://www.qcb.gov.qa/arabic/publications/reportsandstatements/pages/annualreports.aspx>

sometimes a decline on average due to some global crises such as the Corona crisis and the Gulf blockade on Qatar, but in general, the increase is noted in the average.

1.2. QATAR'S MILITARY STRUCTURE

The first challenge faced by a small country is the desire of a large country to obtain from its smaller neighbor the recognition of its leadership and its agenda on issues related to security. Major states, especially those that have invested generously in security, often seek to build alliances with their neighbors as the champions of leadership. The United States of America, after proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine in 1823⁸⁸ was the first contemporary country to declare itself the leader of regional security (considering European powers as undesirable forces within the Western geographical space). There are small countries that believe that the best policy they can take is their dependence on a foreign power that provides them with support and empowerment to assume the role of that big country. In the western part of the world, Cuba played this role, and for decades it was a hypothetical satellite state of the Soviet Union and made anti-Americanism a defining element of both its national identity and its foreign policy.

The vision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (and later the United Arab Emirates, toward Qatar that a smaller country plays an external role that exceeds its size in security issues) presents itself as the leader of the Arab Gulf states and seeks to impose a unification of policies and visions with Qatar and other small Gulf states. The Gulf Cooperation Council is the framework and logical tool for policy and security coordination between these countries. Likewise, just as the main headquarters of the Organization of American States is in Washington, the main Gulf Cooperation Council is based in Riyadh as the headquarters of its central leadership.

Qatar demonstrated its evasion and violation of the line of behavior required of it by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain by following a different policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood, concluding a partnership with Iran (which, at a minimum, was imposed on it by geographical data and its sharing with Iran several oil fields), and Qatar's acceptance of

⁸⁸ The Monroe Doctrine was delivered as a Presidential address to Congress in 1823. The transcript may be found in Congressional records, (accessed 8 feb 2022)

Receiving opponents of the regimes of other GCC countries on its soil, and funding media platforms critical of the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, steps that the neighboring countries of Qatar considered unforgivable provocations. For its part, Qatar worked to ensure its continued existence by following two main directions: the first was its alliance with the United States, and the second was the purchase of large quantities of military equipment.

Qatar has announced projects to expand the military base that hosts US forces, an initiative that has been very welcomed in America, which is undergoing a state of financial austerity. Qatar also cooperated in the issue related to open skies, an issue that preoccupied American air carriers and troubled relations between the two countries.⁸⁹ Finally, Qatar purchased large quantities of American weapons—far more than what its local population could use⁹⁰. All of these steps put Qatar in the circle of positive lights, and gradually undermined the image that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE painted of it as a rogue state militarily hostile to the interests of the Americans. It is the only US base in the Gulf capable of accommodating B-52 operations.⁹¹ Al Udeid base hosts the US Central Command's forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, and the forward headquarters of the US Central Command's Special Operations Unit.

Qatar realized the importance of this rule. Indeed, since the beginning of the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis, one of the most important goals of the coalition against Qatar was to move the headquarters of the US Central Command from Al Udeid Base to Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi.⁹² While the MOD has been steadfastly opposed to the move (mostly for reasons of cost and lack of a military need), moving the base has been a constant demand throughout the crisis. Qatar realized the value of the Al Udeid base, and sought to increase

⁸⁹ Bart, Jansen, “U.S., Qatar Reach Agreement in Long-running Dispute Involving Qatar Airways,” USA (accessed 8 Feb 2022)

⁹⁰ Chirine, Mouchantaf, “A Huge Military Build-up is Underway in Qatar. But Who Will Man the Systems?” Defense News, December 15 2017 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2017/12/15/a-huge-military-buildup-is-underway-in-qatar-but-who-will-man-the-systems/>

⁹¹ David, Des Roches, “A Base is More Than Buildings,” War on the Rocks; 8 June 2017 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/a-base-is-more-than-buildings-the-military-implications-of-the-qatar-crisis/>

⁹² See remarks of Robert Gates at the Foundation for Defense of Democracy Conference (which can be considered to be the DC kick-off event of the GCC crisis), 23 May 2017, (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bT6ypHHH9JA>

its value; In his speech before the Legacy Committee, in January 2018, the Qatari Defense Minister announced an increase in the number of barracks and the opening of an American school at the base, in addition to the project to establish an American naval facility in Qatar.⁹³

The growing Qatari-Turkish military, political, and economic ties (which the blockading countries view as a somewhat hostile force) play this role. While Turkey's military capabilities are often overestimated, it has managed to establish a limited military presence in Qatar, one that the press often portrays (inaccurately) as a potential guarantor of Qatar's independence.

Qatar has also recorded an opening to Russia.⁹⁴ Although this openness in relations with Russia does not match the depth or importance of the recorded openness towards Turkey, the purchase of Russian combat aircraft has no military justification at all, but it acquires a very logical political meaning. It reminds America, and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well, that Qatar has other options that it may have to take if pressure increases.

As for the military alliance with Iran. It is very beneficial for Qatar that its leaders did not establish a security relationship with Iran. No doubt strengthening ties with Iran, as a force parallel to the forces of the blockading countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, would have harmful consequences for Qatar's security. While Iran certainly seeks to present itself as an alternative vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the UAE, any strengthening of Iran's presence in Qatar risks alienating the United States and other Western powers from Qatar. Indeed, incorrect reports have been published stating that Iranian Revolutionary Guards are in Doha to discredit Qatar.

Since the start of the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis, Qatar has purchased, or announced its intention to purchase, a variety of combat aircraft; In December 2017, Doha signed a \$6 billion contract to purchase 36 F-15 fighter jets.⁹⁵ Earlier in the same month, Qatar announced the purchase of more than 12 French Rafael fighters (in addition to the 36

⁹³ US Qatar Military to Military Relations,” January 29, 2018, (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/us-qatari-military-military-relations>

⁹⁴ Qatar Mulls Buying Russia’s Su-35 Fighter Jets,” Tass, March 1, 2018 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://tass.com/defense/992351>

⁹⁵ Ryan Browne, “US announces sale of F-15 fighter jets to Qatar,” CNN.Com, 22 December 2017 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/us-qatar-f-15-fighter-jets-sale/index.html>

aircraft it already possessed) with the possibility of purchasing 24 additional fighters.⁹⁶ Doha also announced, earlier in the fall of 2017, its plans to buy 24 European Typhoon aircraft from Britain.⁹⁷ In total, with these purchases, Qatar will raise its air force arsenal from 12 fighters to 72, and perhaps more. As for the arsenals of other sectors of the army, they also witnessed a similar increase. Qatar has made advances in purchasing naval boats, air defense systems, and infantry fighting vehicles. It is tempting to view Qatar as an emerging superpower, but this is a deceptive truth. While military equipment is an essential component of capacity building, it is not certain that Qatar possesses the human capacity or expertise required to transform such raw equipment from naval boats, combat aircraft, and armored vehicles into real military capabilities. Qatar has a population of just 330,000 Qataris. It is difficult to have a sufficient number of qualified, prepared, and prepared citizens to undergo high-level military exercises such as those required to operate this modern military equipment.

1.3. THE BRITISH ROLE IN QATAR

Britain's links with Qatar go back to 1868 when the Qatari-Bahraini dispute intensified which developed into a joint attack carried out by the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifa (1855-1908) and Sheikh and Bahraini Muhammad bin Khalifa (1842-1868) against Doha, which led to a temporary occupation to the extent of causing serious damage to it, and in light of these events and the strained relations between The parties to the conflict Britain worked to strengthen its political and economic influence more in the region, so the British Resident in the Persian Gulf established,⁹⁸ who was unaware of the military preparations for that campaign because of the speed and secrecy that was surrounded by the campaign of the Sheikh of Bahrain and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and the contentment of sending letters to each of them, asking them to explain the measures that led to the breach of

⁹⁶ Pierre Tran, "Qatar moves to buy more Rafael jets, order infantry fighting vehicles," Defense News, 7 December 2017 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2017/12/07/qatar-moves-to-buy-more-rafale-jets-order-infantry-fighting-vehicles/>

⁹⁷ Andrew, Chuter, "Qatar to buy 24 Typhoon fighters from UK", Defense News, 18 September 2017 (accessed 8 Feb 2022) <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/09/18/qatar-to-buy-24-typhoon-fighters-from-uk/>

⁹⁸ Hobbs, Mark (2014), A History of Qatar: Pivotal Moments Revealed in the India Office Records, Qatar National Library. <https://www.qdl.qa/>

the maritime peace, which was the attack on Qatar, without taking punitive measures against them due to the absence of cutting off the British fleet from the Arabian Gulf, And their preoccupation with the battles in East Africa. Thus, Britain took the Qatari-Bahraini dispute as an excuse to tighten its grip on the sheikhdoms of the northern Arabian Gulf, helped by the absence of a strong competitor in the region, and thus Britain became the power with the greatest influence in the Persian Gulf, where it was able, through a series of treaties, to confront any danger that might threaten Its influence, and giving it greater capabilities to confront the Ottoman Empire, which it tried to compete with on Qatar during the last quarter of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

With the rise of the British power as a dominant power in the Gulf, the United Kingdom established through the “India Company” eastern Province by concluding a series of agreements with the princes of the Gulf in what was known as the “Trucial Coast” agreement of 1820; Through it, Britain imposed its authority in the Gulf and recognized the authority of some sheiks and princes in exchange for their protection of the vital trade routes that linked its colony in India with Iraq, and this agreement included that Bahrain is under the authority of the Al Khalifa family, which is sovereign over Qatar. However, the Khalifa family was unable to control Qatar and the surrounding situation from piracy and the sale of weapons and slaves.⁹⁹ Therefore, the British in 1867, through Colonel Pelly, installed Sheikh Hamad Al Thani directly as ruler of Qatar without signing a protection agreement with him, and thus the agreement expressed the actual separation of the Qatar Peninsula on the authority of the Khalifa.

Placing Qatar under the authority of the Al Thani family by the British did not bring peace and stability to this troubled region. Al Zubarah and other areas remained rebellious against the authority of the Al Thani family, and Qatar remained a site of instability and wars waged by the warring clans between the two sides. In 1916, the British government signed an agreement with the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani, according to

⁹⁹ Mawla, Saba, International Relations of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (1981-1999), Journal of Al-Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, No. 32, 2010

which Qatar became under British protection, and Qatar continued under British protection until 1971.

1.4 HISTORY OF THE TURKISH PRESENCE IN QATAR

The policy of the Ottoman Empire towards the Arab Gulf region was based on avoiding the burdens of direct rule, and contentment with nominal sovereignty or interference in the narrowest limits by using local leaders against each other, to prove their presence in the region, and this policy came after the failure of their expansionist attempts in the Arab Gulf region. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the conflict against Portugal emerged, as Portugal had succeeded in ending the conflict in its interest after it was able to weaken the Ottoman naval activity, and was able to return the areas that the Ottomans had seized.¹⁰⁰ The Ottoman Empire pursued during the second half of the ninth century Ten new policies towards the Arabian Gulf region, so it worked to double its garrisons by sending a military campaign in both Mecca and Medina and sending a military campaign to Yemen. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 helped pave the way for the Ottoman fleet to reach the Persian Gulf. The appointment of Midhat Pasha, the governor of Iraq (1869-1872), at his request and with the approval of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha (1867-1871) to implement the policy of the Ottoman Empire to confront British influence in the Persian Gulf region; Where the new governor of Iraq sought to assert the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire over the Arabian Gulf, and the way was opened for him following the dynastic dispute that the second Saudi state (1824-1891) was subjected to following the death of Faisal bin Turki in 1865, and the children of Abdullah and Saud disputed over the rule. The first to ask for help from the Ottoman Empire to consolidate his power in exchange for recognition of Ottoman sovereignty.¹⁰¹

The British position on the expansionist Ottoman policy towards the Persian Gulf revealed a new stage of the international struggle for control of the Arab Gulf. The follower of the correspondences that took place between the British Consul in Baghdad, (Herbert

¹⁰⁰ Qabalan, Marwan, Qatar's Foreign Policy: The Elite Confronts Geography, Arab Politics Journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Issue 28, September 2017.

¹⁰¹ Sweden, Yassin, The Foreign Military Presence in the Gulf: Reality and Options, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut - Lebanon, 2004

Desbrow), and the Foreign Secretary in London, Lord (William Wyndham Craneville) and the Governor of India, (Lord Mayo) 1869-1872, shows the extent of Britain's fear of the possibility of threatening its commercial and political interests in Region.

Therefore, when the news of the attack reached the British Government of India, in August 1868, it directed the resident Pelly at the head of a military force of British military units in the Persian Gulf, to respond quickly to the hostilities carried out by Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, to show the extent of their military strength, concern for maritime peace, and work To restore its prestige, and to punish the Sheikh of Bahrain for being the source of provoking those problems that threaten maritime security and stability in the Arabian Gulf, and he blockaded the coasts of Bahrain, and soon Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa felt unable to resist the British ships, which led him to leave power to his brother Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa Khalifa (1868-1869), who pledged to the British Resident to respect the terms of the 1861 agreement that Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa concluded with Britain and after the British authorities in the Persian Gulf ended punitive measures against the ruler of Bahrain and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.

The British naval force headed to Qatar, and in Al-Wakra, the British Resident met with the tribal sheiks led by Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani (1852-1876) and explained to them the British government's understanding of the Qataris' resentment over the aggression against Doha, and the British government's readiness to ensure that Qatar receives appropriate compensation from the rulers of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

These developments helped in concluding September 12, 1868. agreement between Britain and Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani, and this is the first direct contact between Britain and Qatar, if no contact had occurred between them or treaties were made with them, unlike the other Gulf emirates that Britain was able to link policy early. This treaty included political and commercial clauses that facilitated the penetration of British influence, as Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani pledged not to carry out hostile acts against his opponent, and Pelly indicated to the Sheikh that Britain guaranteed obtaining appropriate compensation from the Sheikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

A year before the outbreak of the First World War, Britain and Turkey signed the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913,¹⁰² Turkey ceded most of the areas that it had under its control in the Arabian coast from the Gulf to Britain, and that agreement made the Qatari peninsula under the rule of Sheikh Jassim Bin Thani¹⁰³, and after the borders of Qatar were drawn in a way that separated it from the “Sanjak of Jund,” which, according to the agreement, remained under the authority of the Turks.

Due to the small size of Qatar's population and economy, and Turkey's sub-par economic performance at the end of the twentieth century, economic relations between Turkey and Qatar were limited until the twenty-first century. By the beginning of this century, Qatar emerged as a major player in the global LNG market, while Turkey managed to tackle persistent hyperinflation and weak institutions that crippled its economy for most of the second half of the twentieth century. The emerging link between economic growth and stability in the two countries has opened up new opportunities for trade and economic cooperation.

A few years since the inauguration of Muhammad Al-Thani as ruler of Doha by the British until he sought the help of the Turks, asking them for protection. The Qatari island was not of a strategic value worthy of Britain placing its forces there, and was content with a request from Sheikh Muhammad Al Thani, to monitor and secure the sea route; Thus, in the year 1871 and upon construction, Midhat Pasha - the governor of Baghdad - and after he restored control of the Al-Ahsa region, sent a Turkish military force to Qatar, where the Turks established a camp for them in Qatar and sent a military force of 100 men there, and Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad Al Thani was appointed The Turks set the place for the region.¹⁰⁴ However, the relations between Al Thani and the Ottomans did not always continue peacefully, as the entry of the Ottomans into Qatar also did not provide the required protection for the Al Thani family, as the raids continued in succession during the years that followed the Ottoman presence in Qatar; Tribes from Abu Dhabi tried to seize the area of Khor Al Adair, and armed clashes led to the killing of one of Sheikh Jassim's sons. Under

¹⁰² The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913

¹⁰³ Summaries of judgments, advisory opinions and orders of International Court of Justice. The United Nations 1997-2002.

¹⁰⁴ Rahman. H the Emergence of Qatar: The Turbulent Years 1627 – 1916

these circumstances, Jassem began declaring his disobedience against the Ottomans, but the Turkish presence continued in Qatar until the Turks abandoned their claims regarding Qatar in July 1913.¹⁰⁵

1.5 QATAR- US MILITARY RELATIONS

Sheikh Muhammed bin Khalifa Al Thani was appointed Crown Prince and Minister of Defense in 1977, and he was granted broader powers in the late 1980s. In 1995, Sheikh Hamad assumed power through a coup against his father, to adopt more impulsive and ambitious policies that were, in general, moving Qatar from Saudi hegemony, Sheikh Hamad pre-empted the coup by developing relations between Qatar and the United States, Israel, and Iran, and after Iraq invades Kuwait in 1990.

Qatar signed an agreement with the United States to establish its largest airbase in the Middle East, not far from the area that was the subject of a border rivalry between both The Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in the past, and Qatar has sponsored the construction of the base financially, as a billion dollars were spent to build the base in the nineties of the last century. 10,000 US troops on a semi-permanent basis.¹⁰⁶ Qatar considered the presence of this base on its territory one of the most important guarantees against any Saudi interference or domination. In addition, in 1996 Qatar launched the controversial Al Jazeera satellite channel, which has become one of the most important tools of Qatari security and foreign policy.

After the Gulf wars, military cooperation with powerful countries became a strategic priority for Qatar. Despite that Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, there is a lack of the defense mechanism of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as there is no unified army for the Council. For this reason, Qatar could not ignore the inability of the Council to provide regional protection. Nor could it count on the Arab League, despite its accession to the Defense Treaty of 1950, but there are no actual results for a common defense. Therefore,

¹⁰⁵ Helem Chapin Metz, ed. *Persian Gulf States A Country Study*. Washington: GOP for the Library of Congress, 1993.

¹⁰⁶ <https://southfront.org/us-military-presence-in-qatar-al-udeid-airbase/>

Qatar established strong military ties with several countries such as United America and Turkey.

Realist theory in international relations explains Qatar's defense relationship as it is a small country whose options are very narrow, toe concept of a bandwagon approach, this concept was chosen to try to reach a degree of security guaranties and defense through defensive alliances with allied countries.¹⁰⁷

Qatar's position followed the bandwagon approach to achieve its international defense in its relationship with the United States, and this approach would help Qatar contain any potential threats. On the other hand, it gives the character of power to the dominant and controlling party. Qatar-US relations were based on careful calculations, and Qatar focused on this to gain its advantage.¹⁰⁸

As for the US military base in Qatar, it is an air military base in Qatar, where members of the US armed forces are stationed, the majority of whom are from the Air Force, is one of the most important US military bases in the Gulf region. Al Udeid base is located more than thirty kilometers southwest of the Qatari capital, Doha, and is also known as Abu Nakhla Airport.

In 2000, Qatar put the Al-Udeid base at the disposal of the United States without signing any agreement at the time. The Americans began managing the base in 2001. In December 2002, Doha and Washington signed an agreement giving official cover to the American military presence at the Al-Udeid base. In April 2003, the Central Command of the US Air Force moved from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid Base, in agreement with the Saudi side. The military base includes the various main facilities required by the base infrastructure, including housing facilities, basic services, command and communication centers, in addition to ammunition stores. More than 11,000 military personnel are deployed at Al Udeid Base. The base includes the headquarters of the Central Command of the US Air Force, the Joint Center for Air and Space Operations, and the 379th

¹⁰⁷ Saïdy, Brahim: Qatari-US military relations: context, evolution and prospects, evolution and prospects, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 10:2, 286-299, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2016.1244902

¹⁰⁸ Al Sabawi, Suleiman, The Role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Independence of the Arab Gulf Emirates 1968-1971, *Journal of Tikrit University for Human Sciences*, Volume 22, Issue 7, October 2015.

Air Missions Wing. The base is the headquarters of the 319th Air Expeditionary Group, which includes bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes, in addition to several tanks, military support units, and sufficient quantities of advanced military equipment and machines, which made some soldiers classify it as the largest strategic store of American weapons in the region. Al Udeid base also has the longest air landing corridor in the Gulf region.

From the Al Udeid base, the air operations of the international coalition in Iraq and Syria are organized and coordinated, and more than 100 aircraft are stationed there. In 2016, al-Qaeda used the launchpad for B-52 bombing strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria. At the beginning of the American campaign in Afghanistan, F-16s and surveillance planes made this base their headquarters and a major refueling station.

After Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain cut their relations with Qatar, the media affiliated with these countries promoted news that Washington might move the Al Udeid base in Doha. However, US officials denied the existence of any American intention in this direction, as the US Department of Defense (Pentagon) confirmed that Washington has no plans to change the military presence in Qatar, and its planes are still carrying out missions from Al Udeid base.¹⁰⁹

In a statement on June 5, 2017, Pentagon spokesman Major Adrian Rankin-Galloway said that US military aircraft continue to carry out missions to support ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. US Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson confirmed to the Senate Committee that there is no threat to transfer the airbase in Qatar, despite the decision of Arab countries to cut ties with Doha, and said on June 6, 2017, that she is not concerned about this base, explaining that US operations continue without any disruption.¹¹⁰

2. QATAR FOREIGN POLICY

Since 1995, Qatar's foreign policy has been characterized by flexibility and the ability to create balanced relations with regional and international powers. The State of Qatar has established strong diplomatic relations with the United States of America. Also, Qatar hosted

¹⁰⁹ David R. Francis, "US bases in Iraq: a costly legacy" in Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 2006

¹¹⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2017/6/7/>

the largest US military bases in the region. Bilateral relations have been characterized by coordination between the two countries on many regional and global issues, such as cooperating insecurity in the Arabian Gulf region.¹¹¹

Qatar's foreign policy focused on holding dialogue conferences, and this was part of the soft power, as the establishment of the Al Jazeera channel became a voice for Qatar and the Arab world. Al-Jazeera opened the door for discussion on the Arab world issues, as contributed to promoting the concept of dialogue and acceptance of the other. Al-Jazeera hosted intellectuals, scholars, and social media activities and professionals from different various intellectual, liberal, leftist, and right-wing nationalist and Islamic currents. It also concerned with women's rights issues, as Qatari women participated in the municipal elections in 1998 by 47%, after the approval of the right to vote and run for Qatari women in the speech of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in the regular session of the Shura Council in 1997.¹¹² Al Jazeera focused on education issues, as six American universities were established in Qatar.¹¹³ In light of all these changes, religious discourse began to renew, so the Emir of Qatar funded to build churches. Al-Jazeera had a great political role in raising awareness of rights and duties in the Arab world, one of the most important rights that the Arab nation demanded was the right to freedom of opinion and democracy. Accordingly, the Arab peoples began to rise and it's known as Arab Spring. Qatar stood with the vast majority of nations who demanded their democratic freedoms and transmitted their voices through Al Jazeera.

The Arab Spring revolutions began, and the revolution began in Tunisia until the overthrow of the Tunisian president in January 2011 and spread to Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Sudan. The Constitution of the United States of America supports freedoms and democracies. Therefore, it supported the Arab Spring revolutions. This led the United States to abandon its old allies such as Egypt, "Hosni Mubarak." In February, the Egyptian president resigned. In Libya, too, America intervened militarily to help the Libyan revolutionaries overthrow Gaddafi, while Russia supported Bashar's government to prevent

¹¹¹ The Official Website of U.S. Department of defense

¹¹² www.Global security.org

¹¹³ The Official Website of U.S. Department of defense

the regime from collapsing, which is why America was unable to support Syria.¹¹⁴ As for Yemen, the US ambassador in Yemen announced at the beginning of the revolution that there is no solution but for the Yemeni president to remain in power and negotiate with him to achieve popular demands for reform. With this statement, it seemed as if the green light was given to suppress the demonstrators. Accordingly, the Yemeni authorities escalated the measures to suppress demonstrations and demonstrators in all Yemeni governorates. Some Arab countries have tried to hold the media and Qatar responsible for leading the Arab nation to carry out revolutions against the ruling regimes. Qatar and Al Jazeera played a major role in the media coverage of the Arab Spring revolutions.

Two years after the revolutions, the opposite results of the revolutions began to appear. After feeling free and going through the democratic experience in some countries, such as the success of the Tunisian experiment, on the other hand, there was a return to the zero point for some countries, such as Egypt and Syria.

Indeed, 2013 was a very important year for Qatar's foreign policy. Especially that the revolutions began to recede as a result of the failure of the revolutions, such as two things first, as happened in Egypt, there were many mistakes committed by Islamists, which led to the fall of the first legitimate regime in the history of Egypt, which lasted for a year. In addition, the army in Egypt obtained regional support for the coup against the democratic system. Therefore, after the Egyptian army overthrew President Mohamed Morsi, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait pledged \$12 billion in economic support to Egypt.¹¹⁵ Second, regime violence, as Bashar's regime did in Syria. Bashar al-Assad's regime, with the help of Iran, was able to confront the revolution.

After the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to restore the situation to its previous era, which is the establishment of an Egyptian regime similar to and supportive of the Saudi and UAE regime and relies on its help and stands

¹¹⁴ The strategy of building the American empire, a study by retired Brigadier General Ahmed Alo, published on the official website of the Lebanese Army. <http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb>

¹¹⁵ Adam Hanieh, *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). pp. 35-36.

against Islamists and democratic movements.¹¹⁶ It was not only with Egypt but throughout the Arab region including Syria and Gaza. The Egyptian army was able to control the Egyptian people in 2013, which made Saudi Arabia dedicate itself to holding Qatar accountable, and increased pressure on it to change its political views. Accordingly, the Riyadh meeting included the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. The King of Saudi Arabia presented to the State of Qatar a document that included a review of its foreign policy and non-interference in the affairs of Arab countries in general and the Gulf states in particular. This document is the Riyadh Agreement, which included several items as follows:

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First, not to interfere in the internal affairs of any of the GCC states directly or indirectly, not to harbor or grant citizenship to any of the citizens of the Cooperation Council countries who have an activity that contradicts the regulations of his state, except in the case of his state's approval, not to support rogue groups opposed to their states, and not to Using the media against the Gulf states.

Second, not to support the Muslim Brotherhood or any organizations or individuals that threaten the security and stability of the GCC states through direct security action or attempting political influence.

Third: Prevent any of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries from providing support to any group in Yemen that poses a threat to Yemen's neighboring countries.

The attempt of the three countries to try to change Qatar's foreign policy, especially towards Egypt, did not succeed, as the three countries wanted to make Qatar support Egypt financially and, in the media, which they did not do. On the contrary, it did its opposite and supported the Egyptian opposition with great media coverage of Al Jazeera. Accordingly, as pressure on Qatar to change its position in March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from the State of Qatar, and the statement justifying the withdrawal of ambassadors was that Qatar had not implemented the terms of the agreement. Mediation attempts to resolve the crisis began. The Kuwaiti mediator made some demands

¹¹⁶ Al-Kuwari Ali, "The Perils of American Policy and the Challenges to Confronting It: The Case of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries" (2010), p. 3. From: http://dr-alkuwari.net/sites/akak/files/ameracia_and_gulf.pdf

for the return of the ambassadors, the most important of which was the request of the three countries from Qatar to close Al Jazeera and to give it three months to implement their demands for the return of diplomatic representation.¹¹⁷

3. QATAR-GULF RELATIONS

For the possibility of understanding and dismantling the Gulf crisis, it is necessary to look at the historical dimension of the conflicts of the Gulf states, specifically Qatar and the blockading countries. Some researchers attribute the reasons for Qatar's inconsistent situation with its Gulf surroundings to the complex fear of neighbors that has shaped the thinking of its rulers since the establishment of the emirate by the British in 1868¹¹⁸. Historically, the Qatari peninsula was the scene of attacks from all directions by its neighbors. The Wahhabi threat to its existence was from the south, and it was the target of attacks by tribes that inhabited the coasts of the areas that make up the United Arab Emirates today, and the Sultan of Oman had his ambitions in Qatar Bahrain has been in constant conflict with the Qataris; Therefore, Qatar has no choice but to ally with larger powers to maintain its presence in the face of constant threats in a hostile environment. It is worth noting that this behavior is shared by all the Emirates in the Gulf, with some variation in the type of major power and the nature of alliances.

Qatar's behavior has not changed since its inception, as it remained within the British protection regime during the period 1916-1971, and in the period that followed the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The political framework has not been able to establish a sustainable state of sound relations among its members despite the passage of more than 36 years since its establishment. It seems that Qatar is trying to move away from the Gulf dependency, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But the tribal force armed with the former Wahhabi sect took new titles and methods against the neighbors.

¹¹⁷ Congressional Research Service <https://crsreports.congress.gov/95-1013>, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf>

¹¹⁸ David B. Roberts, *Understanding Qatar's Foreign Policy Objective*, Mediterranean Politics, Vol 17, No. 2, 233-239, July 2012.

3.1 QATAR-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS

Initially, Saudi Arabia depends on a pivotal pyramid that allows it to continue to dominate the region. The Wahhabi doctrine system, its existence under American protection, and oil. But it seems that Saudi Arabia is now going through a phase of transformation; The regime established by the Dean of the Saudi family, King Abdelaziz Al Saud in the thirties of the last century, faces existential and structural challenges from within the ruling system and the ideological guiding system of governance, in addition to economic and social challenges and the emergence of changes taking place in the region.¹¹⁹

The world is witnessing a change in a new global order in which the United States may not be a major player, and its interest in direct intervention in international crises has decreased under the rule of US President Donald Trump. This means reducing the commitments of the United States to its traditional allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia feels a great concern for the United States to give it its back in light of the dwindling strategic value of oil in the Gulf and the presence of other competitors in the region that provide that you cannot provide for it. The attention of the United States shifted from the Gulf to other regions of the world. Accordingly, this shift weakens the Saudi tripartite pyramid on which it depends on being dominant in the region.

In 2011 Saudi Arabia began to feel increasingly concerned about the Arab Spring, which led to the downfall of several regimes and the entry of other countries into civil wars. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf countries, has a rentier politics that is based on the idea of politics and providing appropriate solutions to the problems of Saudi society. And Saudi Arabia failed in this role in light of the people being affected by the Arab Spring, which led to several conflicts in the dynasty of King Abdelaziz Al Saud of his sons and grandsons.¹²⁰ For this reason, Saudi Arabia began working to present itself as a leader of the Sunni Muslim world by spreading the Wahhabi doctrine in the world as an important card in Saudi foreign policy, but Saudi Arabia faces several challenges, such as the challenge of the emergence of

¹¹⁹ Al Emara, Lamy, Atwan Khader, The Future of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: A Reading of the Gulf Regional Environment, Journal of Al-Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, No. 29, 2010.

¹²⁰ Al-Shujairi, Fayek, Mikhlif, Munim, Saudi armament and military spending: a strategic vision in motives, Kufa Journal of Legal and Political Sciences, University of Kufa, Volume 1, Issue 19, 2014.

other Islamic leaders such as the rise of Turkey led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who presents himself as a Sunni Islamist leader with strong Islamist leadership, as well as other organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar and Egypt under President Morsi and challenge Iranian Shi'ism, al-Qaeda and Salafi-jihadi organizations such as ISIS. This does not negate the great importance of the Wahhabi doctrine, from which several other doctrines, have branched out, but its existence has begun to threaten the effectiveness of the Wahhabi doctrine as a dominant force on Saudi foreign policy.¹²¹

3.2 QATAR-BAHRAIN RELATIONS

The conflict between the Al Khalifa and Al Thani families began when the Al Khalifa family settled in the Al Zubarah area in Qatar after migrating from Kuwait in the late nineteenth century. As the region turned into a center of pearl trade in the Gulf region. This is what made the ruler of Bahrain at the time Nasser attack the Zubarah area to seize it. This conflict led to the so-called (Utub Pact) to attack and seize Bahrain in 1782 and it has been under the rule of Al Khalifa since that time while maintaining its control over Al Zubarah. Qatar has always been an area of violent conflict, which made the current government distinguished given the historical wars.

For historical reasons related to the animosity between the Al Khalifa and Al Thani families, the bilateral relations between Qatar and Bahrain can never be classified as normal. Although the dispute between the two countries was borderline on the surface, and although it was resolved through international arbitration, the historical political aspect of it continued to poison the relationship between the two countries, a country that entered into an armed conflict over islands of no more than a few kilometers In 1986, when a Qatari armed force landed on the coral reefs (Shaft al-Dabal) north of the Bahraini island of Muharraq and arrested twenty foreign workers who were setting up the Bahraini Coast Guard there.¹²²and the "border" conflict between the two countries continued until the nineties.

¹²¹ Al-Anbari, Ahmed, Iranian-Gulf relations and their developments after the year 2011, Journal of International Studies, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, No. 66, 2016.

¹²² Helem Chapin Metz, ed. Persian Gulf States A Country Study. Washington: GOP for the Library of Congress, 1993.

In the last century, Qatar raised the issue of the border dispute with Bahrain to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1991, despite Bahrain's objections. Relations between the two countries continued in a state of tension to the extent that Bahrain agreed to its objection to the Gulf Cooperation Council summit that was held in Doha in 1996. In 2001, the International Court of Justice issued a binding decision depriving Bahrain of sovereignty over the Zubarah area in the Qatari peninsula and the island of Fast al-Dabal and Jinan in favor of Qatar, with the ruling granting Bahrain sovereignty over Hawar Island. But it seems that the crises between the two countries did not end with the end of the border dispute through international arbitration.

3.3 QATAR-UAE RELATIONS

During the years 1869-1836, the Qubaisat clan moved from Abu Dhabi to settle in the Al Khor region. Many of the rulers of Abu Dhabi fled to Qatar, and over time, Khor Al Adaid became an area of conflict and war for a long time. The conflict took the form of an armed clan between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and the Qubais clan rebelling against their authority, and personally between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and the rulers of Qatar, and politically between the Ottomans and the British during the years that followed the year 1870, and the conflict later turned into a conflict between the rulers of Qatar and the rulers of Abu Dhabi until the dispute was resolved amicably between Qatar and the Emirates in 1974.¹²³

4. GULF CRISIS

The Gulf disputes, which are not considered modern, were always the result of differences in the positions of the Gulf states, and the Arab Spring (the Syrian crisis, the revolution in Egypt.) is one of the main drivers of the divergence of Gulf positions. Accordingly, the Riyadh Agreement came to ease the tension between the Gulf states and Qatar.

4.1. RIYADH DOCUMENT

It is an agreement concluded on November 23, 2013, in Riyadh and signed by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in the presence of Sheikh Sabah Al-

¹²³ Atris, Hamad, A Dictionary of Countries of the World, Cultural House for Publishing, Cairo, 2001.

Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, and King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. internal affairs of any of the GCC states, directly or indirectly.

The agreement also stipulates "not to support organizations or individuals who work to threaten the security and stability of the GCC states, whether through direct security action or by attempting political influence and not to support hostile media."

4.2 AMBASSADORS WITHDRAWAL CRISES

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar on March 5, accusing Doha of not implementing an agreement signed in Riyadh November-2013, before Kuwaiti mediation was able to reach an agreement between the Gulf states on a mechanism to implement the agreement, on April 17. last April. The Riyadh Agreement provides for "commitment to the principles that ensure non-interference in the internal affairs of any of the GCC states, directly or indirectly." While these countries justified the step of withdrawing the ambassadors by Qatar's non-compliance with the Riyadh Agreement concluded on November 23, the Qatari cabinet said that "this step has nothing to do with the interests, security, and stability of the Gulf peoples, but rather has to do with a difference in positions on issues outside the GCC countries. cooperation". On Thursday, April 17, the foreign ministers of the Gulf states announced their countries' approval of the mechanism for implementing the Riyadh Document.¹²⁴

With the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the alliance between the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the Saudi Crown Prince returned for internal and external reasons, and the two leaderships returned to their aggressive policy against Qatar and this appeared in the Saudi and Emirati media, up to the Riyadh summit, which gave indications of a pent-up crisis in relations with Qatar. Most notably, the attempt to marginalize the Qatari presence.

The Emirati-Saudi media attack on the State of Qatar began based on the statements of the Emir of the State of Qatar. Although the Qatar News Agency indicated that the agency was hacked, the Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian media continued their attack, until they reached

¹²⁴ "Riyadh Supplementary Agreement" Returns Gulf Embassies to Doha, November 17, 2014 Viewed on December 10, 2014, on Al-Arabiya website: [http://www.alarabiya24.com/ar/news/17916/...](http://www.alarabiya24.com/ar/news/17916/)

an insult to the ruling family, and the conflict evolved from a leader to a popular one, and this is an unprecedented development.¹²⁵ In the past, Gulf disputes focused on issues and policies and avoided dealing with the ruling families, because that would lead to a challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling families upon which all Gulf regimes are based. In addition, for the first time in the Gulf dispute over the years, the dispute turns from a leadership issue that is resolved in offices to a popular conflict that is between peoples.

Trump contributed to activating the crisis by not bringing the conflicting parties closer, since Obama announced the establishment of Gulf-American relations far from bilateral relations, for example, America and Saudi Arabia or America and Qatar and so on, to the relationship of America and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and from it, the first summit of the American-Gulf gathering was held 2015 at Camp David, and after Obama's 2016 visit to Riyadh, then Trump's 2017 visit to Riyadh on his first foreign visit, and since then the Gulf-US summits have stopped. Trump's presence and his bias against Qatar contributed greatly to the formation of the crisis, and later the American position was modified to stand with Qatar by praising the Qatari Ministry of Defense and also praising the Al-Udeid base because it is the main nerve of the United States and its movements and wars against ISIS, the Taliban, and Afghanistan. The three Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, submitted 13 demands to Qatar. If it investigates them, it will cancel the blockade against Qatar, provided that these demands are implemented within 10 days, after which these demands will be canceled.

4.3 THE DEMANDS

1- Qatar should officially announce the reduction of diplomatic representation with Iran and the closure of Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar. Qatar must also expel members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from Qatar and cut off any joint military cooperation with Iran. Only trade with Iran that complies with US and international sanctions is allowed,

¹²⁵ Al-Ansari, Majid: Does Washington benefit from the Gulf crisis, Issue 10733 | Tuesday 11 Safar 1439 AH | October 31, 2017

provided it does not endanger the security of the GCC countries. Cut off any military or intelligence cooperation with Iran.¹²⁶

2- Qatar should immediately close the Turkish military base under construction, and stop any military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatari territory.

3- Qatar should cut ties with “terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations,” notably the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, al-Qaeda, Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Qatar should officially classify these entities as terrorist groups, based on the list of terrorism announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, and update its list based on any future list that the four countries will announce at a later time.

4- Ceasing all means of funding to individuals, groups, or organizations that are considered terrorists by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, the United States, and other countries.

5- Terrorist figures”, fugitives and wanted persons from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain should be extradited to their countries of origin. Freezing their assets and providing any required information about their residence, movement, and money.

6- The Al Jazeera network and its affiliated stations must be closed.

7- Interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states must be stopped. Stop the naturalization of wanted persons from Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. Withdrawing Qatari citizenship from current citizens who hold Qatari citizenship violates the laws of those countries.

8- The State of Qatar should pay compensation for the loss of life and other financial losses resulting from Qatar's policies in recent years. The amount will be determined in coordination with the State of Qatar.

9- Qatar should side with the Gulf states and other Arab countries militarily, politically, socially, and economically, in line with the agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014.

¹²⁶ Al JAZEERA, Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis,12/07/2017
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis170623022133024.htm>

10- Qatar should provide all personal details of all members of the opposition that Qatar has supported and details of all the support it has given them in the past. Cut off contacts with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. Hand over all files detailing Qatar's contacts with and support for opposition groups.

11- Qatar should close all news platforms that directly or indirectly fund it, including "Araby tv," "Raid," "Al-Araby Al-Jadeed," "Middle East Eye," etc. Examples and here we mean all the platforms funded by Qatar.

12- Approval of all applications within 10 days of submission to Qatar, or the list becomes void.

13- Approval of monthly reviews during the first year after claims are approved, and then quarterly during the second year. Over the next ten years, Qatar's compliance will be monitored annually.¹²⁷

4.4. DISCUSSING THE DEMANDS

The Gulf media attack began to increase, accompanied by many accusations. the most of what media were handling:

First: Qatar was accused of supporting and financing terrorism and terrorist movements, the most important of which is Hamas and some other movements such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in general. Qatar denied the allegations and accusations through its strong participation in financing the war on terrorism, not to mention Hamas. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is still accused of perpetrating the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Second: Qatar's growing relationship with Iran, about the Gulf states in general and Saudi Arabia in particular, for them, Iran is the axis of evil. Therefore, when Qatar's relationship with Iran is strengthened, it appears as if it is allied with the axis of evil, and this leads to hostility with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although the UAE achieved the highest returns as a result of its growing economic relations with Iran, the UAE

¹²⁷ Abdullah Babood "THE MIDDLE EAST'S NEW BATTLE LINES", European council on foreign relations, https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/battle_lines/oman

represents 80% of the volume of Gulf trade exchange with Iran. In addition, it is an important financial center for Iranian remittances. Iranian Ambassador Muhammad Ali Fayyad stated that official statistics indicate that the volume of trade exchange between Iran and the UAE in 2010 amounted to 20 billion, in 2011 it amounted to 23 billion, in 2012 it reached 17.8 billion, in 2013 it amounted to 15.7 billion, and the year 2014 witnessed a jump. The volume of trade exchange between the two countries is significant, and the UAE has become the largest exporting country to Iran with 27% of the total Iranian imports, and the volume of exchange amounted to 41,620 dollars.¹²⁸ The volume of exports reached 981.19 billion. The UAE was one of the most important countries exporting goods to Iran, then China, India, and South Korea.

Three weeks after the blockade imposed by the Gulf states on Qatar, which represented the severing of diplomatic relations with it, the blockading countries, with American help, decided to propose a list of 13 demands, asking the State of Qatar to implement them as a condition for ending the blockade. Qatar, in turn, rejected all the demands, considering them a violation of its sovereignty and independence, in addition to its illogicality. All these demands are considered a burden that an independent and sovereign country cannot accept these conditions. , and thus responded by writing to the Kuwaiti mediator, expressing her readiness to defend her sovereignty. On the other hand, several countries expressed their denunciation of the demands, including Turkey, Germany, and even the United States of America, as well as the media, human rights organizations, and political activists, describing the demands as fighting the freedom of the State of Qatar and not fighting terrorism.

Qatar was not surprised by the current crisis with the Gulf states. Because it has always seen and felt Gulf and Egyptian dissatisfaction since the expansion of the Qatari role in the region, several signs indicated dissatisfaction with Doha's influence, which has become beyond its geographical and demographic size. What exacerbated the regional dissatisfaction with Qatar's role was the success of Qatari mediation, where many failed, including the 2006 Lebanon crisis, the Palestinian arena crisis and its division, and the Qatari mediation role

¹²⁸ Al JAZEERA, Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis,12/07/2017
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis170623022133024.htm>

between the Palestinian factions. Also, the prominent Qatari presence in the Darfur conflict in Sudan, the conflict over power in Somalia, the Houthi conflict, and the power in Yemen. Qatari diplomacy had a tangible role in eliminating the conflicts of the countries of the Horn of Africa, and finally Qatar's role in supporting the Arab Spring revolutions.¹²⁹

5. REPERCUSSIONS OF CRISES ON QATAR

The social and humanitarian consequences of the embargo imposed on the State of Qatar since June 5, 2017, have varied, and cases are still increasing on the National Human Rights Committee, at a time when the lives of some citizens have been confused as a result of severing their relations with their families in the three sister countries that imposed The ban, which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain, the pressure of inaccurate news and fallacies on ordinary citizens, and the frequent indictment of arbitrary accusations against Qatar and its achievements, cast a shadow based on family relations in terms of rejection and apprehension and focus only on the issue of the ban and its repercussions, which It eliminated the niche spaces for social and family conversations, not to mention some of the financial measures necessitated by the ban. There have also been some cases of divorce between Gulf nationals and female Gulf nationals who were afraid to stay in Qatar as a result of the measures taken by their countries.

According to reports by the National Human Rights Committee, 13,314 citizens and Gulf citizens were subjected to the severing of relations with the State of Qatar by the three countries and the establishment of air and land embargoes on them, not to mention the failure to operate Qatar Airways and the lines of the three countries boycotting to and from Doha. This has hindered a lot of citizens' movements and the movement of goods; which Gulf citizens also benefit from! also, obvious losses for airlines in the three countries.¹³⁰

The report also indicated that 1,927 Qataris residing in the three countries were directly affected. Many stories cannot be mentioned as a result of this siege. These numbers warn of a humanitarian catastrophe that is occurring for the first time in the Gulf region, a

¹²⁹https://siyasatarabiya.dohainstitute.org/ar/issue027/Documents/Siyassat27_2017_Issue.pdf

¹³⁰ "Qatar, Turkey bilateral ties based on the shared vision", gulf-times.com, 13 February 2017, <https://www.gulf-times.com/story/532847/Qatar-Turkey-bilateral-ties-based-on-shared-vision>

little closer to what happened in August of the year 1990 when Iraq invaded the State of Kuwait.

The suspension of postal transactions by the three countries with the State of Qatar is a violation of the constitution of the Universal Postal Union and disrupts the lives of tens of thousands of citizens and institutions. The deprivation of Qataris from the right to practice religious rites in Mecca and Medina, and is contrary to the true Sharia, which does not distinguish between any person in religion and belief.

The abuses affecting human rights did not stop at this number, but the numbers rose successively every day, and the suffering expanded in every field and field of life, as the National Human Rights Committee received daily more than 50 human rights complaints related to the embargo imposed on the State of Qatar, not to mention the Psychological anxiety among some male and female residents of the three countries, who are now suffering and feeling the effects of the unjustified blockade on the State of Qatar, while doing their business with their Qatari counterparts in departments and institutions, ashamed of what their countries issued against the State of Qatar.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid bin Raad, noted, “The measures that have been taken are excessively broad in scope and implementation and seriously impede the lives of thousands of women, children, and men just because they belong to one of the nationalities of the countries involved in the conflict.” He considered procedures to address the humanitarian needs of families with shared nationalities insufficiently effective to address all cases. The UN official also expressed his alarm at the threats to imprison and fine anyone who sympathizes with the State of Qatar or opposes his government’s measures, noting that these measures are “a clear violation of the right to freedom of expression.”

Human Rights Watch condemned the measures taken by the three Gulf countries to “block media outlets linked to, or considered sympathetic to, Qatar, describing them as a violation and a slap in the face of freedom of expression.” opinions on current events, and

governments do not have the right to shut down media outlets and criminalize expression with the intent of stifling criticism they consider disturbing.”¹³¹

A statement by the National Human Rights Committee in the State of Qatar referred to some figures that prove the reality of social confusion that has occurred among Gulf citizens residing in the State of Qatar as a result of the measures taken by their countries recently. The statement referred to the following:

Several Gulf students registered at Qatar University were affected: 33% Bahraini - 59% Saudi - 8% Emirati. There are also 4,600 Gulf students registered in public schools in the State of Qatar. Qatar University has considered the conditions of its Gulf students and has taken measures to ensure their comfort about the exams. The measures are taken by the three countries also resulted in clear violations of human rights, affecting the following:

The right to freedom of movement, the right to education, forcible deportation, the right to practice religious rites, the right to freedom of expression, the right to health, the right to family reunification, the right to work. More than 37,000 Qataris, who own 40% of agricultural land in the Eastern Province, have also been affected, and have left their homes and farms as a result of the siege that was applied to the State of Qatar.

About violations of the right to work, they included the following: 1,053 Saudi nationals, 830 Bahraini nationals, and 71 Emirati nationals, most of whom are in the private sector. These measures also affected mixed families, as follows: 3694 Saudi men and women - 1345 Bahrainis and Bahraini - 1435 Emiratis and Emiratis.

As for the media professionals affected by the aforementioned procedures, who are citizens of the three countries residing in the State of Qatar, they are: 93 media professionals are pressured to leave their jobs, and 10 media professionals have been forced to submit their resignations.¹³²

Qatar has succeeded, less than three years after the blockade, in achieving self-sufficiency in providing its food needs by more than 80 percent. Several parties contributed to alleviating the repercussions of the boycott and the fear of withdrawing foreign

¹³¹ :Turkey’s Economic dilemma: Win Qatar or Lose the Gulf, 20 July 2017, <https://en.vestikavkaza.ru/analysis/Turkey's-economic-dilemma-Win-Qatar-or-lose-the-Gulf.html>

¹³² <https://www.al-sharq.com/opinion/19/06/2017>

investments in Qatari projects and banks, which could lead to a state of economic collapse. dollar. Steps came to relieve pressure on the exchange rate of the local currency against foreign currencies, while international reports and economic analysts indicated that the Qatari economy was able to absorb the first shock of the boycott at an unexpected speed with a kind of economic recovery.¹³³

The State of Qatar possesses a huge wealth of gas and oil and huge financial reserves that provide it with more options to overcome the boycott measures and prevent the local economy from collapsing or even the decline in growth rates from its normal levels, and the increase in oil and gas prices in the global market for 2017, in turn, contributed to strengthening state economy. Achievements made in this sector appeared in the paths of openness to various countries of the world and proceeding with the path of achieving self-sufficiency, in terms of food, dairy products, and livestock. Baladna Company provides the basic base for local consumption after the blockade.¹³⁴

One of the most important measures is to focus on activating the strategic and basic role of Baladna Company, which was established a very short period before the imposition of the blockade. It is a Qatar agricultural company that produces dairy products and raises livestock, and is considered the largest dairy and food company in The State of Qatar. In June diplomatic 2019, exactly two years after the Gulf crisis, Qatar became supplying more than 50% of dairy products in Qatar after the blockade and then the company also started exporting milk to Afghanistan and Yemen and in 2021, the company was exporting to 11 countries including Pakistan and Libya.¹³⁵ As for the blockading countries, they have priorities for the war in Yemen, internal reforms, and other concerns.

¹³³ Al-Faqih, Ihsan, A Thousand Days of Siege, where has Qatar reached? Anatolia, 2020, last visit on March 7, 2022 <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-/1752648>

¹³⁴ Ibd

¹³⁵ Al-Faqih, Ihsan, A Thousand Days of Siege, where has Qatar reached? Anatolia, 2020, last visit on March 7, 2022 <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86->

6. THE QATARI BLOCKADE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to the Dictionary of International Law, a boycott is defined as “the refusal to deal with a country and this is done by cutting diplomatic relations or reducing them to the lowest level, and closing the borders to this country and its citizens. The blockade comes within the framework of the legal procedures of countries that see in a country that it constitutes a violation of its sovereignty and national security. As for the blockade, “it is to surround a country by sea, air, and land, and to prevent any commercial or external contact with it.” Within the framework of international conventions and legal custom, no country has the right to declare a blockade decision, except through a resolution issued by the Security Council. The measures taken against Qatar are almost considered a “siege”; Because the countries have fully informed Qatar by land and air in terms of its common land and air borders with Qatar, and have not relied on an international decision to take these measures.

Whether the measures are a “siege” or a “boycott”, there are a set of articles in international covenants, which show that the measures taken by some Gulf states against Qatar are not legally correct:¹³⁶

Article 33 of Chapter VI of the United Nations states the following: This article states “the necessity of resolving any dispute through negotiations, investigation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.”¹³⁷ However, the Gulf countries took their measures without going through those “legal and legitimate” options offered.

Article 34 of the same chapter, states: “It is necessary to notify the Security Council of violations by a state, to examine the validity of allegations.” However, it is noted in the course of the Gulf crisis that the Gulf states took measures without notifying the Security Council of the nature and extent of Qatar’s “violations.” The matter did not stop at that, but those countries are still, up to now, continuing not to provide clarifications and tangible evidence to support their allegations.¹³⁸

<https://www.un.org/repertory/rt33.shtml>

¹³⁶ Salma, Jalal :How can we read the Gulf crisis with a legal perspective, (2017).

¹³⁷ <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art33.shtml>

¹³⁸ <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art33.shtml>

As for Article 37 of the same chapter, it also states: This article imposes on states “to present the basis of the dispute to the Security Council, and on its basis, the Security Council recommends what it deems appropriate.” This article is fairly close to article 34.

Article 55 of Chapter Nine of the United Nations: affirms the aforementioned article on the need for international economic and social cooperation, to “common respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.” The sudden expulsion of Qatari citizens who are citizens of a common country within the framework of a regional economic and social cooperation called the "Gulf Cooperation Council" is a blatant violation of this article. Imposing a prison sentence on anyone who expresses sympathy with even one word is also a blatant violation of this article and other articles of human rights protection. Qatar felt that the demands of the Gulf states affect its regional sovereignty, so it can protect and restore its rights through regional alliances, such as the alliance with Turkey.

Article 75 of Chapter Twelve of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates: The aforementioned chapter includes the foundations of the international trusteeship system. And when considering the demands of the Gulf states that were presented to Qatar, to implement them and achieve reconciliation, without any doubt, to impose a guardianship system on Qatar¹³⁹. In addition, Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that trusteeship can only take place through the United Nations, and after the waves of independence of states have ended, the international custom has categorically forbidden the imposition of trusteeship.

Article 7 of the Charter of the International Criminal Court states: Looking at item “H” of the article in its Arabic version, we find that the article prohibits the persecution of any specific group or group of people. The right of residence for Qatari citizens in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states stems from the charter of the “Gulf Cooperation Council,” meaning that they reside in the Gulf states as if they were a group of citizens. The expulsion and losses that happened to them come within the framework of the persecution mentioned in the above article. In addition, the clause in question considers the imposition of the blockade, whether partial or total, as one of the aspects of illegal aggression.

¹³⁹ <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art33.shtml>

Article 4 of the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, states: This article defines the goals of the Council, including “achieving coordination, integration, and interdependence between member states in all fields to reach their unity, and deepening and strengthening the ties, links, and aspects of cooperation existing between their peoples in various fields.” However, those who contemplate the measures taken by some Gulf states against Qatar find that they represent flagrant violations of this charter.¹⁴⁰

Article 9 of the same charter states: This article stresses “the necessity of resolving disputes and substantive issues unanimously.” A meeting may not have taken place at the level of the member states of the Council before the decision on the witnessed measures was taken. However, the fact that three countries implemented these measures, and two countries, Oman and Kuwait, abstained from implementing them, can be considered a violation of this article that imposes consensus. Qatar used its right to “diplomatic protection” and contracted with a legal committee to restore those rights

Article 10 of the same charter provides for the resolution of disputes and disputes between member states within the framework of the Dispute Settlement Commission. Some Gulf countries are anticipating this procedure, an illegal penetration. Violation of the principle of transparency, which stipulates “the necessity of the obligation not to impose non-tariff restrictions to restrict imports except within certain limits,” in addition to the principle of quantitative restriction of trade, which stipulates “the possibility of imposing restrictions on trade exchange between countries, while a crisis occurred in the balance of payments, or a decline in significant in monetary reserves only”, which are considered one of the most important principles of the World Trade Organization Charter. As for the Gulf states, they did not adhere to the principle of transparency and proceeded to impose restrictions on trade exchange without a crisis in the balance of payments or a serious decrease in the monetary reserve.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Miqdad, Khalil: The seven causes of the Gulf crisis and the escalation against Qatar. 2017

¹⁴¹ The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, (2017), The Crisis of Gulf-Qatari Relations: On the causes and motives of the campaign.

Therefore, these massive materials make it clear that the Gulf states, opposing Qatar's foreign policy, took illegal measures that harmed Qatar as a sovereign state, and its citizens as people who were working in Saudi Arabia in multiple legal frameworks.

Given that the nation-state is an independent political and legal entity consisting of sovereignty, the people, and the geographical region, this means that the nation-state has the right to protect its territory, its citizens, “the people,” and its independent political sovereignty from any prejudice or aggression. The sovereignty of the state is divided into three points:

- Territorial sovereignty: means the sovereignty of the state in its air, land, and territorial waters. It is felt through the state's preservation of its security in its territory and its independent political decision-making.

- Organizational or institutional sovereignty: refers to the sovereignty of the state over its embassies and consulates located in other countries.

Sovereignty linked to citizens: linked to the state's right to protect its citizens at home and abroad. The protection of citizens abroad is described as 'diplomatic protection'. If the right of a state to protect its territory from any aggression is one of the well-established rights in international law, then it also has the right to protect its people and defend their rights in other countries.

The state's right to “diplomatic protection” was confirmed by the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice issued on August 30, 1924, related to the “Mavromatis” case, which formed a dispute between “Britain and Greece” regarding the issue of concession contracts granted in Palestine. The resolution at the time stated the following: “One of the main principles of international law is that every state has the right to protect its citizens if they are harmed as a result of actions taken by other states that violate the provisions of international law if they cannot obtain appropriate satisfaction through judicial means. interior. When the state adopts the case of one of its citizens and resorts to the diplomatic path or international judicial means, it is affirming its right, that is, the right of the state to guarantee to its citizens the necessary respect for the rules of international law.

If a state, on behalf of one of its nationals, brings a case to an international court, only that state is considered by the court to which the case is brought, the claimant for compensation.¹⁴²

For its part, the International Court of Justice in the “Liechtenstein and Guatemala” case, April 6, 1955, upheld the conclusions of the Permanent International Court of Justice in the “Mavromatis” case, stressing that diplomatic protection is considered an indivisible right of the state, noting that “diplomatic protection constitutes Through judicial means, measures to defend the rights of the state.”¹⁴³

In the Barcelona Driving Forces case, 1970, the International Court of Justice noted that “a state is completely free in its assessment of the exercise of diplomatic protection, the extent of the scope of this protection, and when it expires.

Considering that Qatar felt that the demands of the Gulf states affect its regional sovereignty, it can protect and retrieve its rights through regional alliances, such as the alliance with Turkey, negotiations that are considered the fastest and most likely solution to implementation, arbitration, or judicial settlement. Given that the institutional sovereignty of Qatar has not been violated, attention is drawn to the sovereignty of citizens, which has been flagrantly violated, as a result of the expulsion of Qatari citizens and deprivation of their rights, which prompted Qatar to use its right to "diplomatic protection", and to contract with a legal committee to restore those rights.

7. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE QATARI BLOCKADE

7.1 TURKISH RESPONSE

Since the first day of the crisis, Turkey, through Turkish President Erdogan, has tried to intervene in a quick mediation, but the negative Arab position on the Turkish mediation made Turkey take a position in support of the Qatari position, by sending military forces to Qatar after the Turkish volcano ratified the agreement to strengthen bilateral relations between the two sides. The administration of the Justice and Development Party and the Turkish President “Recep Tayyip Erdogan” shares with Qatari policies in more than one file, perhaps the most important of which is the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and its

¹⁴² Berger.Linda: The Gulf Cooperation Council between Unity and Discord towards the Arab Uprisings. Security and Peace, Vol. 32, No. 4, Hot Spot Middle East (2014), p.262.

¹⁴³

various branches in the Arab and Islamic countries, which was evident in the areas of Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt, and is consistent with Qatari policies. In the areas of economic and investment cooperation, especially in the fields of energy and natural gas, in which Turkey aspires to be the confluence of gas pipelines and its extensions from Russia and Qatar to all European countries, and from here it is possible to understand the Turkish position biased towards Qatar and to take quick measures to implement and establish the base The Turkish military in Qatar, as an unmistakable indication of the level of alliance and protection, even if this Turkish protection is less important and influential than the American protection and its bases in Qatar, and it aims from this to reduce tension between the two parties.¹⁴⁴

At the beginning of the crisis, the Turkish president, whose country has good relations with both sides of the crisis, rushed to contact the Russian president and held talks with Iranian officials on the side of the crisis, to defuse the tension between the two sides. Turkey also received the Bahraini foreign minister to discuss the crisis without Erdogan's efforts yielding anything. Erdogan's call for the Gulf states to calm down and lift the air and land blockade imposed on Qatar did not fall on deaf ears in the Gulf circles. Rather, some Gulf newspapers launched a campaign against Turkey accusing it of supporting Qatar in the context of what it describes as supporting the "Muslim Brotherhood" project. The Saudi newspaper, wrote under the title of a suspicious Brotherhood scheme under Turkish sponsorship to support. (BBC), but Erdogan has reached a conviction that the margin of maneuvering against Turkey has greatly diminished and that he must take a clear position on the crisis and stand by one of them. It was cold due to the stark contrast in the two countries positions on the overthrow of Egyptian President Morsi. And the Turkish parliament's haste to ratify the military agreement between Turkey and Qatar was a Turkish message to the regional powers that Turkey is deeply concerned with this crisis and will not stand idly by if the situation in the region deteriorates. With the intensification of the Gulf crisis.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the list of demands submitted to Qatar as a violation of international laws. Erdogan expressed Turkey's support for Qatar's position on it. Describing these sanctions, which have continued since their inception, as

¹⁴⁴ Al-Amarat, Fars: The State of Qatar (730) days of siege, March 26, 2021 No. 23 (<http://www.elyomnew.com/articles/70425>)

unprecedented in the Gulf region, Erdogan said, "I say it frankly, there is a situation that is contrary to international laws, and it must be eliminated." The Turkish president indicated that his country "values and adopts Qatar's position on the list of thirteen demands, and considers it a violation of international laws."¹⁴⁵

7.2 USA RESPONSE

The first steps to prepare for the crisis of the blockade of Qatar began when the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, in partnership with the Hudson Institute, held an incitement conference, which was supervised and funded by Yousef Al-Otaiba, the Emirati ambassador in the American capital. The conference was about Qatar's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which some consider the official signal for the start of the Gulf crisis. Hours after the conference ended, hackers managed to hack the Qatar News Agency website and broadcast false news, which was used as a pretext to start the blockade of Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut ties with it.

Washington confusion

The contradiction in the positions of the staff of the American administration, especially during the first hours and days, had its effect on increasing the complexity of the crisis, and it became clear that the determinants of Washington's position are summed up in two main points, the first point being the failure to take any military steps or the use of force by the parties to the crisis, the second is the lack of the impact of any of the blockade measures and the closure of the airspace on the freedom of movement of American military aircraft at the American base of Al Udeid in Qatar, whether in its operations towards Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, which made the American message clearly and strictly visible to all parties to the crisis.

Although President Donald Trump adopted the Saudi-Emirati position for a short period - through his tweets after returning from the Riyadh conference, in one of which he said, "During my visit to the Middle East, I confirmed that the issue of funding radical ideologies cannot be ignored. From this point, Trump himself was likely an important player

¹⁴⁵ Shansis, Khadija, Basher, Khalil: The list of demands submitted to Qatar in violation of international law, 25.06.2017, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en>

in creating, fueling, and blessing these tensions, either as a result of his great ignorance of his state's relations with the Gulf states and their complexities, or as a result of his exploitation by two Gulf leaders he trusts, or for the two previous reasons together, a changing position.

However, Washington balanced its response through the response of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and their emphasis on the strategy and importance of relations between Qatar and the United States.

This was followed by the exposure of Emirati government agencies and their involvement in the hacking of the Qatar News Agency, as US Central Intelligence Agency officials leaked to the Washington Post details of a meeting of senior Emirati government officials in Abu Dhabi to discuss the Qatar News Agency hacking plan on May 23, 2017, one day before from the hacking incident.

Trump administration adopted a neutral response on the parties to the crisis, and senior US officials met their counterparts from the crisis countries, whether in Washington, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, or Doha. Washington does not stop demanding the necessity of ending the blockade and the necessity of resorting to the negotiating table by the parties to the conflict. Retired general Anthony Zinni was appointed as an envoy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the conflict, given his extensive relations with the three capitals, but he despaired of resolving the conflict and had to submit his resignation at the beginning of 2019.

Washington has a variety of relations with the Gulf capitals separately, but they are similar, although they differ in their degrees. As Washington considers the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries as one unit in planning its strategies in the region.

7.3 IRANIAN RESPONSE

The Gulf crisis certainly favored Iranian policy in the region and served the Iranian strategy aimed at weakening the Saudi position in the regional conflict. Therefore, Iran took the initiative to open its airspace to Qatari planes and to provide Qatar with all the supplies that the Gulf states had stopped. The previous decades converged with some tensions at different times. The Iran-Qatar relations witnessed the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Qatari support for the Arab alliance in the 1991 Gulf War. The Qatar-Iran relations were stable since the era of Shah “Pahlavi” until this stability turned There was a

clear hostility after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, all the way to the first Gulf War, and soon this hostility turned into an alliance following the border dispute that arose between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Khfuss area in 1992, and relations between the two countries stabilized, especially after President Khatami visited Doha in 1999. The signing of several agreements, the most important of which is the understanding of several regional and international political issues, the two countries' condemnation of the phenomenon of terrorism, and the need to distinguish between terrorist operations and legitimate resistance. In 2000, the visit of the former Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, to Tehran, at the invitation of former Iranian President Khatami, was the first visit by a ruler of a Gulf country in 20 years, and he had previously visited it in 1998 to participate in the Islamic Summit Conference, and since then it has not been interrupted. The visit of Qatari officials to Iran, and in 2006 the Emir of Qatar made another visit to the Iranian capital, and the effects of this visit were evident in July of the same year, when Qatar was the only member, in the Security Council, to vote against Council Resolution No. 1696, which demanded from among 15 Iranian members to stop work on its nuclear program. In December 2007, cooperation between the two countries reached its climax when Qatar issued an official invitation to Iranian President Ahmadinejad to attend the 28th Gulf Summit in Doha as a guest of honor. Ahmadinejad was the first foreign head of state to attend that summit, which angered the Gulf states at the time.

Permissions to pass in Iranian airspace, for example, have increased from 100 to 150 flights per day.¹⁴⁶ On June 11, 2017, Iran announced that it had sent 4 planes to Doha, each carrying about 90 tons of perishable food, i.e. mostly vegetables, and fruits, and expressed its willingness to send more as requested by the Qatari side.¹⁴⁷

It has designated a seaport to facilitate the transportation of goods and food commodities specifically to Qatar, with three shipments per week via ships.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Iran's airspace open to Qatari flights “, Tehran Times, 7 June 2017. (Visited on 24 May 2018) <http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/414038/Iran-s-airspace-open-to-Qatari-flights>

¹⁴⁷ Iran's 4th Food Shipment Sent to Qatar”, Financial Tribune, 11 June 2017, (Visited on 7 Feb 2022) <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/66128/irans-4th-food-shipment-sent-to-qatar>

¹⁴⁸ Naval arteries, alternatives to Qatar in the face of the blockade,” Al Sharq, August 30, 2017, (access date: February 6, 2022) <https://www.al-sharq.com/news/details/509955>

7.4 RUSSIAN RESPONSE

The Russian position emerged, which considered that what was happening (a matter specific to the Arab and Gulf countries), without commenting on the nature of the accusations leveled by the Gulf states against Doha, with its refusal to comment on the nature of the accusations leveled at Qatar regarding its support for terrorist organizations against which the Russian forces launch attacks inside Syria. But at the same time, she said she would carefully study all information about Doha's support for terrorism. The Russian reservation about the decision of Arab and Gulf countries to cut ties with Qatar may be due to the economic and trade relations between the two countries, especially in the field of natural gas, and Qatari investments inside Russia.

The head of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Parliament, Ozerov, was quoted by the official Russian “Novosti” news agency as saying that Moscow “carefully studies the information that talks about Doha’s alleged support for terrorism.” He added that relations with Doha "will not witness any changes." Ozerov added, "Of course, we will carefully study all the information claimed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the countries that joined them that Qatar sponsors international terrorism but Moscow has independence in developing its policies toward diplomatic relations with Qatar."

As for Peskov, Putin's press spokesman, he said in the Kremlin's first comment on the Gulf-Qatari crisis, that Moscow "does not interfere in the affairs of other countries, nor in the affairs of the Gulf states, because it values its relations with the Gulf states collectively and with each country separately." And he added, "Therefore, we are concerned with maintaining friendly relations, and we are keen to provide a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the Gulf region to settle the existing differences in its shadow," refusing to comment on a question about the validity of the accusations leveled by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt to Doha. The potential for Qatar in its current predicament is “misplaced.” For his part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during a press conference with his Belarusian counterpart, commenting on the decision of several Arab countries to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar: “This is their business,” adding: “This is their business, and these are bilateral relations between countries. We do not interfere in these decisions,

although the world believes that Russia is behind every incident in the world, I assure you that it is not.” The Russian foreign minister added: “We are convinced that any disagreements can occur. We have never rejoiced at the difficulties that arise in relations between other countries. We are interested in maintaining good relations with everyone, especially in the region where the most important thing now, is to focus all efforts to combat the common threat of all — the threat of international terrorism.” On Saturday, Moscow entered the line of the Gulf crisis, calling for dialogue between Qatar and its neighboring countries, and offering to help mediate the escalating dispute that began to directly affect the lives of thousands of Gulf citizens. Lavrov said Russia is "ready to try to do everything it can" to help settle the crisis, stressing the need for unity in the fight against terrorism. "It is clear to us that unity is necessary to achieve maximum results on this front¹⁴⁹.

Russian President Putin met in Moscow with Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman, and the two men held talks on the conflict in Syria and the reduction of oil production. In a telephone conversation with Saudi King Bin Abdelaziz, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his concern about the situation in the Gulf, especially about the tension between several Gulf and Arab capitals on the one hand and Doha on the other, warning that this might harm efforts to end the war in Syria. He discussed the distinguished bilateral relations between the two countries and the opportunities to develop them in all fields, as well as the developments in the region and cooperation to combat extremism and terrorism in pursuit of security and stability in the region.¹⁵⁰

Putin stressed that the crisis is not conducive to fighting terrorism and finding a settlement in Syria. A Kremlin statement said that Putin and Salman discussed the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf region against the backdrop of the crisis between Qatar and some Gulf states. He explained that Moscow regrets that the crisis with Qatar does not help unite efforts to confront terrorism and settle in Syria. The Russian President also discussed by phone with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi ways to solve the Gulf crisis, and the Kremlin indicated that the call was made at the request of the UAE side.

¹⁴⁹ BBC News: Will the Gulf crisis succeed where others have failed? August 29, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity-41085648>

¹⁵⁰ The Gulf Center for Strategic Studies: The Russian position on the Qatari crisis, issue: 28, July 28, 2017 <http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1082877/>

7.5 EUROPE RESPONSE

The German position on the Gulf crisis since its eruption has been frank and clear. German Foreign Minister Sigmar demanded that the blockade imposed on Qatar should be lifted because it harms efforts to combat terrorism. The German position on the crisis came, in part, as a reaction to President Trump's policies in the Gulf region and towards the European Union, as Germany began trying to play a more active role internationally through the European portal, especially after Britain's exit from the European Union, and this tendency in behavior became clear. Commenting on the Gulf crisis, the German said: "The adoption of such a "Trumpist" method in dealing with Qatar "constitutes a very great danger in a region that is primarily fraught with crises. Continuing to escalate is not in anyone's interest. As for French response it called for resolving the Gulf dispute through dialogue, as Macron expressed his country's support for all initiatives supporting the truce, and a statement issued by the French presidency expressed France's determination to make efforts through consultations with friendly countries to find a solution to the crisis. Despite Saudi Arabia's attempt to obtain French support to obtain their support for the move to besiege Qatar, he found resentments regarding this issue and therefore it was the first foreign station for the Qatari Foreign Minister, and he met with the German Foreign Minister, who reiterated Berlin's rejection of the blockade imposed on the State of Qatar, and considered Qatar as a partner Strategically in combating terrorism, and that it is an important party in the international coalition to confront ISIS, and that its weakening is a weakening of that war on terrorism.¹⁵¹

8. THE QATARI BLOCKADE AND THE GULF ECONOMY

8.1. THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE ON THE QATARI ECONOMY

There is an important observation regarding the timing of the siege crisis on Qatar, which is that the Gulf countries have been experiencing a real economic crisis since the end of 2014, due to the crisis of the collapse of oil prices. percent of GDP in 2016, and the Gulf countries, without exception, resorted to issuing bonds to borrow from the international

¹⁵¹ Al-Jazeera: France calls for a quick solution to the Gulf crisis, 7/15/2017, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2017/7/15>

market, as well as borrowing from the local market, and Saudi Arabia, for example, jumped its public debt to approach 100 billion dollars at the beginning of 2017 and resorted to Some Gulf countries to withdraw from their foreign exchange reserves or sovereign wealth funds.

Consequently, the crisis came under unfavorable conditions, and the alternative opportunity was for the blockading countries to think about improving their economic conditions rather than entering into a conflict that drains their financial and economic resources, or to turn with their resources to invest in areas that help diversify their economies that suffer from the negatives of dependence. On oil as the only resource, and here several basic conclusions can be observed:¹⁵²

1- It appears that the blockading countries were expecting to achieve a victory over Qatar and achieve their goals in the short term. Therefore, there was talk about evaluating losses, about providing food commodities, diverting flight paths, preventing some citizens from traveling, or asking other citizens to leave the countries, and the blockading countries did not realize that there are common interests more complex than short-term calculations. Some companies practice investment in various forms in the countries party to the conflict. The continuation of the crisis will lead to losses for these companies that are not limited to mere compensation, but may even change the paths of economic activities completely.

2- The Gulf blockade on Qatar has drawn a new picture of the investment climate and reality, which is more negative. Investment is affected by this new reality and the classification of the countries of the Gulf region as unstable countries. The nature of the Gulf region is seen as a single block, due to the convergence of customs and traditions, the high level of income, benefiting from the Gulf Cooperation Council agreements on trade and investment, and the free movement of capital and individuals. And other common features, which make the investment decision mainly target the six Gulf countries and not one country.

3- If the blockading countries persist in their stances by continuing the crisis or escalating their tools, there will be high costs for everyone, most notably compensation for businessmen and investors, whose decisions led the blockading countries to leave Qatar, and

¹⁵² Al-Anbari, Ahmed: The Gulf-Qatari Crisis and Its Impact on the Unity of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Center for Strategic and International Studies/University of Baghdad, Part One November 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340594511_alazmt_alkhlyjyt_-_alqtryt_wtathyrht_awn_mby_jld_jwlh

the same will be the case for Qatari businessmen who were forced to leave the blockading countries.

Also, the search by each party for an alternative that dispenses with the other, will represent additional costs, which will undoubtedly represent losses. In the event of escalation and Qatar resorting to cutting gas supplies to the UAE, for example, there will be great losses for Emirati companies to search and find the alternative, and Qatar incurred. In the early days, losses were represented in the high cost of transporting foodstuffs or providing an alternative to pastures for camels and sheep that were expelled from Saudi lands or increasing the costs of flights for Qatar Airways as a result of changing its course.¹⁵³

4- The economic pressure papers on both sides are not up to the level of conflict resolution. Going to alternatives from other sources is available, albeit costly, and the mortgage that both parties have financial resources flowing through oil revenues is a losing bet in light of the challenges of the continuing crisis of collapse. Oil prices on the one hand, and the other hand, this bet is a drain on financial resources and weakens the position of the Gulf states in the regional conflict, the most important of which is Iran, whose weakening of the Gulf states will be an opportunity for them to achieve many gains in the region.

5- The cost of litigation in international arbitration and international organizations will be high for all parties, and if one of them is awarded compensation, Qatar announced that it will resort to filing cases for compensation for losses incurred in several areas. Undoubtedly, preparing to apply for these compensations requires the existence of legal teams and fees, on the other hand, there will be costs for the defense teams, as well as the costs of compensation in the event of a ruling.

6- The two sides of the conflict sought to gain support from internationally and regionally influential countries, and the regional and international powers dealt with the logic of interests, so deals were made and investments were pledged to support one party against another. Where there is duplicity in the position of the US administration, Trump supports Saudi Arabia and the rest of the blockading countries to the point of accusing Qatar of

¹⁵³ Al-Anbari, Ahmed: The Gulf-Qatari Crisis and Its Impact on the Unity of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Center for Strategic and International Studies/University of Baghdad, Part One November 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340594511_alazmt_alkhlyjyt_-_alqtryt_wtathyrht_awn_mby_jld_jwlh

supporting terrorism, and another party from the US administration visited Qatar and announced its support for its position.¹⁵⁴

If Qatar ended the F-15 plane deal worth \$21 billion and announced its intention to buy 10% of the shares of American Airlines, Saudi Arabia preceded in May 2017 and concluded economic and military deals worth about \$450 billion with America during Trump's visit. The two sides' efforts to attract countries' support for their stance are witnessing a state of escalation by the dialogue countries, as Omar Ghobash, the UAE ambassador to Russia, announced thinking about the request of the trading partners of the blockading countries to stand against Qatar, considering the request of the trading partners of the blockading countries to stand against Qatar, as well as the thinking of the blockading countries in Qatar, is expelled from the Gulf Cooperation Council.

7- It is important to point out a high cost, and it may not be transparent to show the size of its cost to all parties to the crisis, which is the cost of soft tools, such as the employment of the media with its various tools, as well as public relations companies, and the promotion of propaganda that supports each party. And if at the Arab level the conflict countries have some tools, the matter in the West and America is very different in terms of cost, especially if the crisis continues for long periods.

Some estimates go that Qatar's annual losses from the blockade will be around \$15 billion if the crisis continues in the long term, and that this amount does not represent a weakness for Qatar in light of its merchandise exports reaching \$77 billion annually,¹⁵⁵ in an atmosphere of low oil prices, and that Any improvement in oil prices will have a positive impact on increasing Qatari export revenues, which will help reduce the economic impact of the blockade on Qatar.

The crisis imposed on Qatar in the short term some economic costs represented in the high cost of transporting foodstuffs that were imported from Turkey and Iran via air transport, due to the high cost of air transport compared to what was the situation in the use of land

¹⁵⁴ Al-Rantisi, Mahmoud: Turkish Policy towards the Crisis of Qatar and Its Neighbors: Combining Medium Power between Hard and Soft Power Tools. *Middle East Studies*, 1-21 (2020) 274-295, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1181038>

¹⁵⁵ Khudair, Majid: The Elements of Qatar's Foreign Policy: A Study of Political Behaviour, *Journal of International Studies*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 49, 2011

roads to import foodstuffs from Saudi Arabia. Qatar also has to use larger areas of warehouses to secure their needs for longer periods in anticipation of prolonging the crisis. But in the medium and long term for the continuation of the crisis, Qatar can replace air freight with sea transportation, which was done recently via Turkish and Iranian ships, and its cost will undoubtedly be much lower than the cost of air transportation, and the cost may be very close to the cost of land transportation. It is widely seen in political employment, especially in light of political conflicts.¹⁵⁶

The State of Qatar announced that it has cash reserves estimated at \$40 billion, in addition to its sovereign fund holding about \$300 billion of liquid able investments at any time. It is worth noting that the Qatari money market, as well as the Qatari riyal, witnessed a significant decline at the beginning of the crisis, but after the first week passed, the situation returned to normal transactions in both the money market and the exchange rate of the riyal. Although Qatari businessmen achieved tangible gains from the decline in the prices of some shares, which fell due to the exit of Emirati and Saudi investors from the market and selling their shares.

Qatar incurred an additional cost, represented in an alternative measure to pastures for about 15,000 heads of camels and sheep that were expelled from Saudi lands, which led to the Qatari government's commitment to providing fodder and water in the quantities necessary for these animals, which were grazing in Saudi lands without return.

As part of Qatar's efforts to confront the possibility of using the food security paper against it, it took a step that is more of political employment than a step that has economic implications, as it was contracted to import 4,000 cows from Germany, where the first batch of them arrived, and the contribution of these cows is estimated in the event of the arrival of full numbers Cows agreed to provide 30% of Qatar's dairy needs. The meaning here is that Qatar lacks the ingredients for animal investment in terms of agricultural land, fodder

¹⁵⁶ Al-Hiti, Ahmed, Ibrahim, Mustafa: Gas production and consumption in the State of Qatar, available capabilities and export capabilities, Anbar University Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Volume 7, Issue 13, 2015

production, or provision of freshwater, and the import cost may be less than the cost of caring for livestock in Qatar.¹⁵⁷

8.2 THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE ON THE ECONOMIES OF THE BLOCKADING COUNTRIES.

Conflicts between states remain one of the most important reasons for the depletion of their wealth, as well as waste opportunities for cooperation and integration between the economies of the conflicting countries. The Gulf conflict falls within the circle of adversarial conflicts, and there will not be a winner and a loser, and based on this axiom, it is necessary to monitor the economic losses borne by both parties, after months of the siege imposed on Qatar.

The identification of economic losses will stop in light of the term that the crisis will live in, in the short, medium, or long term, and we cannot determine this term now, given the apparent absence of success in the endeavors diplomatic or political, whether that took place within the framework of the Gulf House through the mediation of the State of Kuwait, or from abroad through US and French officials, or Turkish President Erdogan.

The losses of the airlines of the blockading countries were estimated two weeks after the crisis at about \$100 million, which represents 20% of their revenues. It is difficult for it to bear such losses unless both Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledge to compensate it for those losses, which is very likely.¹⁵⁸

The blockading countries also lost about \$10.4 billion, which is the volume of Qatar's trade exchange with the Gulf countries, and although the figure is not influential for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in light of their oil exports, the implications of Qatar's shift towards Turkey and Iran with this amount on the unity of the GCC countries, and its lack the components of the economic unit project.

At first glance, some thought that Saudi Arabia possessed a strong pressure card against Qatar through its supply of major foodstuffs, especially since the crisis occurred during the month of Ramadan, but the reality showed losses incurred by companies that were

¹⁵⁷ Abdel Hafez El-Sawy, (2017), The blockade of Qatar, the economic losses of the parties to the crisis, the Egyptian Institute for Studied

¹⁵⁸ Abdel Hafez El-Sawy, (2017), The blockade of Qatar, the economic losses of the parties to the crisis, the Egyptian Institute for Studied

committed to supplying these foodstuffs to Qatar, especially since the decision to ban It was not from Qatar, and there are penal conditions regarding these supplies in the event of their late arrival, and Saudi companies did not stand idly by but resorted to Omani ports to fulfill some of their obligations. The Saudi authorities had announced that they would compensate the affected companies for their losses as a result of the implementation of the blockade.¹⁵⁹ The Saudi authorities also pledged to provide jobs for Al-Jazeera journalists after asking them to return to their country, but the rest of the professions were not talked about, especially since Saudi Arabia suffers from a high unemployment rate of 12.3%.

As for the UAE, perhaps the UAE is one of the largest siege countries that is threatened with greater losses as a result of its participation in the siege on Qatar, where major Emirati contracting companies or foreign companies based in the Emirates have projects related to infrastructure in Qatar, especially those related to projects to prepare for the upcoming World Cup competition. to be organized by Qatar in 2022.

The Qatari gas card is still against the Emirates, and in the event of an escalation of the crisis, Qatar may resort to it, although the Qatari administration has announced more than once that it will not use the gas card against the Emirates or Saudi Arabia.

At the level of the UAE, Al-Tamimi explained that its losses are huge, as it invested in Qatar between 2015 and 2016 at least 2.5 billion dollars, and the volume of its demand for gas will triple in the next five years, and it is not known whether Qatar will continue to supply it with the gas that it obtains.¹⁶⁰ It is easily compared to the high cost of the alternatives.

Also, the loss of Jebel Ali Port in Dubai to its commercial status as a major port in the Gulf has exacerbated the economic crisis of the Emirates, which it is now suffering from. Qatar's imports through this port constituted 3% of the volume of its activity. It is difficult for him to compensate for this number, especially since Hamad International Port has begun

¹⁵⁹ Al Sabawi, Fahd: The Role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Independence of the Arab Gulf Emirates 1968-1971, Journal of Tikrit University for Human Sciences, Volume 22, Issue 7, October 2015.

¹⁶⁰ Karam, Muhammad: Cutting Diplomatic Relations: Concept and Reasons, The Arab Journal of Political Science, The Arab Association for Political Science in cooperation with the Center for Arab Unity Studies, No. 16, Fall 2007.

to operate at its large capacity, in addition to the ports of the Sultanate of Oman, and the port that Khartoum and Doha intend to build in Sudan.¹⁶¹

As for Bahrain, it is the loser and the absent present in this crisis, because its economy is largely dependent on Saudi Arabia, which is mired in a stifling economic crisis as a result of the wars that finance it, and the increase in unemployment, which has reached one million unemployed people.

It is expected that the suspension of the blockading countries' exports to Qatar will harm many producers and exporters, whose exports to Qatar in 2016 amounted to about five billion dollars, according to International Monetary Fund data.

He added, "It is true that these exports represent a small percentage of the total exports of the blockading countries. Almost all of them are non-oil exports, and from companies affiliated with the private sector," which he said are in dire need of increasing their activities, especially in light of the economic slowdown in the countries of the region.

The Omani economist, Yousef Al Balushi, believes that the Gulf crisis harms everyone, even if the damages vary from one country to another. A great industrial revolution due to the need for many tools, industrial methods, production, and progress processes, and this is what the evidence indicates that Qatar may succeed in it, especially in the field of manufacturing the raw materials that it was importing from the blockading countries.¹⁶²

As the Gulf crisis opened the eyes of the rest of the Gulf countries to the dangers of dependence on others, the Sultanate of Oman accounts for about 20% of its exports to China, while its imports from the UAE constitute 80%, and this will change soon after the blockade of Qatar, which shook the confidence of the GCC states in each other.

It is considered the integration of the economic relationship between peoples and governments so that the economic cycle continues naturally, as the Gulf crisis showed the great gap between the decision-maker and between individuals and institutions, so the decision-makers in the blockading countries caused this crisis without thinking about interests.

¹⁶¹ Al-Misfer, Mohammed: The winners and losers in the Qatar siege, middle east monitor, March 3, 2020 <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200303-the-winners-and-losers-in-the-qatar-siege/>

¹⁶² (<https://www.aljazeera.net>)

9. THE TURKISH ROLE IN THE CRISES

It was not easy for the Turkish side at first to decide to support Qatar in light of the prevailing regional and international conditions, but it did so quickly based on strategic considerations, and in the end, it was forced to make concessions that included rapprochement with Iran, despite the prevailing dispute with it in several Regional squares, to ensure the effective delivery of supplies to the besieged Doha.

Turkey rejected the accusations made by the countries of the blockade, and quickly worked on three axes, political, economic, and military, to support Qatar. Ankara categorically condemned the blockade, and demanded an end to it on the initiative of Saudi Arabia, through King Salman in particular. It also maintained the positive message sent through diplomatic and media channels to resolve the issue through dialogue, avoid escalation and retract the decisions taken, to keep channels of communication open with all players.¹⁶³ The Turkish authorities sent directives to their representatives in international institutions to support the Qatari position and communicated with major powers and Islamic countries to urge them not to be drawn into the position of the Quartet hostile to Qatar.

In the Qatari calculations, Turkey is a strategic partner by the agreement signed with Qatar at the end of 2014, and therefore it was expected that Ankara would do what it had done under these agreements, in addition to the fact that Doha was the first to condemn, in July 2016, the coup attempt. failed in Turkey, and therefore it was reasonable to expect that the favor would be repaid in time of need.¹⁶⁴

For the Iranian side, the outbreak of the Gulf crisis against Qatar represented a golden opportunity. The crisis led to the dismantling of the regional axis of countries that had been working in recent years to repel Iranian influence in the region. The crisis has also distracted the regional and international focus on dealing with Iranian policies as the biggest source of danger, and many countries and groups were forced to approach Iran and Turkey in an attempt to protect themselves from the encroachment of the Quartet axis. Tehran took the opportunity to get closer to Qatar and sent positive messages through several officials

¹⁶³ Bernd Kaussler, *Tracing Qatar's Foreign Policy and its Impact on Regional Security*, Series: Research Paper, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, 2015.

¹⁶⁴ Alrantisi, Mahmut: *Qatari-Turkish Relations*, SITA Publishing, first edition, Oct 2021 Istanbul. ISBN: 978-625-7712-51-4

calling for a solution to the crisis through dialogue, and at the same time expressing its willingness to help break the siege.

Doha was not late in benefiting from this Iranian openness, but it was keen to make it selective to benefit as much as possible from Iran's geographical proximity in the economic aspect of the crisis. All the steps that Doha took later (bilateral or multilateral agreements, returning the ambassador to Tehran, mutual visits...etc) were aimed at breaking the siege and not developing a political alliance with Iran, and this ultimately served both parties, and there was no problem The Iranian side understands the Qatari accounts.

With a population of about 2.5 million, Qatar is a peninsula that is connected by land to the outside world through a single port on the border with Saudi Arabia, which is the Abu Samra crossing. To meet the needs of its population of basic and consumer foodstuffs, Qatar relies almost entirely on imports from abroad. About 80% of its food needs come across the border with Saudi Arabia, or through the Jebel Ali port in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁶⁵

This situation means that food security in Qatar is an obvious weakness. In this sense, the blockade imposed by the countries hostile to Qatar targeted the soft flank of Doha, and since the political and diplomatic tools were not enough to make Doha submit and accept the bargaining of its sovereignty and independence, the blockading countries decided to use the economy, money, and trade as a weapon to force Qatar to surrender.

It was important for Qatar to maintain contact with the outside world to prevent the blockade from undermining it, and the means to achieve this was its fleet of Qatar Airways planes, as well as its later opening of Hamad Port. The time factor was the number one enemy for Doha. The Gulf emirate indeed possesses a huge financial wealth, but it was not in a position to take advantage of that to break the siege, especially with the quartet that is hostile to it cutting off banking transactions, and preventing middlemen or third parties from sending their goods or Their services to and from Qatar, in addition to trying to manipulate the Qatari currency, so the Turkish intervention was decisive in this context, and the openness to Iran helped accelerate the pace of support from Ankara to Doha.

¹⁶⁵ Gulf blockade disrupts Qatar Airways flights”, Aljazeera, 7 June 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/gulf-blockade-disrupts-qatar-airways-flights-170606081841215.html>

The Turkish and Iranian authorities have increased permits for Qatari planes to pass through their airspace, and planes bound for Europe have been diverted through Iranian and Turkish airspace and those headed to Africa via Iran and the Sultanate of Oman and from there to the south.¹⁶⁶

These alternative measures disrupted the immediate effects of the air blockade. Although this included an increase in the costs of trips as well as in the time allotted to them, it secured an important lifeline for Doha¹⁶⁷. This step ensured the Qatari government the ability to reassure its citizens and the outside world, as it can withstand and is ready to challenge the illegal actions of the quartet and Britain.

Turkey, as Doha's main regional ally, has established an air bridge to break the economic blockade imposed on Qatar. During the first hours of the blockade on June 6, 2017, Turkish goods began to flow into Doha via Turkish Airlines air cargo planes loaded with foodstuffs, especially milk, yogurt, eggs, and chicken. Soon, Qatari and Qatar Airways military cargo planes joined the Turkish air bridge, and the daily air route between the two countries witnessed the largest possible number of aircraft in the history of flights between Turkey and Qatar to the extent that some indicated that the Turkish government allocated a single station for airlines Qatar Airways at Sabiha Airport in Istanbul.¹⁶⁸

Within 48 hours, Turkish goods had flowed into the Qatari market, ending any possibility of Qatar being suddenly strangled by the Quartet of the blockade. In less than 10 days, Turkish and Qatari giant cargo planes had made no less than 40 flights, transporting no less than 2,800 tons of food.¹⁶⁹ According to the Turkish Minister of Economy, during the first 15 days of the blockade, about 105 planes transported goods daily from Turkey to Doha, an average of about 7 planes per day.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Iran's airspace open to Qatari flights “, Tehran Times, 7 June 2017. (Visited on 24 May 2018) <http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/414038/Iran-s-airspace-open-to-Qatari-flights>

¹⁶⁷ BBC Arabic News: Turkish parliament approves sending military forces to Qatar website, on (7/June/2017), available at the following link: <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middle-east-40186368>

¹⁶⁸ Turkey, Qatar build 'air bridge' with aid air traffic”, Daily Sabah, 17 June 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2017/06/17/turkey-qatar-build-air-bridge-with-aid-air-traffic>

¹⁶⁹ Turkey, Qatar build 'air bridge' with aid air traffic”, Daily Sabah, 17 June 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2017/06/17/turkey-qatar-build-air-bridge-with-aid-air-traffic>

¹⁷⁰ Iran's 4th Food Shipment Sent to Qatar”, Financial Tribune, 11 June 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/66128/irans-4th-food-shipment-sent-to-qatar>

On the maritime front, Turkey sent its first naval vessel carrying 4,000 tons of food and goods to Doha on June 21, 2017.¹⁷¹ This is to reduce costs and maintain a continuous flow of goods, especially since aircraft loads are expensive and not feasible in the medium and long term. After that, a direct Turkish-Qatari maritime line was launched from the port of Izmir to Hamad Port, as part of a series of new direct marine lines that were opened between Doha and several cities in the world in Kuwait, Oman, India, and Pakistan. And in August 2017, the first direct transport service for refrigerated goods was launched between Qatar and Turkey to operate regularly with sailing every 20-25 days, to arrive from the Turkish port of Izmir within 11 days.¹⁷²

On the land front, Turkey has the largest fleet of transport trucks in all of Europe. Turkish trucks loaded goods to Doha via Iran but encountered some logistical problems and delays. Some Iranians believed that Turkey overtook them and was quick to take advantage of the crisis in a way that robbed them of an assumed share in the Qatari market.¹⁷³ which prompted Doha and Ankara to involve Tehran in a tripartite agreement whose mission is to facilitate the transfer of goods from Turkey to Qatar, in addition to benefiting from proximity. The geographical location of Iran to import part of the goods directly from Iran, especially those that may be damaged if their shipment is delayed. The importance of this landline is that it reduces the cost of transportation by about 80% compared to air transportation. In terms of time, the trip from Turkey to Qatar takes about 9 to 11 days, less than the sea trip, and it can be reduced to less than two days from the nearest Turkish point on the border with Iran.¹⁷⁴

At the beginning of June 2017, a Turkish delegation of two high-ranking people went on an unannounced visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi officials at the highest level

¹⁷¹ Turkey sends 4,000-ton food shipment to Qatar”, TRT World, 22 June 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.trtworld.com/mea/turkey-sends-4000-ton-shipment-of-food-to-qatar-385084>

¹⁷² Naval arteries, alternatives to Qatar in the face of the blockade,” Al Shariq, August 30, 2017, (date of entry: May 24, 2018). <https://al-sharq.com/page-not-found.html>

¹⁷³ Turkey to Expedite Efforts on Transit to Qatar via Iran”, Financial Tribune, 18 January 2018, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/80240/turkey-to-expedite-efforts-on-transit-to-qatar-via-iran>

¹⁷⁴ Qatar-Turkey Trade Route Via Iran to Cut Transportation Cost”, Financial Tribune, 15 August 2017, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/70372/qatar-turkey-trade-route-via-iran-to-cut->

in the kingdom, just a few days after the outbreak of the crisis. The delegation, which was commissioned by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, returned from the Kingdom without obtaining adequate answers to its questions but concluded through a sentence that was heard that there is a major escalation ahead.¹⁷⁵

After assessing the outcomes of the meeting on the one hand, and the acceleration of events in the Gulf crisis on the other, the Turkish side on June 7, 2017, just two days after imposing a blockade on Qatar, expedited the necessary procedures in Parliament to approve a bill allowing the deployment of Turkish military forces In Qatari territory, based on the basic defense agreement concluded between Qatar and Turkey in December 2014 and other agreements attached to it, especially in 2015 and 2016.

On the following day, the President of the Republic approved the decision, which entered into force immediately, and on June 22, 2017, Ankara sent a new batch of its forces, consisting of 5 armored vehicles and 23 soldiers, to join about 88 soldiers who had previously been stationed at Tariq bin Ziyad base.¹⁷⁶ The flow of Turkish forces continued in the form of batches, the last of which was on December 26, 2017,¹⁷⁷ when reports indicated that the two sides were seeking to raise the number in the future to 3,000 Turkish soldiers, noting that the base can accommodate about 5,000 soldiers.¹⁷⁸

Although the first batches were small in number, the timing of the Turkish decision, as well as the military content that stipulates the commitment of the Turkish side to defend its ally militarily if necessary, sent a very clear message to the axis of the blockading countries on more than one level:

It caused a psychological shock to the countries at the axis of the siege and complicated any military steps they might have, especially since they believed that the

¹⁷⁵ Baker, Ali Hussein, "What You Do Not Know About Turkey's Effort to Resolve the Gulf Crisis," Al-Qabas, No. 15817, June 12, 2017, p. 35

<http://pdfs.alqabas.com/2017/06/12/15817.pdf>

¹⁷⁶ Butler, Daren and others, "Turkey sends Qatar food and soldiers, discusses Gulf tensions with Saudi", Reuters, 22 June 2017 (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-turkey-saudi/turkey-sends-qatar-food-and-soldiers-discusses-gulf-tensions-with-saudi-idUSKBN19D0CX>

¹⁷⁷ Turkey sends more troops to Qatar", Aljazeera, 27 December 2017, (Visited on 2 Feb 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/171227051912500.html>

¹⁷⁸ Uras, Umut, "No timeline set for further Turkish forces in Qatar", Aljazeera, 31 January 2018, (Visited on 24 May 2018) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/turkey-deploy-air-naval-forces-qatar-180131151537660.html>

division of American institutions and their reluctance to intervene decisively to end the crisis might provide an opportunity for military escalation.¹⁷⁹

The balance of power that was imbalanced at the beginning of the crisis, and in this sense prevented the military escalation because it made the blockading countries very costly to think of the military option. As a result, Doha is in a better position after securing its economic and military side, allowing it sufficient time to benefit from its political, diplomatic, and financial capabilities while securing its internal front from external risks.¹⁸⁰ The Turkish decision obligated the US side to rush to contain the situation so that it does not lose its credibility either or the credibility of its security guarantees represented by its military base, not only for Doha but for all the small countries that depend on the US ally to neutralize external dangers.

The crisis has greatly and unusually developed the Qatari-Turkish alliance, as well as opened a hole in the wall of the relationship with Iran. The context of events shows that Doha does not want to stand at the level of reaction only, but rather wants to take the initiative and transform the temporary steps that were taken during the first months of the blockade into sustainable policies, which it is already doing.

Politically, the first foreign visit of Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani during the siege to Turkey reflected this trend, and Doha hosted the third session of the Joint Higher Strategic Committee between the two countries, in November of 2017, to confirm this. Economically, the two parties seek to transform the temporary trade boom to give sustainable momentum to bilateral economic relations in the future, especially in the fields of trade, food, construction, pharmaceutical industries, transportation, plastic industries, and other sectors.¹⁸¹

Defensively, the alliance between the two parties appears stronger than ever, with Doha hosting the first Turkish military base in the Arab world, and the armaments deals Doha

¹⁷⁹ Babak, Mohammad: Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar's Emergence in Perspective, *The International Spectator*, 07 Jun 2017, VOL. 52, NO. 2

¹⁸⁰ Pulliam, Sara: Qatar's Foreign Policy Building an International Image, Khamasin, *The Journal of the American University in Cairo's Department of Political Science*, (2013)

¹⁸¹ Al-Kuwari, Ali: The Dangers of American Policy and the Challenges to Confronting It: The Case of the Cooperation Council Countries, p. 3 (2010). From: http://dr-alkuwari.net/sites/akak/files/ameracia_and_gulf.pdf

signed with Turkish defense companies at the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition “Dimdex 2018.”¹⁸² reflect the future vision of this alliance. And ensuring that Ankara effectively contributes to the components of the Qatari defense strategy.

10. RECONCILIATION

The parties to the Gulf reconciliation are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain. However, in the presence of a Qatari-Saudi understanding only, and the absence of the Emirates and Bahrain, the reconciliation is still a formality. In the beginning, the crisis focused on three main files: the file of the Qatari relationship with Turkey, the file of the Qatari relationship with Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s file, they were the main files that made up the crisis, and they are the same ones that negated the Gulf reconciliation. The best way out of this controversy, according to Majed Al Turki, is to cancel the term Gulf reconciliation.¹⁸³

The General Secretariat of the Gulf Council failed to activate the mechanisms of the dispute resolution system within the Council. This is not called reconciliation, but it can be called a rapprochementt presence of the Emirates, because the absence of Bahrain, the taci¹⁸⁴ and the presence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia only are considered semi-conciliation. Considering a procedural reconciliation, as Saudi Arabia has a diplomatic representation between Qatar and there is an exchange of official visits, and on the other hand, economic and political cooperation through joint committees. crisis. In the relationship between Qatar and Bahrain, there is no procedural reconciliation except in terms of signing the Al-Ula Charter, and assuming that the contract is the Sharia of the Contracting Parties, it cancels, for example, the actual existence of the crisis, but the lack of other procedures that indicate actual interests, such as embassies, official offices, and others.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Turkish defense companies clinch key deals in Qatar”, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 March 2018, (Visited on 2 Feb 2022) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-build-two-training-warships-for-qatar-navy-128714>

¹⁸³ Majid Al-Ansari: The Qatar Siege Crisis, on YouTube 03/08/2018 <https://youtu.be/shbR8drwDKY>

¹⁸⁴ Al Jazeera: Qatari royal: Gulf crisis to seize Qatar's wealth, January 19, 2018

¹⁸⁵ Majid Al-Ansari: The Qatar Siege Crisis, on YouTube 03/08/2018 <https://youtu.be/shbR8drwDKY>

The reasons for the reconciliation are somewhat artificial because Qatar did not respond to any of the demands of the blockading countries, which led to the establishment of 6 principles by the blockading countries to reach reconciliation, which was agreed upon.

1- Commitment to combating extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe-havens.

2- Stop acts of incitement and speech inciting hatred or violence.

3- Full commitment to the 2013 Riyadh Agreement and the 2014 supplementary agreement and its executive mechanisms within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

4- Commitment to the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-American Summit, which was held in Riyadh in May 2017.

5 - Refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of states or supporting outlaw entities.

6- Acknowledging the responsibility of the countries of the international community in confronting all forms of extremism and terrorism as they represent a threat to international peace and security.

The main thing in the reconciliation is Iran's strike on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia in September\2019, according to US intelligence, Iran destroyed Aramco with drones and ballistic missiles that disrupted Saudi oil production by 5 million barrels and 5% of the world's production. Trump did nothing to support Saudi Arabia except to send batteries Missiles remained in Saudi Arabia for a while, then Biden took them now, which shows that there is no partnership between a strong party and a weak party, either you are dependent or you are strong and your strength is equivalent to the other party in a relative way to the existence of a partnership and that despite the historical Gulf disputes, diplomacy and lack of intensity dialogue played a major role in balancing Gulf relations, and accordingly, the thing that prevented the continuation of the blockade is the change in the US presidency and Biden's coming to power.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Al-Anbari, Ahmed: Iranian-Gulf relations and their developments after the year 2011, Journal of International Studies, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, No. 66, 2016

Regional and international changes are a major driver that leads to reconciliation, after one of the 13 demands was the problem of the Qatari-Iranian relationship, Saudi Arabia now comes to understanding. Iran, on the other hand, stripped the Emirati-Turkish rapprochement. On November 24, 2021, the President of the Emirates visited Turkey and injected a large sum of money estimated at 10 thousand billion dollars to help the lira that showing a change in alliances.

The challenges facing the region and the Gulf region, in particular, require another different awareness, whether the shift in the path of international power, for example, the United States of America to delegate it to regional incubators such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey, became the local Arab interests that collided with international interests before the Arab Spring,¹⁸⁷ which resulted in the Arab Spring and turned into a worse situation. The situation has shifted to take into account regional interests, and international interests have become somewhat elevated, meaning that the Arab world is facing a regional challenge with regional incubators and international wills.

Israel and Iran are imposing their wings on the Arab world. Turkey is watching the situation and moving along tracks parallel to the two polar tracks. The problem lies in the disappearance of the Gulf will, which began to disappear in the light of these facts. New alliances have begun to appear in their economic external form, and this is absorbed, but there is no life for an economic alliance if it is not of political essence. So, the Gulf challenge is great, because, for the first time in the Gulf dispute over the years, the dispute turns from a leadership matter that is resolved in offices to a popular dispute, and the scene is led between the mob.

¹⁸⁷ Guzansky, "The Foreign-Policy Tools of Small Powers: Strategic Hedging in The Persian Gulf," pp. 112–22.

CHAPTER 3

CONSEQUENCES OF TURKEY-QATAR RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS

1. REASONS FOR TURKEY'S SUPPORT TO QATAR DURING THE CRISIS

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan considered that the list of conditions supposed to be followed by Doha to end the blockade imposed on it by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain is a violation of international law and goes beyond the borders to constitute an attack on the rights of an independent country. Ankara initially presented itself as a neutral party in the Gulf crisis, as its Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on June 6 that all Arab countries are Sunni brothers and friends of Turkey. It was not expected that this crisis would last for a long period of more than three years. Qatar is Turkey's main ally in the Gulf. The two countries are very much in agreement about the policies that each of them pursues at the Middle Eastern and international levels. Therefore, the threat of this main ally of Turkey led to Turkey's attempt to solve the crisis. In this context, the Gulf demands contained an article demanding Qatar to suspend the Turkish military base, as the deployment of forces came in implementation of an agreement between the two countries that was signed in 2014 but was only implemented with the Gulf crisis.

Erdogan confirms through his support for Qatar that it is not only Qatar that needs Turkey, but Turkey also needs this Qatari ally. Although Turkey has relations with other countries such as Iran or Russia, the level of relations between Ankara and Doha cannot be compensated by any other relations, as there are differences, for example, with Iran in Syria, but the situation with Qatar is different, which makes Qatar the only country in which Ankara can build strategic relations with her in the area. But there is another factor that plays a role in Turkey's support for Qatar. The two countries share the same vision of Islamic countries in the Middle East. While Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Cairo stand on the opposite side of the forces that emerged following the so-called Arab Spring.

These four regimes also adopt conservative attitudes towards the rest of the Islamic countries in the region. Except for the military-backed regime led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, all of these regimes are monarchies, and they all panicked when former US President Barack Obama stopped his country's support for former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

in 2011, which paved the way for the "Muslim Brotherhood" to reach power in 2012. These monarchies view the Brotherhood as a threat to their hereditary systems of rule, a vision with which Doha differs despite its hereditary regime, while Cairo sees them as a threat to its military-based regime. On the other hand, Ankara and Doha supported the Muslim Brotherhood, which saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to pounce on the authoritarian regimes in the region that had long banned this movement. Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly defended this movement in February, stressing that it is not an armed movement, but is an ideological organization.¹⁸⁸

Turkey has received many members of the Brotherhood fleeing from Egypt on its soil. In addition to this, Erdogan said in 2015, two years after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Doha also enthusiastically supported the group's activities in Egypt, and the preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is seen as the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, is not only the preacher of one of the largest mosques in Doha but also has a special program on Al-Jazeera¹⁸⁹.

1.1. REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS

Turkey's role as a regional protector means that the responsibilities of leadership rest with Turkey at the regional level or based on the specific issue. Turkey's role as protector of the Middle East. It is manifested through a sense of responsibility to protect the people who suffer, and this limits the role that Turkey will play on a large scale, such as the Palestinian issue and the Syrian conflict

Qatar-Turkish relations represent a distinctive experience in the entire Middle East region, as they have achieved significant gains for both sides and reached a great extent in political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation. This dynamic has strengthened the strength of the two countries at the regional and international levels, in the sensitive

¹⁸⁸ Hassan, Fouad, what are the motives for Turkish support for Doha in the Gulf crisis? France 24, Middle East 6/26/2017, last visit on 2/21/2021 <https://www.france24.com/ar/20170626->

¹⁸⁹ Al Jazeera Channel, the Strategic Committee, a tool for cooperation, a Qatari-Turkish partnership translated by multiple agreements in all fields, 12/8/2021, (Accessed on 22/2/2022) <https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2021/12/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86>

conditions that the region has experienced since 2011. With the beginning of the Arab uprisings in the region in 2011, both Turkey and Qatar sought to achieve balance in the region, while the two countries realized that it is necessary Taking on new regional roles¹⁹⁰. As a result, the two countries in the early stages tried to display their mediation in different ways, whether in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, or Yemen. However, in most cases, these efforts have been unsuccessful due to strong resistance to change from current regulations. Thus, both Turkey and Qatar supported the popular demands¹⁹¹. On the other hand, some other regional powers acted as opponents of the forces of change and embarked on a broad anti-change program aimed at depriving the popular uprisings of any long-term political success. As a result, these forces supported all opponents of the Arab Spring, which turned peaceful demonstrations into civil and sectarian wars, as happened in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

This situation prompted Turkey and Qatar to take positions consistent with their foreign policies. As a result, both sides condemned Egypt's 2013 coup with Sisi¹⁹². In Syria, both sides tried to mediate between the regime and the opposition, but to no avail. With violence escalating in all of these locations, Turkey and Qatar have provided the Syrians with political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and logistical assistance. Turkey opened its borders to Syrian refugees, especially after the use of chemical weapons¹⁹³, after which Ankara launched three major operations to secure its borders from movements that it classifies as terrorists.

In the face of this hostile geopolitical environment, Turkey and Qatar have strengthened their relations; Discussions on establishing a strategic partnership between the two sides took place in December 2014. A year later, in December 2015, President Erdogan and the Emir of Qatar met in the State of Qatar at the first Turkey-Qatar High Strategic Committee. This meeting was decisive, and paved the way for closer relations between the

¹⁹⁰ Salloukh, Basel, "The Arab Uprisings and Geopolitics in the Middle East," *Al-Mashhad Al-Dawla* magazine (2013), (Journal 48, No. 2, pp. 32-46.

¹⁹¹ Akpinar, Pinar, "Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* (2015), *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* (2015), 17, No. 3, pp. 252-268.

¹⁹² Harunoglu, Şetinoglu, "Turkey's Escalating Partnership with Qatar and Its Implications for Turkish-US Relations," *Middle East Journal of International Affairs* (2016), *Journal 20*, No. 3, 1-11.

¹⁹³ Harunoglu, Şetinoglu, "Turkey's Escalating Partnership with Qatar and Its Implications for Turkish-US Relations," *Middle East Journal of International Affairs* (2016), *Journal 20*, No. 3, 1-11.

armies of the two countries, including military training: defense industries, joint exercises, and the deployment of military forces between the two countries when necessary¹⁹⁴, as well as the establishment of a Turkish military base in Qatar¹⁹⁵. The military base gives Turkey a similar standing to France and the United States in Gulf security. An analysis from the Washington Institute asserted that Turkey's move in Qatar will make Ankara more valuable to its Arab partners, and to an American ally that appears inclined to share the burdens of Gulf security. The new rule will also strengthen the country's independence from Qatar towards regional powers¹⁹⁶.

The two countries became targets of the Anti-Change Axis. In 2016, the failed coup against the Turkish leadership was financed¹⁹⁷, and the Emir of Qatar was one of the first foreign leaders to contact President Erdogan and confirm his rejection of any attempt to destabilize Turkey. In 2017, a blockade was imposed on Qatar by a group of countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt). The Turkish response was also decisive. The anti-Qatar Quartet issued an ultimatum with 13 requests that included the closure of the Turkish base, the Turkish defense minister immediately stated that Turkey would not close the Turkish military base in Qatar, adding that "The base in Qatar is a Turkish base. It's a base that maintains the security of Qatar and the region."¹⁹⁸. On June 7, 2017, the Turkish parliament urgently approved a law allowing the deployment of Turkish troops to the Turkish military base in Qatar¹⁹⁹. The Turkish response was not limited to military cooperation but extended to include shipments of food, water, and medicine by air and sea freight. The Turkish government also promised to provide the necessary materials to build the 2022 World Cup

¹⁹⁴ (26) Al-Hajj, Saeed, "Turkey and Qatar Look to Build a New Alliance," Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2015), accessed: February 22, 2022, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150315-turkey-and-qatar-look-to-be-building-a-new-alliance/>

¹⁹⁵ Cetinoglu, "Turkey's Escalating Partnership with Qatar and Its Implications for Turkish-US Relations."

¹⁹⁶ Decotigny, Olivier & Cagaptay, Soner, "Turkey's New Base in Qatar," The Washington Institute (2016), (accessed February 22, 2022) <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/qadt-trkya-aljdydt-fy-qtr>

¹⁹⁷ Turkey issues red notice for UAE-linked Mohammed Dahlan over his role in the coup, DAILY SABAH November 22, 2019. (Accessed on 22\2\2022) <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/11/22/turkey-issues-red-notice-for-uae-linked-mohammed-dahlan-over-his-role-in-feto>

¹⁹⁸ Al Jazeera and news agencies : Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis, July 12, 2017, (Accessed on 22\2\2022)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html>

¹⁹⁹ Baabood, A. "The International Implications of the GCC Stalemate". In Azzam & I. K. Harb, the GCC Crisis at One Year. Arab Center Washington DC, (2018), pp. 109–119

projects²⁰⁰. In 2018, when the Turkish currency became the target of speculative attacks, Qatar sided with Turkey.

The strategic partnership between Turkey and Qatar has the potential for continuity and growth. The leaders of the two countries have developed strong cooperation at the highest level in the decision-making process of the two countries. President Erdogan and Sheikh Tamim met 26 times over 5 years, this reveals the depth of the relationship between the two parties. In addition, the two sides need each other, Turkey faces many serious issues in the Middle East, the most important of which is the Syrian file. Doha was also facing a complex Gulf environment to settle the blockade file, as well as the Saudi-Iranian polarization. Even given recent developments indicating moves to repair the relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, it is unlikely that this will hinder the growth of Qatar-Turkish relations. The Turkish leadership is aware of Qatar's interest in accepting the normalization of its relations.

1.2. CONJUNCTURAL FACTORS

Qatar and Turkey have convergent thoughts and positions towards many events. One of the common factors between the two parties is crystallization in several forms, through the Palestinian issue and support for Hamas, or around the Arab Spring, and how to support the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Qatar and Turkey's position on the Palestinian issue:

Qatar and Turkey combined common positions, such as the separation of the two states and the establishment of the Palestinian state, and it is imperative to end the occupations to restore stability to the region. Both Qatar and Turkey refused the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, accepting the results of the Palestinian elections with the victory of Hamas and considering Hamas an official representative of the Palestinian people, while America refused Israel and the Western world of Hamas and its classification as a terrorist movement.

The blockade on Qatar in 2017 launched a fierce campaign against Qatar aimed at putting pressure on it to change its policy towards the Palestinian cause and the resistance in Gaza represented by Hamas and other factions that adhere to the option of resistance. It

²⁰⁰ The Peninsula : Qatar receives 3000 tonnes of food products from Turkey through Hamad Port July 5, (2019) (Accessed on 22\2\2022). <https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/05/07/2017/Qatar-receives-3000-tonnes-of-food-products-from-Turkey-through-Hamad-Port>

adheres to this role, which it considers a humanitarian and national duty. Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the former Emir of the State of Qatar, was the first Arab leader to visit the Gaza Strip in 1999 since 1967, and he was received by the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and his second visit was in October 2012 at the head of a high-ranking Qatari delegation to inspect the antiquities The devastating Israeli war, and during the visit, the Emir of Qatar provided financial assistance of four hundred million dollars to finance several projects for the reconstruction of the besieged sector.²⁰¹ The Qatari Ambassador, Chairman of the Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza, Muhammad Al-Emadi, inaugurated several reconstruction projects that have been completed in the Gaza Strip, foremost of which is "Sheikh Hamad City", in addition to the projects of power plants donated by Qatar to solve the problem of frequent power cuts in the context of the suffocating siege on Gaza²⁰².

In terms of political and financial support for the Gaza Strip, Doha had a historic position in calling for the holding of the "Emergency Gaza Summit" in January 2009 to support the Gaza Strip in facing the Israeli war, which several Arab leaders abstained from attending, including Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, The Palestinian resistance factions attended the summit and gave a speech in it. Accordingly, Doha has been constantly keen to end the Palestinian division that followed Hamas' victory in the 2006 legislative elections, and the subsequent complete control of the Gaza Strip. Qatar culminated these efforts with the signing of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and head of the Hamas political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, on the Doha Declaration in February 2012, whose provisions included accelerating the pace of Palestinian national reconciliation. Solve all the problems that exist between the two parties.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Al-Jazeera, the Palestinian issue at the heart of the campaign against Qatar, (5/6/2017)
<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/5/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89>

²⁰² Ibid

²⁰³ Al-Jazeera, the Palestinian issue at the heart of the campaign against Qatar, (5/6/2017)
<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/5/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89>

Qatar hosted several Hamas leaders on its soil after Jordan expelled them in 1999, and provided them with freedom of movement and political action. It also hosted a large number of liberated prisoners who were expelled from Palestine as part of the Wafaa al-Ahrar deal, or what is known as the Shalit deal. Doha has always had clear and strong positions towards the Palestinian cause, Jerusalem and Gaza in international forums, especially the United Nations General Assembly and international institutions such as UNESCO and the Human Rights Council, where it spoke on behalf of the Palestinian people and exposed Israeli policy in the occupied territories. This policy that Qatar has committed to the Palestinian cause, specifically towards Jerusalem and Gaza, has effectively contributed to the steadfastness of the Palestinian person in the face of Israeli and regional pressures on the resistance movement in Gaza, which has become openly targeted in the past few days and explains the fierce campaign against the State of Qatar to change its policy external²⁰⁴.

As for Turkey, the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey in 2002, and the accompanying religious-Ottoman nationalist discourse, instead of the discourse of the secular Ataturk state, constituted a turning point in Turkey's political behavior towards the Palestinian issue. This shift stemmed from the ruling ideology close to Hamas and the religious dimension of the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and from the shift in the role that decision-makers in Ankara see as moving from the West, especially after the failure of repeated attempts to join the European Union, to the East as a base for Turkey to present It is an effective regional power that possesses influential cards, including the Palestinian issue. This explains the escalation of political, economic, and cultural support for the Palestinian people and Turkey's attempt to maintain a positive relationship with the Palestinian leadership and Hamas alike, and even try to play the role of mediator in the file of Palestinian reconciliation²⁰⁵.

Turkey criticized the policy of violence practiced by Israel against the Palestinians by suppressing peaceful demonstrations, and showed clear support for the concept of the two-state solution in historic Palestine, especially since the Bush administration was the first American administration to utter the word Palestinian state, and the Turkish government has

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ Youssef, Ayman, The Palestinian Issue and Israel in Turkish Foreign Policy, Research Center, www.prc.ps

on more than one occasion reiterated its position in support of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians based on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution to the refugee issue in exchange for mutual security for both Palestine and Israel, which is almost the official Palestinian position, as well as the Arab²⁰⁶.

Turkey showed clear criticism of Israel's policies in the occupied territories, and showed support for the Palestinians in various cultural, political, social, and economic fields, and even in the fields of arts, education, and scholarships for poor Palestinian students studying in Turkish universities²⁰⁷. All this was evident in the free trade agreement signed by the Turkish government with the Palestinian government in February 2004, which stipulated the importance of the passage of goods and services between the two countries without any obstacles. In the same year, the Turkish government raised its diplomatic representation in the Palestinian territories to the rank of ambassador at the same time when the relationship with Israel was strained, especially on the grounds of the policy of repression practiced in Palestine, and on the grounds of the absence of Yasser Arafat and Ahmed Yassin at the end of the same year.

Turkey attempted to play the role of mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, especially after Hamas won the last legislative elections in 2006. Erdogan considered that the rise of Hamas came as a free Palestinian option and that his work in the future will focus on the importance of integrating Hamas into the Palestinian political system, In the regional and international systems, Erdogan also stressed the importance of making clear to them - that is to Hamas - that its non-recognition of Israel and its non-acceptance of the signed agreements will not help the negotiating and peaceful process. In the months that followed, Turkey received more than one leader from within Hamas - including Khaled Meshaal - to continue coordination and dialogue and explore the prospects for political action, especially since Hamas' experience in governance is still limited and Turkey can have an active role in the

²⁰⁶ Turkey and the Palestinians, Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, Beirut: Lebanon, 2010, p. 38-40

²⁰⁷ MOFA. Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the PLO for the benefit of Palestinian Authority, available from: <http://www.mofa.gov.ps/MneModules/agreements/Atur-pal.pdf>.

Palestinian file in general. And the file of the peace process in particular, due to its good relations with the two parties to the conflict²⁰⁸.

Turkey intends to, despite its harmony and support for the Palestinians, balance its interests with Israel, America, and the West, by continuing its escalating economic and cultural relations with Israel, although its political positions were openly and continuously critical of the policies and procedures of the occupying power on the ground²⁰⁹. One of the most important issues of Turkish helps to Qatar is the common actions or responses through regional issues such as Palestinian issue, Syria, Libya, Egypt revolution.

Turkey's response to the revolution in Libya

With the beginning of the Libyan revolution, Turkish leaders opposed any international military intervention against Libya, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to mediate with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to agree to a ceasefire. The Turkish government does not want to appear as a force participating in the foreign military intervention against Libya, because it contradicts the determinants and principles that it set for its foreign policy toward the Arab revolutions, and because it contradicts the determinants and principles it set for its foreign policy toward the Arab revolutions, and it should have also entered into competition with the French position. Enthusiastic about external intervention, and based on the calculations of France's influence and interests in the southern Mediterranean region, the Turkish position was firm about NATO's military intervention. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initially refused any role for NATO. However, there were about 25 thousand Turks from Turkish workers and technicians, in addition to the presence of more than 200 Turkish companies. With the deterioration of the situation, voices emerged in Turkey calling for the speedy evacuation of Turkish nationals from Libya, as it is a priority in Turkish foreign policy.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Bayraktar, Bora, The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from 1990s to 2010s, Akademik Bakış, Issue, 24, Vol. 12, 2019.

²⁰⁹ Ibid

²¹⁰ Koch, Omar, The Turkish position on the Arab revolutions, Al-Jazeera channel, 2011, last visit on March 7, 2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2011/6/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-2>

Turkey offered mediation that took into account all components of Libyan society, including Gaddafi and his family members, and called for parliamentary and presidential elections, but it did not receive the approval of the Libyan parties and did not take its share of international attention. Rather, Western pressures increased on Erdogan and his government, which made him change The Turkish position on the crisis in Libya, where the Turkish government began contacting members of the Libyan National Transitional Council, without this leading to the severing of contacts with Gaddafi. Then the Turkish position towards Libya developed when Turkish officials called on Gaddafi to step down, and they invited the President of the Libyan Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, to visit Ankara, and he was received by the President of the Turkish Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. With this, the Turkish position on the Libyan opposition, without conducive to severing all ties with Gaddafi, indicates that Turkey is pursuing a foreign policy that provides for long-term diplomacy.²¹¹

Turkey's response to the Syrian crisis

Recep Tayyip Erdogan considers that Turkey's interest in what is happening in Syria is different from its interest in what happened in Egypt or Tunisia, because the situation about Syria is completely different, as Turkey considers what is happening in Syria a matter that touches it completely, because "Syria is a neighboring country, and there are borders that extend over a distance of 850 km.

However, the people supporting the Justice and Development Party sided with the demands of the protest movement in Syria. The Turkish government made statements condemning the lack of response to popular demands. Erdogan and Ahmed Davutoglu made escalating statements that annoyed Syrian officials and prompted the Syrian media to launch a campaign against Turkish discourse and positions. This coincided with the increasing pressure of the United States of America, France, and Britain towards the regime in Syria, especially after imposing unilateral American and European sanctions on Syrian figures, followed by an exciting visit of the American Chief of Staff to the Turkish capital.²¹²

²¹¹ Ibdı

²¹² Koch, Omar, The Turkish position on the Arab revolutions, Al-Jazeera channel, 2011, last visit on March 7, 2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2011/6/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81->

The Turkish interest in Syria finds its reference in strategic, security, and economic considerations, as it formed Turkey's window on the Arab world, as the relationship between the two countries has strengthened in a way that transformed Syria from being considered a hostile country to the Arab Turkey's gateway, and signed with it in 2004 the Free Trade Agreement, as well as dozens of security and economic agreements and other commercials. The Turkish role in the Middle East has grown in a way that has led to the weaving of a network of relations and influence in the countries of the Arab Mashreq, and the signing of important economic and political agreements with them. The Justice Party government has concluded bilateral agreements with many Arab countries, ad canceled entry visas with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. And it was able to strengthen political and economic cooperation with most of the countries of the Arab Mashreq. All of this constituted a pivotal turning point in Turkish policy towards Arab countries, and most importantly, Turkey was considered as the model state in the Arab region, based on good and positive relations with its Arab and Islamic surroundings, in addition to its remarkable successes in the fields of development, economy, and democracy, and the relationship of religion to the state.

Turkey is playing its growing role as a rising power, and as a regional player whose role is indispensable in many of the region's crises, in addition to its role as an essential element in preserving the region's security and stability, the sovereignty of its states, and the rights and dignity of its peoples. Therefore, Turkey practiced a dual policy. On the one hand, it did not stop urging the Syrian leadership to carry out reforms and changes, and on the other hand, it embraced the opposition abroad. At the same time, external pressures come from the United States, the European Union, and NATO, in addition to that Turkey is interested in stabilizing the situation in the region, especially on its southern borders.

Turkey's response to the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt

In the early days of the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan initiated a letter to Mubarak, in which he called on him to respond to the demands of his people. It is a speech that expressed Egypt's standing with Turkey and its support for

[%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-2](#)

it in the transition to democratic life. The new Turkish foreign policy towards Egypt puts Egypt at the center of its attention and intensifies its projects towards it since the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution. However, the continuity of this Turkish vision and strategy depends so far on the AKP remaining in power. This is because they are partisan principles and vision that it is difficult to say that they have become part of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's doctrine. Hence, every mutation taking place inside Turkey is an element of danger and threat to these relations.²¹³ The relationship is based on ideological thought, as Turkey supports the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The economic factor is a major focus of Turkey's foreign policy; With Turkey heading towards more political and economic relations with the countries of the Arab world in recent years, Turkish capital has flowed towards many Arab and Islamic countries, especially Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. With the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, and Turkey's standing by these revolutions against its traditional regimes, Turkey lost many of its investments. Qatar's policies reflected a careful assessment of its interests in various countries experiencing turmoil. It sought to intervene directly and indirectly in Libya and Syria under the pretext of searching for Arab solutions to Arab problems and providing economic aid in Tunisia and Egypt.²¹⁴

Tunisian-Turkish relations were characterized by coolness during decades of the previous regime in Tunisia headed by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, but the outbreak of the revolution in 2011 made it grow at a rapid pace.

Turkey bet on new and solid relations with Tunisia; It was one of the most important countries that showed great interest in it and considered it strategically, so it supported and supported its revolution through material and logistical aid.

However, Tunisian-Turkish relations have known a faster pace, in which Tunisia has become an important point in Turkish foreign policy, especially after the revolution and the arrival of the Tunisian Renaissance Movement to power, and the latter sought to deepen relations with Turkey, which stood by the revolution and supported it. Where the Tunisian

²¹³ Koroglu, Burhan, Turkish Relations with Egypt after the Revolution: Reality and Ambitions, Al Jazeera Channel, 2011, last visit on March 7, 2022

<https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2011/10/2011103010241148202.html>

²¹⁴ Ibdj

revolution topped the headlines of all Turkish newspapers, especially the media affiliated with the Islamic trend, and civil society was active in carrying out rallies in support of the Tunisian revolution. The former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a visit to Tunisia, Tunisian officials paid attention to this visit, and Turkey provided aid to Tunisia. Ottoman era.²¹⁵

The Turkish government saw that the revolution in Tunisia helped to establish good relations with the Ennahda movement, with which they are close in ideology and Islamic intellectual background, and they stood with it and provided the necessary assistance to the Ennahda government, which caused a different behavior in Tunisia's foreign policy in terms of searching for new allies in the world. Turkey is one of the most important countries that Tunisia has attached great importance to dealing with and even considered it the next strategically for Tunisia in the future.²¹⁶

Tunisia has become a magnet for Turkish investments and Turkish businessmen. This reflects Turkey's vision of Tunisia as the most important region suitable for investment in it and in the Maghreb region, which has become an alternative to the Middle East, which is experiencing great turmoil that threatens investors and their projects. Post-revolution Tunisia seemed to look pragmatically at its international relations, and see that contentment with a European strategically does not serve it in the future. Therefore, I pursued a policy of searching for new allies, the most important of which is Turkey, which today stands by the side of the Tunisian revolution and is ready to support the emerging national democratic project in Tunisia. The strategic and economic dimension constitutes the most important dimension of the nature of these relations between Tunisia and Turkey and in the light of which determines their future and development.²¹⁷

Qatar's response to the Libyan revolution

Since the beginning of the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi's capricious dictatorship in Libya, Qatar, along with France and the United Kingdom, has played a pivotal

²¹⁵ Khalaf Allah, Al-Zubair, A reading of Tunisian-Turkish relations from different angles, Turk Plus, 2014. <https://www.turkpress.co/node/1706>

²¹⁶ Ibd

²¹⁷ Khalaf Allah, Al-Zubair, A reading of Tunisian-Turkish relations from different angles, Turk Plus, 2014. <https://www.turkpress.co/node/1706>

role in mobilizing the international community for action. It has decisively mobilized Arab support through the Arab League to enforce the no-fly zone. Hamad bin Jassim engineered the suspension of Libya from the Arab League, thus securing a unanimous support vote in favor of the no-fly zone after a confrontational battle with Algeria.²¹⁸

Qatar's military and financial assistance were crucial to the success of the Libyan uprising, particularly in enabling the emerging interim government, the National Transitional Council, to gain momentum. Beyond quickly expanding diplomatic recognition to the opposition, Qatar's Mirage fighters took part in NATO airstrikes, and Libya TV (based in Qatar) allowed the rebels to make their cause heard around the world. The goal of establishing the channel was to confront the propaganda machine of the Gaddafi regime, and it showed that Doha is deeply aware of the media's ability to influence narratives, perceptions, and events.²¹⁹

Qatar's response to the Syrian crisis

The revolution in Syria prompted Qatar's second intervention in the Arab Spring. However, there is a huge chasm between the Libyan and Syrian cases, as they are the epicenters of conflict in the regional turmoil that has gradually unfolded. While the Qaddafi regime was diplomatically isolated and politically, and geographically distant from the main regional players, Syria is at the heart of the geopolitics of the Middle East. In addition, Syria's multicultural fabric, sectarian balances, cross-border tribal ties, and political alliances ensured that the civil unrest that began in March 2011 did not remain within the country's borders. Syria has become an arena for proxy wars being waged with increasing frequency and ferocity at the hands of groups linked to both sides of the Sunni-Shiite regional divide.

Qatar's frank, flexible, and proactive role in the crisis has failed to make a direct or long-term impact, as it did in Libya the previous year. This is partly due to the emerging rivalries between the regional parties over the forces that should be supported in Syria. The inaugural meeting of the Friends of Syria, an international coalition, held in February 2012

²¹⁸ Urlexian, Christian, Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications, Malcolm Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 2014 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Ulrichsen_Qatar.pdf

²¹⁹ Barakat, "The Qatari Spring: Qatar's Emerging Role in Peacemaking,

ended in disarray, and the Saudi delegation left in protest at the inability to reach a unified position.²²⁰

Doha's political statements have become even more sharp and desperate. In October 2012, Hamad bin Jassim accused the Syrian government of genocide after another attempt at a four-day ceasefire failed. The Qatar News Agency quoted him as saying, "What is happening in Syria is not a civil war, but a war of extermination with a license to kill from the Syrian government and the international community."²²¹

Qatar's response to the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt

Qatar provided significant economic support to the transitional regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Qatari aid poured into these countries when they entered the midst of the Arab Spring. Trade relations between Qatar and Tunisia flourished following the January 2011 revolution and the election of a government headed by the Islamist Ennahda party. Particularly noticeable was the announcement in May 2012 of Qatari plans to build a refinery on the coast of the Gulf of Gabes in Skhira, Tunisia, with a production capacity of 120,000 barrels per day. The \$2 billion projects would have allowed Tunisia to refine oil from neighboring Libya and develop its capabilities as an export hub for refined products, which would expand the aging Bizerte refinery's 35,000 barrels per day refining capacity. This development was part of a broader Qatari effort to boost Tunisia's ailing economy. In 2012, Qatar also provided balance-of-payments support to the Central Bank of Tunisia to overcome the problem of the deterioration of the external balance, and Qatar International Petroleum Company supported vocational training in the oil and gas sector in Tunisia.²²²

The volume of Qatar investments in Egypt increased, especially during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood. More than 8 billion dollars were provided in aid aimed at supporting the Egyptian economy, and an appropriate contract to provide gas to alleviate the shortage of electric power during the fiery summer.²²³ During a

²²⁰ Matthew Weaver, "Saudi Arabia Backs Arming Syrian Opposition," *Guardian*, February 24, 2012

²²¹ Qatar Accuses Syrian Government of Genocide After Failed Truce," *CNN*, October 30, 2012"

²²² Qatar Refinery Play Highlights Tunisian Agenda," *Gulf States Newsletter* 36, no. 924, May 24, 2012

²²³ Bassam Sabry, "Why Qatar Supports Egypt, Why Many Egyptians Aren't Excited," *Al-Monitor*, April 17, 2013

visit by Hamad bin Jassim to Cairo in September 2012, he announced that Qatar would invest a total of \$18 billion in Egypt over five years.²²⁴

As soon as the relationship between the two parties changed after the dictatorial coup that took place in Egypt. The relationship that arose with the previous regime was of a common ideological nature, which was naturally in support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

1.3. ECONOMIC FACTORS

The relationship between Qatar and Turkey is based on brotherhood, cooperation, and understanding. The two countries have enjoyed friendly relations since the beginning of the twentieth century, and the partnership between them since the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed great growth and prosperity.

To enhance the development of economic relations between the two countries, several strategic partnerships and agreements were concluded. Among the first partnerships at the global level is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, for example, which was founded in 1969, of which Qatar and Turkey were members. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation entered into the “Agreement to Promote, Protect and Guarantee Investments among the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation”, signed in 1981. Recently, Qatar and Turkey have formalized many agreements in the field of trade and investment. In 2001, the two countries signed a bilateral investment treaty. Furthermore, to facilitate cross-border business, two double taxation avoidance agreements were signed in 2001 and 2016.

This applies in particular to the economic relations between the two countries, which witnessed in 2006 the signing of an agreement by the Qatari Businessmen Association with the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to establish the Qatari-Turkish Business Council. The main purpose of this council is to identify and develop trade, business, and investment opportunities in both Turkey and Qatar. To achieve this goal, the council organizes joint meetings among the members and helps facilitate the exchange of information. The first decade of the millennium saw several developments in the burgeoning

²²⁴ Qatar Seeks to Invest—and Secure its Footing—in the New Egypt,” Gulf States Newsletter 36, no. 932, September 27, 2012, 9–10“

commercial relations between the two countries. This prosperity is primarily due to the formation of the Qatari-Turkish Higher Strategic Committee in 2014, which was the result of the agreement signed by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan²²⁵.

The exchange of trade between Qatar and Turkey increased, because of the agreements concluded by the Supreme Strategic Committee, by more than 100% in the period from 2016 to 2020, so the trade exchange between the two countries amounted to \$1.91 billion in 2020. In the seventh meeting of the committee since its inception in 2014, the committee held The joint higher strategy between the State of Qatar and Turkey meeting its seventh session, chaired by the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Doha hosted its first session in December 2015.²²⁶ Since its establishment, it has held 7 meetings, resulting in the conclusion of nearly 90 agreements in various fields.

The Strategic Committee is the Qatari-Turkish tool for discussing ways to consolidate and develop cooperation relations between the two countries and prospects for upgrading them at various levels, especially in the fields of economy, investment, industry, defense, and security. The trade exchange between Qatar and Turkey has grown due to the agreements concluded by the Supreme Strategic Committee by more than 100% in the period from 2016 to 2020, so the value of trade exchange between the two countries amounted to \$1.91 billion in 2020 compared to about \$900 million in 2016, amid hopes of doubling These numbers over the coming years. The volume of investment between the two countries is explained by the large number of companies operating in Doha and Ankara. About 711 Turkish companies operate in Qatar, including about 664 companies with Qatari and Turkish capital, 47

²²⁵ Al Jazeera Channel, the Strategic Committee, a tool for cooperation, a Qatari-Turkish partnership translated by multiple agreements in all fields, 12/8/2021, (Accessed on 22/2/2022 <https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2021/12/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86>

²²⁶(Ibid)

companies with 100% Turkish capital, and more than 183 Qatari companies operating in Turkey.²²⁷

During its seventh session, the Emir of Qatar and the Turkish President witnessed the signing of 11 agreements in many fields, the most important of which is the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Qatar Development Bank and the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization in Turkey, and the executive program of the memorandum of understanding in the field of standardization between the Qatar General Authority for Standardization and Standardization and the Turkish Standards Institute. An agreement of understanding between the Qatari Businessmen Association and the Turkish Investment Authority was held. The agreements also included the signing of a protocol on the implementation of a letter of intent for cooperation in the areas of implementing major events between the two countries' governments, a letter of intent on emergency and disaster management, a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of ceremonies and a letter of intent on the content partnership program between the Doha Forum and the Antalya Diplomatic Forum. Accordingly, Turkish Ambassador to Qatar Mehmet Mustafa Goksu confirmed that the seventh meeting of the Qatari-Turkish Joint Higher Strategic Committee witnessed the signing of many new agreements in many fields in the presence of the leaders of the two countries.²²⁸

The agreements come within the framework of strengthening economic, political, and cultural cooperation between the two countries. Therefore, the continuation of the convening of the Supreme Strategic Committee between the two countries is an affirmation of the strength of the relations linking Doha with Ankara and the extent of the great partnership and strong alliance that unites the two countries, especially since this alliance has undergone more than one test in the coming period. Each time it increases in strength and durability. Moreover, since its establishment in 2014, the Strategic Committee's meetings witnessed the signing of 91 agreements between the two countries in all fields, and these agreements work to expand the economic, commercial, and political partnership between the two countries.²²⁹


²²⁷ Al Jazeera Channel, the Strategic Committee, a tool for cooperation, a Qatari-Turkish partnership translated by multiple agreements in all fields, 12/8/2021, (Accessed on 22/2/2022)

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Ibid

In 2016, the committee met in Trabzon, Turkey, and confirmed more partnerships in several fields, by signing multiple memoranda of understanding, signed by the two countries, the agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and the agreement on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments.

As for the year 2019-2020 at the committee meeting, the two countries emphasized strong strategic relations in all fields, especially the political, commercial, economic, and investment fields. In 2019, 7 Memoranda of Understanding were signed. In 2020, 10 memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries. It is noticeable that during the siege period 2017, cooperation and economic meetings did not stop, but rather were continuous, so 675 Turkish companies were registered in Qatar, and 182 Qatari companies were registered in Turkey, including 50 companies working in the field of construction and real estate, and 51 companies active in wholesale and retail trade. Even that the flows of foreign direct investment from Qatar to Turkey became 570 million dollars, which is the highest in the last ten years. \$1.4 billion is the volume of trade exchange between the period from the last quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of 2020.



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute – TurkStat²³⁰

²³⁰ <https://www.tuik.gov.tr/Home/Index>

This chart shows an increase in the volume of trade exchange between the two countries since the beginning of 2013, and bilateral trade between the two countries is in a period of rising, and the year 2015-2016 has gone through a little decrease. Turkey's border neighbors. However, it is noted that since the beginning of the blockade in 2017, bilateral trade between the two countries is witnessing a rise and has become in a state of continuous increase, as from 2017, which was 1.200 million dollars, it became in 2018 to more than 1.600 million dollars.

Turkish exports to Qatar

Turkish exports to Qatar have witnessed significant growth in the past few years, the main role was played by the efforts of the Higher Strategic Committee, and the effects of the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017.²³¹ While the value of Turkish exports to Qatar was 255 million US dollars and 366 million US dollars in 2013 and 2014, respectively, this number increased to 1.1 billion US dollars as in the third quarter of 2020 Turkish Statistical Institute.

Trade-in 2019 consists of 3 main products, namely:

- 1- Precious stones and minerals: \$107 million
- 2- Furniture: 105 million US dollars
- 3- Aircraft and their parts: 101 million US dollars

In addition to other products, such as electrical machinery, mechanical appliances, and boilers, a large part of the commercial inventory.

Qatari exports to Turkey

During the same period, the volume of Qatari exports to Turkey fluctuated, largely due to the change in energy prices in the same period, which had a significant impact on Qatar's annual exports. Nevertheless, the share of Qatar's total exports to Turkey during that period increased from 66.0% in 2016 to 25.1% in 2019, and this is further referred to the strong growth of trade exchange in that period.

Between 2012 and 2019, nearly 50% of Qatari exports to Turkey were petroleum and other gaseous hydrocarbons. The main products exported in 2019 include the following:

- 1- Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons: 597 million US dollars

²³¹ Invest in Turkey, 2020 <https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/publications/lists/investpublications/qatar-turkey-bilateral-trade-fdi-report-en.pdf>

2- Unwrought aluminum: \$214 million

3- Ethylene polymers in primary forms: \$59 million

Accordingly, the trade between the two parties is characterized by coordination, as Qatar is considered one of the largest producers and exporters of natural gas and other hydrocarbons in the world, and therefore it represents a major energy resource for Turkey. Furthermore, Qatar also has an abundance of raw materials and manufacturing inputs, including aluminum, polymers, and other chemical inputs;²³² On the other hand, Turkey is an exporter of several ready-to-use goods, including gemstones, auto products, finished aircraft and parts, and machinery needed in a small and wealthy country like Qatar.

2. IMPACT OF TURKEY'S SUPPORT

the political Impact of Turkey's support of Qatar and the Gulf region is manifested through Turkish mediation in the Gulf crisis. Turkey's keenness to keep the Gulf region stable, as the Turkish vision of the Justice and Development Party is based on the stability of the region, especially the Gulf region. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, about a month before the outbreak of the last crisis, during his visit to Kuwait, that Turkey and the Gulf are islands of stability in the middle of the region. Geography suffers from various problems. Turkey fears that the crisis will get out of control, which will add more threats to it, especially with the war in Syria and Iraq entering new phases. Therefore, one of the most important pillars of Turkish mediation is to emphasize the need to maintain stability and to remind the losses that the region and the concerned countries may incur if the crisis develops²³³.

It is also keen on developing bilateral relations in the Gulf, as Turkey maintains good relations with both sides of the crisis, especially in the economic field. Turkey wants to continue and develop these relations and continue to attract investments from the region and implement projects in it. Turkey in one the year 2016 succeeded in attracting foreign direct

²³² Invest in Turkey, 2020 <https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/publications/lists/investpublications/qatar-turkey-bilateral-trade-fdi-report-en.pdf>

²³³ Al-Rantisi, Mahmoud, Turkish Mediation to Resolve the Gulf Crisis: Opportunities and Obstacles, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, (2017) https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports-ar/documents/3054f834f3d449fd87bc3ff3be30afc2_100.pdf

investment worth 12.3 billion dollars, and most of these investments came from the Gulf region. Saudi investments in Turkey are estimated at \$6 billion, while the volume of Qatari investments amounted to \$1 billion, and a rise in the volume of direct Gulf investments in Turkey was recorded by 397 percent in the period from January to May 2017, compared to the previous period. Same as last year. Therefore, one of the objectives of the Turkish President's visit was to clarify Turkey's positive stance in this crisis to prevent the deterioration of bilateral relations with it, especially on the economic level, and specifically with Saudi Arabia. Where there are agreements in the field of military industrialization, and Turkey is still looking forward to major future projects with the Gulf countries. At this point, Turkey is keen to settle the crisis; Because the results of the victory of any of the parties to the crisis and the defeat of the other will be a loss for Turkey.

One of the impacts of Turkey's support to Qatar is to prevent the increase of Iranian influence in the region, Turkey realizes that the Gulf division is in Iran's interest and its policies. In February 2017, Iran summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tehran due to statements made by the Turkish Foreign Minister and the President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Iran of destabilizing the region, which is why Turkey needs cooperation and coordination with the GCC countries to confront Iranian policy, and Ankara is aware of the Gulf countries' interest in it in this point, especially since this crisis represents a great opportunity in which Iran has tried to present positions that encourage its rapprochement with both Qatar and Turkey at least in this crisis and also by exploiting the Shiite minorities in the Gulf.

Also, the fear of the repercussions of the crisis will extend to Turkey is one of the reasons for Turkey's support to Qatar. The Saudi media focused on conducting media interviews with Kurdish politicians opposed to Turkey, as it was noted the activity of the Syrian Al-Ghad movement supported by the UAE in opening a relationship with the Kurds opposing Turkey in northern Syria, and the mediation of Turkey, which shares many views on regional issues with Qatar. Therefore, Turkey's continued dialogue with Saudi Arabia contributes to Qatar's support and mitigates the damages of the process of antagonizing or inciting Turkey.

In addition, Turkey is getting benefiting from the rapprochement with the Gulf position in some of the region's files, such as the Syrian file, specifically in the future of Bashar al-Assad, safe areas and support for refugees, as well as the case in the Yemeni issue and about the Palestinian issue. its terms and interests.

Turkey's desire to restore its role that was before the Arab Spring, because the mediation role provides Turkey with an opportunity to perpetuate the new formula of its foreign policy that began with the advent of Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, which depends on increasing the number of friends and reducing the number of enemies, which was what was It was before the Arab Spring. Turkish endeavors to solve the Gulf crisis constitute an important contribution, and it is clear that Turkey is trying to make a great effort in that.

2.1. POLITICAL IMPACT

The important impact of Turkey's support to Qatar reflected politically to the four countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt) that Qatar will now be isolated from other countries and will not stay without an ally. Although the 13 demands included the closure of the Turkish military base located in Qatar, which was rejected by both parties because they believed that it is interfering in the internal policy and the will of the states. The Turkish support for Qatar and insistence on not leaving Qatar alone made the countries retreat from some of the demands and bring out other new demands. The new demands Ideas do not include the closure of the Turkish military base in Qatar.

The existing relations between Turkey and Qatar, which have solid bonds of friendship and brotherhood, are rapidly developing in all fields, and mutual visits between the two countries are gaining great momentum. There is also close cooperation and coordination between them regarding the issues of the region. The mechanism of the Higher Strategic Committee, which was established in 2014 to form the institutional structure for cooperation and high-level dialogue between the two countries, holds its annual meetings under the joint chairmanship of Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkey, and Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar. In this context, after the blockade, it held its third meeting on November 15, 2017, in Doha, Which shows the importance of Turkish-Qatari cooperation and

support²³⁴.

The fourth meeting was held on 26 November 2018 in Istanbul. During these meetings, many agreements, protocols, and memoranda of understanding were signed in various fields, which contributed to strengthening cooperation between the two countries. On the other hand, the first round of political consultations between the Turkish and Qatari Foreign Ministries was held on October 4, 2018, in Ankara, under the co-chairmanship of Ambassador Sadat Unal, Deputy Foreign Minister, and Ahmed bin Hassan Al Hammadi, Secretary-General of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs²³⁵.

Two days after the crisis started, Turkey fast-tracked two pieces of legislation to allow more troops to be deployed to a military base in Qatar that houses Turkish soldiers under an agreement signed in 2014. Other measures agreed upon included joint exercises between the armies of the two countries and the Turkish gendarmerie training Qatar's gendarmerie forces. Two weeks later, five armored vehicles and 23 military personnel from the Turkish armed forces arrived in Doha as part of the new deployment plans. As Turkey flexed some military muscle to show the world Doha was not alone, it also sent in other sorts of reinforcements.

2.2. ECONOMIC IMPACT

The blockade imposed by the four countries: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt created an opportunity for the growth of trade exchange between Qatar and Turkey. In addition to the previous agreements, the two countries signed new urgent agreements to cover any deficit in the Qatari market as a result of the blockade. Within a few days of the crisis, Turkish air cargo planes and commercial ships carrying various types of goods were making their way to Doha. The agreements were reinforced by the visit of delegations of Qatari businessmen to Turkey and the meeting of the Qatari-Turkish Joint Higher Committee. According to data provided by the Turkish Economy Minister, Nihat Zeybekci, Turkish exports to Qatar rose from \$36.2 million in May 2017

²³⁴ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Relations between Qatar and Turkey https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-katar-siyasi-iliskileri_ar.ar.mfa

²³⁵ Ibdı

to \$52.4 million in June 2017. In contrast, the value of Qatar's exports to Turkey reached \$23.7 million in In June 2017, which was \$19.6 million in May 2017. This development in the growth of trade exchange between Turkey and Qatar prompted the Qatar Chamber of Commerce to encourage Qatari businessmen to invest in Turkey as a result of the great opportunities offered by Turkey and the favorable environment it enjoys. Turkish economic reports have indicated that Qatar will invest \$19 billion in Turkey during 2018; Of these investments, \$650 million will be directed to the agriculture and animal development sector.

The Turkish-Qatari economic relations have witnessed rapid growth since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, and this was evident through the volume of trade exchange and the number and diversity of projects. This suggests a brilliant future for these relations in the future, especially after talking about the establishment of a free trade zone between the two countries and the arrival of companies with joint capital between them to 99 companies, waiting to increase this number in the coming years. The Gulf crisis pushed the Turkish-Qatari economic relations to further development and rapid growth in the volume of trade exchange and investments. In August 2017, Turkish and Qatari companies signed 15 cooperation agreements covering the fields of pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, building materials, plastics, and aluminum, in addition to technological products. During the crisis period, Turkish exports to Qatar tripled from their normal level.

On the maritime front, Turkey sent its first naval vessel carrying 4,000 tons of food and goods to Doha on June 21, 2017²³⁶; This is to reduce costs and maintain a continuous flow of goods, especially since aircraft loads are expensive and not feasible in the medium and long term. After that, a direct Turkish-Qatari maritime line was launched from the port of Izmir to Hamad Port, as part of a series of new direct marine

²³⁶ Al Jazeera Channel, Realistic Politics, Qatar's Regional Relations as Effective Balances Against the Siege, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 6/3/2018
<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/2018/6/3/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9>

lines that were opened between Doha and several cities in the world in Kuwait, Oman, India, and Pakistan. And in August 2017, the first direct transport service for refrigerated goods was launched between Qatar and Turkey to operate regularly by sailing every 20-25 days, to arrive from the Turkish port of Izmir within 11 days²³⁷. As for Iran, it has allocated a seaport to it To facilitate the transportation of goods and food commodities specifically to Qatar, with three shipments per week via ships²³⁸.

On the land front, Turkey has the largest fleet of transport trucks in all of Europe. Turkish trucks loaded goods to Doha via Iran but encountered some logistical problems and delays. Some Iranians believed that Turkey overtook them and was quick to take advantage of the crisis in a way that robbed them of an assumed share in the Qatari market²³⁹, which prompted Doha and Ankara to involve Tehran in a tripartite agreement whose mission is to facilitate the transfer of goods from Turkey to Qatar, in addition to benefiting from proximity The geographical location of Iran to import part of the goods directly from Iran, especially those that may be damaged if their shipment is delayed. The importance of this landline is that it reduces the cost of transportation by about 80% compared to air transportation. In terms of time, the trip from Turkey to Qatar takes about 9 to 11 days, less than the sea trip, and it can be reduced to less than two days from the nearest Turkish point on the border with Iran²⁴⁰.

The volume of trade exchange witnessed by the two countries during the past few years has enhanced and developed after the Gulf crisis, opening new horizons and instilling promising hopes for a greater economic partnership, which includes more sectors and provides many opportunities and options for investors from both countries. This cooperation will undoubtedly enhance the strength of the political and military relationship between Turkey and Qatar and will push them to further unify efforts in setting the compass of their foreign policy towards their common goals in regional and international politics. At Expo Qatar-Turkey 2018, reports from the Qatari Ministry of

²³⁷ Ibd

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²³⁹ Ibd

²⁴⁰ Ibd

Economy indicated that 40 Turkish companies entered Qatar in the wake of the blockade that the country was subjected to more than a year ago, in addition to an increase in the volume of trade exchange during the siege period by 30% to reach 4 billion riyals Qatari in 2018. The blockade on Qatar contributed to the increase in Turkish investments in Qatar, as Doha witnessed a large turnout from Turkish investors and companies targeting the manufacturing, food, and pharmaceutical sectors.

The value of trade exchange between Qatar and Turkey witnessed a remarkable increase in 2017, reaching \$788 million compared to 2016 when the value of this exchange reached \$678 million. The months following the blockade on Qatar witnessed the largest proportion of this increase. The value of the Qatari-Turkish trade exchange from 2015-2017 amounted to \$784 million in 2015, in 2016 it amounted to \$678 million, and in 2017 it amounted to \$788 million. In continuation to the approach of the Turkish-Qatari economic partnership, which increased and developed a lot after the blockade, the value of trade exchange between the two countries during the first quarter of 2018 amounted to about \$200 million, which represents an increase of 20% to 30% compared to the same period in 2017. These significant increases in the volume of investments and the volume of trade exchange between Qatar and Turkey reflect a rapid and important development in the Turkish-Qatari economic relations, as well as the ability of this strategic relationship to mitigate the damages of the blockade on Qatar by finding regional alternatives represented by Turkey as a powerfully rising economic and military power. In continuation to the approach of the Turkish-Qatari economic partnership, which increased and developed a lot after the blockade.

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power.

The expansion and increase of Turkish-Qatari economic activity after the Gulf crisis and within the framework of the two countries efforts to develop the economic partnership between them, the special technical committees of the two countries completed the procedures and laws necessary to establish a free trade zone. This agreement aims to facilitate the movement of trade exchange, facilitate investments and remove all obstacles facing the expansion of economic activity between the two countries. New reform policies in the economic field have been taken by the Qatari authorities in preparation for the launch of the free trade zone project, including developing investment laws, modernizing administrative methods, and providing all logistical tools to facilitate the work of this zone.

The opening of Hamad International Port constituted an important pillar in the new Qatari strategy for economic advancement, as the new port is linked to 14 international ports and provides services to 72 destinations around the world. Statistics from the Qatari Ministry of Economy and Trade indicate that Hamad International Port controls 27% of the volume of regional trade in the Middle East. Other strategic decisions regarding the development and strengthening of the economic partnership have been taken. Among these strategies is the diversification of the non-hydrocarbon sector by opening up the prospects for foreign investment (FDI) by 100% in many sectors of the state, in addition to enacting special laws regulating the free trade zone.²⁴¹

The free trade zone between Turkey and Qatar will constitute a new economic tributary in the Middle East and will push the two countries to achieve major economic benefits by attracting capital and gaining more investors. It is a dream that has vanished due to the crises and the sharp polarization in the region.

²⁴¹ Ibrahim, Ashraf, Jumping over geography Qatar's global investments as a tool of power, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Al Jazeera Channel, 3/8/2017, last visit 2/26/2022
<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/economy/2017/8/3/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d9%81%d8%b2-%d9%81%d9%88%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%ba%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%ab%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%82%d8%b7%d8%b1>

In the economic tradition, the establishment of free trade zones reflects the development of economic activity between countries and the increase in the volume of this activity. Therefore, countries seek, through the establishment of free trade zones, to support investment and facilitate the movement of goods and merchandise by special customs laws that stimulate capital attraction.

The Arab Gulf countries account for 40% of all foreign contracts for Turkey, which is a large percentage with an important contribution to the Turkish economy. According to the statistics of the first quarter of 2017, Turkish companies signed contracts worth \$2.9 billion in the Gulf countries. The projects of the Turkish companies are distributed as follows: 310 projects in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 128 projects in Qatar, 109 projects in the United Arab Emirates, and 34 projects in Kuwait. Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, Turkey has been striving to bridge the rift between the brothers and find a solution to the crisis. It has enlisted its diplomacy for these efforts, which has worked for months on this goal. However, these efforts and efforts have not yielded any progress towards resolving the crisis. Turkey, which has just emerged from Russian economic sanctions, is keen to preserve the unity of the Gulf as a popular economic market for Turkish companies. The level of trade exchange between it and the Gulf countries has witnessed a significant increase in recent years, but the strategic alliance between Turkey and Qatar made Ankara pay the price for its support and standing with Doha in the face of The blockade, at least on the economic side, witnessed a marked decrease in trade exchanges between Turkey and the blockading countries during the first months of the crisis. Although the volume of Turkish exports this year increased by 1.8 percent to reach \$12.1 billion, some observers express their fears of the possible effects of Turkey's position on the crisis on its economic relationship with the blockading countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which Turkey does not want as a regional economic power²⁴².

²⁴² Ibrahim, Ashraf, Jumping over geography Qatar's global investments as a tool of power, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Al Jazeera Channel, 3/8/2017, last visit 2/26/2022
<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/economy/2017/8/3/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d9%81%d8%b2-%d9%81%d9%88%d9%82->

In May 2018, the value of Turkish exports to the Saudi market reached \$277 million, and this value decreased by 36.4% during June of the same year. As for Turkish exports to the United Arab Emirates, they declined by 20.5% from \$316 million to \$234 million during the same period. As for Bahrain, Turkish exports to it decreased by 24%, from \$20.7 million to \$15.6 million. These results come in what appeared to be a challenge to the Turkish decision in support of the State of Qatar and economic punishment for it. Turkey does not seem indifferent to these messages so far, despite the importance of the economic relationship with the blockading countries. It turned its face to the east and activated trade agreements with Iran. The trade exchange rate between Ankara and Tehran increased by 8.5%, i.e. from \$233 million to \$250 million. Then it activated similar agreements. With Kuwait in the economic and military field²⁴³.

Outside of profit and loss calculations, the Turkish stance towards the Gulf crisis is not without a tinge of morals and recognition of gratitude. Turkey still remembers well Qatar's standing with it in the ordeal of the coup, on July 15, 2016. The words of Turkish President, Tayyip Erdogan, came at the beginning of the crisis to confirm this approach when he said: "Turkey knows who stood with it and who rejoiced in the coup." In a clear reference to Qatar's standing with Turkey in this ordeal, and the joy of other Gulf parties in it.

More than 180 Turkish companies are operating in Qatar, and the projects they are implementing amount to \$17.4 billion, in addition to the increasing importance that Qatari capital attaches to Turkey day after day, as Qatar is now making important investments in Turkey, and it is at the forefront of countries The Gulf region, in which Turkish contractors implement the largest number of projects. In parallel with the

<https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2021/12/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86>

²⁴³ Al-Jazeera, jumping over the mountains, the strategic committee, a tool for cooperation, a Qatari-Turkish partnership translated by multiple agreements in all fields, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, December 8, 2021, last visit, February 26, 2022

development of the Turkish relationship with Qatar, Turkey has become an important tourist destination for Qatar citizens.

With the onset of the Gulf crisis, the Turkish-Qatar economic relations have solidified, strengthened, and expanded, and this relationship has become a strategic choice for both countries, in light of a tense region surrounded by geopolitical conflicts. The two countries still have a lot of tireless joint work to develop the horizons of the strategic partnership to include new vital sectors such as education, health, manufacturing, and other fields of mutual benefit. It is expected that the coming years will witness more work towards this integration, which may expand to include other countries in the region and create the conditions for creating a new economic pole, especially after the agreement on facilitating the transit of goods signed between Turkey, Qatar, and Iran, in addition to the growing interest shown by Kuwait and Turkey. To strengthen economic and military cooperation between them. And what accelerates the steps towards creating this new economic pole is the state of isolation chosen by the blockading countries, a non-strategic option that opens the region to a division that will be indispensable, and will cause the experience of the economic integration of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in which these countries have taken important steps, and will also suffer. The economies of these countries are among the negative effects of this division, and the result will be that the impact of the geographical reality of this region in imposing economic integration is stronger, larger, and more influential than the transient geopolitical conflicts.

Security and stability serve the region more than tension and conflict. The experiences of other countries in maintaining a stable and coherent regional position have had a positive impact on the economies, growth, and development of these countries.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Al-Jazeera, jumping over the mountains, the strategic committee, a tool for cooperation, a Qatari-Turkish partnership translated by multiple agreements in all fields, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, December 8, 2021, last visit, February 26, 2022
<https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2021/12/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86>

Therefore, these countries are keen to design their policies in a way that prioritizes their relations with neighboring countries and the regional environment, due to its importance in continuing development and prosperity and maintaining a stable environment to attract investment. Southeast Asian countries and other regional economic blocs have succeeded in this endeavor, highlighting the importance and strength of bloc and regional integration in Facing external challenges.

Regardless of the outcome of the Gulf crisis and reaching Gulf reconciliation, Turkish economic relations have witnessed rapid growth since the beginning of this crisis, and the trade exchange between the two countries has set a record compared to previous years. A report by the Turkish Investment Agency stated that Turkish exports have increased by 90% since the first months of the crisis. The strength of political and strategic relations between the two countries and their common orientations towards all regional and international issues contributed to this growth. This relationship will be strengthened in light of the formation of a new regional reality looming on the horizon, a reality that will inevitably create new poles in the region at the expense of the old blocs, if the blockading countries do not wake up and realize the seriousness and size of the rift it has caused and try to bridge it, hoping that the waters of the friendly relations between the two countries will return. country to its course.

2.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

Wars and crises cause many psychological problems for a large number of individuals, families, and societies because wars and tendencies are the most threatening to human life and make him in a state of psychological and material instability²⁴⁵. The sudden change causes a major imbalance and generates an impact on the hearts of families, the blockade against Qatar By air, sea, and borders, which led to the prevention of Qataris and citizens residing in Qatar from going to any of the blockading countries or even crossing over it by air.

The nature of the Gulf society, in general, is to intermarry with each other, i.e. the

²⁴⁵ Al-Rashidi, Bashir, The psychological and social map of the Kuwaiti people after the Iraqi aggression, Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, No. 74, p. 289-311 - State of Kuwait (1994).

Gulf countries. Qatari society also intermarries with neighboring countries. In all Gulf countries, there is a large part of the family divided, part in Qatar and part in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, or Bahrain. The blockade has caused a great psychological impact on families. In the Gulf countries that were denied access to their families. So. Families began to converge in some neutral countries such as Kuwait, Turkey, and some other countries. Turkey has become Qatar like the Gulf states, so Qatari citizens can move from Qatar to Turkey with ease and without the need to obtain a visa.²⁴⁶

The gratitude of Qatari citizens and residents of Qatar is reflected in making Turkey their first tourism destination and thus increasing tourism to Turkey because Turkey was one of the first countries that supported Qatar during the blockade, so there was a feeling of un security by Qataris and residents that the beginning of the blockade meant the beginning of famine due to the complete dependent from Qatar on importing foodstuffs from the Gulf countries, in particular from Saudi Arabia, and this is due to the geographical proximity and the fact that the borders between them are land. Accordingly, the interruption of foodstuffs from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, in general, led to a gap and shortage in markets, but Turkish goods were the first goods to reach Qatar and begin to solve this crisis, creating feelings of security.

3. REACTIONS OF THE THIRD COUNTRIES TO TURKISH SUPPORT

Since The main objective of the blockade against Qatar is to pressure Qatar to evaluate and change its policies, which is current policy is not compatible with the three Gulf countries' visions, accordingly, it was important for the Gulf countries to isolate Qatar and cut off any food supplies from it for it to become in need of the Gulf countries and succumb to the demands, and this is due to Qatar's reliance on a large image From importing its food needs from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, and this did not happen from Qatar. Rather, it did not remain alone and found support from allied and neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran, and other countries.

²⁴⁶ Qatar Foundation, The Impact of the Siege on Families in Qatar, Second Edition in Arabic, Hamad Bin Khalifa University Press, 2018 <https://www.difi.org.qa/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Blockade-Arabic-TEXT-Hyperlinks.pdf>

3.1. GULF COUNTRIES' REACTIONS

Gulf countries have always been considering Iran as the axis of evil. As for Turkey, it has always been an important and influential force in the Middle East, in addition to being an important ally of Saudi Arabia. Turkey's support for Qatar under the blockade has led to dissatisfaction on the part of the three Gulf states. For this reason, the indicators led to the existence of a Saudi trend calling for support for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and talk about it escalated in light of the Gulf crisis, and in response to the Turkish position, which rejected the blockade of one Muslim country to another, according to what the Turkish president said, who made efforts to succeed in mediation to resolve the crisis. What increased the fears of a Saudi tendency to this matter, was the hosting of the Saudi media by Kurdish figures opposed to Turkey, and the Saudi media and activists hinting that there was a tendency to support the Kurds in defiance of Turkey after they directed a torrent of sharp criticism of Turkish policy.²⁴⁷

Saudi media and activists have conveyed calls to support the establishment of a Kurdish state that aimed to extend over Turkish, Iranian, Syrian, and Iraqi lands, declaring their support for the Kurdish cause and calling for its support. Saudi tweets launched the hashtag (Saudis with Kurdistan) in response to the hashtag Turkey with Qatar, launched by Turkish activists in refusal to the blockade against Doha.²⁴⁸

The wave of Emirati hostility with Turkey escalated during the Gulf crisis, but the Gulf crisis file was not the only file in which political and foreign positions clashed between the three countries. Turkey's firm position of supporting the peoples of the region in

²⁴⁷ Arabi 21 newspaper, Saudi newspapers attacking Turkey after its decision to deploy forces in Qatar, 2017, last visit 26/2 2022 <https://arabi21.com/story/1014875/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1>

²⁴⁸ Arabi 21 newspaper, Saudi newspapers attacking Turkey after its decision to deploy forces in Qatar, 2017, last visit 26/2 2022 <https://arabi21.com/story/1012609/%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1>

liberation, which began with the wave of the Arab Spring, has caused a dispute between it and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which supported the military coup in Egypt against the late elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

In Libya, Abu Dhabi supported the revolutionary General Khalifa Haftar in his attempts to abort peace opportunities and his targeting of the Libyan capital, Tripoli, to seize it and commit many crimes, while Ankara continued to provide support to Libya and extend a helping hand to the legitimate internationally recognized Government of National Accord, and to confront Haftar's supporters, including the state The UAE, as Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, on his visit to Libya, warned Khalifa Haftar and his supporters against any attempt to target Turkish forces on Libyan soil²⁴⁹.

As for the Syrian file, the British "Middle East Eye" website published a report revealing Mohammed bin Zayed's attempts to push Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to violate the ceasefire with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition in Idlib. In October 2015, the UAE also refused to sign a statement issued by seven countries, including Turkey, the United States of America, and Saudi Arabia, calling on Russia to stop its military operations in Syria. From hidden support to public support, the UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus, expressing its support for the Syrian regime, which was involved in the use of aerial bombardment and chemical weapons against demonstrators and civilians of its people, thus making Abu Dhabi a policy against Turkish policies regarding the Syrian file. Other reports have also published the UAE's relentless pursuit of what is called an attempt to pull the rug out from under Turkey's feet in Syria, by presenting a set of proposals to Russia to revive Syria's economy²⁵⁰.

²⁴⁹ Zouari, Iman, Turkish-Gulf relations from tension to the search for strategic partnerships, TRT Arabi, 2021, last visit 2/26/2022

<https://www.trtarabi.com/issues/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-4319966>

²⁵⁰ Ibd

Turkish support for Qatar is tantamount to increasing tension between the two countries, but both towns realize that their moves are based on the interests of each one. Therefore, Abu Dhabi supported the PYD militia with separatist goals, in a clear antagonism to Ankara, as stated by the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash in an interview with him on the American Al-Hurra channel: "We have great sympathy with the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and they have done well in defeating ISIS and made great sacrifices, and from this point of view I think the Kurds must be protected²⁵¹.

The UAE attempted to follow the example of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf capitals in reaching an agreement with Turkey. UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Qarqashvi told local and foreign media that Abu Dhabi "is Ankara's first trading partner in the Middle East," and added that his country is seeking to normalize relations with Turkey. Thus, it seems that Abu Dhabi took a step back in its rivalry with Ankara, but there was no official reaction from the Turkish side to these messages, except declaring to discuss ways of coordination and cooperation with the Arab Gulf states in several files²⁵².

Kuwait's view of Turkey's support for Qatar is manifested through its cooperation in resolving the Gulf crisis. Kuwait was approaching parties that could help provide some form of protection and protect its interests inside and outside the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, such as Turkey. In recent years, there have been frequent meetings between the leaders of the two countries. At the 2017 meeting between the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and Turkish President Erdogan. Erdogan stressed the long-term strategic importance of the economic partnership between the two countries, saying that

²⁵¹ Zouari, Iman, Turkish-Gulf relations from tension to the search for strategic partnerships, TRT Arabi, 2021, last visit 2/26/2022

<https://www.trtarabi.com/issues/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-4319966>

²⁵² Ibd

Kuwait is Turkey's gateway to the Gulf and that Turkey is Kuwait's path to Europe and Central Asia²⁵³.

3.2. EXTERNAL ACTOR'S REACTIONS

The US position on the Gulf crisis as a whole was not clear, as it was characterized by a state of ambiguity and conflict when Trump published a tweet on June 6 in which he adopted the positions of the blockading countries and confirmed that what happened was one of the fruits of his visit to the region. On the other hand, through the statements of the Ministry of Defense and the Pentagon, which embodied the initial American reaction to the crisis, it came from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who demanded that the crisis be resolved by peaceful means.²⁵⁴ Turkey and Kuwait had the largest share through mediation efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully.

The other international opinion came from the European Union countries whose position was clear and who did not see any other appropriate solution but to resort to mediation to solve the Gulf crisis. The positions of Germany and France were among the first European Union countries to respond to the crisis and to appreciate the mediation efforts and appeal to it. German Foreign Minister Gabriel Sigmar pointed to the need to lift the blockade imposed on Qatar because it harms efforts to combat terrorism. French President Emmanuel Macron also called for a peaceful solution through dialogue, while the Russian position was initially cautious, but soon developed, when Moscow offered to provide Qatar with foodstuffs to end the siege, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for settling the crisis at the dialogue table. All of these reactions are consistent with the Turkish

²⁵³ Al Jazeera Channel, Kuwaiti Mediation: Historical Experiences in Facing a Unique Crisis, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2017 <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2017/08/170801113046136.html>

²⁵⁴ Abdul Majid, Medhat, an international consensus on a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis in light of an American contradiction, Anadolu Agency, (2017), last visit on February 26, 2022 <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B6-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/842735>

assistance and mediation that Turkey carried out to find an actual solution to the Gulf crisis.

4. CONSEQUENCES OF TURKEY'S SUPPORT TO QATAR

According to Cengiz Tomar, professor of political science at Marmara University, the three Gulf countries can put pressure on Turkey in the economic aspect due to its enjoyment of wide economic relations with it through investments in the real estate sectors, tourism, and large business deals.

This is explained by the volume of trade exchange with the three Gulf states, which amounted in 2016 to more than 17 billion dollars, including nine billion with the UAE, eight billion with Saudi Arabia, and 330 million dollars with Bahrain, compared to one billion three hundred million dollars with Qatar. And Aliyah, this act by the three Gulf states could have been one of the biggest consequences²⁵⁵.

4.1 ECONOMIC ASPECT

Since the beginning of the first hours of the siege, and with Turkey aware of its Qatari ally's need for food aid to help activate Turkish food security, Turkey hastened to compensate for the shortage in the Qatari market with thousands of tons of foodstuffs, via cargo ships and Turkish planes. This matter did not come out of anywhere due to the bilateral relations and agreements between them, as during the crisis that the Turkish local currency (the lira) was exposed to, and the depreciation of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies, Qatar announced in August 2018, the signing of a currency exchange agreement between the central banks of Qatar and Turkey, with a value of three billion dollars. The Emir of Qatar also pledged, in mid-August, to invest \$15 billion in Turkish banks and financial markets, at a time when the Turkish currency lost about 40 percent of its value in 2018. By the end of 2018, the volume of trade exchange between the two countries amounted to \$2.28 billion, with Turkey representing a haven for Qatari investment, with a volume of about \$22 billion,

²⁵⁵ Congratulations, Khalil, Turkey at the heart of the accounts of the siege on Qatar, Al-Jazeera TV, (2017) last visit on February 26, 2022
<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/14/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1>

while Turkish companies' investments in Qatar amounted to \$16 billion. 500 Turkish companies are operating in Qatar, including about 242 companies with Qatari and Turkish capital, and 26 companies with 100 percent Turkish capital. Qatar also hosts the “Expo Turkey in Qatar” exhibition annually, with the participation of hundreds of Turkish companies wishing to work in the Qatari market. The consequence of Turkey's economic support for Qatar is in increasing the economic link between the two countries²⁵⁶.

4.2 POLITICAL ASPECT

Turkey's position was clear from the beginning, as it did not back down from its support for its Qatari ally, but at the same time, it is considered positive neutrality, meaning that Turkey did not completely sever its relationship with the three siege countries at the same time when it supported Qatar by all means economically, militarily and socially, which is the matter Which enabled Turkey to continue its role as an acceptable and influential mediator for all²⁵⁷.

Turkey is the country that had the greatest ability to make mediation efforts successful, provided that its relations with any of the parties to the crisis do not deteriorate, which requires it to maintain neutrality without abandoning its duties to bring the various parties together for the interest of the Gulf, Arab and Islamic house. The pressures on Turkey have not yet been visible to the public, and some countries that did not like the Turkish position on the crisis through their support for Qatar began to approach the Kurdish militias and describe them as revolutionaries and freedom fighters. One of the most important political sanctions imposed on Turkey is to move the Kurdish file and turn it against it, which Turkey needs, given the long wars that Turkey is trying to close²⁵⁸.

Given the political consequences of Turkey's support for Qatar, which affected the blockading countries, which is explained by this demand, one of the demands of the three Gulf blockading countries is that the Turkish military base in Qatar is closed, but the opposite happened. The activation of this agreement arose in 2014 after the imposition of the blockade

²⁵⁶ Gulf Online, Qatar and Turkey, a strategic partnership and a qualitative leap in relations, 2019
<http://khaleej.online/x84xxd>

²⁵⁷ Gulf Online, Qatar and Turkey, a strategic partnership and a qualitative leap in relations, 2019
<http://khaleej.online/x84xxd>

²⁵⁸ Ibdī

against Qatar in 2017, and joint military exercises were conducted, and the agreement stipulated the possibility of deploying Turkish forces on Qatari soil. Accordingly, during his visit to Qatar, the Turkish president announced that his country had completed the construction of a new military base in Qatar called "Khalid bin Al-Waleed", stressing that "we have no difference between our security and the security of Qatar." During Turkey's announcement of carrying out a military operation in northern Syria targeting Kurdish militias, Qatar, in turn, announced its support for Ankara in this operation to protect its borders. It also refused to sign a statement issued by the Arab League condemning the Turkish military intervention in Syria²⁵⁹.

4.3 SOCIAL ASPECT

The role that Turkey played in the crisis has resulted in several consequences. On the one hand, the Qatar-Turkish relations have moved to a higher level of friendship and alliance through the brotherly relationship between the two peoples and the encouragement of tourism from Qatar to Turkey; Also, with the start of the operation of the military base in Qatar, Turkey became a direct party to the strategic balances of the Gulf. On the other hand, the coldness has returned to Turkish-Emirati relations, after months of attempts at normalization between the two countries.

The UAE was absent from the meeting of Iraqi Sunni forces and personalities, which was held under Turkish auspices in Ankara last August 2017, while representatives of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar attended. It is clear, despite the degree of close understanding and coordination between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that the Saudi leadership is still keen to maintain its relations with Turkey at their normal level. Riyadh is not happy with the Turkish position on the crisis, but the Saudi crisis table has undoubtedly become crowded, and it is not in Riyadh's interest to aggravate Turkish-Saudi relations at this stage²⁶⁰.

Turkey's quick response in the context of the Gulf crisis to implement its commitments with Qatar encouraged Kuwait to raise the level of Turkish-Kuwaiti relations.

²⁵⁹ Gulf Online, Qatar and Turkey, a strategic partnership and a qualitative leap in relations, 2019
<http://khaleej.online/x84xxd>

²⁶⁰ Turk Press, The results of the Turkish role in the Gulf crisis, (2017), last entry on February 26, 2022
<https://www.turkpress.co/node/39664>

There is no doubt that the Kuwaitis have started to build new accounts for the security of their country, taking into account the sudden dangers threatening Qatar from its Gulf sisters, the possibility of the collapse of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or at least its loss of effectiveness, and the need to build several alternative alliances to preserve Kuwait's regional security. This prompted Kuwait to strengthen its security and military relations with Turkey and to sign several cooperation agreements in the two fields during the Kuwaiti Prime Minister's visit to Ankara in mid-September 2017²⁶¹.

At the same time, the Gulf crisis was reflected in Turkish-Iranian relations, especially since both countries took a position that was in essence pro-Qatar and keen on its security and stability. The Iranian Foreign Minister had paid a quick visit to Ankara at the beginning of the crisis, aimed at exchanging views and coordinating positions. On August 15, 2017, Ankara received the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army, on an unprecedented visit, during which he met his Turkish counterpart, Hulusi Akar, and President Erdogan. But, certainly, Turkish-Iranian relations were not bad even before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis²⁶².

Despite the great differences between them in Syria and Iraq, the two countries have maintained normal relations over the past few years and the common interests that bind them, both economically and securely. Perhaps it can be said that the consensus on the Gulf crisis coincided with other consensuses about Ankara and Tehran's concern about the Iraqi Kurdistan region's pursuit of secession, the US policy in favor of the Syrian Kurds, the increasing Kurdish nationalist activities against Iran, and Iranian fears of the Trump administration's adoption of anti-Iran policies²⁶³.

5. CHALLENGES FOR TURKEY AND QATAR DURING THE CRISIS

The Qatar-Turkish cooperation, at the level of regional power balances, has changed the shape of Gulf politics. Because it is not said that the winner from the siege is Turkey, several parties succeeded in getting out of this siege with the least possible losses. The Turkish move towards Qatar in 2017, during the crisis, increased and highlighted the strategic

²⁶¹ Ibdı

²⁶² Turk Press, The results of the Turkish role in the Gulf crisis, (2017), last entry on February 26, 2022
<https://www.turkpress.co/node/39664>

²⁶³ Ibdı

position of the State of Qatar. It showed Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates how far they can go and how their borders can be limited. One of the most important challenges is to clarify an important message that Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman both refuse to sponsor the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This shows how the cooperation and partnership between Qatar and Turkey have brought new challenges to the blockading countries.

5.1. CHALLENGES FOR TURKEY

Providing peace and development is the main agenda of Turkey in its relations with the Gulf countries, and this is due to Turkey's realization of the principle of cooperation in diplomacy and the economy. This matter would be a win-win for both parties,

The challenges that Turkey faced during the Gulf crisis through its support for Qatar is that, before the crisis, Turkey had a strong investment relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have solid economic relations, which reflects the volume of trade exchange between them, which amounted to about eight billion dollars in 2018, and the flow of inter-investment, in addition to the increase in the number of Saudi tourists who go to Turkey, and Turkish labor entering the Saudi market. These relations were strengthened following several official visits by the leaders of the two countries, including a visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Riyadh in 2017, preceded by a visit to Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz in April 2016. Given Ankara's pro-Qatar stance on the issue of the blockade imposed on Doha since June 2017.²⁶⁴

5.2. CHALLENGES FOR QATAR

One of the main challenges that Qatar faced during the crisis was the emergence of the crisis through the manifestation of the surprise element of the crisis, although the difference of views for the Gulf countries is not a new matter and that in 2014 the first Gulf crisis occurred, which ended with the withdrawal of ambassadors as an expression of the

²⁶⁴ Al-Jazeera, Saudi-Turkish economic relations, what after Khashoggi's disappearance, 2018, last visit on February 27, 2022
<https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2018/10/9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9>

dissatisfaction of the Gulf countries. With the Qatari policies, the dispute was resolved quickly and did not reach this extent of estrangement and the conditions in which it is obligated so that the escalation and continuation of the siege for more than years is already the historical precedent and the great challenge to Qatar. However, despite all these repercussions, Qatar emerged from the blockade by strengthening its relationship with the allies, in addition to Qatar's attempt to self-reliance and start manufacturing and encouraging local products so that the Qatari people stood in support of their country by purchasing national products. Another challenge for Qatar is how to restore the relationship of countries to each other after this siege ended because it will not be easy for Qatar to rebuild its confidence towards the three Gulf states that have imposed the siege on it for four years, ignoring the political, economic, social and psychological damage to the Gulf peoples in general and not only Qatari people.

During the crisis, Qatar faced the challenge of acquiescing to the 13 demands imposed by the blockading countries or losing one of the most important Gulf countries, and which of the two options required it to give up something, either its freedom and sovereignty or its Gulf brothers, although they do not have the right to sacrifice Qatar before. This great challenge, this siege is incompatible with human rights.

6. TURKEY-QATAR RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL RECONCILIATION

The reconciliation that came not under the imposition of conditions by any party or through a Qatari retreat or acquiescence to the conditions of Saudi Arabia and the other blockading countries, but rather came within the framework of great American pressure, after the end of Trump's term and Biden's victory in the elections, to end the Gulf dispute based on putting the differences aside. And building on the points of agreement to protect the Gulf Cooperation Council and confront the growing challenges in the region, which did not allow Saudi Arabia to talk about advanced conditions such as severing relations with Turkey or closing the Turkish military base. In this context, the political and media circles in Turkey do not see any danger to the Turkish-Qatari relations, which have been expanded and

consolidated over the past years in the political, military, security, economic and other fields, leading to a strategic partnership that cannot be easily undone by either party.²⁶⁵

In addition, the Gulf reconciliation does not mean the end of all the differences between Doha and Riyadh, as confidence is still at its lowest levels, which pushes Qatar to maintain its regional balances and relations with the various parties and to work carefully to remove Saudi concerns about relations with Turkey and perhaps help later in Bringing views closer between Ankara and Riyadh instead of aligning with Riyadh's efforts to distance Doha from Ankara, which is largely in line with the new Turkish tendency to open a new page in relations with many countries around the world, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is one of the first countries to welcome the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister's announcement of the consensus between Doha and Riyadh to open the borders between the two countries. A statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry considered that this development represents an important step in resolving the Gulf crisis that has been going on since June 2017. Turkey is a strategic partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council and has taken over of great importance to the security and stability of the Gulf region, it will continue to support all efforts that fall into this framework, and this makes it clear that the Qatari-Turkish relationship will not be undermined by Gulf reconciliation.²⁶⁶

Gulf reconciliation could be an important motive for efforts to improve relations between Turkey on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other during the next stage, and this could extend to Abu Dhabi, where a new Turkish ambassador was appointed, in the most prominent Turkish sign of the desire to improve relations if the appropriate conditions were available for that. This is in addition to the stability and increase of Qatar-Turkish relations.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ Jamal, Ismail, Gulf Reconciliation: Is Qatar moving away from Turkey or closer to Riyadh from Ankara, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Magazine, (2021), the last visit on 27\February, 2022

<https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A/>

²⁶⁶ Ibd

²⁶⁷ Jamal, Ismail, Gulf Reconciliation: Is Qatar moving away from Turkey or closer to Riyadh from Ankara, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Magazine, (2021), the last visit on 27\February, 2022

<https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A/>

6.1. OPPORTUNITIES

Reconciliation in its current form is of interest to Turkey and Qatar in many respects. In the first place, it is a step that stopped a crisis based on several possibilities and possibilities that harm the vital interest of the region for years, and thus the reconciliation spared Qatar and Turkey worse scenarios, and this is in the fundamental interest of the region and Turkey.²⁶⁸ The reconciliation in itself broke the existing siege against Qatar and eased the pressures on Turkey that resulted from the support of an ally country, Qatar, especially since the reconciliation took place without making any concessions from Qatar, or in response to the demands that the blockading countries had set as a condition for the embargo against it.

On the third hand, about Turkey, the Al-Ula summit statement did not include any negative reference to Turkey or demands and requirements on Qatar regarding its relationship with it, unlike Iran, for example, which is a very positive sign for Ankara. It is an opportunity for the continuation of the relationship between Qatar and Turkey without any restrictions or tension.²⁶⁹ Also, the reconciliation in its current form opens the way to the possibility of improving Ankara's relations with several parties to the crisis, especially Riyadh and Cairo, including developing economic relations and increasing investment in Turkey, which is a matter of great importance in light of the Corona pandemic and the reality of the Turkish economy. This improvement in relations, if it occurs, even if it reduces tension and temporarily rotates the angles of dispute, would ease pressure on Turkey, and loosen the cohesion of alliances and alignments against it in the region in relative terms.²⁷⁰

This would also open up prospects for possible solutions - acceptable to Turkey - for several regional files, foremost of which is the Libyan issue, where the visions of Turkey and some of these countries conflict. This possibility is exacerbated by the

²⁶⁸ Al-Hajj, Saeed, Turkey and Gulf Reconciliation | Position and Reflections, Al Jazeera Channel, 2021, last visit 28/2/2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2021/1/18/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81>

²⁶⁹ Ibd

²⁷⁰ Ibd

conviction of the various parties that the chances of a military solution will recede, which prompted some of them to modify their position on the Government of National Accord.²⁷¹

Greater opportunities can open up for all parties from the Gulf reconciliation step. The conciliation features began to crystallize in Qatar's proposal for Qatari mediation to reach more harmony between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, given that the Turkish-Saudi relationship went through several curves and difficulties that led to its tension, and the Turkish-Qatari support exacerbated the tensions and led to counterproductive behavior by Saudi Arabia, which was represented in An attempt by Saudi parties to communicate with Kurdish groups that call for secession to mobilize them against Turkey and make Turkey preoccupied with its internal problems and leave the Qatari aid behind to achieve its 13 demands.

The reconciliation represents a great opportunity to reform relations in the region, not only the Qatar-Gulf relationship, but also the Turkish-Saudi relationship, and the Turkish-Emirati relationship, which is also going through twists and turns as a result of differing views on several different issues, as well as improving Turkish-Bahraini relations. Another aspect of the important opportunities of reconciliation for all the Gulf states is the end of the Iranian role, given that the Iranian-Qatari rapprochement increased at a time of crisis. American.

6.2. RISKS

Some analysts discuss the possibility that reconciliation between Qatar and the four siege countries will reduce relations between Qatar and Turkey due to Qatar's lack of need for Turkey, and make Qatar more eager to satisfy its neighbors from the Gulf countries, which will push the level of relations between the two countries to decline over time, but this argument is valid because The Qatari-Turkish relations were not only strengthened due to

²⁷¹ Al-Hajj, Saeed, Turkey and Gulf Reconciliation | Position and Reflections, Al Jazeera Channel, 2021, last visit 28/2/2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2021/1/18/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81>

Turkey's standing with Qatar during the Gulf crisis but this relationship was formed as a result of several accumulations and common orientations between the two parties, which denies the existence of such a possibility.

Also, because Doha realizes the importance of the role that Turkey played in bringing it to the moment of reconciliation without concessions from it, which it cannot risk losing in the future, especially since it - along with Turkey and the rest of the parties - realizes that reconciliation is still fragile and the siege that has taken place since 2017, cannot be forgotten, as it is difficult to overcome by writing the Al-Ula statement and the reconciliation declaration.

As for the Russian side, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing its welcome to the results of the summit and the agreements reached, which led to the Gulf reconciliation. It was also emphasized that since the beginning of the crisis, Moscow has effectively supported the efforts made to overcome the differences between Qatar on the one hand, the four blockade countries are on the path of constructive dialogue based on the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of states, as well as non-interference in each other's internal affairs.²⁷²

The Qatar -Turkish risks from this reconciliation can be represented about Qatar, as Turkey focused more on its relations with the Gulf states, and the Qatari-Turkish relationship was marginalized, because, throughout the blockade period, Turkey provided the necessary support to Qatar, whether it was political, military, economic or moral support And this matter drained Turkey financially, meaning that the Turkish assistance to Qatar had several consequences about the economic aspect through sending food aid, and accordingly there is a possibility that the Turkish-Qatar role will become less influential than before. Or that the Turkish focus on the Gulf relationship in a more comprehensive way than the Qatar

²⁷² The Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow welcomes the Gulf Reconciliation Agreement, 2021, last visit on February 28, 2022
<https://arabic.sputniknews.com/20210106/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-1047719232.html>

relationship would harm the continuity of the Qatari-Turkish bilateral relationship, but from the perspective of Turkey, Turkey wants to make up for what it missed during the siege period and strengthen the bonds of connection between it and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. It is clear that the points of non-difference have not been resolved, but it is an approach and an attempt to coexist and peaceful cooperation with the help of different points of view.

6.3. REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROSPECTS

The United States considered that ending the Gulf crisis does not only serve the American interest in the Gulf but also closes the way for the loopholes that Iran is exploiting to destabilize the region. The rapprochement is a step to harmonize the GCC countries and create more pressure on Iran, especially by ending the profits that Iran derives from Qatar's use of Iranian airspace.

Saudi Arabia's fears of reviving the Lausanne nuclear agreement, and Trump's efforts to increase pressure on Iran, and add reconciliation to the legacy of Trump's policies in the Middle East, these factors represented the main motives for resolving the Gulf crisis and uniting ranks to disrupt Iran's return to the international system, although a reconciliation has been reached.

6.3.1. REGIONAL (GULF) DYNAMICS

The Gulf reconciliation is an opportunity for Turkey to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the blockading countries, in the proposed and given offer made by Qatar to help facilitate the process of reforming relations between Turkey and the blockading countries. However, even with joint endeavors, Erdogan's continued support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Government of National Accord will make a complete de-escalation of tensions almost impossible, even though the thaw in relations may translate into real benefits for Turkey.

Over the past few years, Ankara has been at loggerheads with Saudi Arabia over Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, the conflicts in Syria and Libya, and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul by Saudi agents in 2018. Nevertheless, Erdogan has expressed a desire to improve relations with the Saudi government. It is worth noting that the Turkish president spoke with King Salman in November 2020 and reported an agreement to keep channels of

dialogue open to improve relations. It is noteworthy that the benefits of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the blockading countries are not far from Turkey. While Turkish exporters seeking to ship their goods to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had to deal with the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, they have had to grapple with an unofficial blockade of their goods.

The blockade entails actual economic damage. Although the UAE and Saudi Arabia cannot keep pace with the European Union countries as the main export destination for Turkey, however, the total Turkish exports to them amounted to \$6.91 billion in 2019, as shown above. Thus, the decline in the intensity of the Turkish government's rhetoric about Khashoggi's killing—a criticism that provoked Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Saudi officials—is largely due to economic considerations. But despite the potential benefits, it is unlikely that Turkey's relations with the blockading countries will fully recover. In part, the inherent difficulty of turbulent Turkish-Saudi relations stems from the fact that, like the ruling Al-Thani family of Qatar, Erdogan has no intention of abandoning the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that supports his political identity—and several governments in the Quartet have designated it a terrorist organization. While Erdogan can limit evidence of his public support for the group, he will not agree to demands to abandon it, whether they come from the UAE or other members of the Arab Quartet. Given the nature of Turkish support for the group, it is unlikely that a full rapprochement will occur between Turkey and the Arab Quartet, particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.²⁷³

Moreover, Cairo and Abu Dhabi will also hesitate to normalize relations with Ankara given their blatant opposition to Turkey's military intervention in Libya and concerns about Erdogan's assertive policy approach in the eastern Mediterranean. It is unlikely that Turkey will abandon its support for the Government of National Accord in Libya, whose main opponent, the Libyan National Army, is backed by Egypt, the UAE, and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the obstacles to consolidating relations are real, even if Erdogan has

²⁷³ Al-Hajj, Saeed, Turkey and Gulf Reconciliation | Position and Reflections, Al Jazeera Channel, 2021, last visit 28/2/2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2021/1/18/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81>

indicated that he is interested in it. However, a potential shift in regional dynamics should not be entirely overlooked; Ending the embargo on Qatar simply contributes to strengthening Turkey's position. Moreover, the agreement concluded between the “Arab Quartet” and Qatar in January shows that the red lines it imposed are not fixed. Erdogan can remain comfortable in his relationship with his closest allies while anticipating the potential opportunity to open channels of communication with the Quartet actors.²⁷⁴

The other regional power with which Ankara wants to develop relations in Egypt, according to the statements of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who stressed that the two countries are in a new phase of inter-relations, based on avoiding escalation and harming each other's interests. This possibility is increased by the existence of real interests that unite the two countries in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean (demarcation of the maritime borders), as well as Cairo's annoyance with the decline of its regional role in light of some ongoing developments. Including the path of Arab normalization with "Israel".²⁷⁵

As for the relationship between Qatar and Egypt, it is still a potential source of tension between the two countries, and it has failed to move forward with the full normalization of relations between them. Because the two countries are on opposite sides of the civil war in Libya, where Qatar supports Turkish efforts to support the Government of National Accord led by Fayeze al-Sarraj, recognized by the United Nations, in the face of the coup. Major General Khalifa Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE. In addition, Qatar continues to take positions contrary to the Egyptian positions, whether about Qatari-Iranian and Turkish relations, or the position on the Qatari-backed " Hamas " movement in Gaza, which the Egyptian regime considers an extension of the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, and waged war against them on various levels, in coordination with the Emirates.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Al-Faqih, Ihsan, Prospects for Gulf Reconciliation in the Light of Controversial Files, Anadolu Agency, 2021, last visit on February 28, 2022
<https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A2%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84/2129475>

²⁷⁵ Ibdı

²⁷⁶ Ibdı

Since the 2013 coup, Egypt has adopted a hard-line policy towards Gaza, by closing the crossings, destroying smuggling tunnels, and accusing Hamas of supporting extremist organizations in the Sinai. At the same time, Cairo maintained the role of mediator between Palestinians and Israelis and encouraged reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The Egyptian-Qatari differences will likely continue even after the announcement of the "Al-Ula" agreement and the resumption of flights and other "normalization" steps, as the roots of the differences between them go back to that period. About four years before the last crisis, following the coup against the elected president, Mohamed Morsi, and the Qatari role in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁷⁷

The Gulf reconciliation lacks a lot of positivity in opening the controversial files that led to the severing of relations between the countries concerned with the Gulf crisis, despite the reopening of airspace and land borders, the resumption of diplomatic relations, and the approaching exchange of ambassadors. The reconciliation also did not go beyond the barrier of building confidence and certainty among the four countries for Qatar's commitment to the reconciliation agreement, especially Egypt, which officially supported the agreement as a means to "confirm its solidarity with the Arab Quartet and discourage interference in it." The Ministry of Interior", in a clear message that Cairo is still questioning the credibility of the agreement. Doha's commitment to the agreement.

6.3.2. GLOBAL DYNAMICS

Relations between countries, in general, are always affected by global changes. That is why the change in the US administration and Biden's victory in the elections instead of Trump had a significant impact on Turkish and Gulf relations, which played a major role in reconciliation, even if it was not the main movement for reconciliation. From this point of view, the relationship between Qatar and the Turkish parties continues to grow, regardless of the change in the US administration. The change will be in the Qatar relations and the

²⁷⁷ Al-Hajj, Saeed, Turkey and Gulf Reconciliation | Position and Reflections, Al Jazeera Channel, 2021, last visit 28/2/2022

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2021/1/18/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81>

blockading countries, despite the existence of differences between them, despite the return of economic and political relations, diplomatic representation, and the opening of land and sea borders. Global changes require keeping pace with the two parties, so the two sides are keen to sever relations despite their differences.²⁷⁸

The American side had a major role in the reconciliation, as the reconciliation came in the context of an attempt to exert maximum pressure on Iran and increase its political isolation, and inflict more economic losses on it before Trump left the White House, so that the reconciliation represented depriving Iran of important financial income, which it was getting from Qatar. As a result of the imposition of the blockade on the latter by the Quartet countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt), through the use of Iranian airspace by Qatari aviation after imposing a siege on it and depriving its plane of crossing Saudi airspace. Thus, ending the blockade against Qatar leads to a tightening of the noose around it and its regional isolation.

Trump's loss to Biden in the US elections made him stifle the relationship with Iran and its complexity to such great levels that it is impossible to achieve Biden's plan towards Tehran, which is managing the crisis with it through the diplomatic approach by setting a set of understandings and settlements to bring it back to the negotiating table, thus opening the way for a return to the agreement concluded in the year 2015 or the conclusion of a new agreement between Iran and the International Five. According to the American doctrine, Trump wanted to record Gulf reconciliation during his reign, after it was among the reasons that fueled the Gulf crisis, from which he reaped great political and economic gains.²⁷⁹

The opinion of the European Union was represented by the statement of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the European Union, Josep Borrell,

²⁷⁸ PİRİNÇÇİ, FERHAT, Ortadoğu'da İhtiyatlı "Normalleşme" Trendi, sabah, (2021). last visit on 27\2\2022 <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/ferhat-pirincci/2021/09/04/ortadoguda-ihthyatli-normallesme-trendi>

²⁷⁹ Egyptian Institute for Studies, Gulf Reconciliation between America and Saudi Arabia: Motives and Paths, 2021, last visit on February 28, 2022 <https://eipss-eg.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/>

who made it clear that the European Union welcomes the return of full relations between the boycotting countries and Qatar after a Gulf summit held in the city of Al-Ula. From us, the European Union welcomes these important developments because they will greatly enhance Regional stability and as a result the Gulf Cooperation Council regains its unity and cooperation in full, explaining its veneration of the mediating role that Kuwait has played all along, as well as the United States.²⁸⁰

The German Foreign Ministry expressed the reconciliation by saying that the opening of the borders and airspace between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and the joint declaration of the Gulf Cooperation Council represent a major step in resolving the crisis between the Gulf states and once again for the peoples of the region. Opening the borders not only has a positive impact on the stability and economy of the Gulf states but is above all again that is in the interest of people's lives in the region. In addition to praising the American and Kuwaiti efforts to resolve the crisis, and emphasizing the role of the German government in dedicating its efforts with its European partners to resolving the crisis.²⁸¹

CONCLUSION

Qatar's foreign policy since 1970 has witnessed radical changes and ambitions, especially after Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani took power in 2013. At the same time, the Turkish Republic has witnessed, since the Justice and Development Party took office in 2002, radical changes in the behavior of foreign policy, which led to new alliances in the region, represented by the ideological vision of both countries in the Brotherhood's vision and the provision of support to the Brotherhood. Qatar, being a small country, wanted to adopt a more active and influential foreign policy behavior to avoid becoming a vassal of regional hegemony.

Qatar's foreign policy principles are about respecting other countries' internal affairs and preventive diplomacy that manifests itself in mediation and foreign aid that puts Qatar on the map as a major regional player. Qatar is an essential and influential part of the Gulf

²⁸⁰ E Euro news, the European Union welcomes the Gulf reconciliation and considers it a factor that enhances the stability of the region, 2021, last visit on February 28, 2022 <https://arabic.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/01/06/eu-welcomes-the-gulf-reconciliation-and-considers-it-a-factor-enhancing-the-stability>

²⁸¹ DW, German, European and international welcome to the Gulf Reconciliation Agreement, 2021. Last visit on February 28, 2022, <https://p.dw.com/p/3nYfp>

Cooperation Council, and this does not negate the nature that it seeks to maintain a separate and independent foreign policy. Iran in the Middle East is considered an enemy that threatens the security of the region, and the majority of the Gulf countries are biased against Iran. After the Gulf crisis, the Qatari view of Iran has changed, and it is no longer participating with the Gulf countries, believing that the Iranian threat is a source of concern, especially with Iran standing with Qatar in the Gulf crisis.

The Arab Spring led to the emergence of new regional regimes, and therefore the Gulf crisis is considered the worst diplomatic crisis occurring between the Gulf states and lasted for more than three years due to the different views of the Gulf states towards the Arab Spring. Gulf states Qatar and Turkey shared common positions towards the Arab Spring through both countries' support for the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition in Syria and the Libyan crisis, as in all crises, both countries-maintained mediation to resolve the crisis. Neorealism through the balance of threat theory provides a major framework in international relations theories in the field of interpreting the foreign policy of small states. In particular, Qatar and Turkey are trying to have a significant role in the region through diplomatic efforts and support for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and media soft power for both alternatives, for Qatar, the media is represented by Al-Jazeera, which supports Turkey.

Qatar, being a small country, withstood the blockade so that the Gulf blockade is a blessing for it instead of a curse. After the total dependence on importing most food from Saudi Arabia, Qatar began to find a quick solution, which is to isolate Turkish and Iranian goods to cover and meet the needs of the markets. On the other hand, it began In the production of food items by establishing factories and encouraging local production.

The innate Turkish rapprochement constitutes a narrowing for the blockading countries, but it has not exacerbated the crisis, as Turkey and Saudi Arabia have a strong cooperative relationship, and after the Gulf crisis, the UAE has been trying to get closer to Turkey: this is why the rapprochement of Qatar and Turkey did not affect the crisis.

The formation of the Qatar-Turkish alliance before, during, and after the blockade is almost the same, as the Qatar-Turkish cooperation is based on common interests and common

principles that prevent the cooperation between them from becoming the end of the security dilemma and the security threat.

Local, regional, and international developments have changed the priorities of the conflict countries over the past three years. About Qatar, support for the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is not a top priority for the regime at the moment given the economic challenges the country is facing due to preparations for the 2022 World Cup, low gas prices, and the coronavirus pandemic. One of the most important points is that the reconciliation came without damaging the relations that Qatar established with Turkey and Iran. Preserving its relations with Turkey, which was Qatar's biggest aid during the blockade, is what Qatar will do.

The Qatar-Turkish relationship, which began effectively since the Justice and Development Party took over in 2002, took a positive curve in the context of developing relations between the two parties, in 2014, when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the Qatari capital, Doha, with a key role in reversing the escalating partnership between Ankara and Doha, and the alliance which was formed in the region following the transformations of 2011. Among the agreements signed by the two sides after the establishment of the Joint Strategic Committee between them in 2014 was an agreement on defense cooperation, which authorized Ankara to deploy military forces in Qatar. This agreement was translated into reality in 2017, when the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of forces at the Turkish military base in Doha, in a message of support to Qatar after the boycott imposed by the blockading countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. The Gulf crisis marked a new turning point in the Qatari-Turkish alliance, it moved it to a greater level of cooperation that later developed into Qatar's support for Turkey in the lira crisis in 2018, with direct investments amounting to \$15 billion, in addition to Doha's emergence as an Arab voice opposing Arab statements against Turkey in the Arab League, in addition to coordination between the two countries on issues Regional, Libya and Syria.

The Turkish-Qatari partnership was among the main causes of the Gulf crisis, as it raised Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's concern about the growing Turkish role in the region in general, and the Gulf in particular. Turkey's support for Qatar at various political, economic, and military levels in the 2017 crisis has further deepened the crisis with the UAE and Saudi

Arabia. Given the American influence, the presence of the Trump administration during that period not only contributed to increasing the crisis between Qatar and its neighbors but also fueled the differences between Turkey and its Gulf opponents, to limit the growth of the Turkish role in the Gulf. Therefore, it was not possible to talk about the possibility of ending the Gulf crisis or making a turn in relations between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, without achieving a major condition, which is a change in the American situation, which is what happened with the departure of the Trump administration and the advent of the Biden administration, which was a major factor in Several factors led to a change in the regional priorities of Turkey and the Gulf states.

One of the factors that contributed to the formation of the Turkish-Qatari alliance was the policies of the axes that were formed in the region after 2011, and accordingly, Erdogan sought to confirm that Turkey would continue to build good relations with all Gulf countries without exception and that this trend would not be at the expense of the close partnership with Diameter. The future of Turkish-Qatari relations is fixed in its place and does not diminish after reconciliation, but reconciliation necessitates imposing the new relations that Ankara seeks to build with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, meaning that Turkish relations include the rest of the other Gulf parties, not only Qatar, as it was in past years, and this will enable Saudi Arabia and the UAE to exercise Some influence on Turkish policies in the region in the future, and this may be seen as a competition for Qatari influence in Ankara. On the other hand, this transformation will impose on the parties wishing to repair their relations with Turkey an approach that considers the Turkish role in the Gulf and the Turkish-Qatari relations. The Gulf crisis in 2017 was not the first, and the Al-Ula summit did not fully address its root causes. However, the chances of maintaining the current Gulf stability will increase if Turkey and the Gulf states succeed in establishing good relations.

However, Qatar remains a close and important Gulf ally for Turkey for many considerations, the most important of which is that the alliance that emerged between them was based not only on the existence of their regional interests but also on their similar ideological approach to the regional situation after the Arab Spring in terms of supporting the rise of political Islam. While the new relations that are currently emerging between Ankara, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are imposed primarily by the need to adapt to regional and

global changes, in addition to the fact that the conflict of interests between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in most regional issues still exists, although it seeks to manage it in the new stage.

Turkey's military presence in Qatar brings it important advantages in enhancing its Gulf presence and displaying its military capabilities, in addition to its defense industries, which attract the interest of many in the region, including the UAE, which is examining the possibility of defense cooperation with Turkey. In addition, Erdogan's foreign policy is characterized by maintaining partners, no matter how circumstances change.

Qatar has large economic investments in Turkey, which amounted to more than 33 billion dollars in 2020, in contrast, the UAE intends to invest about ten billion dollars in Turkey after repairing relations between the two countries, as well as being Turkey's largest trading partner in the Gulf region. Ankara is looking forward to bringing Saudi investments back into it, after restoring relations with Riyadh. Therefore, Turkey attaches importance to the new path with all the Gulf countries, as it will not only help it to bring in the largest amount of Gulf investments but also rid it of the restrictions imposed by the tension in relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia during the last period on the movement of trade between it and the region and the Gulf and other Arab countries. Therefore, the economic benefits to Turkey and the Gulf states seem to be the main driver now for the process of reforming relations.

It may be too early to present these future visions of Turkish-Gulf relations, as the region is still in the beginnings of the phase of transition from chaos in regional and Turkish-Gulf relations to the stage of restoring stability to these relations, and building a suitable ground to overcome the past stage. Cooperation in the economic and defense fields appears to be the currently available ground for restoring relations between Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, but they are not sufficient to solidify this ground, without reaching common approaches to regional issues, such as Libya and Syria. Also, the process of restoring trust between yesterday's opponents may take a long time, given the severe damage that the past phase left on Turkish-Gulf relations. Before the completion of the features of the new regional situation, it is unlikely that we will witness major shifts in the regional conflicts that

were the main driver of the Turkish-Gulf disputes in the past decade. This process will not fully crystallize before the crucial elections in Turkey, after about a year and a half.

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