



T. C.

ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

FELSEFE VE DİN BİLİMLERİ ANABİLİM DALI

DİNLER TARİHİ BİLİM DALI

CHRISTIAN MISSION

IN

POST-INDEPENDENCE INDONESIA

(YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ)

Mohammad Muafi HIMAM

Bursa – 2018



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Danışman:

Doç. Dr. Bülent ŞENAY

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
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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS İNTİHAL YAZILIM RAPORU

ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
FELSEFE VE DİN BİLİMLERİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

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Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 125 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 23/02/2018 tarihinde şahsım tarafından *Turnitin* adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan özgünlük raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 10'dur.

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
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LETTER OF OATH

I declared that my master thesis on the topic of: “**Christian Mission in Post-Independence Indonesia**” has consisted of the scientific method of research; I followed the writing and ethics rules. Likewise, all the sources that were given are ultimately relevant to the thesis’ rules, therefore: I swear an oath with my dignity that I did not plagiarize paragraph on my thesis.

Date and signature

09-03-2018



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BAĞIMSIZLIK SONRASI ENDONEZYA'DA HRİSTİYAN MİSYONERLİĞİ

Endonezya takımadalarındaki Hristiyan misyonu faaliyetleri coğrafya keşifler ile birlikte, on beşinci yüzyılda Portekiz ve Hollanda'nın Güneydoğu Asya'ya gelmesi ile başlamıştır. Portekiz ve Hollanda gemilerle gelen misyonerler tarafından gerçekleştirilen Hristiyan misyonu, İslam'ı yüzyıl önce benimsemiş krallarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu sebeple zamanla Hristiyanlık, sömürgecilik ile özdeşleşmiş ve sömürge dini olarak imaj kazanmıştır. Dahası, Hollanda sömürge hükümeti, İslami faaliyetlere yardım etmeyi göz ardı ederken, Hristiyan faaliyetlerinin surdurmesine destek vermeyi devam etmiştir. Hollanda hükümeti, bu iki dinin çatışmasına sebep olmuştur.

Yüzyıllarca süren bu itiraz ve ayrımcılık, Endonezya bağımsızlığını kazandıktan sonra da devam edegelmiştir. Dolayısıyla hükümetin toplumsal ve siyasal alanda aldığı çeşitli kararlar, her iki din arasındaki çatışmanın potansiyelini artırmaktadır. Fakat son dönemde, uzun suredir ihmal edilmiş çatışma problemi hafifletmek için Endonezya hükümeti çeşitli faaliyetler başlatmıştır. Ayrıca Dinler arası çatışmanın temel sebebi kendi dinlerini yaymada karşılıklı saygı eksikliği olmasıdır. Bazı Müslüman gruplar

tarafından, çatışmanın eksenini Hristiyan misyonerliğin olduğunu düşünülürken; bazı Hristiyan gruplar tarafından ise Müslüman gruplarının politik kıskançlığından dolayı Endonezya'da özgürlük ve hoşgörü ilkelerine zarar verdiklerini düşünülmektedir.

Bu çalışmada, Endonezya'daki Hristiyan misyonerliğinin tarihsel gelişimine dayanan veriler sunulup; Hristiyan misyonerliğin reform sonrasına kadar çözülmemiş sorunlar ve devam eden dinlerarası çatışmalarla ilgili konuları değinilecektir. Endonezya'daki Müslümanlar ve Hristiyanlar arasındaki çatışmaların sebebi sadece misyonun kendisi değil, siyaset, ekonomi ve iç-dış politikalar gibi başka faktörlerin dahil olduğunu açıklanacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Hristiyanlık, Misyoner, Çatışma, Endonezya

ABSTRACT

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CHRISTIAN MISSION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDONESIA

The arrival of Portuguese and Dutch to Southeast Asia in the fifteenth century as part of a new world quest also became the beginning of the Christian mission in the Indonesian archipelago. The Christian mission carried out by missionaries who came with the Portuguese and Dutch ships faced resistance from the rulers who had embraced Islam a century earlier. Christianity gradually identified with colonialism, and it forms a new image of Christianity as a colonial religion. Moreover, the colonial government continued to support Christian activities, while ignoring aid to Islamic activities. The Dutch government has led to conflicts between these two religions.

This contestation that lasted for hundreds of years made an impact on the relationship between these two religions after Indonesia gained its independence. Accompanied by various decisions of the new order government in the social and political sphere, the potential of conflict among adherents of both religions is increasingly ignited. In the end, the government began to take various approaches to mitigate the conflict that has long been abandoned. Various accusations are raised, which pursue the conclusion that the primary source of inter-religious conflict is the lack of mutual respect in spreading their respective religions. By some Muslim groups,

Christian mission is considered as the axis of conflict; whereas by some Christian groups, political jealousy of Muslim groups is considered to harm the principles of freedom and tolerance in Indonesia.

In this study, the author presents data based on the historical development of Christian mission in Indonesia and how Christian missionary related to the interreligious conflicts which continue to be unresolved problems, even until the post-reform era. The authors found that the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia occurred not only because of the mission itself. But, there are other factors such as politics, economics, and internal-external policies.

Keyword

Christianity, Mission, Conflict, Indonesia

ABBREVIATION PAGES

ABRI	: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesia Nasional Armed Forces)
BMS	: the Baptist Missionary Society
BPUPKI	: Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence)
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CRCS	: Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies
CSIS	: Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDII	: Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Council of Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia)
DGI	: Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia (Council of Churches in Indonesia)
G30S PKI	: Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (30 September Movement)
GKN	: Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Dutch Reformed Churches)
GKJW	: Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan (East Java Christian Church)
Golkar	: Golongan Karya (Golkar Political Party)
HAMKA	: Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah
HMI	: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Students' Association)
HTI	: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
IAIN	: Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Institute)
IRB	: Ilmu Religi dan Budaya (Religious and Cultural Sciences)

Khasebul	: Khalwat Sebulan
KNIP	: Komisi Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Indonesian National Commission)
KWI	: Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia (Bishops' Conference of Indonesia)
MAWI	: Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia (a new form of Bishops' Conference of Indonesia)
MPRS	: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly)
MUI	: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council)
NGZV	: Nederlands Gereformeerde Zendingsvereniging (Dutch Reformed Mission Union)
NMS	: the Netherlands Missionary Society
NU	: Nahdlatul Ulama
NZG	: Nederlandsch Zendinggenootschap (Dutch Missionary Society)
NZV	: Nederlandsche Zendingvereening (Dutch Mission Society)
OPSUS	: (Operasi Khusus)
PERSIS	: Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union; a religious organization)
PGI	: Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia (Communion of Churches in Indonesia)
PMKRI	: Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (Union of Catholic University Students of the Republic of Indonesia)
PMP	: Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education)
PNI	: Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)

PPKI	: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence)
PPP	: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
SJ	: Society Jesus
UÜİF	: Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi
VNZ	: Vereenigde Nederlandse Zendingscorporaties (United Dutch Mission Corporations)
VOC	: Vereenign de Oost Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)
YCW	: Young Christian Workers

PREFACE

Indonesia is a country with a huge Muslim population. According to the latest census of 2010, 87.18% of Indonesia's 237,641,326 are Muslim, 6.96% Protestant, 2.9% Catholic, 1.69% Hindu, 0.72% Buddhist, 0.05% Kong Hu Cu, 0.13% other religions, and 0.38% missed or unasked.¹ On the other hand, Christians in Indonesia experienced the fastest growth, from 7.39% to 8.92% by the end of 2000. This growth is even faster than the growth of Indonesian population, which is 1.83%.²

Christianization in the archipelago began for the arrival of Francis Xavier to the islands of Maluku in the early 16th century along with the arrival of Portuguese to Indonesia. Then in the 17th century, Protestants began to come together with the Dutch and became the majority Christianity in Indonesia until now. The process of Christianization in Indonesia was not without problems, because Islam has existed long before as the majority religion of Indonesia, especially in Java. The resistance between the colonial government and the indigenous people gradually became the opposition between Christianity and Islam. As a result, the inter-religious strife has become a continuing conflict even though the Dutch themselves have left Indonesia.

Therefore, it is worthy to examine the main problem that causes this protracted interreligious conflict. With the title "Christian mission in post-independence Indonesia", I emphasize some important points of discussion which are: 1) that Christian mission is an important point - if not to be regarded as the source of the problem - for the continuation of conflict between Muslims and Christians; 2) the spread of religion (both Christian and Islam) is a conflict-prone sector; 3) the period after Indonesian independence was a very "free moment", in which all elements of the nation of various interests vied to express their beliefs and desires freely, having escaped from the confines of the colony government for hundreds of years.

¹ "Sensus penduduk tahun 2010", <http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=0>, retrieved on 06/01/2018

² See Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 104.

Thanks to all those who have assisted me in completing this research, all parties that I can not mention their name one by one. My greatest thanks to my *hoca*, Doç. Dr. Bülent Şenay, who for the past year has been my mentor, not only as a supervisor for this thesis, but also as a wise listener and adviser to all the problems I faced. I would also like to thank his assistant lecturers and students in the history of religions program who were willing to spend their time helping to improve this thesis, such as Bayram Akbulut, Nagehan Zeynep Ceylanlar, and Mahmut Sami Şengül; also my comrade, Muhammad Munir El Kabir. In the end, my expression of gratitude and love to my family, especially to my mother who in the end did not have time to witness my efforts completing this master study. May you be proud of your children.

I hope that this research can be useful to broaden the perspective of conflict resolution studies, the religious historical point of view in Indonesia, and to benefit anyone interested in Indonesian studies.

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INTRODUCTION

Some scholars argue that before the 16th century Christianity had arrived in Indonesia - or more precisely at certain locations in the Indonesian archipelago - due to the emergence of records about the presence of Nestorian Christians on the west coast of Sumatra in the 7th century. However, due to the unavailability of comprehensive data or information because Nestorian who had arrived did not leave a visible mark, the official trace of Christianity in Indonesia began to be calculated since the 15th century, with arrival of the Portuguese in Malacca Island.³

The Indonesian archipelago that was to become known as the Netherlands' Dutch Indies tells a particularly interesting variation of this story. The history of the Christian mission on the island of Java in particular, demonstrates the highly complex relations between commercial expansion, colonial governance, and religious order. The Christian mission started in the region with the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. In Java, however, the spread of Christianity was prohibited in 1680 because the VOC (Dutch East India Company), which had by then monopolized the trade in the region, feared that missionary efforts would cause social and political disturbances at local and regional levels that would impact negatively on public order and trade.

However, in 1800, there were virtually no native Christians in Java. The Christians in Java Island in those years were only dominated by migrants from Europe.⁴ In 1848, Jelle Jellesma, the first missionary affiliated with a missionary society (NZG), arrived with formal permission to evangelize in Java. From 1850 onward, the Dutch colonial government allowed an increasing number of missionaries to take up activities in Java. The emergence of the first native Christian followers in Java only occurred in the second part of the 19th century. In South Jombang, in a village named Ngoro, there is a religious group headed by a Dutch-Javanese Christian named (Conrad Laurens) Coolen. He became the founder of a new village that attracted many Javanese from the region. Coolen was a pious Christian, but also continued much of Javanese tradition and

³ Aritonang, Jan S., *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004, p. 13-14

⁴ Aritonang, Jan Sihar & Steenbrink, Karel (ed.), *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2008, p. 640

wisdom in his life. He was acknowledged as a *Kiai*, a traditional wise and holy man, albeit in a Christian version, but still, one who could give advice and receive visions.⁵ He did not urge the new villagers to become Christian and accepted that many of them remained Muslim. But he set some specific rules for his foundation like abstention from work on Sunday. The Christians were obliged to attend Sunday morning worship, as well as the midweek meeting in private houses.⁶

In the next period, small friction began to arise between the Christians who are predominantly Dutch, and followers of Islam, mostly *Santris*⁷. In that year also, began to emerge Christian missionaries who are ideologically different from the Christianity brought by the Dutch. These people, such as *Kiai* Tunggul Wulung, Paulus Tosari, and *Kiai* Sadrach, also colored the development of Christian mission in Java in the 19th century.

This increasingly Christian development provoked the attention of the government which was then controlled by the Dutch, as well as indigenous groups dominated by Muslims. The interaction of these three groups eventually led to new dynamics in religious development in Indonesia, especially in Java Island; from the era of colonization until nowadays.

THE PROBLEM

The history of the propagation of Christianity in Java has already attracted the attention of many. Previous works done by both Javanese and Dutch missionaries have highlighted essential persons such as C. Coolen, Johannes Emde, *Kiai* Tunggul Wulung and of course, *Kiai* Abbas Sadrach.⁸ These works also offer a picture of the relations

⁵ The word is of Javanese origin. Sometimes it is spelled kyai. Traditionally, students of Islam in Indonesia would study in a boarding school known as a pesantren. The leader of the school was called kyai, as a form of respect. The traditional word for a teacher in Islam is *ustad*, which is a Persian word. More on *Kiai*, see Bruinessen, Martin van (1995). "Shari'a court, tarekat and pesantren: religious institutions in the sultanate of Banten". *Archipel*. Vol. 50: 165–200

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 641

⁷ *Santri* is a cultural 'stream' of people within the population of Javanese who practice a more orthodox version of Islam, in contrast to the *abangan* classes. The American sociologist, Clifford Geertz, identified three main cultural streams (*aliran* in Indonesian) in Javanese society.

⁸ Johannes Emde was born in 1774 in Germany. He was raised in a "pietist" tradition that demanded total surrender of Christ, although later he became a reactionist. He was famous among the Indo-Dutch for forming his own Christian community (21-26); Conrad Laurens Coolen was born in Semarang from

between Christianity and Islam in Java. However, at that moment, Christian-Muslim relation occurred in a confined space. The meeting of these two religions, both of which are immigrant religions on Java, was determined by the position of the two faiths and the function they performed amidst village society in the hinterlands of Java. With the forming of Christian congregations scattered in the various villages on Java, there began a new act in the meeting between the Christian and Islamic religions. That meeting was no longer between Europeans and indigenous people, but between Javanese who had embraced Christianity and Islam. With the common background of these two adherents, the meeting took place in various sectors, especially the political sector.

After the independence of Indonesia in 1945, conversion to Christianity occurred on a large scale in various regions in Indonesia. As a result of the G30S PKI event (the 1965 event)⁹, the government required every Indonesian people to choose one of the five religions recognized by the government¹⁰. Then, so as not to be considered as a member of the PKI which also identified as atheist groups, many of the “*Islam abangan*”¹¹ adherents were converted to Christianity. This conversion event became the starting point of the physical conflict between Islam vis-à-vis Christianity in the early

Russian-Dutch father and native Javanese mother. In 1827, he asked the government for permission to clear the forest and make it as a new village. In the end Coolen built the village as a village for Christian communities in Surabaya (31-42); Tunggul Wulung was (his original name was Ngabdullah Ibrahim) born at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Juwana residency, near Jepara, Central Java. For seven years, he was imprisoned in mount Kelud and changed his name to Tunggul Wulung. He converted to Christianity thanks to Jellesma, a female missionary who lives in Surabaya. Like his teacher, he uses cultural approach to spread Christianity in Java (42-47); Abbas Sadrach is one of Coolen's disciples who have successfully converted thousands of Salatiga residents in less than five years. more details about Sadrach will be explained in the next chapter (51-).

⁹ Movement of September 30th by Communist Party of Indonesia; an assassination of military generals alleged to the communist party of Indonesia which happened on 30 September, 1965.

¹⁰ These five religions are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism.

¹¹ Cited from his book, Geertz saw differences between Islam *abangan* and Islam *santri*, “Comparing the *abangan* and *santri* variants of the Modjokuto religious pattern, two very striking general differences, other than their differential evaluation of Islamic orthodoxy, are immediately apparent. In the first place, *abangans* are fairly indifferent to doctrine but fascinated with ritual detail, while among the *santris* the concern with doctrine almost entirely overshadows the already attenuated ritualistic aspects of Islam” (1960:126). Furthermore, Geertz stated that, “An *abangan* knows when to give a *slametan* and what the major foods should be-porridge for a birth, pancakes for a death” (1960:127) while “For the *santri* the basic rituals are also important-particularly the prayers, the conscientious performance of which is taken by *santris* and non-*santris* alike to be the distinguishing mark of a true *santri*-...” (Geertz, Clifford, *the Religion of Java*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 1960, p. 127)

days of the New Order.¹² According to a note from Institution of Research and Social Development in Java, in less than a decade especially after the 1965 event, the number of Roman Catholic churches has doubled, from 125.486 to 241.387.¹³ According to Alwi Shihab, Muhammadiyah¹⁴ considered that the large-scale conversion is also supported by Soeharto's New Order to minimize the existence of Islam. They suspect that the government was still traumatized by the uprising of a group led by Kartosuwiryo in 1962, which sought to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia.¹⁵

Until the late of the 1970s, due to the activity of Christian missionaries in the form of education and health in Central Java, *Suara Muhammadiyah* expresses much criticism and attacks the Catholics. It was due to the practice of celibacy alleged to the Catholic clergy which happened during September 1971, also several cases of Christianization in Java in the 1970s. As a result, Muhammadiyah, Persis¹⁶, and the Indonesian Council for Islamic Da'wah (DDII) made a relation with international organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and *Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami*¹⁷ "to prevent the danger of proselytism."

¹² In the early 1967, for example, difficulties arose regarding the construction of a small Methodist church in Meulaboh (western Aceh) and on October 1, 1967 the young Muslim in Makasar (South Sulawesi) destroyed the furnishings of various churches (Boland, B.J., *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: PT Grafiti Press, 1985, p. 241; Feillard, Andree, *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999, 142- 143).

¹³ See *Institute for Research and Social Development*, "Ichtisar Statistik Tentang Geredja Katolik di Indonesia: 1949-1967", Jakarta: KWI, 1968.

¹⁴ Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with 29 million members. Although Muhammadiyah leaders and members are often actively involved in shaping the politics in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is not a political party. It has devoted itself to social and educational activities. ("*Muhammadiyah*", Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affair, retrieved 17.09.2017).

¹⁵ Shihab, Alwi, *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Mizan, 1998, p. 173.

¹⁶ Persis was founded in Bandung, West Java, in 1923, which was relatively late to establish an Islamic organization. By that time the nationalist party Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah were both well established and Sarekat Islam leader Abdoel Moeis was already making waves in Bandung by opposing Communism and warning Muslims of the threat of Christians. Persis was founded in an atmosphere of polemics and polarization, which was reflected in its policies toward Islamic reformists and traditionalists, Christians, and Communists. See Menchik, Jeremy, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 45

¹⁷ Muslim World League; Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami was founded in 1962 in Saudi Arabia to discuss the affairs of the Muslim ummah in view of the threats posed to the Muslim world by Communism and irreligion. The intent was to promote the message of Islam, fight perceived conspiracies against Islam, and discuss all problems relevant to Islam. See <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1652>, received on 4.3.2018, 9.22 am

During the new order which lasted up to 32 years, there were 664 places of worship (55 mosques and 604 churches) suffered attacks and destruction.¹⁸ The inter-religious dialogue was launched as an attempt to resolve the conflict. The first meeting was initiated by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Muhammad Dachlan, in Jakarta on November 30, 1967. This meeting was unsuccessful because Christian representative protested against the limitation propaganda while Islam representatives refused to engage in dialogue. Finally, when Abdul Mukti Ali¹⁹ became a Minister of Religious Affairs (1971-1978), inter-religious dialogue successfully bridged, although the issue of Christianization repeatedly reappointed in various aspects of political and social.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

As one of 'immigrant religions' in Indonesia, Christianity which came from Europe along with the Portuguese and the Dutch got a stigma as a religion of the colonists. Although the Christian mission in Indonesia was delivered by 'peaceful mean'²⁰ through Francis Xavier who came with Portuguese merchant ship, the image of Christianity as a religion of the colonists already attached due to the act of the Portuguese and the Dutch colonialist simultaneously for more than 350 years to the archipelago of Indonesia.

The characteristics of Christian mission in Java are very different compared to the other islands in Indonesia. William Robinson²¹, an evangelist at the time of governor Stamford Raffles (1811-1815), chooses to use a cultural approach to deliver the gospel to the Java community in Batavia²². Some missionaries in Java after Robinson's death

¹⁸ Dhakidae, Daniel, *Cendekiawan dan kekuasaan dalam negara Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Gramedia, 2003, p. 516

¹⁹ Abdul Mukti Ali, Minister of Religious Affairs, 1971–1978 and professor of Comparative Religion at State Islamic Institute Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, deserves to be called "Bapak Dialogue" (father of dialogue) in Indonesia. During his ministry the inter-religious relationship, esp. Christian-Muslim, was quite encouraging. See Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 853

²⁰ Not through debate or war, Francis conveyed his teachings through a cultural approach. Xavier realized that "not all elements of non-Christian culture should be despised or rejected, otherwise there are many things worthy of respect. Christianity must be communicated according to local education and culture," wrote Anne Ruck. See <https://tirto.id/kisah-fransiskus-xaverius-penyebar-katolisisme-di-indonesia-cmh4>, retrieved on 4.3.2018, 9.31 am

²¹ William Robinson (1784-1853) was a British Baptist who worked in Batavia between 1813 and 1821. See Lapp, John, *Churches Engage Asian Traditions: A Global Mennonite History*, Pennsylvania: Good Books, 2011, p. 54

²² Batavia is the old name of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia today.

also followed his footsteps. Slowly, they acculturate Christian elements into indigenous cultures. This method proved successful with the increase in the number of adherents of native Christians who in the last 19th century had increased to more than one hundred thousand.²³

The growing number of Christian believers at the beginning of the New Order era has caused anxiety among Muslim leaders, especially leaders of the Muhammadiyah in Central Java. Claimed evidence found in the field such as logistics distribution to poor Muslim communities in Salatiga, Central Java, after the demise of the Communist party in 1966,²⁴ which was then used by the Muhammadiyah leaders to accuse the Christian group on engaging illegal Christianization activities in Muslim-majority areas.

The relations between the Muslim majority and Christian minority were tense during this period. Muslims and Christian disagreed on how to interpret the law concerning freedom of religion and tolerance. Muslims claimed that Christians used foreign aid for 'Christianization'. Christians, on the other hand, claimed that Muslims curtailed the freedom of religion of Christians by acts of intolerance and violence. Meanwhile, then president Suharto²⁵ tried to be seen as impartial, for he considered economic prosperity more important than religion.²⁶

This thesis will analyze the dynamics of Muslim-Christian relations in New Order Indonesia critically as manifested in the way both religious traditions have interacted with specific socio-political and religious issues that concerned them. More specifically, it will also analyze the socio-political contexts and bases of the 'Christianization' discourses produced by representative Muslim leaders and how elected Christian leaders have responded to them. Moreover, this study will show how the New

²³ Sumartana, Th, *Mission at the crossroads: Indigenous churches, European missionaries, Islamic association and socio-religious change in Java, 1812-1936*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1994, p. 22

²⁴ Christianization in New Order Indonesia (1965-1998). (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://journal.unpar.ac.id/index.php/melintas/article/download/943/927>

²⁵ Suharto, or Soeharto, was the second President of Indonesia, holding the office for 31 years from the ousting of Sukarno in 1967 until his resignation in 1998. The legacy of Suharto's 31-year rule is debated both in Indonesia and abroad. Under his "New Order" administration, Suharto constructed a strong, centralised and military-dominated government. An ability to maintain stability over a sprawling and diverse Indonesia and an avowedly anti-Communist stance won him the economic and diplomatic support of the West during the Cold War. More about Suharto, see Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, *Soeharto: The Life and Legacy of Indonesia's Second President*, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2007.

²⁶ Christianization In New Order Indonesia (1965-1998). (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://journal.unpar.ac.id/index.php/melintas/article/download/943/927>

Order government responded to Christianization issues regarding government policies and actions. Also, it is significant to see how both Muslims and Christians reacted to such policies and actions.

The purpose of this thesis is to offer a view that there is a need to understand the issue of 'Christianization' during the New Order in Indonesia from a wider context, beyond internal considerations. From a broader perspective, as Haddad thought, the Muslims fear and anxiety seemed to proceed from a feeling of disempowerment and defeat that has enveloped the Muslim world and a perception that hostile powers virtually encircle it not only bent on the destruction of the community's strength but also on keeping it underdeveloped and dependent.²⁷

It chooses the period after the independence of Indonesia because, according to the conflict timelines, the nonstop case of Muslim-Christian tensions in Java that lead to significant physical conflict from 1965 to 1998 is the highest.

Religions in Indonesia are poorly represented in the international literature, especially in religious matters. Using "Indonesia" and "religion" as keywords, no more than five books can be found, in the Turkish libraries, for example. The Christian community in Indonesia, whose number has reached 23 million or about 10 percent of the total population in Indonesia, does not get sufficient description in English. Study of Christianity in Indonesia is predominantly dominated by Dutch-language literature, also several German languages.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Some of the core questions underlying this study are:

1. How was the development of Christian mission after the independence of Indonesia?
2. How Islamic groups react to the missionary activities in Java?
3. What is meant by Christianization, as alleged by Muhammadiyah leaders?

²⁷ Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, "Christians in a Muslim State: The Recent Egyptian Debate," in *Christian Muslim Encounters*, Waddi Z. Haddad (ed.), Miami: University Press of Florida, 1995, p. 381

4. What are the allegations that are directed to Christian missionaries and how do they respond?
5. Is interfaith dialogue a practical solution to maintain religious harmony in Indonesia?

METHODOLOGY

This study will be a qualitative study that uses written sources, which is based on both Western and Indonesian literature. Some data will be gained through interviews with some Christians and Muslims and a survey of the Muslim youths. Primary sources will be obtained from the archives of the national library, church libraries, various Indonesia newspapers, magazines, books and unpublished documents.

This study will be focused on Java, especially Central Java. Central Java is a densely populated area. Unlike other provinces, the Central Java region is less industrialized than other provinces. Central Java is a region dominated by the highlands; there are many mountains, including the active volcano of Mount Merapi in Yogyakarta.²⁸

The second half of the 18th century became the earliest year of the presence of Christianity in Central Java.²⁹ Actually, before that year, there has also been a church there named “*Koepelkerk*” (*Gereja Blenduk* dome), but at that time the existing Christians were only Dutch colony officials; those who do not care about religious lives.³⁰ So no wonder then, when the first missionary who came to Central Java, Gottlob Brückner (1783-1857), complained to the BMS related to the condition of Christian communities there that did not match his expectation. He expressed that at that time it was tough to find Dutch people who were obedient to Christianity.³¹ Until about the 1850s, in Central Java, there were only a few Dutch-speaking communities who were

²⁸ Aritonang, 2008, p. 685

²⁹ Ibid, 669; Coolsma 1901, p. 13

³⁰ Ibid; Van Trostenburg De Bruyn, 1884, p. 175

³¹ Ibid; letter to BMS December 8, 1843, Archives BMS

Christians. They concentrated in major cities of Central Java such as Semarang and Purwokerto, served by one or two pastors from the *Geereformede* church.³²

In addition to being a place where indigenous missionaries came from, as manifested by Headley in Durga's Mosque, Central Java is a community that is closely related to the Hindu-Buddhism tradition. Inevitably, missionaries in Java were required to adapt to the customs of society which then received acceptance from the community there.

This study is a research study on the missions and churches development process since their arrival to Indonesia until the post-reformation era. Therefore, I am using a *historical investigation* to systematically examine all the terms and problems that arise during the development. It is a way of finding out what a word means is to determine what it has been used to say and then describe the range and distribution of its uses.³³

OUTLINE

In the first chapter, this thesis will explain the terms and history of the primary focus of this study mission. As part of the significant Christian theology, the mission is a task that must be done by all Christians. The histories of mission in the colonialism era dwell on a negative connotation which is violation and oppression. As a form of adjustment to the new world, mission experienced some paradigm shifts, and the study of this will be discussed in the history, aim and the objective of the mission.

In the second and third chapters, this thesis will go deep to the Christian mission in Indonesia and its history. As the annals of history, the first Christianity which entered Indonesia is Catholicism that came with the Portuguese ships (April, 1511). Furthermore, in the 17th century Protestantism came with the Dutch East India trade group. In this chapter, it will study how the conflict began between Catholicism, Protestantism and the religion that had already existed, Islam. I will also explain the development of Christian groups as a community in Java, as well as the role of colonists in its progress.

³² Ibid, p. 670; van Boetzelaer 1947, p. 361

³³ Smith, Morton. "Historical Method in the Study of Religion," in *History and Theory*, vol. 8, 1968, pp. 8–16.

Guided by what was written by Ricklefs and Hefner³⁴, the process of forming the basis of the state becomes the starting point of friction among religions after ‘softened’ by a joint struggle against colonialism. From there, some big cases like the communist insurgency movement that led to the ‘massive cleanup,’ as well as the policies of former president Suharto in the new order era that limits the number of official religion make inter-religious conflict increasingly worrying. History and discussion of these cases will be explained in this chapter. Also, this thesis will analyze some changes in the form and method of mission that developed in Indonesia after the second Vatican council.

Later in the fourth chapter, it will discuss and unravel the interreligious conflict, particularly between Muslim and Christian groups, coherently, in the new order era. New Order era indeed is a time where religion is not allowed to protrude significantly. The government tried to limit the manifestation of the religious identities in the public areas.³⁵ Began with the accusation of Christianization from Muhammadiyah to the Catholic groups, the new order era can be called as the peak of the interreligious conflict.³⁶ In that period, the Muslim-Christian strife underwent several conditions that made both alternately got supports from the government. The attitude of the New Order government that often changes against Islam and Christianity also affects this contestation.³⁷ For nearly 40 years, the conflict is more dominated by physical upheaval. I will also discuss the inter-religious dialogue which is a new solution formed by a former religious minister. The question is, whether the inter-religious dialogue is the appropriate method to maintain religious harmony in Indonesia? Do inter-religious dialogue only became a formal activity to cover the conflict that cannot be stopped in Indonesia?

³⁴ See Amid Sukamto, *Ketegangan Antar Kelompok Agama Pada Masa Orde Lama Sampai Awal Orde Baru Di Indonesia*, Indonesian Journal of Theology, vol. 1/1 (July 2013), p. 25-47

³⁵ Suhadi, *“I Come from a Pancasila Family”: A discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesia Post-Reformasi Era*, Wien: LIT Verlag, 2014, p. 198

³⁶ Sukamto, Amid, 2013, p. 33

³⁷ For example, during the first period of the New Order era (1966-1973), Christian groups were at the top of the wind, while Muslims were in a marginal position within the government. In the second period (1974-1989), although their position within the government has not been dominant, Muslims have become more solid, while Christians have begun to feel pressed and have little support from the authorities. While in the third period (1990-1998), as the strength of the new order became weaker, the role of certain Muslims - especially modernists - was increasing, while Christians were increasingly urged and marginalized. (Aritonang, Jan S., *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004, p. 363).

CHAPTER I: DEFINITIONS AND HISTORY

1. UNDERSTANDING THE TERM OF MISSION

The word “mission” comes from the Latin word which is a substantive form of the *mittere* verb (*mitto, mission, missum*). It has some basic meanings: (1) to throw, to shoot, to hit; (2) to send; (3) to let, to let go, to take, to take off.³⁸ In the Vulgate, the word "*mittere*" is a translation of the Greek words "*pempein*" and "*apostelein*" (which also means, to send). These two Greek terms existed 206 times in the New Testament. "The person who is sent" or *missionarius* (in the Latin word) which is translated from the Greek word "*Apostolos*" appeared 79 times in the New Testament. While, “the tasks they carry out” which is called *mission*-translated from the Greek word "*Apostole*"-appeared four times in the New Testament.³⁹

Mission is defined as a divine activity of sending intermediaries, whether supernatural or human, to speak or do God's will so that his purposes for judgment or redemption are furthered. Mission is used as a tool to convey the message of god that comes from the holy book. That is because the holy book does contain messages to be conveyed to humans.⁴⁰ The concept of "missionaring" itself has its meaning; internally and externally. The internal missionaring implies the work of the church among its believers for the sake of keeping and improving their religious and moral life. The external mission is interpreted as "the activity of propagating faiths or thoughts into non-Christian communities to make them accept the new teachings."⁴¹

Furthermore, *Dictionary of Jesus And The Gospels* defines the mission as "*the activity of individuals (or the community of faith) who distinguish themselves from the society in the which they live both in terms of religious convictions (theology) and social behavior (ethics), who are convinced of the truth of their beliefs, and who actively*

³⁸ See K. Prent, c.m., *Kamus Latin – Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1969, p. 539 – 540.

³⁹ Legrand, Lucien, *Unity and Plurality: Mission in the Bible*, New York: Orbis Books, 1990, p. 14

⁴⁰ Aykıt, Dursun Ali, *Misyon ve İnciller: Misyonerliğin tarihsel kökenleri*, Istanbul: Kesit Yayinlari, 2006, p. 15

⁴¹ Gündüz, Şinasi, “Misyonerlik”, *Diyanet Islam Ansklopedisi*, p. 193

works to win other people to their convictions and way of life".⁴² Therefore, the mission has ordinary means as an action to delegate and delivery, performed by someone assigned by God, as an attempt to change the old things. Jesus called himself as a person sent by *The Father*, the apostle of God (referred to as the mission of Jesus). Jesus then educated his disciples, sent them to some towns and villages such as Galilee, Judea, Samaria and so on (referred as the mission of the Twelve). Then His mission was proceeding by four authors of the Bible (also called the mission of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John).

In general, it can be said that missionary work is a church activity related to evangelization and church building, also the extension of the church beyond its existing frontier. This meaning narrowed down as a preaching activity to those who have never heard of the gospel, while the extension of the church was a direct consequence of the proclamation of the gospel, that to those who accept the proclamation and surrendered to be baptized. Mission then is a form of spreading the gospel by Christians outside the borders of the (Christian) state, by mapping the territory in two parts: Christian and non-Christian countries.⁴³

Hillman describes, at the beginning of Christianity era, mission was a term which meant the form of *the Father's* will to *the Son* (mission of God); and of *the Father and the Son's* will' to the Holy Spirit (mission of Jesus), to convey the Christian doctrine. It had been used as an official mission of the church, and also as a theological meaning of the Trinity.⁴⁴ To familiarize this term, the church usually uses words such as spreading the faith (*fidei propagation*), repentance of the unbelievers (*conversion gentilium*), expansion of the church (*dilation ecclesiae*), apostolic preaching (*praedicatio Apostolica*), and others.⁴⁵ David J. Bosch mentions that this mission term traditionally has been paraphrased as (a) the propagation of the faith, (b) expansion of the reign of God, (c) conversion of the Heathen, and (d) the founding of new churches.⁴⁶ Kasting states: "*mission was, in the early stages, more than a mere function; it was a*

⁴² Green, Joel B., "Mission" in the *Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels*, England: InterVarsity Press, p. 604

⁴³ Aykıt, Dursun Ali, 2006, p. 20

⁴⁴ Gündüz, Şinasi, "Misyonerlik", *Diyanet İslam Ansklopedisi*, p. 193

⁴⁵ Woga, Edmund, *Dasar-dasar Misiologi*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2002, p. 16

⁴⁶ Bosch, David J., *Transforming Mission - Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission*, New York: Orbis Books, 2011, p. 1

*fundamental expression of the life of the church. The beginnings of a missionary theology are also the beginnings of Christian theology.*⁴⁷

However, since the 16th century, started by Jesuit priests led by Ignatius of Loyola⁴⁸, the word mission began to be used as a term of spreading the faith with the beginning of the spreading of Christianity to the colonial worlds.⁴⁹

Although commonly used as a particular term in Christianity, mission which means dissemination is also used as a standard term for the religions that actively spread their theology. In Indonesia, religions are divided into two groups: missionary and non-missionary religions. Missionary religion is a religion that always tried to increase its adherents, convey its teachings to others. Christianity and Islam are in this category.⁵⁰ Non-missionary religion is a religion that has no missiology as a part of its theology, such as the Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian. Missiology can be understood merely as a doctrine to lure other followers, as Sharma wrote.⁵¹

Throughout its history, the mission has incised so many records that elicited pro and con reactions. Conflict in mission understanding occurs throughout account as there is no complementary which is uniting the various motivations, objectives, and interests

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 32

⁴⁸ St. San Ignacio de Loyola. Born in 1491, Loyola, Castile [Spain]—died July 31, 1556, Rome [Italy]; Spanish theologian and one of the most influential figures in the Catholic Reformation of the 16th century, founder of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in Paris in 1534. (<https://www.britannica.com/biography/St-Ignatius-of-Loyola>.)

⁴⁹ Gündüz, Şinasi, “Misyonerlik”, *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 193

⁵⁰ Although equally have a same term, the concept of mission in Islam and Christianity is different. In Christianity, mission means as a propaganda of beliefs, converting unbelievers, and building churches in new places (Aykıt, 2006: 22). In addition, the form of Christian mission is clearly mentioned by St. Paul in **1 Corinthians, 9: 19-22**:

“(19) Though I am free and belong to no one, I have made myself a slave to everyone, to win as many as possible. (20) To the Jews I became like a Jew, to win the Jews. To those under the law I became like one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under the law. (21) To those not having the law I became like one not having the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so as to win those not having the law. (22) To the weak I became weak, to win the weak. I have become all things to all people so that by all possible means I might save some.”

In Islam, the mission is often referred to as *tabligh*, which means to tell, deliver, and give news. The meaning of this *tabligh* is much explained in the verses of the Qur'an (24: 54, 5: 67, 16: 125, 22: 49). From some verses about *tabligh* in Islam, no terms found connecting *tabligh* with deception, cheating, pressing. The principle of *tabligh* is openness, truth, and without coercion (Küçük, Misyonerlik Nedir?, on *Dinler Tarihiyle Gözüyle Türkiyede Misyonerlik*, Ankara: Türkiye Dinler Tarihi Derneği, 2005: 25)

⁵¹ Sharma A., “Religions: Missionary and Non-missionary”, in *Problematising Religious Freedom, Studies in Global Justice*, vol. 9, Springer, Dordrecht, 2012, p. 175-195

that are embedded in the whole motion of the mission. Traditional meanings of missions such as repentance, the salvation of souls, and church planting where missionary work is understood as an attempt to expand, subjugate and conquer other nations to the invaders (Spain, Portugal, Holland, Germany, England) are a burden to the mission.⁵² “The efforts of territorial expansion that driven by the spirit of dominating nations and the expansion of the "kingdom of God" which is energized by the spirit of Christian triumphalism against tribal religions make them as dilemmas to the mission work. Meanwhile, in the mission’s field, there was also an internal conflict between the Catholic Church, in this case, the Portuguese and the Spanish, dealing with the Reformed Church (Protestant) in this case the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain due to economic, political and cultural interests.⁵³

2. BETWEEN MISSION, PROSELYTISM, AND EVANGELISM

The term of proselytism suddenly became popular again when Pope Francis expressed it in the middle of 2011. Proselytism (or proselytizing), was used as an antonym for evangelization, a new concept that became the symbol of the Roman Catholic Church’s official mission. Proselytism seems to be a bad past, dumped, and an idea that is incompatible with the present.

The term proselytism first found in the Old Testament, especially *the Septuagint*, a Greek translation of the phrase "*ger*". In the Hebrew version of the Bible, "*ger*" means stranger, ‘alien’, unidentified immigrants and a stranger without blood ties with the inhabitants who settled on the land they visited.⁵⁶ In this

⁵² During the Lent Sermon on March 12, 2000, Pope John Paul II apologized to the world for 'evil deeds' that made the church's face stained. "We cannot not recognize the betrayal of the Gospel committed by some of our brothers, especially in the second millennium," the pope said. "Recognizing the deviations of the past serves to reawaken our consciences to the compromises of the present." The pope also mentioned the persecution of Catholics by other faiths. "As we ask forgiveness for our sins, we also forgive the sins committed by others against us," he said. (<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/13/world/pope-asks-forgiveness-for-errors-of-the-church-over-2000-years.html>, retrived on 18 October, 2017).

⁵³ It started with the Treaty of Tordesillas, an agreement mediated by Pope Alexander VI that divided the newly discovered lands along to African coast and in the Americas between Spain and Portugal. (See Frank K Flinn, *Encyclopedia of Catholicism*, New York: Checkmark Books, 2007, p. 609)

⁵⁶ Freedman, David Noel, *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, Anchor Bible, 1992, vol. 5, p. 503

context, they are non-Jews who entered into the Jews groups. Similar sentences are found in several verses.⁵⁷

In antiquity, proselyte term is only used in the Judaism context.⁵⁸ Etymologically, proselytize means as an attitude to switch (entrance, heading to) carried out by foreigners (in the biblical word, it is the gentile, non-Jews) from the old belief to the Judaism, and then to live as a Jew by the laws of Torah.⁵⁹ Those who became a newly Jews who are not pure-blooded Jewish (gentile) should get the same threat as a Jewish people, also get the same rights and obligations as they are, with the conditions that must be met, such as circumcision, baptism, and sacrifice.⁶⁰

In the New Testament (Book of Matthew), the term proselytism tends to be negative. In the early Christianity, “proselytes” was a ‘neutral’ term to address early Christian followers. Along with the change in the concept and purpose of Christian mission, slowly the use of word proselytism began to be avoided. However, since the 18th century, proselytism has the sole means which is "converting the believers of one church to another" (Sheep stealing).⁶¹

Changes given proselyte began since the era of enlightenment and the increase of so-called freedom and tolerance. Also, the growing understanding of secularism is also an important point of the cause of increasing negative views on forms of proselytism that are considered to violate the elements of the human rights and rights of individuals. The declaration of freedom of religion (1965) became the greatest obstacle: "The human being has the right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups or any human power, in such wise as in matter of religion no one is to be forced to act in a

⁵⁷ Exodus 12: 48-49; 22: 21; Deuteronomy 29: 10-15

⁵⁸ Freedman David Noel, 1992, p. 503

⁵⁹ Paul J. Griffiths and Jean B. Elshtain, “Proselytizing for Tolerance,” in *First Things*, no. 127 [November 2002]: 30

⁶⁰ Deuteronomy, 10: 19

⁶¹ Kerr, David A, “Christian Understandings of Proselytism” on *International Buletin of Missionary Research*, Number 1 Volume 23, Januari 1999, p. 5

manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others."⁶²

2.1. PROSELYTISM

As mentioned above, proselytism is an antithesis of mission and evangelization. In the New Oxford English Dictionary, proselytize (proselytize) interpreted by (1) convert or attempt to convert; (2) promote or advocate; (3) to cause to turn to religion, belief, belief, or opinion to another; to transform; to change in character or function. Given the meaning that the Dictionary presents, the word "proselytize" contains a superior understanding which means to change or to converse. A "proselytized man" was a turnaround for changes or follows a new opinion that made him change. It is like a politician who moves for another party because it fits him better ideologically. Another example is like someone who is persuaded to buy a new product that is advertised beautifully by the seller.

Proselytism is the term that first appeared in the Old Testament. Generally, the term of proselytism (proselytos) is referred to foreigners, non-Jews. This term actually has a positive meaning, which is used for non-Jews who convert to Judaism. Proselyte is also mentioned in the New Testament, precisely in Matthew 23:15. However, in the New Testament this term has a negative meaning, which is the description of the coercion of the Persians against those who renounce their religion.⁶³

Proselytize contains attitudes that change opinions, faiths, and beliefs. Elmer Thiessen in his book details various standard forms of persuasion that are identical to proselytizing. Parents who encourage their children to brush their teeth after every meal, a friend who recommended his friend about his recommended movies, a manager who briefed employees, so there are no incidents in work, as well as a professor who argue with a student about his student's opinion which is not making sense.⁶⁴

⁶² Vatican II on Religious Freedom Catholic Culture. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/otc.cfm?id=700>

⁶³ Aykıt, Dursun Ali, 2006, p. 82

⁶⁴ *Interview with Sacred Tribes Journal*, Elmer Thiessen, 8-1-2013, p. 7

Any form of persuasion, whether intentional or not, directly or indirectly, whether open or closed, can be included in the category of proselytizing. Up here, proselytizing does not contain an utterly negative meaning. The politician who left his old party to join the opposing side that succeeded in convincing him, which he thought had a better vision, was no different from the pagans who embraced the Christian religion because of his enlightening call. So proselytizing is an activity that creates new arrivals (*proselytos*).

In a statement in 1995, the Joint Working Group between the Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches acknowledged that at one time the term has a definite meaning as a term for missionary activity, but in the context of the modern ecumenical movement, it takes on a negative connotation when Christians try to win adherents from other Christian communities.⁶⁵

2.2. EVANGELISM

Evangelism comes from the Greek *euaggelion*, which means ‘good news’. Evangelism which means delivering the good news, in Greek is called *euaggelizesthai*.⁶⁶ Quoting Paul Benedict, Pope Francis encouraged Christians to "evangelize" but warned not to "proselytize."⁶⁷ We should be familiar with a common problem in the contemporary Church: The use of terms which are vague and can mean different things to different individuals. For many Christians, evangelism (or evangelization) is a term equivalent to “mission”. However, evangelism is more the global proclamation of the best news of all, “in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself”.⁶⁸ Styles of evangelism are vary greatly. For some, evangelism is more “propositional,” seeking to “get the word out.” It attempts to create a need. For others

⁶⁵ “These activities may be more obvious or more subtle. They may be for unworthy motives or by unjust means that violate the conscience of the human person; or even if proceeding with good intentions, their approach ignores the Christian reality of other churches or their particular approaches to pastoral practice” (World Council of Churches, “The Challenge of Proselytism and the Calling to Common Witness: A Study Document,” Geneva: Oikoumene [September 25, 1995], sect. 4, par. 18, www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-commissions/joint-workinggroup-between-the-roman-catholicchurch-and-the-wcc/challenge-ofproselytism.html).

⁶⁶ Aykıt, Dursun Ali, 2006, p. 22

⁶⁷ http://en.radiovaticana.va/storico/2013/05/08/pope_francis_at_wednesday_mass_build_bridges%2C_no_t_walls/en1-690203, retrived on 18 October, 2017.

⁶⁸ 2 Corinthians 5: 19 New International Version

evangelism is more relational, seeking to establish a relationship and then allowing the need to surface within the relationship so that the gospel can be applied to a felt need.⁶⁹ However, in its wider meaning it implies “activities of some Christian community among people; conversion to Christianity”,⁷⁰ that is, “the process by which the members of a certain nation, namely those that are colonization target, are converted to one of the Christian religions”.⁷¹

Evangelism is social action; evangelism is announcing the gospel to non-Christians to faith and conversion and their eventual incorporation into the church by baptism.⁷² Catholic missionary efforts are *never* described as proselytizing; the word is more commonly used concerning the efforts of non-Catholic religious groups. In the 1962 *Catholic Dictionary* edited by Donald Attwater, proselytism is defined simply as "to make converts", but it also admits that the word had tended to take on a pejorative meaning in modern times. As an example, it cites something called "souperism", which was a practice of Protestant relief services during the Irish potato famine of providing food (usually soup, hence "souperism") to starving Irish but only on the condition that they convert to Protestantism first. Thus the reception of material aid was made contingent upon apostasy. Again, the implication is that proselytism is something non-Catholics do.⁷³

In short, efforts of religious groups to make converts cannot be understood apart from what they are trying to convert others too; the content of the religion is not irrelevant. There is a real difference between the evangelization done by the Catholic Church and the proselytism done by non-Catholic sects.

⁶⁹ McFarland, Ian A, *the Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 399.

⁷⁰ Todorovic, Dragan (ed.), *Evangelization, Conversion, Proselytism*, Nis: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2004, p. 6

⁷¹ Evangelization Conversion Proselytism. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.npao.ni.ac.rs/files/584/2.2.19._Todorovic_-_Evangelization_Conversio

⁷² Thangaraj, M Thomas, *The Common Task: A Theology of Christian Mission*, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1999, p. 335

⁷³ *A Catholic Dictionary*, Donald Attwater (ed.), 3rd Ed, "Proselyte", New York: Macmillan, 1962.

3. MISSIOLOGY AND THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS

Discussion about missiology just appeared between the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. Missiology appears as a new discipline in Christian theology, which is focused on the nature and implementation of Church mission. Martin Kahler suggests that mission was ‘the mother of Christian theology, especially in the new testament. More recently, Martin Hagel said essentially the same: the history and the theology of early Christianity were, primarily, ‘mission history’ and ‘mission theology’. Moreover, writes Heinrich Kastig, “Mission was, in the early stages, a fundamental expression of the life of the church. The beginnings of a missionary theology are therefore also the beginnings of Christian theology as such”.⁷⁴

First effort to make missiology as a new discipline has started as early as 17th century. At that time, among Protestant churches, there was an attempt to institutionalize the study of a mission called "*Seminarium Indicum*" (1622), which was initiated by Prof. Anton Walaes when he was a professor at Leiden University. Although it was not approved by the Dutch Kingdom, at the end, Walaeus made a big step in by creating a new curriculum which later called missiology.⁷⁵ There are also another efforts in to make a systematical study on a mission like the establishment of *Collegium Urbanum de Propaganda File* in Rome by Catholic Church in the Paus Urbanus VIII period (1627), this *Collegium* intended to be an institution for the new seminarians.⁷⁶

In 1832, as a new discipline, a new missiology curriculum was taught by Prof. J. Danz at the University of Jena in the Apostolate course. In 1867, Aleksander Duff, an Anglican missionary from Scotland was called back from missionary work in India to be a permanent lecturer in Evangelical Theology in the newly opened program in New College, Edinburgh. According to Myklebust, Duff was the first missiology professor in

⁷⁴ Bosch, David J., “Reflections on Biblical Models of Mission”, *Toward the 21st Century in Christian Mission*, ed. J.M. Philips, Michigan: 1995, p. 177

⁷⁵ See L.J. Joose, “Walaeus Antonius” on G.H. Anderson, *Biographical Dictionary*, Michigan-Cambridge: 1999, p. 712-713

⁷⁶ Before the *Collegium* was founded, there have also been schools that educate missionaries, especially in terms of recognizing the languages and customs of various peoples on mission ground. This new *Collegium's* merit is to become a school for native missionaries to deepen their theological education. See Woga, Edmund, 2002, p. 34-35

the history of Christianity. However, the figure who then really laid the solid foundation for missiology as a new discipline is Gustav Warneck, a professor at Halle University, Germany.⁷⁷

It is necessary to keep in mind that the present era is fundamentally different from the period in which Matthew, Luke, and Paul wrote their gospels and letters for the first and second generations of Christians, as Bosch suggested. Each era has a different understanding of Christian faith according to their contexts. Because of these differentiate, their understanding of mission also related to these contexts too. Any individual Christian's understanding of God's revelation is conditioned by a great variety of factors. These include the person's ecclesiastical tradition, personal context (sex, age, marital status, education), social position (social "class" profession, wealth, environment), personality, and culture. Therefore it is inappropriate to talk about "Christian theology"; but about "Christian theologies."⁷⁸ This change in mission paradigm is the result of the shift in a social condition that happened along with the development of the times. 'An old understanding' on a mission that believed in the Early Christianity (Primitive era) might not be relevant anymore with the modern world; which in the end produced a new understanding called missiology as a new discipline.

Missiology as a science is about implementing church into itself and its role as an "organ" that was sent by Jesus to preach the gospel,⁷⁹ to be a witness of safety creation⁸⁰ and to be a witness of all nation.⁸¹ The particular object of missiology is faith propagation that has impacts on the establishment, development, and deployment of the church in the countries that are not yet impregnated by Christian faith. Furthermore, there is also practical level in missiology as a new science, such as finding a suitable method to preach the gospel in the particular place and time.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 36

⁷⁸ Bosch, David J., 2011, p. 166

⁷⁹ Mark 16: 15

⁸⁰ Luke 24, 47; Acts 1, 8

⁸¹ Matthew 28, 18

4. HISTORY, AIM, AND OBJECTIVE OF MISSION

According to Christian belief, the first-ever mission had coincided with the birth of Christianity. Popularly known in Christian theology as a "mission of God", the mission is referred to leads to the text of the New Testament. Jesus which is called as the first missionary (sent by God) must save all his people by himself.⁸² Before the crucifixion, Jesus met the apostles and proclaimed that he would be resurrected, advised them to meet him again in a particular place.⁸³ In that last supper, Jesus said, "*All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and Make Disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. Moreover, surely I am with you always, to the very end of the age.*"⁸⁴

According to the Christian theology, the very first missionaries are the apostles; disciples who are assigned personally by Jesus to spread Christianity into four parts of the world. The history of Christianity can be divided into seven periods of time, namely:

1. The Apostle's period (33-100)
2. Early Development period (100-800)
3. Medieval period (800-1500)
4. The Reformation of the Church period (1500-1650)
5. Post-reformation period (1650-1793)
6. Modern period (1793-1965)
7. Dialogue period (1965-2000).⁸⁵

Judging from the paradigm, Hans Küng submits that the entire history of Christianity can be subdivided into six majors. These are:

1. The apocalyptic paradigm of primitive Christianity
2. The Hellenistic paradigm of the patristic period

⁸² It also called as a mission of Son

⁸³ Kuzgun, Şaban, "Misyonerlik ve Hristiyan Misyonerliğin Doğusu", *Erciyes Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 1, Cumhuriyetin 60. Yılına Armağan, Kayseri: 1983, p. 66

⁸⁴ Matthew 28: 17-20

⁸⁵ Oymak, İskendir, *Metot ve Çalışma Alanları Açısından Türkiye'de Misyonerlik Faaliyetleri*, Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2010, p. 39

3. The medieval Roman Catholic paradigm
4. The Protestant (reformation) paradigm
5. The modern enlightenment paradigm.
6. The emerging ecumenical paradigm.

These majors, as Küng suggests, revealed a peculiar understanding of the Christian faith.⁸⁶

The first two periods are the birth period which is followed by the spread of Christianity to nearby areas. In a way, this period is a period of recognition of Christian theology that brought by the apostles. In the beginning, as explained in Matthew 15: 24, Christian transmission was directed to the where Jesus came from, the Jews. Christianity as a universal religion began to be echoed as the churches start to be widely established by the apostles. Although the first century Christianization was more focused on the Jews, by the end of the early century, the growing number of Christian believers among the Jews was not so significant. In 40 AD, there are 1000 followers of Christianity, then in the 70 AD there are about 2700 Christians, until the end of the first century, the amount of Christians 'just' reached to seven thousand people.⁸⁷

Through St. Paul, for more than 15 years he has been spreading the gospel he brought to the land of Anatolia, Macedonia, and Greece. As a Hellenistic Christian, St. Paul had expanded a different doctrine from the Jewish one. He assumed that Jesus is Son of God. St. Paul also claimed that he had possessed the interpretation of the gospel. St. Paul conveyed his thoughts on the teachings of Jesus. "In fact, even an angel, if he conveys a doctrine that is different with what I teach, I pray that he should be cursed by God," as St. Paul said to his people.⁸⁸ This method and manner which was used by St. Paul grew massively and become a standard until now.

The third period is a period in which Christianity began its missionary activities massively. Moreover, in this third period, Islam began to emerge and quickly spread to various Arabian lands. This period is popularly filled with stories about the widespread

⁸⁶ Bosch, David J., 2011, p. 165

⁸⁷ Sim, David C., "How many Jews became Christians in the first century? The failure of the Christian mission to the Jews", *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies*; Vol 61, No 1/2 (2005), p. 418

⁸⁸ Gündüz, Şinasi, *Misyonerlik*, Ankara: T.D.V. yayınları, 2008, p. 48; Although in the end, this understanding was no longer used after the second Vatican Council.

of Christianity in the area of Europe. Also, this period is also a time when a significant inter-religious war occurred for decades. The fourth period is a challenging time for Catholic Christians. Christianity undergoes reformation; Protestants emerge as the climax of long debates on Christianity's theology. Protestants grew and began to spread to the Catholic regions. In this period, the emerging of new orders started and massively increase such as the Franciscans and Jesuits who then promoted their missionary activities with the help of Spanish and Portuguese imperialists into 'third countries'.

1600 AD marked the beginning of the spread of Catholicism and Protestantism to some parts of Asian countries, from central to the southern part. In 1793, along with the arrival of William Carey in India, missionary activity in the Indian Ocean began to coincide with a Western expansion that existed there. After that, driven by the Portuguese and Spanish, Western imperialism in the third world lasted for many hundreds of years. Particularly in the nowadays Indonesia, the road which was opened by the Jesuits under the Portuguese flag then continued by the Dutch. The Dutch, who was Protestant, drastically erased the catacombs of the Catholics and began to spread their teachings which is Calvinism.

From the beginning of its emergence, the church as a mission authority was guided by one of the verses from the New Testament which is, "*After John was put in prison, Jesus went into Galilee, proclaiming the good news of God. "The time has come," he said. "The kingdom of God has come near. Repent and believe the good news!"*"⁸⁹ The goal of the mission is to get as many new Christians as possible. After dominating the majority of Europe, the Roman Empire tried to spread the Christian religion to all corners of the world, so the continuity of Roman politics remains assured.⁹⁰ Although efforts to expand power through the crusade did not work, missionary activities which are an extension of the hand of the crusade war are always innovating with new things.

On his paper, Abdurrahman Küçük's quoting Danielou's speech:

⁸⁹ Mark 1: 14-15

⁹⁰ Aydin, Mehmet, "Türkiyede Katolik Misyonerliğin Dünü, Bugünü", *Türkiye'de Misyonerlik Faaliyetleri*, İSAV Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantılar Dizisi, (17-18 April, İstanbul) İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2004, p. 95

"If the political domination which is driven by the West goes according to plan, then efforts to influence the culture have also reached its goal. Westernization and modernization of technology are one of the efforts to conquer the world. With increasingly technological developments and such conditions, can the eastern culture avoid it? The world of the future will contain humans who have been affected by the modernization we propagate."⁹¹

Theologically, the understanding that the mission exists and is necessary for the glory of God comes from a theological thought with the reflection that God -who sought to save all humanity- from the beginning sent Himself to the world that the world with His son should return to Him. The necessity of a mission is directly related to God's plan of salvation which was defined from the period of creation. St. Paul, for example, sees the mission as a hidden secret for and generations, which is now revealed to all nations so that all nations can face the God through Jesus as a hope of glory.⁹²

Therefore, the motive of the mission itself here is still ambiguous. Along with the development of the times, because of saving all humanity, the mission can be used as a tool for new motives. Bosch mentions there are two kinds of motives: Pure and impure. Missions that are empowered by imperialists can be included as an impure motive. Because of saving the remaining third world's indigenous people, imperialists make mission as an object of colonialism. As happened along with the history of colonialism in the colonies, one of the imperialist attempts to dampen the resistance of the natives was to make them new Christians. By becoming Christians, they will be able to improve their living standards and recognize the modern culture brought by the west.⁹³

On the mission development, Mr. John, embassy staff in Turkey Embassy in England, told a story to Ahmet Hamdi Pasha. "The mission duty has been prepared for a long time. Each year, mission organizations go to middle schools in England, choosing those who stand out academically to be guided explicitly in missionary education. With

⁹¹ Danielou, Jean and Küçük, Abdurrahman (trans.), "Kilisede Misyoner Düşüncesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. XXXVII, Ankara: 1997, p. 104

⁹² Colossians 1:26-29

⁹³ Schröter, Susanne, *Christianity in Indonesia – Perspective of Power*, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010, p.

the permission of their parents, children are selected according to their place of origin, and then every three children are sent to the destination country of the mission to get further education.⁹⁴ Early education in mission countries is essential because each destination country has different characters. This has to be done because, with the significant characteristics differences, the prospective missionaries can be able to understand more in the social, cultural and character conditions of the surrounding community.

With the changing times, the paradigm of the mission also changed. In the first period, the mission was interpreted as a duty to convey the religion and teachings that God commanded to Jesus, and then bequeathed by Jesus to his disciples. In this early period, mission was the task of conveying religious teachings consisting of duties of worship, how to behave, and the spiritual life.⁹⁵ But, along with the development of Christian history, the meaning of the mission began to change, became more "westernization".⁹⁶ This was influenced by the development of church attitudes that were increasingly biased towards politics and cultural inculturation. Especially after the failure of crusade that lasted for 179 years.

Along with the wider workplace of mission, there are more variety of understandings and motives of Christian mission. In the next chapter, there will be a discussion about how Christianity comes to Indonesia through Portuguese and Dutch starting from the 16th century.

⁹⁴ Paşa, Ahmed Hamdi, *Misyonerlik - İngiliz Misyonerleri nasıl yetiştiriliyor*, İzmir: Tibyan Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 41

⁹⁵ Küçük, Abdurrahman, 2005, p. 26

⁹⁶ Aykıt, Dursun Ali, 2006, p. 216

CHAPTER II: THE EMERGENCE OF CHRISTIANS IN INDONESIA

1. CATHOLICISM IN THE MOLUCCAS

Admittedly, the beginning of the development of Christianity in Indonesia as demonstrated by Y. Bakker occurred in the middle of the seventh century with the establishment of the Syrian episcopate in Sumatra. But the results of Christianization began to appear since the incessantly done by the Portuguese, especially in the Moluccas in the 16th century.⁹⁷ This is by the manuscript allegedly written by Abu Salih Al Armini, a geographer and Armenian historian who lived in Egypt in the 12th century. In his account of St. Thomas's 'holy journey' to India as accorded to history of Christianity, he mentions an area rich in camphor called Fansur (or Pansur), close to a town named Baros which is located in the Northern Sumatra.⁹⁸

Unfortunately, there is no further information about the existence of Christian communities in Baros, Northern Sumatra. Furthermore, recent discoveries corroborate Al-Armini's brief account of the historical linkage between Baros, India and the Persian Gulf which has existed since the ninth century. This opinion is supported by the discovery of an old location named "*Janji Mariah*" (Promise of Mary) near Baros.⁹⁹ However, when the Portuguese first came to the island, they did not report anything about former Christians there.¹⁰⁰

"Interreligious contestation"¹⁰¹ in the Indian Ocean began in the late fifteenth century, right after Columbus's discovery. According to Schrieke, the two main actors of interreligious contestation, Muslims, and Christians, consider India and its surrounding islands as a profitable partner in the business, especially spice business. In addition, this new area (the modern world) for both Muslims and Christians' sides is a good land to spread their religion. Christian Portuguese in a short time easily build their

⁹⁷ Quoted by Lukman al-Hakim from his article "*the History of Catholic Church in Indonesia*"; Hakim, Lukman, "Ketegangan Yang Tak Pernah Reda" (Introduction), in *Fakta dan Data Usaha-Usaha Kristenisasi di Indonesia*, Jakarta : Majalah Media Da'wah, vol. 2, 1991, p. 13

⁹⁸ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 5

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 6

¹⁰⁰ Schröter, Susanne, 2010, p. 32

¹⁰¹ A term presented by B. Schrieke in his book, *Indonesian sociological studies: ruler and realm in early Java*.

influence in India although there have been Muslims there. Christian Portuguese began to carry out the next mission, crushing the Muslims who had first mastered the Indian Ocean. According to Schrieke, this Portuguese's step is based on the old spirit of competition between Christendom and Islam.¹⁰² Thus, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, this prolific Christian step began to meet its goals: Attacks on the ships of the Mamluk rulers and Ottoman in the Indian Ocean, as well as against the ship of Muslim pilgrims ('Mecca ship') from Southeast Asia.¹⁰³

The Portuguese who initially attempted to dominate the mainland of Aceh¹⁰⁴ Muslim majority experienced continuous resistance from the Aceh sultanate which was assisted by the Ottoman troops. Therefore, through Afonso de Albuquerque (-1515), the Portuguese army decided to sail to Goa and then succeeded in conquering it in 1510. It did not take long, until in 1511 d'Albuquerque with 1200 troops with 17 ships successfully conquered Malacca in the Sultan Mahmud era. Portuguese gained control of Malacca, which is an important port for the success of their business in the Indian Ocean region. Subsequently, he settled there until the end of the year as well as to prepare for Malacca's defenses from the Aceh Sultanate's expected counterattack.¹⁰⁵

Despite having Malacca under their control, their desire to dominate the Indian Ocean trade, unfortunately, did not happen. The Aceh Sultanate as a leading actor in the Indian Ocean trade moved the trading center from Malacca. Also, the Portuguese Christians who slowly began spreading Christianity to the indigenous people reaped the continuous resistance from the inhabitants and the surrounding sultanates. Moreover, at that time the Portuguese troops began to lack workforce and money. The city began to die as a trading port under the Portuguese, they never monopolized Asian trade, and they soon settled down as a rather odd part of their Indonesian surroundings.¹⁰⁶ In

¹⁰² Schrieke, B.J.O, *Indonesian sociological studies : selected writings of B. Schrieke*, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1957, vol. 2, p. 233

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 234

¹⁰⁴ Aceh is a semi-autonomous Indonesian province in Northern Sumatra, which, like most of Indonesia, is overwhelmingly Muslim. It has a population of around five million, and a long tradition of resistance to outside powers. Aceh was first known as Aceh Darussalam (1511–1959) and then later as the Daerah Istimewa Aceh (1959–2001), Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (2001–2009) and Aceh (2009–present). For more about Aceh, see Arndt Graf, Suzanne Schröter, Edwin Wieringa (eds.), *Aceh: History, Politics, and Culture*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

¹⁰⁵ Ricklefs, M.C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, third edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 25-26

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 27

November 1511, with the departure of d'Albuquerque to India, several Portuguese ships also left Malacca and sailed to eastern Indonesia, the Moluccas.

The name of the Maluku islands originated from Arabic, *Jazirat al-Muluk* (the land of many kings). Since the mid-fifteenth century, Islam has come to Maluku through merchants from the eastern Java region where there has been an Islamic kingdom¹⁰⁷, mainly from the coast of Gresik and Tuban.¹⁰⁸ Some traders have returned to Java after they finished their business in the Moluccas, some were living on the island and then become religious teachers. In addition, thanks to the intensity of the trade that exists between the traders, the Moluccas, which was previously an almost forgotten island, slowly became known as a producer of spices, cloves, nutmegs, and maces. Their desire to expand the business network out of the island got chances when several Portuguese ship troupe led by Francisco Serrao stranded in northern Ambon. Serrao, an expert martial artist with a snap, overran northern Ambon. The presence of the Portuguese in the north of the Moluccas Islands is also a blessing economically, as the spice trade transaction is getting bigger as well because of their new partnership with the Portuguese.¹⁰⁹

The presence of the Portuguese in the Moluccas Islands is also exploited by the two Islamic kingdoms that never get along: The sultanate of Ternate and Tidore. Abu Lais (1500-1522), a Ternate's sultan, promised trade monopoly cloves to Portuguese as long as they will strengthen the sultanate of Ternate with army and weapons.¹¹⁰ However, the cooperation between the Portuguese and the Sultanate of Ternate met his opponent with the arrival of Magellan from Spain to the Island of Tidore; with the latter also establish cooperation in trade and defense. Along with the increasing influence of the Portuguese in Moluccas Island, in the following years, the Portuguese ship began to arrive and begin their new mission: Christianization.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ The Portuguese also call Moslems in Maluku as "Moors". This term was originally only used by Europeans to call Muslims in North Africa. But then, it also used to call Muslims in general. (See Aritonang, Jan Sihar, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004, p. 25).

¹⁰⁸ Gresik and Tuban are regencies within East Java Province of Indonesia.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 28

¹¹⁰ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 26

¹¹¹ Ricklefs, M.C., 2001, p. 28

The presence of the Portuguese in the archipelago relates to Pope Alexander VI's decision at the end of the 15th century. To prevent conflicts between Spaniards and Portuguese in the aftermath of the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula, the Pope issued a bull in 1493, dividing the world into two global interests: the Spaniard's side and the Portuguese's side. Due to the Ottoman Empire that was blocking the traditional marine route, alternative sea routes were finally discovered in the southernmost part of the African continent by Vasco da Gama and became a new path for inter-ocean trade.¹¹²

1534 is considered a milestone in Catholicism in Indonesia because in that year a merchant named Gonzales Veloso came and started the spread of Catholicism on the island of Halmahera, northern Indonesia.¹¹³ However, the most successful Portuguese missionary in spreading Catholicism in the Moluccas is Francis Xavier (1506-1552). He arrived in Ambon in February 1546. After three months working there, he visited Ternate, Halmahera, and Morotai (Moro), then return to Ambon and Malacca. During the 15 months of work in the Moluccas, Xavier managed to baptize thousands of people. Xavier once wrote, "If every year only a dozen of pastors come here from Europe, the Islamic movement will not last long, and all the inhabitants of these islands will be the followers of the Christian religion."¹¹⁴

Francis believes that all who are not baptized will go to hell; therefore he has a strong urge to baptize as many people as possible. One day Francis met a monk after his landing in Japan. He himself was happy when landed in Japan, because at that time the Portuguese ship was not yet landed in Japan. This monk had asked Francis, how could God be a wise God, if He prepared hell for the Japanese just because they did not understand the Gospel? Francis paused, he couldn't find the answer. In the end, he managed to find the answer that was already in the first chapter of St. Paul's letter to Rome, that a faith actually is in the heart (of everyone); so a man doesn't need to be baptized in order to be saved as long as he has faith in his heart. This may be considered as the first step that the Catholic Church began to realize that it is impossible to baptize

¹¹² Schröter, Susanne, 2010, p. 32

¹¹³ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 50

¹¹⁴ Aritonang, 2004, p. 31

everyone. They were, in the beginning - before colonialism was done in the third world - unaware of the immensity of the non-Christian world.¹¹⁵

According to H Berkhof, Xavier who is proficient in Malay language regularly for two hours every day introduces children and adults to the teachings of the gospel and the fundamental Catholic theology.¹¹⁶ In fact, as the first Catholic missionary, he formulated the main points of Catholic faith and translated it into local languages for the indigenous peoples. He also lives in the midst of society, teaching worship procedures such as putting up of crosses and images of saints. He also composed poems concerning the twelve chapters of the Catholic faith.¹¹⁷

The effort that was pioneered by Xavier was further modeled and imitated by Catholic priests in other areas. There were different names such as Antonio de Taviero (1551-) in Flores, Peter Vicente Viegas in Makassar, then Francisca Dominika and Diego Magelhaes, two priests who spread the gospel in Manado.¹¹⁸ The culmination of the first Catholic mission at that time was when Portuguese succeeded in establishing a second base in Ambon, at some distance from the sultan's seat. Furthermore, Catholic Portuguese through Francis Xavier began to spread their religion limited to tribal societies who embraced ancient indigenous religions. Some fundamental Christian doctrines are introduced; those who can live it will be baptized later.

Knowing the Portuguese effort that began to spread their religion, Abu Lais was outraged. He considers Muslims who converted to Catholicism have rejected the teachings of God. This sultan's anger was caused by the new converts who no longer obeyed the sultan's orders. Their attitude is based on the assumption that those who are obliged to follow the rules of the sultanate are those who are Muslims. Because, the obligations, regulations, and laws of the Sultanate are based on the rules of Islamic religion, and these rules bind only those who are Muslims. This new converts attitude makes the sultan angry. Moreover, they know that baptism could be used to free oneself

¹¹⁵ An interview with Franz Magnis Suseno, a prominent Jesuit figure, 6/3/2017

¹¹⁶ Berkhof, Hendrikus, *Sejarah Gereja* (Translated by I.H Enklaar), Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1988, p. 251

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 56

¹¹⁸ Dhuha, Syamsud, *Penyebaran dan Perkembangan Islam-Katolik-Protestan di Indonesia*, Surabaya: Usaha Nasional, 1987, p. 56

from subjectitude to sultan.¹¹⁹ He felt that his power could be weakened by the increase of new Catholics. Finally, in 1570, Sultan Baabullah (1570-1583) decided to expel the Portuguese and Spaniard troops from the Moluccas.¹²⁰ In addition to the Moluccas, Catholic Christians also spread to East Nusa Tenggara in 1556 as well as North Nusa Tenggara and Sangir-Talaud islands in the 1560s. However, they failed to spread Catholicism in western Indonesia (Java Island). As a little, the Portuguese had a chance to evangelize the Eastern Java, precisely in Blambangan and Panarukan in 1585-1598. They baptized some people, including those from the royal family of Blambangan.¹²¹

At the end of the sixteenth century, the spread of Catholicism ended when Blambangan attacked and became Islamic territory.¹²² After that, there was no Christian community on the island of Java until the arrival of the Dutch in the 17th century.

However, even after a century of Portuguese rule the new religion apparently was not much more than a thin veneer.¹²³ This, according to Xavier, is caused by the attitude of uncivilized Portuguese soldiers and traders, as well as their drunken habits.¹²⁴ Also, the prosecution by the sultan ternate shortly after his decision against the Portuguese in Northern Halmahera also disrupted the process of missionary activities which ended with the expulsion of the Portuguese from the Moluccas Islands at the end of the 16th century.

2. THE SPREADING OF PROTESTANTISM IN JAVA

To understand the mission activities of the 19th century in the Dutch Indies area, we must begin with the crucial initial work done by the Roman Catholic Church. As competition between Portuguese and Spanish intensively heated, in Tordesillas in 1493, Pope Alexander VI held peace talks between Portuguese and Spanish about the 'new discovered world' and finally mediated by the pope; they divided the new world into two parts. The regions west of Cape Verde were given to Spain and the rest of

¹¹⁹ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, 35

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 34

¹²¹ Heuken, Adolf, *Be my witness to the ends of the earth!: the Catholic Church in Indonesia before the 19th century*, Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002, p. 176

¹²² Muller-Kruger, Th., *Sedjarah Geredja di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1959, p. 25; See Aritonang, 2004, p. 44

¹²³ Schröter, Susanne (ed.), 2010, p. 241

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 36

Portugal.¹²⁵ So the Moluccas Islands were given to Portugal and the Philippines to Spain. Their goals were the same, to save, civilize, and make non-Christians pious and virtuous.¹²⁶ Catholicism, under the auspices of Portuguese troops, began to be a dominating faith among the Christian minority in Moluccas Islands until the arrival of the Dutch in 1605, which came with Protestantism. With these backgrounds, it is hardly possible to draw a dividing line between proselytizing and colonialism, even though missionaries and colonial officials did not always have the same interest.¹²⁷

The Dutch imperial mission began with the establishment of the VOC (*Vereenign de Oost Indische Compagnie*), which is an association of Dutch trader that existed for nearly two hundred years. The Calvinist-Protestant Dutch established their first settlement in Ternate in 1607.¹²⁸ Initially, the Dutch had little interest in spreading the word of God. In some parts of its territory the VOC did support missionary activities, but in most of these cases, it restricted itself to pastoral care for the (already) Christian communities which mostly contained Europeans. However, one policy was rather clear: When it came to Christianity, only Dutch Calvinist Protestantism was allowed.¹²⁹ Catholic priests previously converting locals to Catholicism were dismissed. Thus one can conclude that the process of Christianization, which was started by the Portuguese, had come to a near complete standstill when the Dutch were in control during the VOC period.¹³⁰ What is clear, the VOC with its political power supports the care of Christians and the spread of the gospel in the areas under their control.

Although trade is the main reason for the arrival of the VOC to the archipelago, the relation between the religious mission and the economic interests cannot be

¹²⁵ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, *Sadrach's Community and its Contextual Roots*, Amsterdam – Atlanta: Rodopi, 1990, p. 24

¹²⁶ The combination of Roman ideals of civilization and a belief that Christians had the duty to convert the world's population convinced many Westerners that it was their responsibility to spread Western civilization and Christianity to the rest of the world. For early Christians, Pagans were both non-Christian and without civilization. Consequently, pagans or non-Christians were considered the same, considered less than human (inhuman). Therefore, under the banner of "saving" a population from "backward", they believed they were chosen by God to bring "inhuman" into the realm of human, by Christianizing them. See Spring, Joel, *Deculturalization and the Struggle for Equality*, 8th Edition, New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 2-3.

¹²⁷ Schröter, Susanne (ed.), 2010, p. 10

¹²⁸ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 51

¹²⁹ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 1

¹³⁰ Lukman Hakim, "Ketegangan Yang Tak Pernah Reda" (Editor page), in *Fakta dan Data Usaha-Usaha Kristenisasi di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Majalah Media Da'wah, 2nd edition, 1991

separated. It became the historical character of the development of Christianity in the Dutch colony, especially in the Java Island. The give and take between economic interests and the spread of religion often lead to high tension in the VOC era. However, if a conflict between these two interests occurs, business interests remain a top priority.

Along with the arrival of VOC, Portuguese's position in eastern Indonesia is also getting squeezed. The Portuguese, who at the end of the 16th century conflicted with the rulers of the Moluccas Islands and its suburbs, expelled by the VOC for disturbing business stability in the Dutch East Indies. With the departure of Portuguese from the archipelago, the spread of Catholicism also stagnated. Catholic priests previously converting locals to Catholicism were dismissed. Thus one can conclude that the process of Christianization, which was started by the Portuguese, had come to a (near) complete standstill when the Dutch were in control during the VOC period (1602-1798).¹³¹ Furthermore, a new era of Protestant propagation took place in the Moluccas Islands. Catholics also forced to convert to Protestantism. Their priests are expelled, and all ecclesiastical activities are temporarily closed. The first person assigned by the VOC in the Moluccas as a new evangelist was Stollen Beeker, who later founded the church assembly in 1615. This church assembly organizes spiritual cultivation of the Moluccas and its surrounding areas.¹³²

In addition to the Moluccas area, North Sulawesi is also the next destination of the Dutch aggression. As in the Moluccas, North Sulawesi which since 1563 has been converted to Catholicism, subjected to the VOC and forced to convert to Protestantism. Catholic leaders were murdered; residents were threatened unless they are willing to convert to Protestantism.¹³³ Efforts to convert Catholics to Protestantism continued to be done in another island, such as Sumatra and Java. Dutch Protestants were introducing Calvinism to those who already committed to Catholicism. Nevertheless, this transition of faiths was not a big problem for Catholics on the Moluccas. The religious knowledge of the inhabitants of the Moluccas at that time was still shallow, and it makes them less concerned with dogma differences in the Christianity's sects.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Dhuha, Syamsud, 1987, p. 75

¹³² Ibid, p. 74

¹³³ Ibid, p. 76

¹³⁴ Muller-Kruger, Th., 1959, p. 58

Interestingly, the people of Java are considered as the most readily Christianized, at least according to the Dutch missionaries. It is based on the assumption that Muslims in Java that tended to be more syncretic made the conversion easier. Alwi Shihab in his notes reveals, of the many areas which are the aim of Christianization, mission work in Java was the most successful.¹³⁵

As mentioned earlier, Protestant missionary activities are permitted by the company as long as the mission work does not disturb their primary purpose, the spices business. Colonials feared that Christian missionary would cause unrest among Muslims. This Christian mission which rode the Dutch company could be viewed as a passenger of a ship: They were not the primary owners of the ship, nor were they the destination of the ship. However, it follows the rules made by the ship-owners, as well as where the ship will dock. However, they thought that the native would more useful if they were Christianized.¹³⁶ This tug of religious-political interest continued until the Dutch kingdom officially and massively began to send their missionaries to their colonies in the early 18th century.

The VOC had started as a trading company, but in its first two decades, it developed into a colonizing institution as well. At first, missionary activities in Java were entirely dependent on the financing of the VOC. As part of the sailors' spiritual education, the company employs missionaries to support the guidance of the crew members of the VOC. With the rapid growth of the company, they began to provide space for religious teachers and teachers of Dutch schools to spread Christianity to non-Christian native peoples.¹³⁷ Colonial attitude began to change toward missionary activity in the 19th century. The expansion of European pacification made mission effort possible in areas where they had previously not been the targets - the adherents of indigenous religious traditions.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Dhuha, Syamsud, 1987, p. 76; there is no explanation in the book why the Javanese are easily Christianized. My supposition is related to the Javanese religiosity itself. The history of Javanese Islamization related to the cultural inculturation performed by the Islamic preachers. By using cultural approach, Javanese people are easy to accept everything that is not against their customs. This applies also to other religions.

¹³⁶ Winzeler, Robert L., *Popular Religion in Southeast Asia*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, p. 171

¹³⁷ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 2

¹³⁸ Winzeler, Robert L., 2016, p. 33

With the growing spread of Christianity through the education of labor and Dutch schools, language barriers gradually began to be addressed. Translation of bible into the Malay language begins to be a government's concern. In the historical record, the earliest translation of the whole Bible into Malay was the work of one man, Melchior Leijdecker (1645–1701).¹³⁹ His translation was used in Protestant circles for almost two centuries, especially in eastern Indonesia. Officially, the first publication of the translation of the New Testament into the Malay language was published in 1688, while the complete translation of the Bible was completed in 1734. In addition to the translation of the Bible, a seminary was also formed in Batavia in 1742 as an educational effort for evangelical candidates for the eastern and northeastern Java parts. A seminary which was established by the efforts of Seminarium indicum in Leiden became evidence that the Dutch kingdom fully supported mission activities in Dutch colony, socially and economically.¹⁴⁰

With the bankruptcy of the VOC at the end of the 18th century, Protestant mission activities in Java land also stagnated. With the lack of funding from the government and company, some missionary organizations began to strive for independence in funding. Through more 'spiritualist' powers, European missionary organizations were trying with a new slogan: The freedom of individual conscience. Thus, in the early 19th century, there emerged a missionary organization like the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) in 1792, as well as the London Missionary Society (LMS) in 1795 and the Netherlands Missionary Society (NMS) in 1797.¹⁴¹ Their missionary activities in the Archipelago lasted until 1811, at that time the Dutch Kingdom began to be dominated by France and the island of Java became part of the British colony.

3. MISSION IN DUTCH COLONIAL ERA

The Protestantism mission work which was supported by the colonial government began when Thomas Stamford Raffles, the Lieutenant-Governor of Java, came to power in September 1811. A British missionary, William Carey, who is famously known as "father of modern mission", suggested Raffles to ask all

¹³⁹ Suhadi, 2014, p. 27

¹⁴⁰ Schröter, Susanne (ed.), 2010, p. 44; Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 2

¹⁴¹ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 3

missionaries in Java using the Javanese language as the formal language for mission work. With a language that is familiar to the natives, the missionaries are expected to establish a more intimate communication with the community of Java.¹⁴² In addition, the process of the Bible translation that has been completed in the mid-18th century has made it easier for people to accept this new religion. At that time in Batavia (now is Jakarta), there were still many missionaries who had begun missionary work which delegated by various mission organizations. However, most of them used Portuguese, Dutch, and Malay languages to communicate with the natives, instead of Javanese language.¹⁴³

In fact, the large-scale mission work which was initiated by Johannes Emde and others was indirectly conceived by English missionaries such as William Robinson in Batavia and Joseph Kam in Surabaya, East Java. Although Kam only stayed in Surabaya for a few years, he had laid a strong foundation for the Christian congregation in Surabaya. The group of Emde cannot be imagined without the impact of Kam. Kam joined in accelerating the process of evangelization in the Greater Surabaya area.¹⁴⁴ The attitude of Javanese is flexible, the Javanese were not closed, but also not open; they seemed as if attracted and accepting of the message, yet in reality, they weren't. They do not believe in it and accept it unanimously. As Robinson puts it about the people of Batavia, "although it seems they listened attentively without any rejection, in the end, what was hoped did not happen; none of them turn to Christianity."¹⁴⁵

For nearly a decade, financial problems, adaptation, and the lack of absorption from the society have been the main cause of the ineffectiveness of Robinson's mission work as well as other missionary members of the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS). The unstable political situation during the five-years period of British rule in Java was also a reason for the less successful missionary work. Although mission work was deemed to be a failure at this time, a missionary named Gottlob Brückner was able to leave a great footing for the further development of the mission: Translating the whole

¹⁴² Suhadi, 2014, p. 27

¹⁴³ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 9

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 10

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 11

New Testament into the Javanese script and language.¹⁴⁶ However, due to the re-enacted prohibition of mission work in Java by the Dutch colonial government, his translation is prohibited by the Dutch government in Java to prevent conflicts between them and the Javanese Muslims.¹⁴⁷

The real beginning of Javanese Christianity started with some local initiatives by Eurasians. The first was Coenraad Laurens Coolen, born in 1775 of a Russian father and a Javanese mother of noble descent. In 1816, while still a soldier in the colonial army, he came into contact with a small group of pious commoners who were nicknamed “the Surabaya Saints,” with the German-born watchmaker Johannes Emde (1774–1859) as their central figure. The colonial government did not like the activities of this small group and in 1820 Emde was even sent to prison at the instigation of a minister of the Indonesian Protestant Church (*Indische Kerk*). After serving for some years in the colonial army and the forestry service, Coolen managed to get permission to clear forest in the isolated region of Ngoro, close to Mojoagung, around 80 km southwest of Surabaya. Coolen became the founder of a new village that attracted many Javanese from the region. In the mid-1840s there were already about 1000 people.

His efforts to attract people to convert to Christianity went successful, as he called his method as the "indigenous method". Coolen said that to become a Christian, a person does not need to abandon their Javanese character and culture; therefore he strictly prohibits the conduct of baptisms at that time. It was applied in an effort to attract the natives to glance at this new religion by 'Javanizing' the Christianity. Coolen also used other Javanese traditions, such as telling stories in the Bible and changing the characters into Javanese characters to convey his messages. What Coolen did was similar to Sunan Kalijaga's¹⁴⁸ method when he invited Javanese people into Islam.¹⁴⁹

When the Dutch "recovered" the Dutch East Indies in 1816, they had to reorganize the relationship between church and state which has long been abandoned.

¹⁴⁶ Anderson, Gerald H. (ed.), *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions*, Cambridge: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999, p. 97

¹⁴⁷ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 640

¹⁴⁸ Raden Syahid (1450-), also known as Sunan Kalijaga, is one of the “nine saints” who have an important role in the spread of Islam in the Java Island. He actively was spreading Islam using Javanese culture as his *dakwah* method. See Chodjim, Achmad, *Sunan Kalijaga (New Edition)*, Jakarta: Serambi, 2013, p. 11-12

¹⁴⁹ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 47

Thus, the king of Wilhelm I (1797-1888), with the interests of the colonies, was concerned about the issue of the spread of the Christianity. Therefore, to be more efficient, he asked the churches that were present in the colonies to be more united and to concentrate their efforts than moving independently in their respective areas. The king's order was finally realized in 1835 when the establishment of the organization of Protestant churches that embodies various streams: Calvinism, Lutheran, Remonstrant, and Mennonite finally established. This church, which later named as *Indische Kerk*, was not aimed at spreading the Christianity, but only serving the existing Christians who were Dutch.¹⁵⁰

In general, the description of missionary activities in Indonesia under the Dutch colonialist was inseparable from their attitudes. For nearly 200 years, from 1650 to 1850, the VOC has been limiting the ecclesiastical activities in Java. Missionary efforts are considered to have consequences for the political and economic stability by the government. However, it is difficult for the Dutch government to treat indigenous people who are not in the same religion with the Dutch, moreover, who are continuously against them.¹⁵¹

Clear evidence of the impartiality of the colonial government is reflected in the issuance of a regulation called "teacher ordinance" in 1905, in which the government required the administration of teaching permits for Islamic teachers. In addition, many Dutch policies are considered not neutral and inclined to the efforts of the Christianization in the various sectors. The following data are taken from the book named "*Politik Islam Hindia Belanda*" in which the author wishes to illustrate how the discriminatory attitude of the Dutch colonial government is clearly reflected. This relates to Dutch government contributions to religious activities in Islam and Christianity. For one year, the government made a total contribution of 127,029 for the purpose of celebrating days in Islam and the salaries of imams. This number is far less than a number of donations received by Christian groups which were amounting to

¹⁵⁰ Guillot, C., 1985, p. 6

¹⁵¹ Therefore, there is discrimination in Dutch policy. Christians generally enjoy the convenience of the Dutch government, both in terms of education, employment, and occupation. See H Aqib Sumanto, *Politik Islam Hindia-Belanda*, p. 30

1,235,500. The donation consisted of 550,000 for priests' salaries, and the rest was for local churches' development.¹⁵²

The missionary movement in Java grew rapidly not only because of support from the Dutch government, but also by the development of missionary method. At the beginning of the 19th century, the number of them is still very little compared to the large mission area in rural Java. Yet, even without an organization that can support them, the persistence of Dutch and native missionaries in their struggle to spread Christianity in Java was able to establish their own identity among religious groups in Java at the time.

In 1800, virtually there were no adherents of indigenous Christianity in Java. Most Christians are baptized Eurasian or white people who were working in the Dutch government. In the second half of the 19th century, the number of Christians in Java has reached up to 17.000 adherents. This growing number of Christians was the result of innovations from mission work initiated by small organizations such as the LMS as well as the efforts of Coolen-type missionaries who embrace the local cultures. Christians in Java identified as a group with a high culture and a more modern lifestyle than the condition of Javanese society at that time. Through the offer of education and health facilities with high standards, as well as the activity of mission workers in various health activities, mission activities became a new phenomenon in inter-religious spirit among the people of Java.¹⁵³

The development of Christian propaganda in Java then attracted the attention of various circles. Previous works which are done by both the Javanese and the Dutch, have highlighted essential persons such as C. Coolen, Johannes Emde, Philips and of course, Kiai Abbas Sadrach. Local missionaries, such as *Kiai* Tunggul Wulung, Paulus Tosari, and Kiai Sadrach, also colored the development of Christian mission in Java in the 19th century.

4. KIAI SADRACH AND THE FIRST JAVANESE CHURCH

¹⁵² For a detailed explanation, see Sumanto, *Politik Islam Hindia-Belanda*, 30-34

¹⁵³ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 22

Kiai Abbas Sadrach is the first missionary to achieve great success in evangelism in the villages of Java. In 1889, the members of the congregation had amounted up to 3000 people in Kedu village, while the missionary officers who worked much longer only acquired a dozen followers. The lack of mission results in Java can indeed be explained for various reasons. The Dutch, let alone the VOC, have brightly more economic aims, in contrast to Portuguese which include religious propaganda as one of the reasons for their expansion to Indonesia. According to the VOC, Java is not as important as the islands which are the source of spices such as Moluccas Island. Consequently, the actions they take in these two areas are also different. Also, there was a caution not to intervene the internal affairs faced by the domestic governments also affects the mission of Christian activities.

Although the Christianization in Java in general is sourced from the European missionaries, its striking development was a result of local missionaries' efforts, as told before. It is Sadrach, a son of a *Kiai* in Central Java, who became an actor in driving Javanese people to embrace the Christianity. Sadrach was originally a *santri*¹⁵⁴ named Abbas. After embracing Christianity, he got Sadrach (from the Old Testament) as a new baptism name, because a new native Christians got the baptismal name from the Old Testament, not the New Testament. Sadrach is a disciple of *Kiai* (Ibrahim) Tunggul Wulung, an original Javanese Christian missionary whose was mysticism. In his early journey, Sadrach was close to the Philips family, especially to Mrs. Philips, a Javanese-Dutch born in Yogyakarta. To study mission, he stayed at Philips' house and given accommodation by the owner. After approximately two years, he went to the forest and settled in the village named Karangjoso, setting up his hermitage there.¹⁵⁵ Having been able to create his group, Sadrach added Surapranata behind his name, to show his new position as a "*guru*". Surapranata means a person who has the right to govern. For the people of Java, the name is the part that has essential meaning. Javanese distinguish two names, "child name", original name, and "adult name", the name that given to someone when he or she gains a specific position/status.¹⁵⁶ The way Sadrach preaches is like his

¹⁵⁴ Geertz (1960). For more explanation about Geertz' *santri*, see Michael Pye (eds) et al, *Religious Harmony: Problems, Practice, and Education (Religion & Reason)*, De Gruyter, 2006, p. 113

¹⁵⁵ Guillot, C., 1985, p. 28

¹⁵⁶ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, *Komunitas Sadrach dan Akar Kontekstualnya*, Yogyakarta: Taman Pustaka Kristen, 2001, p. 81

teacher, Tunggul Wulung, who cannot be separated from cultural ties and values of Java.

The habit of old Javanese people is fighting supernatural power among the people around them. Sadrach's technique to build a Javanese-Christian group was also a usual way among local religious leaders. He challenged Islamic *Kiais* to debate and, thereby, converted them and their followers.¹⁵⁷ He came alone to the villages surrounding the residency Bagelen, Pekalongan and Yogyakarta to form his own congregation.¹⁵⁸ Right after arriving at Karangjoso and establishing his independent *padepokan* (hermitage), Sadrach started '*adu kesaktian*'¹⁵⁹ with a Kiai named Ibrahim who lived in a neighboring village, Sruwuh. Kiai Ibrahim eventually lost the fight and then became Sadrach's first disciple in his mission work. The second was Kiai Kasanmetaram, who converted to Christianity and became Sadrach's disciple after a long-running debate.¹⁶⁰ Most of the early disciples of Sadrach were those who engaged in the mystical world. The main truth in the world of Javanese mysticism which is called *ilmu (ngelmu)*¹⁶¹, became a fascination for Sadrach's new disciples. They believe, Sadrach's *ngelmu* which often appear when he meditated was a hint from the God.

Sadrach's habit of debating with the religious leaders around him makes his group members proliferate. Within a year of its establishment, in 1871, the number of converts to Christianity became hundreds. In the same year, the first Church in Karangjoso was built. Sadrach was increasingly famous for his skills in controlling the evil spirit and demons.¹⁶² According to Javanese belief, the place that there are evils will bring bad luck, illness, and death. Usually, to eliminate the adverse influence of the evils and demons, the shamans in Java hold rituals and ceremonies of expulsion. In the village of Karangjoso, there are rice fields that are considered as a haunted place (*angker*) by the people. According to them, this rice field can bring disaster if cultivated for agricultural land. But as his followers grew, Sadrach bought the area of rice fields which are considered *angker*. Miraculously, Sadrach was able to cultivate the land

¹⁵⁷ Ricklefs, M.C., 2008, p.35

¹⁵⁸ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, 1990, p. 162

¹⁵⁹ A supernatural battle

¹⁶⁰ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, 2001, p. 74

¹⁶¹ "*Ngelmu*" arrives from the Arabic word '*ilm*' which means 'knowledge' and usually refers to knowledge of Islam. "*Nga*" is a syllable in Javanese script that is often used to start a word.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 76

without getting unfortunate. And people believe, Sadrach is a man who has a *ngelmu*, immune from the *jin*. The villagers consider him as a man who got miracles from the God, and Shadrach is becoming more and more famous for it. Karangjoso then became a new place for the gathering of Christians from various regions.

Sadrach's mission work eventually became a record, despite mission work undertaken by former non-native missionaries. Within three years (1870-1873), he captured around 2500 new adherents and established five new churches, each in Karangjoso, Karangpucung, Banjur, Kedungpring, and Karangbambu.¹⁶³

Problems began to emerge when Sadrach's worshipers began to 'expand their territorial areas' in preaching the gospel. Some of his disciples went to Banyumas and its surrounding areas, which was the work area of Priest Vermeer, the first NGZV missionary, a friend of Sadrach from the *Indische Kerk*. The congregation of Sadrach also incites hatred among the *Indische Kerk* congregation, which is called the state's church; whose majorities of the congregation are Dutch. Vermeer then did not want to do baptism and sacrament to the new members of Sadrach's group. Sadrach himself felt he was not entitled to baptism because he regarded himself only as an evangelist preacher who was not ordained by the official church. As a result, for several years the new members of the Sadrach group did not get sacrament services and were not baptized. The issue arose that Sadrach regarded baptism of new adherents as not a means of saving.¹⁶⁴ Sadrach was accused of heretical and inappropriate behavior by various Protestant missionaries and colonial officials.

Spontaneity was a common characteristic of the expansion of the community in Java. The most effective way of communication in the rural areas of the nineteenth century is verbal communication or through direct contact. Before modern transportation and communication were developed, most of Java's inland areas were isolated from the outside world, and the only way of communication was through society itself. Sadrach's expertise as a Guru *ngelmu* became famous throughout Java as well thanks to this traditional mode of communication.¹⁶⁵ The escalating expansion of the Sadrach congregation which was free from the Dutch control aroused the suspicion

¹⁶³ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, 2001, p. 74; D. Doneer, 1899, p. 67

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 79

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 82; Adriaanse, Laurens, 1899, p. 75

from the local government. Government officials began to exercise strict supervision on the Sadrach's community, fearing the community to be too political and endangering local authorities. W. Ligtoet, the chief resident of Bagelan at that time took the initiative to get rid of Sadrach and replace him with another priest from the Dutch. He thought if the congregation led by the Dutch pastor, the congregation's voice will be easier to be controlled.¹⁶⁶

The various attempts by the *Indische Kerk* and the Dutch government to arrest Sadrach were unsuccessful, even his prestige in society grew larger after many allegations were made against him. During his detention at Bieger's house, Sadrach was a friend of Jacob Wilhelm, an NGZV fifth missionary. After his released, together with his friend, in 1883, Sadrach founded the congregation under the name *Golongane Wong Kristen Kang Mardika* (the Group of Free Christians). The use of the word *mardika* (free) indicates that the freedom of the congregation that has always been the character of this group is maintained. All interference from outside will be rejected, either from the government or *Indische Kerk* in Purwareja city. The word *mardika* positively indicates that the congregation is entitled to express their faith freely, and organize themselves in a manner relevant to the local context. The congregation has indestructible independence, which must be acknowledged by all parties.¹⁶⁷

Wilhelm and Sadrach's efforts in forming a new community of congregations that accommodate these Javanese Christians became the forerunner to the establishment of the Javanese Christian church. This congregation asserted itself to the Dutch government that they firmly refused to be united with the government church, the *Indische Kerk*, which was dominated by the Dutch priests. This new church made special rules for their congregation, which broadly asserted that their rights and obligations in worship and voicing opinion were as substantial as the rights of the Dutch. Also, they also affirm that this church group is self-reliant, and forbade the *Indische Kerk* to influence and attract these church members into the *Indische Kerk* group.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 82

¹⁶⁷ Partonadi, Sutarman Soedirman, 1990, p. 162

Sadrach's ever-improving relationship with the *Indische Kerk* made him communicate with several other churches, including *Apostolische Kerk* (Apostholic Church) in Magelang. *Apostolische Kerk* was founded by a Scottish Presbyterian priest, Edward Irving. The establishment of *Apostolische Kerk* was an attempt to rebuild a spiritual life that is driven by the feeling that the existing church life is declining. Several times in contact with an apostle in Magelang, Sadrach was eventually ordained as the Apostle of Java and then had the right to administer the sacrament, the power he desired and pursued for many years.¹⁶⁸ From that moment on, his relation with the *Indische Kerk* was definitively severed. He also gave instructions to his congregation to have no further relationships with Dutch missionaries.

Before his death, Sadrach's congregation was handed over under the aegis of *Apostolische Kerk* (Apostolic Church) in Magelang. Sadrach did not want to give protection of his congregation under the auspices of the *Indische Kerk* because of the Dutch's attitudes toward him. Sadrach died on November 14, 1924, at the age of 90. After Sadrach's death, there was a division within the body of the church. Some wanted to remain with the Apostolic Church, but some wanted to join the *Zending van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland/GKN* (Mission of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands). The GKN was a church which had been a supporter of Sadrach when he was having trouble with the Dutch government. Eventually, the congregation was divided into two groups. Some joined the *Apostolische Kerk*, and some joined the GKN which later became the Javanese Christian Church.¹⁶⁹

5. FORMING THE JAVANESE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

After the collapse of the NGZV, *Gereformeerde Mission* (the Local Reformed Churches) was created as a new strategy for mission work in Java. The *Gereformeerde Mission* gradually became able to formulate an answer to face the challenge of *Kiai Sadrach*. By the beginning of the 20th century, they were ready to begin to return to the mission field with new equipment, new personnel, new methods, and a new spirit. The *Gereformeerde Mission* went back to their primary task, which is trying to improve the

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 104

¹⁶⁹ Aritonang, 2008, p. 675

development of indigenous people to a higher level also implies a function of healing and education. For that aim, it is planned that in each residency in which mission works, there is to be built a school, especially for the indigenous group.¹⁷⁰

Although medical and educational ministries were in principle equal in importance, yet because of the urgency of the situation, the *Gereformeerde* Mission felt that the need for developing medical services was more necessary. Conditions on Java during the beginning of the 20th century appeared to be in an alarming situation. Hardship and suffering squeezed the people; the population rapidly increased, health facilities were unobtainable. Diseases uncontrolled spread everywhere; a frightful eruption of Mount Kelud with a very long dry season.¹⁷¹ The Church is aware of the essential needs of the community, and they decide to provide health services, especially for the poor one.

By providing various health and education services for the Javanese, the *Gereformeerde* Mission also hope that they will return to the spiritual life. After the definitive break with Sadrach in 1889, those who had remained faithful to the mission only numbered 150 persons. During the following years, the number of missionaries continued to grow yet the progress achieved was felt to be unsatisfactory. The medical ministry centered in Yogyakarta contributed a large number of Javanese Christian church members, but conversions in large number never took place. People came in large numbers to the mission hospital, but they went with the primary motive of treatment, not looking for a new religion. Those who visited the hospitals were not necessarily those who attracted to the faith offered by the mission. Most of them merely needed the medicine that was provided by the mission. They did not need the spiritual things that accompanied the medical services.¹⁷²

Slowly, a new era of evangelism in Java began to be underway. New rules accompanied the evangelism: Mission work can only be done by local churches and local missionaries to gain more indigenous people and to create a native local church. The first missionary in charge of the *Gereformeerde* Mission was Laurens Adriaanse, an old friend of Sadrach, who was also the author of a book about Sadrach's biography.

¹⁷⁰ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 72

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 76

¹⁷² Ibid, 86

His primary task was to gain native Christians and make them back to the church; he ordained Javanese elders and assigned them to establish local churches in Purwareja and Temon.¹⁷³ In Temon then, many followers of Sadrach moved and became members of the Christian congregation led by the *Gereformeerde* Mission. The progress achieved by the mission was encouraging. Thus he felt it was time to establish a church council in that place. In his conversation with Sadrach's followers, it had become clear that they did not wish to be led by a Dutch person; they wanted to be influenced by someone from their people. Therefore, the mission decides to appoint a native as their *Guru*, with the mission remain in control.¹⁷⁴

The mission was a success and raised the idea of selecting native as missionary assistant. As the number of Christians from the native rapidly growing, more native people work in missions as evangelists, school teachers, also nurses. With the success of this new method, the mission successfully built the Javanese Christian community, especially in Central Java.

6. THE CHRISTIANS IN CENTRAL JAVA AND THEIR UNIQUENESS

6.1. EARLY PROTESTANTISM

The second half of the 19th century marked the beginning of the growing Christianization in Central Java. The method of preaching the gospel in this early days of Christianity in Central Java was more dominated by the personal determination of the Dutch Christians who happen to influence Central Java. There was a Dutch woman like Elisabeth Jacoba Le Jolle (1824-1906) who began to convey the teachings of Christianity to her laborers in Salatiga who were mostly Javanese. Because of this activity, she received support from missionary J.E Jellesma (-)¹⁸⁰ by sending a Javanese assistant named Peter Sedoyo. From here, began to establish a congregation of fifty

¹⁷³ Rachmadi, Simon, *Reformed Spirituality in Java: The Reformed Tradition and the Struggle of the GKJ to Actualize Its Reformed Spirituality in Indonesia*, Unpublished Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, 2017, p. 75

¹⁷⁴ Sumartana, Th, 1994, p. 88

¹⁸⁰ Jellesma was the first missionary to be sent to Java post-observation by priest Van Rhijn. When van Rhijn knew that in East Java there was a Christian congregation, Jellesma who was in the eastern part of Indonesia immediately sent to the island of Java. See Guillot, 1985, p. 9

people who formed their community in an area called Nyemoh, Salatiga.¹⁸¹ There was also Mrs. Johanna Christina van Oostrom-Philips (1815-1877) who owned a Batik business in Banyumas. Some of the women workers in her place became Christians because Mrs. Van Oostrom always invited them to the church services she held. Missionary W. Hoesoo later baptized this new Christians who were indirectly converted by Mrs. Le Jolle and Mrs. Van Oostrom.¹⁸²

The preaching of the gospel in these times can be considered more successful because the use of methods used was different from before; these women were more 'open' and able to compromise by asking for help from the native Javanese who then was from a 'second-class' group. They emphasized the wisdom aspect and contextualized the teachings of the gospel to the indigenous culture of Java society; unlike previous missionaries such as Brückner, Robinson, and Kam who choose to use 'Dutch-style interpretation'.

The uniqueness of Christianity in Central Java cannot be separated from the role of Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung (ca. 1800-1885) in his attempt to Christianize Central Java in the 19th century. Tunggul Wulung was a famous *guru* who has a secret mystical knowledge (*ngelmu*). He obtained his Christianity after establishing contact with Jellesma in Mojowarno who then baptized him. As we had seen before, like Conrad Coolen who was considered apostate for his syncretism, Jellesma also used the same approach as Coolen did, mixing Christian teachings with the culture and customs of the Javanese. His congregation was called "*Kristen Jawa*", which distinguishes them from the "*Kristen Londo*".¹⁸³

During the nineteenth century, Christianity in Central Java continued to evolve due to the role of at least four kinds of mission agents. First is an independent European evangelist such as Mrs. Le Jolle and Mrs. Philips. They were willing to teach the gospel and held a church service together with the native laborers. Secondly, the Javanese who were assistants of western missionaries; a 'truth seeker', a *guru Injil*. Their uniqueness

¹⁸¹ Partonadi, 1988, p. 44; Sumartana, Th., 1993, p. 14; van der End & Weitjens, 2008, p. 234; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 670

¹⁸² Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 670

¹⁸³ *Kristen Jawa* means Javanese Christians, and *Kristen Londo* means Dutch Christians (or European Christians); Guillot, C., 1985, p. 42-45

was because they were able to use culture and custom to teach the gospel; putting forward the wisdom of spreading the gospel to the inhabitant's community. Third, missionary organizations based in Central Java or East Java. With the existence of various mission organizations especially in East Java and Central Java, despite having a different view, all of them have one field vision which is to convert the Javanese to Christianity. The fourth, *Indische Kerk* which continued to expand in some areas in Central Java, especially in the southern region.¹⁸⁴

In substance, Christianity in Central Java continued to grow, though not drastically. At the beginning of the 20th century, the number of Protestant Christians in Central Java reached about 5000 people, excluding Sadrach's followers who reached 3000s. Economic and social factors played an essential role in this growth. Mission organizations that came from foreign countries and have sufficient funds were able to recruit new adherents through education contributions and health services they provided to the poor Javanese.¹⁸⁵

In general, the development of Protestantism in Central Java came earlier than Catholicism. Protestants were also arguably more successful than Catholics in attracting new adherents. Until 2003, the number of Protestants in Central Java had about 500,000 people; while there are approximately 373,000 Catholics. This significant amount is also actually a file of conversion from Islam to Christianity, especially since the 1965 event which forced the emergence of new Christians massively after the demise of Communist party of Indonesia and its activities. However, in particular areas such as Yogyakarta, the number of Catholics is higher than that of Protestants (165,000 versus 80,000). It is because Yogyakarta is the center and the main headquarters of the Catholic organization in Central Java.¹⁸⁶

7. CATHOLICISM IN CENTRAL JAVA

In the 1890s, Catholicism just started in Central Java through the placement of priests among the Javanese Abangan. The pioneer of mission work in Central Java was

¹⁸⁴ van der End & Weitjens, 2008, p. 52-53

¹⁸⁵ Rendeers, 2001, p. 847; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 676

¹⁸⁶ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 695

pastor Van Lith S.J., who in 1896 began his mission in Muntilan, Central Java, by establishing a teacher training school for indigenous peoples. Van Lith preferred the countryside as his mission workplace; by relying on his Javanese language skills, he managed to approach the middle Javanese society due to his expertise to harmonize Javanese tradition with Catholicism.¹⁸⁷

In fact, up to 1900 in Java island, there were only a few Catholics, and the majority of them were Eurasians who have lived in Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Ambarawa, all in Central Java province. Ambarawa itself was the center of a military barracks where most of the European soldiers who were Catholics lived with the Javanese women. There were also thousands of troops from western Africa who, because they were Catholics, were paid more than other non-Catholic soldiers. This condition apparently affected the psychology of those who were non-catholic and attracted them to be baptized into Catholics. This situation was the beginning of the small community of Catholics in Eastern Indonesia.¹⁸⁸

The Catholic mission which was started by van Lith in Muntilan, Central Java in 1896 was then followed by Peter Hoevenaars in the Mendut region by jointly establishing a small school for the underprivileged people. Van lith even helped some villagers to pay their debts to the Chinese lenders to maintain good relations with the villagers. Although not necessarily got a tremendous welcome through the interest of the people to embrace the Catholicism, the work of Van Lith was able to disconnect the villagers from Sadrach's congregation who also had separated from the Protestant Church. Like Francis, Van Lith believed that a Catholic is mainly expected to be a witness of Christ in the midst of society. That, the gospel is the good news that must be rumored and brought anywhere.¹⁸⁹ It was then in December 1904, van lith succeeded in baptizing 171 villagers from Kalibawang in Sendangsono area, Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta. This baptismal event was seen as the birthmark of Catholicism among the people of Java where 171 people were the first converts to Catholicism among the

¹⁸⁷ Muskens, Pr., *Sejarah Gereja Katolik Indonesia*, vol. 4, 1973, Jakarta, p. 67

¹⁸⁸ Stenbrink, Karel, *Catholic in Indonesia, 1808-1942*, Vol. 2, Leiden: KITLV, 2003, p. 12

¹⁸⁹ An interview with Franz Magnis Suseno, A prominent Jesuit figure in Indonesia, 6/3/2017

Javanese. Meanwhile, Sendangsono area then became the most famous Catholic place of pilgrimage in Central Java.¹⁹⁰

In 1911, the first seminary was officially opened in Indonesia (school of prospective priests) located in the village of Semampir, Muntilan. Furthermore, the church and school that slowly grew were transformed into a complex called Xavierus College. Due to the subsidies from the government, this Muntilan initiative could increase steadily. In 1922, graduates from Xavierus College had amounted to 600. The motivation of parents to send their children there is to get them a good career. As expressed by Soekiman, a former student with Islamic background in his autobiography, he chose Xavierus College because the education there was easier and cheaper than in some other teacher schools in Yogyakarta, Central Java. From the very beginning, Soekiman promised himself only to learn there, and would not convert to Christianity. Eventually, during his education there, as happened in nearly all the pupils of Muntilan, Soekiman accepted Catholicism. He explained that his conversion to Catholicism was because he thought that Christianity taught discipline and hard work. It was in stark contrast to the culture of the Javanese people who tended to be feudal, many were lazy and had a dependence on opium, and did not care about poverty.¹⁹¹ Not only Soekiman, most of the Javanese students who attended school at Xavierus College eventually also got the same awareness, including Soegijapranata; a *Kiai*'s son who then became the first indigenous bishop of the Archdiocese of Semarang.

Xaverius College did not require its students to embrace Catholics to study there. Van lith's own goal at first was to educate the Javanese became a teacher. However, the college provides an opportunity for students to get a religious lesson; also to get baptism, of course with the permission of their parents first.¹⁹² According to F Straeter in the pastoral meeting on 9-10 December 1935 in Muntilan, the Javanese who embrace to the Catholicism can be grouped into three groups: those who were baptized from childhood, those who were baptized as students, and those who were baptized as adults. According to his statement, the most substantial portion of new Catholics among

¹⁹⁰ Van Lith and Muntilan "Bethlehem of Java", <http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0312/27/natal/768772.htm>, retrived on 24/09/2017

¹⁹¹ Soekiman, 1927, p. 7; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 697

¹⁹² Soegijapranata, 1933, p. 17; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 699

Javanese was coming from a second group, especially those who attended Catholic schools such as Xaverus College.¹⁹³

The problem for them was, after graduating from Catholic school, they were going to be mixed up with non-catholic people in their area and become alienated. So by their parents, they were advised to marry a non-catholic, most of whom have been paired since their childhood. However, at that time the Catholic bishops themselves did not allow mixed marriage. One of the solutions taken in the end was the Muslim girl who will be married to a Catholic man 'to be sacrificed' and converted to Christianity, baptized, and then can be married.¹⁹⁴

With the growing Catholicism in Yogyakarta and Central Java through Catholic schools, in 1918 the *Canisius Vereeniging* was established to coordinate mission schools in Central Java. This is a foundation whose majority of its founders are alumni from Xaverius College in Muntilan.¹⁹⁵ By the end of the 1930s, the number of Catholic schools in Yogyakarta alone had reached 110, not including other Central Java parts such as Solo (40), Semarang (60) and Kudu residency (90 schools). The cities above are big cities that will become the central cities for Central Java province.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Subanar, G. Budi, *The Local Church in the Light of Magisterium Teaching on Mission: A Case in Point: the Archdiocese of Semarang-Indonesia (1940-1981)*, Roma: Universitate Gregoriana, 2001, p. 130

¹⁹⁴ Putu Lasminah, 1980; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 700

¹⁹⁵ J. Weitjens, in: Muskens, Pr., 1974–IIIb, p. 861

¹⁹⁶ Anton Haryono 2003, p. 25–27; Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 701-702

CHAPTER III: REVITALIZATION IN MISSION IN THE COURSE OF INDEPENDENCE

1. THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIAN CHURCHES

The beginning of the 20th century was a turning point for the Protestant communities. Relations between numerous Protestant mission societies slowly began to improve. From the NZG, there was an idea to collaborate different Protestant mission societies into one big group. They realized they could work much more efficiently in Java if the three most important societies such as the NZG, the UZV, and the NZV, joined forces instead of competing with each other. Therefore, the NZV officially joined the SZC in 1923 and 1931 and acceded to the cooperative corporation. The organization, however, remained federal; each society kept their administration and archive, and the directors of the individual societies had equal authority within the overarching board.¹⁹⁷ The SZC seeks to strengthen relations with the Dutch Reformed Church, while the NZG and NZV are always unaffiliated with any church. The separation between the different mission societies within the SZC completely disappeared in November 1946, and they were reestablished with a new name - *Vereenigde Nederlandse Zendingscorporaties* (United Dutch Mission corporations, VNZ).¹⁹⁸

During the early days of the mission organized by the Dutch in Java, all missionaries viewed the Indies only from a Western perspective. Most of them were convinced of the superiority of Western culture and did not seek to see other civilizations through different eyes other than their own. Most missionaries in the nineteenth century did not study their local communities and cultures, and therefore their views on the traditions, religions, and cultures of local people did not differ significantly from the colonial officials. They also labeled the beliefs and practices of

¹⁹⁷ Kruithof, Maryse Johanna, *Shouting in a Dessert: Dutch Missionary Encounter with Javanese Islam (1850-1910)*, unpublished dissertation, the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2014, p. 295

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 296

the Javanese and Sundanese¹⁹⁹ as emotional and irrational. After the turn of the century, a change was seen in the discourse of the Dutch mission. Since the success of *Kiai Sadrach* in converting local communities in a short time and with different methods, missionaries have finally stepped up their efforts to understand local culture and begin to write more on this issue. Furthermore, missionaries began to write about the local people, understand their way and how they can adapt their methods to this community.

As a result of the changing missionary training in the Netherlands and the shifting interest in the mission discourse, the mission strategies in the field began to change too. Twentieth-century missionaries approached the people differently than their predecessors had in the nineteenth century. The younger generation of missionaries had gained more knowledge of the people they were trying to convert, and they made a better effort to take their convictions and customs into account. They have been educated with new methodologies and were beginning to be more attentive and wiser to the society and culture that will be faced. They learned from their teachers in seminaries, especially from local missionaries who were successfully transforming local beliefs without changing their beliefs completely, nor without hurting Christianity's core theology. For example, they no longer bluntly asked Muslims whether they wished to convert from a false and mendacious religion to the only true religion, but showed more respect for Muslims. The leaders of the SZC agreed that the aggressive, controversial attitude of their predecessors must be entirely abandoned.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, they had learned from the success of the indigenous Christian *gurus* to present Christianity as something inclusive, open to all. They did not try to convert anyone who would listen, but only those who met specific requirements to become Christians.

While the demand for independence grew stronger in the politics of the country in the early 20th century, the same sentiment was picked up in the mission congregation. In various areas of Java, the congregation announced they considered themselves ready to be more independent of the mission community. As the mission community receives a more extensive subsidy after the introduction of the Ethical Policy, more schools can be opened; not just elementary schooling as it was in the nineteenth century, but now

¹⁹⁹ The Sundanese are an Austronesian ethnic group native to the western part of the Indonesian island of Java.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 297; Graaf van Randwijck, *Handelen en denken in dienst der zending*, p. 414

also higher education. It is tremendous of highly educated Christians in the more autonomous 1920s and 1930s. Also, the NZG appointed the first Javanese minister of the period and these people no longer want to be assistants only for missionaries.²⁰¹

In this phase, many congregations become independent gradually. But Javanese personnel and financial autonomy are not enough to be entirely independent churches: The Javanese church also needs its theology rooted in Javanese dialectics to become fully autonomous. The congregation began to discuss the process of independence frequently. Eventually, they realize that independence will come sooner or later, so they agree that it is better to lead the churches slowly for autonomy than to abandon them suddenly. Missionaries gradually change their role as administrators to advisers, especially on theological issues. The majority of missionaries now encourage people to find their own style of Christianity that suits the life of the Javanese family and society.²⁰²

In the course of time, it became clear that the independent churches were developing their own identity. Javanese Christians had not passively received the Christian message, but instead, had actively absorbed it. They managed to take in Christian convictions while staying faithful to their religious heritage. Contrary to the convictions of the Dutch missionaries, the Javanese managed to create an indigenous Christian theology.

In 1923, the autonomy of the Mojowarno congregation as an independent church was acknowledged and made official. Mojowarno is the eldest mission church in Java. The congregation is then given the freedom of the right to govern their own lives; as well as developing their congregation without the intervention of the NZG. Driyo Mestoko, a leader who had a theological education, was ordained and installed as the leader of this independent church with the status of a congregational worker who could administer the sacrament.²⁰³ Furthermore, local Christian figures began to be educated with a variety of theological courses with a higher academic requirement. With the

²⁰¹ Sumartana, Th., p. 244

²⁰² Kraemer, Hendrik, *From Mission Field To Independent Church: Report on a Decisive Decade in the Growth of Indigenous Churches in Indonesia*, the Hague: SCM Press, 1958, p. 91

²⁰³ Sumartana, Th., p. 139

emergence of several local missionaries who have been educated, local churches in various areas in Java began to be made official.²⁰⁴

On 12 March 1930, it was reported that local churches in Java were ready to hold the first synod. All the completeness of the church has also been prepared and approved according to the principle of *Gereformeerd*.²⁰⁵ These churches were ready to establish a synod that represents an order of communion, to deal with ecclesial matters. However, there was a problem. When the first synod was held, nationalism was emerging in Indonesia. Local people began to campaign for national identity; *Sumpah Pemuda* (oath of the youth) was formed. The critical point of this congress is, the recognition of Indonesia as one nation; Indonesian as the only national language. Everything which was associated with the Dutch is avoided and prohibited from being used as part of the nation's independence campaign. The first synod that was original to be deployed in Dutch was changed and replaced with the local language. The synod leadership was also handed over to the local church leaders who were local people; the Dutch missionaries were only present as consultants.²⁰⁶

Until Indonesia gained its independence in August 1945, the Indonesian church community continued to hold meetings to adapt to the conditions of the Indonesian people struggling to free themselves from Dutch influence. The emergence of the Nationalist movement and the desire of the Indonesian people to escape from the colony also influenced the Church and the Christians in Indonesia to unite and form a stand-alone church. The spirit that is stirred to free itself from colonization and self-regulation also contributes to the ideals towards the autonomy of the church, free from the domination of missionaries.²⁰⁷

The above independence efforts that began in 1930 to 1941 experienced problems in the field of service and leadership. It was because during the reign of Dutch indigenous guidance less attention, so that when the church stands alone still also depends on the leadership of the missionaries. Thus began the ministry centers of

²⁰⁴ Rachmadi, Simon, 2017, p. 99

²⁰⁵ Rachmadi, Simon, 2017, p. 100; Reenders, 2001, p. 822

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 100

²⁰⁷ F. Ukur, "Pengkajian kembali sejarah gereja di Indonesia" in Ihromi. MA; S Wismoady Wahono; J L Ch Abineno (ed.), *Theo-dōron = Pemberian Allah: kumpulan karangan dalam rangka menghormati usia 75 tahun Prof. D. Dr. Theodor Mueller-Krueger*, Jakarta : BPK Gunung Mulia, 1979, p. 71

ministers, either by the church individually or collectively. And one of the joint efforts of the church of Indonesia for the education of the service personnel was established at High School of Theology (*Hogere Theologische School*) in Jakarta in 1934, now the Jakarta High School of Theology, located at the Proclamation street.²⁰⁸

The calculation of the growth of the Church of Indonesia began in 1950. Since that year there have been several things that will become the measure of that growth. Events such as the establishment of the Council of Churches in Indonesia became the turning point for the total independence of the Indonesian churches from the Dutch missionaries. The Council of Churches in Indonesia was established on May 25, 1950, to coincide with the celebration of the Feast of Pentecost. The DGI members at that time numbered 29 denominations, and in subsequent developments, Pentecostal churches became members of the DGI or now the PGI (Unity of Indonesian Churches). Since World War II ended in 1945, the number of European-Dutch Christians in Java decreased drastically. Between 1949 and 1960, the percentage of them in Java decreased by 90 percent. In contrast, the number of indigenous Christians ‘overgrew’ and increased to 80 percent over the next ten years.²⁰⁹ This growth is due to ‘the Indonesianization movement’²¹⁰ which has been promoted since the declaration of the independence of Indonesia by expelling the Dutch troops to their countries of origin.

In this period many local churches were beginning to grow and be more independent. In fact, since the acknowledgment of pastors and church officials from among indigenous people, there have been many new churches emerging but not yet wholly free from the control of Dutch churches. Since the withdrawal of foreign workers from Indonesia since 1942, these local churches began to appear and flourish. After Indonesia's independence, the number of local churches in Indonesia has increased, and Christianity in Indonesia has become more diverse. It was due to the split of some Christian groups because of ethnic and territorial differences. In 1963 in

²⁰⁸ Zechariah Ngelow, *ibid*, P.72

²⁰⁹ *Sejarah Gereja Katolik Indonesia*, vol. 3, Jakarta: 1974, p. 984

²¹⁰ In an ecclesiastical context, the Indonesian movement here is a process of replacing foreign aid workers employed by the colonial government with Indonesians. This Indonesianization term was briefly revealed at the ordination of the new archbishop on June 29, 1983, by Munawir Sjadzali, the minister of religion in his speech: "the process of Indonesianization in the Catholic Church continues." See Huub J.W.M Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi: dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia menjadi Gereja Katolik Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005, p. 24

Sumatra, a new Protestant church named GKPS (the Simalungun Protestant Christian Church) began to emerge, then GKPI (the Indonesian Protestant Christian Church) in 1964, and HKBP (the Batak Christian Huria Church) as the last one. In Sulawesi, in 1966 the Protestant Church divided into two new churches, GKLB (the Christian Church in Luwuk Banggai) and GPIL (the Luwu Indonesian Protestant Church).²¹¹ Although more and more local churches were emerging, due to lack of training, these local church congregations still used the inheritance of the Dutch churches.

After the Dutch missionaries left as a result of the independence of Indonesia, the foundation of faith which has been passed down by the evangelists from Europe remains the basis of the spiritual life of most members of the churches in Indonesia. However, two other thoughts began to arise. First, some Indonesian theologians began to pay attention to the developments on the broader community, especially Indonesian society. That concern even influenced the thinking pattern of leading Indonesian theologians such as Latuihamallo, Nababan, and T.B. Simatupang, and later they called it as a "theology of development". Theology of development is a movement of awareness that the suffering of the poor must be used as a starting point of theological science in addition to the spiritual guidance which has been routinely implemented.²¹² The emergence of this thinking is most likely based on the condition of the majority of Indonesian society which was still slumped in the poverty, loss, and distress of life after the colonization period.

The second thought is more spiritual and attracts a lot of 'simple' members of the congregation. This flow comes from the Anglo Saxon countries, especially from the evangelical stem in the United States. It entered Indonesia in the vessel of new denominations (such as Pentecost, Baptist, and Methodist). Also, it also affects traditional churches, especially in urban congregations. In Indonesia, this stream was accommodated by the Charismatic movements, the prayer groups, and Christian books that were translated from the original English books in large numbers by various publishers. The emphasis of this flow is warm piety, the redemption of sin by the blood of Jesus and the sanctity of life. As a community-based church, it has provoked tensions

²¹¹ Van den End, Th. & Weitjens, J., Th, *Ragi Cerita 2: Sejarah Gereja di Indonesia 1860an - sekarang*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2008, p. 357

²¹² Van den End & Weitjens, J., 2008, p. 364

in some of the earlier churches, as opposed to previous churches which were established by Dutch missionaries.²¹³

2. JAKARTA CHARTER AND THE BEGINNING OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN FRICTION

With the increasing possibility of the independence of Indonesia from the hands of the invaders, national figures began to set up bodies to prepare for Indonesian independence. Started with the establishment of BPUPKI (Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) chaired by Dr. Ir. Radjiman, a Hindu-Javanese believer, this body consists of various religious elements. From 20 May to 1 June 1945, they held their first meeting. The committee had responsible for formulating the foundations of the nation that in the first meeting they agreed on its five principles: Divinity, humanity, nationality, prosperity, and democracy.²¹⁴ The meeting, which lasted for four days also, formed a more specific committee called a group of nine consisting of four representatives of the nationalist group, four representatives from Islamic groups, and chaired by Sukarno. Their primary task is to produce a final decision by the state.²¹⁵

Had met an agreement by issuing a Jakarta Charter²¹⁶ on 22 June 1945, the committee did not fully convince with the principle of the state's article: "*Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*" (belief in God with the obligation for adherents [of Islam] to carry out the Islamic law).²¹⁷ Jakarta Charter considered not accommodates minorities who are mostly from eastern Indonesia. Until the declaration of independence, representatives of secular nationalist

²¹³ Ibid, p. 365

²¹⁴ Suwarno, P.J., *Pancasila Budaya Bangsa Indonesia*. Jakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 1993, p. 12

²¹⁵ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 188

²¹⁶ Knew as *Piagam Jakarta*, this charter said that the state was to be based upon 'belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law. On August 18, just one day after the Indonesian declaration of independence, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta (co-declarers of Indonesian independence) yielded to the appeals of Christians, Hindus, and nonreligious nationalists and dropped the Jakarta Charter from the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution. At the recommendation of Muslim leaders in Nahdlatul Ulama, however, Sukarno added a clause to the first principle of the "Pancasila" so that it read not just as "belief in God" but "belief in a singular God" (*ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*). Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press., 2000, P. 42; MC. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since 1200*. 2001, p. 262

²¹⁷ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 188

groups and prominent Christian figures such as Wongsonegoro, Hussein Djayadiningrat, and Johannes Latuharhary remain adamant that the first principle of the charter Jakarta must be revamped.

Two significant groups actively spurred this debate in the committee: Islamists who support the inclusion of the phrase "*kewajiban menjalankan Syariah bagi para pemeluk Islam*"²¹⁸; and a coalition between secular nationalist groups and Christian groups who were opposing to the first group's proposal. This debate was focused more on the efforts of these two opposing groups to convey that their ideologies were the best. Moreover, this debate also focused on the interpretation of the historical facts of the Jakarta charter which has been approved by both. Through their interpretation, the Muslim group tried to address the importance of religious factors in the Jakarta charter as well as to make Indonesia a country that upholds religious values. On the other hand, Christian groups, as well as secular nationalist' seek to minimize religious values from the basis of the state.

In his rejection, the representative of the secular-nationalist group, Prof. Dr. Supomo, delivers:

“... Establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia means establishing a State which unites itself with the largest religious group, the Islamic group. If Islamic State finally established in this country, then certainly it will arise a "*minderheden*"²¹⁹ question: on small religious groups, Christian religious groups, and others. Although the Islamic State will ensure the best interests of the other groups, these small religious groups certainly can not unite themselves with the ideal State which all of us have coveted.”²²⁰

Due to a prolonged deadlock, Soekarno finally proposed his view, that “*the State shall guarantee the independence of every citizen to embrace other religions and to worship according to his religion and belief respectively*”. According to his view, in

²¹⁸ It means the obligation to enforce the Shari'a law for the followers of Islam

²¹⁹ A minority group; a category of people differentiated from the social majority, those who hold the majority of positions of social power in a society, and it may be defined by law.

²²⁰ Muskens, M.P.M., *Sejarah Gereja Katolik Indonesia: Pengintegrasian di Alam Indonesia*, Vol. 4, Jakarta: Bagian Dokumentasi Penerangan Kantor Wali Gereja Indonesia, 1973, p. 303

principle, the people of Indonesia are always allowed to change beliefs and religions. This view was critical to some groups. It was because the nationalist group at that time seemed to recall the possibility that the mass-*abangan* group, 'not so Islamic' group, no longer need to confess Islam, if then arises coercion that the adherents of Islam should live according to the rules of Islamic law.²²¹ Therefore the nationalist group felt they can accept Soekarno's view. According to the interpretation of this group, if the clause "the obligation to enforce sharia law for the followers of Islam" is becoming juridical, then in the future this proposed article by Soekarno can be used as a defense.

Meanwhile, the Islamic faction argued that it would not cause any danger or disorder. In the afternoon after the announcement of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, the Japanese navy warned. However that Christian Indonesians in its area would disapprove of any particular role for Islam, so the Jakarta Charter and a condition that the head of state must be a Muslim²²² were dropped. They also threatened that "they will not participate in the Republic of Indonesia if the demand is not granted". Thus, in the PPKI emergency meeting on 18 August 1945 which had lasted for 2 hours, in order to 'soften the hearts' of religious leaders in attendance, it was decided to change the seven sentences which contained 'an Islamic perception'.²²³

Called a unilateral decision by some Islamic group leaders such as Muhammad Dahlan, Muhammadiyah chairman and minister of religion, and HAMKA (Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah), a reformist Muslim leader, the decision to eliminate these seven sentences is considered a reflection of "dishonesty, if not cheating" of the nationalists.²²⁴ HAMKA argued, that before the emergence of the Jakarta Charter as a guide for formulating the basis of the State; the Indonesian independence group even separated into two groups: Islamic groups and nationalist groups. Both groups are often

²²¹ Ibid, p. 304

²²² This was proposed by Wachid Hasym, one of Muslim leaders in the committee. See Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 189

²²³ Ibid, p. 310

²²⁴ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press., 2006, p. 110

at odds before the independence of Indonesia. Just because the two groups finally united in a committee of Indonesian independence, they agreed to unite.²²⁵

The controversy over the Jakarta charter continued even more until the emergence of a presidential decree published by Soekarno himself in 1959²²⁶. In the Catholic magazine named *Peraba*, the Catholic party argued that the Jakarta charter is never a recognized law; it was only a draft which was the introduction and preamble of the 1945 Constitution. In fact, according to the magazine, the Jakarta charter was never even signed and endorsed by BPUPKI. As a draft, it was only Muhammad Yamin who called it the Jakarta charter. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the PPKI's decision to remove the seven sentences from the Jakarta charter. Moreover, the omission of this sentence is an attempt to unify Indonesia as one nation.²²⁷ The magazine concluded that Jakarta Charter was "against the unity and integrity of the nation".

Since 29 August 1945, PPKI was replaced by the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), and one of its agenda was to form a cabinet for the new government. The first cabinet that was formed was a presidential cabinet which was inaugurated on 31 August 1945. However, soon this new cabinet was changed to a ministerial cabinet led by Sutan Sjahrir and accompanied by Amir Sjarifoeddin as his deputy. The Cabinet, named as Sjahrir I's cabinet, contained several ministers who are representatives of various parties. The majority of cabinets consisting of nationalist figures, four of whom were representatives of the Christian party, while the representatives of the Islamic group were quite limited. This circumstance led to the disappointment of the Muslim group and caused them to become the opposition.²²⁸

In the debate on the Jakarta charter, there seems to be a misunderstanding arising between the two parties (the Islamists and the nationalists). Islamists believed that the Jakarta Charter is a compromise produced by Soekarno to accommodate the wishes of Islamic groups who want Indonesia to be a country based on religion, as well as to

²²⁵ Ibid, p. 111; HAMKA, "Mengapa Mereka Masih Ribut? Mari Kita Berpahit-Pahit, Kaum Muslim Belum Puas Dengan Kemerdekaan Ini" *Pandji Masyarakat* No. 30 (1968), p. 3-5. The article is reprinted in his *Dari Hati Ke Hati Tentang Agama, Sosial Budaya dan Politik Jakarta*: Panjimas, 2002, p. 310-18.

²²⁶ Soekarno's decree of 1959 was stated that the Charter inspires the 1945 Constitution and constitutes a coherent whole with it.

²²⁷ Ibid, p. 111; See "Ada 'Strategi Bertahap' Kehebohan 'Piagam Djakarta'" *Peraba* (III July 1968), p. 6

²²⁸ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 190

accommodate the wishes of nationalist groups who hoped Indonesia to be founded on the principle of neutrality. The Jakarta Charter was to accommodate both parties due to the balance of votes on the PPKI committee (4:5). Thus, when the PPKI subcommittee unilaterally removed these seven sentences in the Jakarta charter;²²⁹ HAMKA accused nationalist groups of being dishonest, for they have injured the results of a mutual compromise.²³⁰

On the one hand, nationalist groups (as well as Christian groups) assumed that acceptance of the Jakarta charter is an acceptance of Islam as the basis of the State of Indonesia. According to them, Indonesia should be based on the result of the formulation of Pancasila, which religion is one of the bases of the State; not the primary basis of the State. Based on the Pancasila, religion as the first principle is a commitment that Indonesia is a country that upholds morals as the basis of the State. The first precept which is "Belief in the one and only God" is the attitude that Indonesia is a country consisting of religious people who and are entitled to embrace the religion according to their respective beliefs, also affirmed by the law of the 29th verse. Eventually, Islamic parties left hurt and angry; because these Christian and nationalist groups received strong support from the military which also supported their opinion.²³¹

With the increasing strength of military influence since the early 1960s, Indonesia entered the uncertainty in the realm of politics especially since the weakening of the influence of Soekarno. The issue arose that the military council would hold a coup against the Soekarno government. Furthermore, there was the failure of the coup d'etat which ended with the execution of seven military generals, and the military accused the communist party of Indonesia as the mastermind. In this period, the growth of Christians and the churches also experienced a spectacular increase; referred to as the most drastic Christian growth in the 20th century.

²²⁹ In an emergency meeting of the removal of these seven sentences; a representative from the Muslim side, Wahid Hasyim could not take part because he was on his way to Surabaya.

²³⁰ See Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 110-113

²³¹ Ibid, p. 114

3. MASS EXODUS IN 1965 AND ITS CONTROVERSY

On the night of 30 September 1965, left-wing officers staged an unsuccessful coup in the capital city of Jakarta. The army began publicly blaming the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) for the coup attempt; General Soeharto as a military commander along with various community organizations together struggled to eliminate the PKI and its members for several years afterward. This bloody 1965 event was preceded by a movement led by Lieutenant Colonel Oentoeng from Cakrabirawa's presidential guard with an agenda to kidnap and kill six generals and an army officer. PKI denials of involvement did not affect. Eventually, the PKI was outlawed; hundreds of thousands of its followers were killed in a massive bloodbath. Muslim youth groups worked in conjunction with representatives of the military to carry out the bloodletting, going from village to village arresting and executing suspected communists.²³² Later, it was known as the *Gerakan 30 September* (abbreviated as "G30S"; Movement of September 30th).

In October 1965 the killings started. Violence against people associated with PKI took place across the country, but the worst massacres were in Java and Bali. The conflict in East Java between PKI and NU which had begun in 1963 turned into full-scale slaughter from the second week of October 1965. Anti-PKI slaughters then triggered off there, with the army assisting youths in finding Communists. In Bali, with no Islamic forces involved, upper-caste PNI landlords took the lead in urging the extermination of PKI members. PKI's top national leadership was also being found and killed.²³³

At a meeting in Jakarta on 9–11 November 1965, Muhammadiyah proclaimed that the extermination of 'PKI' constituted Holy War. Other Islamic groups endorsed this view.²³⁴ Whatever Islamic leaders may have meant by this, such pronouncements

²³² Hefner, Robert W. (ed.), *Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation*, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993, p. 113

²³³ Ricklefs, M.C., 2001, p. 347

²³⁴ This perception is awakened from several official statements of Islamic organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah chairman's *fatwa* taken in a flash meeting on 9-11 November 1965 in Jakarta, about the PKI's involvement in the 1965 events. A similar view is also apparent from the statement of Ahmad Syaichu, vice chairman of the NU Party's who declared that the sweeping movement of the G30S was not due to humanitarian impulse, but the religious duty to be done to safeguard the honor of the nation, the

appeared to make the killing of Communists a religious duty and a passport to paradise for any Muslim who lost his own life in the violence. Indonesians who suspected Islam of latent fanaticism felt their suspicions to be confirmed.²³⁵

As a communism based party, the PKI was later accused of being an anti-Pancasila organization, as well as atheist groups.²³⁶ Followers of the PKI which was accused as atheists increasingly cornered by the MPRS's decree about the five official religions. This decree states that every Indonesian must embrace one of the five religions officially recognized by the Indonesian government of Islam, Christianity (Protestantism), Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.²³⁷

According to Singgih Nugroho in his thesis, the followers of the PKI in remote villages are mostly non-practicing Muslims.²³⁸ For example, the villagers of Selogede, Semarang, in which the majority were Muslim. The majority of Muslims there prefer Kejawen (Javanism) activities such as *Slametan*, *Bersih desa* (cleaning village), and other. Borrowing the terminology conveyed by Clifford Geertz, their religious style can be categorized as '*Islam Abangan*', a mixture of various "genuine" Javanese beliefs, especially those related to the spirit world of the ancestors. They are often called Muslims in name only, but they do not implement the basic Islamic teachings. The political orientation of the villagers to the PKI, according to Singgih Nugroho, also influenced the religious pattern of the majority of the people.²³⁹

After the 1965 event, this religious style became a difficulty for citizens who leaned towards the PKI. The difficulty is partly because, as noted above, the formal religious identity becomes so important as to prevent one from the communists and atheist stigmas. Consequently, there was a general phenomenon in which religious

State and religion. (Nugroho, Singgih, *Menyintas dan menyeberang: perpindahan massal keagamaan pasca 1965 di pedesaan Jawa*, Syarikat, 2008, p. 1-3)

²³⁵ Ricklefs, M.C., 2001, p. 347

²³⁶ Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 99; Budiawan, "Othering the Communist and Religious Identity in Contemporary Indonesian Society", unpublished paper, p. 5-6

²³⁷ Aritonang, Jan S., 2004, p. 382

²³⁸ Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 148

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 149

centers in villages such as mosques and church visited by many villagers, although previously they rarely worshiped there.²⁴⁰

People who were considered to have links with the PKI began to be pursued and captured. Some were killed on the spot; some were detained and underwent rehabilitation. This rehabilitation process is called *santiaji* (indoctrination), a "purification" of Pancasila program to restore a religious identity of the prisoners.²⁴¹ This rehabilitation process begins by asking the religious identity of the prisoners at once to check whether they are atheists or not.²⁴² The technical implementation of the *santiaji* program was submitted to the mental coaching assistant (*Asbintal*) from the ABRI²⁴³, as well as the ministry of religious affairs that sent the officers of Islam, Catholic, or Protestant sections.²⁴⁴

The forms of disciplining during the rehabilitation period were that all prisoners are required to adopt and practice the rules of one of the five religions recognized by the State. To support that policy, all prisoners were required to attend spiritual activities according to their respective faiths. For prisoners who claimed to be Muslim, they were required to attend all religious lectures, Friday prayers, and two weeks of recitation. While prisoners who claimed to be Protestants and Catholics, in addition to having to attend religious sermons as well as weekly worship in their respective churches, they were also required to fill in attendance lists which were placed in front of churches. However, presentation and materials of religious lectures must be through the approval of *Asbintal*.²⁴⁵

For the whole policy to go according to expectations, the rehabilitation process was strictly controlled. Each block, even each cell was installed "religious police", which was recruited from among the prisoners themselves, to supervise other prisoners in performing their religious worship. If a prisoner performed worship in inappropriate

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 150

²⁴¹ Toer, Pramodya Ananta, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, Jakarta: Lentera, 1995, p. 117

²⁴² Toer, 1995, p. 105-106

²⁴³ The Indonesian National Armed Forces

²⁴⁴ Krisnadi, I.G., *Tahanan Politik Pulau Buru (1969-1979)*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001, p. 136. In the official language of the New Order government, the security officers who sent to the prison are commonly referred to as Rohis [*Rohaniawan Islam*] (Muslim cleric), Rohkat [*Rohaniawan Katolik*] (Catholic clergy), and Rohpot [*Rohaniawan Protestan*] (Protestant clergy). Thus the mention of the spiritual officers was part of the politics of language by the New Order regime.

²⁴⁵ Krisnadi, I.G., 2001, p. 137

ways or pretending to worship, this religious police will report his behavior to the head of the block, and will then be reported to the camp commander. Furthermore, the detainee will be transferred to the isolation room as punishment for his actions.²⁴⁶

This tightly controlling policy of worship also caused the consequences of religious conversion among prisoners. This concern explained by Nugraha in his book when he told a story about one of the prisoners named Mustahal:

“..It should not be surprising that when the security guards proclaimed that prisoners should practice their respective religious rules, the Muslim majority who adhered to ‘Islam abangan’ took the weight of five-time prayers in a language they did not even understand. Also, they must perform mandatory fasting for a whole month outside the other *sunnah* fasting. Because of that, many of the prisoners were converted to other religions. Most of them moved to Protestants whose services are relaxed and sang in a language they understand.”²⁴⁷

The conversion to Christianity which was carried out while in prison was motivated by several interrelated factors. After being arrested and then detained in prison, the prisoners were forced to undergo hard work obligations. Being accused as the enemy of the State and as a group of atheist society, exploitation can be imposed on the prisoners without legal consequences for the perpetrators. For some prisoners, this condition creates a confusion of the soul. As an escape, they look at the religion that is expected to offer solutions to their problems. Unfortunately, that desire cannot be realized because through the religious lectures they also get insulted as atheists.²⁴⁸

In contrast to the attitude of the religious officers of Islam, the sympathetic attitude of the church conveyed by Protestant and Catholic religious officers in the exercise of spiritual and social services to the prisoners was one of the main factors behind the conversion of the prisoners to Christianity.²⁴⁹ By conveying spiritual caution

²⁴⁶ Setiawan, Hersri, *Aku Eks Tapol*, Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2003, p. 51; Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 111

²⁴⁷ Moestahal, Ahmadi, *Dari Gontor ke Pulau Buru*, Yogyakarta: Syarikat Indonesia, 2003, p. 256; Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 113

²⁴⁸ Toer, Pramoedya Ananta, 1995, p. 87

²⁴⁹ Subanar, G. Budi, 2001, p. 239

to the prisoners, the attitude of religious officers from both Protestants and Catholics was highly polite and gave a sense of empathy to the lives of the prisoners. In addition to work in spiritual matters, Christian religious officers also provide self-run social services that were full of risks such as seeking contact with detainees' families, providing educational facilities, healthcare and living necessities for prisoners.²⁵⁰

The social services of Christian religious officers to these prisoners continued until they were released from prison. In practice, the pastors also provide services to believers other than Catholic and Protestant.²⁵¹ The empathetic attitude of these pastors, especially to the adherent of '*Islam abangan*', continues to make an impression and gained their sympathy. This attitude was also one of the factors of massive conversion to Christianity.

In the wake of the events of 1965, not to be an adherent of an officially recognized world religion was to run the risk of being labeled an atheist and hence a Communist. Some Indonesians who were unwilling to call themselves Muslims – mostly are the adherent of '*Islam abangan*' - therefore proclaimed themselves as Christians, sometimes without having had prior contact with Christian proselytizers.²⁵² According to Hefner, about three-fourths of the Christian converts were children or close relatives of communists who had been killed or disgraced in the events of 1965-1966.²⁵³

The 1971 census revealed major religious changes since the last figures of the 1930s, but perhaps they were less dramatic than some Muslims had feared. In 1933 only 2.8 percent of all Indonesians were Christians (under two million people) whereas in 1971 the figure had grown to 7.5 percent (nearly 9 million people). In Central and East Java the scale of the increase was more dramatic. In the 1930s only 0.1 percent of the population in Central Java and 0.4 percent in East Java were Christians; in 1971 these figures were 2.1 percent and 1.7 percent respectively. These are of course small percentages, but the Christians were particularly visible because of the prominence of Christian schools and because conversions were heaviest in urban areas. In 1971

²⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 242

²⁵¹ Ibid, p. 245

²⁵² Ricklefs, M.C., 2001, p. 354

²⁵³ Hefner, Robert W., 1993, p. 116

Christians constituted 11.6 percent of the population of urban Central Java as a whole; they were 14.9 percent in Yogyakarta and 15.1 percent in both Surakarta and Magelang. Some of these new Christians were Chinese, but most were Javanese.²⁵⁴

The G30S PKI movement in 1965²⁵⁵ became a growth momentum for Christianity as their new adherent skyrocketing to more than two million, according to Alwi Shihab's estimate. This change was triggered by fears of the Indonesian communist who are mostly *agama abangan*, to avoid a massacre. That mass conversion was a starting point of physical conflict between Islam vi's-à-is Christian in the early days of the New Order. The significant growth of Christian adherents is considered by Islamic groups as a form of proselytism.

The process of conversion to Christianity occurred on a large scale of various regions in Indonesia. According to a note from the Institution of Research and Social Development in Java (1968), the number of Roman Catholic churches has doubled, from 125.486 to 241.387 since the start of the purge of PKI followers which are predominantly '*Islam abangan*'. Moreover, in Medan, North Sumatra, only in one year Protestants increased by 83 percent (June 1966 - November 1967). According to Shihab, Muhammadiyah accused the churches of doing a Christianization; also considers that the large-scale conversion is also supported by the new order to minimize the existence of Islam. They suspect that the government is still traumatized by the uprising of a group led by Kartosuwiryo in 1962, which sought to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia.²⁵⁶

4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1965 EVENT TO THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATION

After the incident of the 1965 event, the army-backed government and mostly Muslim circles allied to eradicate the PKI's influences in every aspect of Indonesian

²⁵⁴ Ricklefs, M.C., 2001, p. 355

²⁵⁵ The Thirtieth of September Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, abbreviated as G30S, also known by the acronym Gestapu for *Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or sometimes called Gestok, for *Gerakan Satu Oktober*, First of October Movement) was a self-proclaimed organization of Indonesian National Armed Forces members who, in the early hours of 1 October 1965, assassinated six Indonesian Army generals in an abortive *coup d'état*.

²⁵⁶ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 173-174

life. In this anti-communist atmosphere, religion was the most critical identity. The people who were recognized as an 'obedient to Pancasila' were those who embraced one of the five official religions that are approved by the government. Consequently, many of the ex-members of the PKI dissolved themselves by converting to Christianity. Moreover, the church opened them to the former followers of communism party by providing various services and shelters in Christian churches.

The large number of Muslims who converted to Christianity was one of the factors that had a significant impact on conflicts between Islam and Christianity in the aftermath of the 1965 event and the years that followed. This tension can be traced from the church's treatment to people who were considered communist after the 1965 event, although the church itself has ideologically disagreed with communist ideology.²⁵⁷

The attitude of the church that differed significantly from the attitude of most of the Islamic groups later led to the phenomenon of conversion of prisoners from Islamic background to Christianity. Also, the announcement from the Army, which required all Indonesian citizens have one religion and also reinforced by the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly in 1966 was also a factor of massive migration into Christianity.²⁵⁸

Tensions sprang up after some Islamic leaders accused churches and mission agencies of carrying out evangelism in "unhealthy ways",²⁵⁹ which strained relations between them. Some Islamic groups considered that the protection and service of the church against the prisoners and members of the PKI was an act of profit-taking for the benefit of Christians. The accusation had increasingly justified when the implications of

²⁵⁷ The Church has a more 'dynamic' attitude toward the 1965 event. Before 'the massacre', the church took a firm stand against communism and the communist party of Indonesia (PKI). This was revealed by the attitude of Mgr. Soegijapranata, the archbishop of Semarang, against communism. During his tenure, a number of strategies were designed against communism, through discussion, contact with Catholic politicians, and together with other organizations keeping faith against the growth of mass communist organizations. But after the 1965 event, in the period of leadership of Mgr. Darmojuwono, the Catholic Church takes a different stance. As the military authorities mobilized the masses to screen PKI members and arrest them, the church, in addition to providing support to the military for screening PKI members, also paid attention and performed spiritual and social service to the prisoners and their families. See Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 121

²⁵⁸ Avery T. Willis, Jr., *Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ*, South Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1978, p. 19; Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 108; Jan S. Aritonang, 2004, p. 382.

²⁵⁹ As happened in the Makassar and the Meulaboh events that will be described in the next chapter.

the church services led to the massive conversion of religion from Islam to Christianity. This condition further sharpens the suspicion of Islamic groups towards Christian activity.²⁶⁰ The conversion of the millions of *abangan* Muslims in Java was one of the crucial issues that disrupted the Christian-Muslim relationship at that time.

The accusation of Christianization is also related to the New Order's religious policy. This policy itself is run inconsistently, based on their existing needs.²⁶¹ According to Willis in his research on communism in Indonesia and aftermath, the early government of the New Order used Islam as a weapon to combat communism. However, after the communism was successfully destroyed, the new order shifted the power of Islam both in movement and politics, which is still considered to have real power in society and a strong desire to make Islamic law as state law.²⁶² Some Islamic groups assumed, the collapse of communism and the victory of the new order as the victory of the Islamic group, and with this victory, they hoped the new government made Islamic law as the foundation of state law and became a starting point of their political glory.²⁶³ Muslims saw it as consecutive defeats following on from the battles to decide the philosophical basis of the state during the years 1945-1959. Eventually, the treatment of the new order to them was the beginning of the frozen relationship between government and Islamic organizations.

Meanwhile, among Muslim activists began to arouse suspicion to Christians, whom they regard as having a strong bargaining position inside of the new order government. This suspicion arose because they actively blocked the political activities of these Islamic groups. Their assumption became stronger after seeing Christians seemed to be privileged by the New Order regime, such as the appointment of some ministers in key posts and the leader of ABRI who are Christians.²⁶⁴ The suspicion that was initially addressed to some Christians in government, in its development influenced the perception of Christian activity in general. This accusation stemmed from the

²⁶⁰ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 174

²⁶¹ Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 196

²⁶² Avery T. Willis, Jr., 1978, p. 104

²⁶³ Aritonang, Jan S., 2004, p. 368; Avery T. Willis, Jr., 1978, p. 104

²⁶⁴ Husein, Fatimah, *Muslim-Christian in The New Order Indonesia, The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslim's Perspective*, Bandung: Mizan, 2005, p. 116. Some of ABRI leaders and ministers who are Christians are: Admiral Sudomo, Gen. Maraden Panggabean, Gen. TB. Simatupang, and Dr. J.B. Sumarlin (Minister of Finance).

phenomenon of the church building in many places, even some of them built in the middle of the settlement of the citizens who are predominantly Muslims. As a result, the construction of churches in Muslim majority areas was regarded as one of the forms of Christianization. This situation further reinforced the assumption among Muslims that the issue of Christianization after the events of 1965 which has been denied by the Christian group was palpable.

For example, in early 1967 a small methodical church was built in Meulaboh, West Aceh. Muslims in West Aceh protested against the building of the church in the majority Muslim community. As a result, the church construction was stopped by the local government to avoid harmful excesses. Furthermore, there was also a religious conflict in Makassar, Northern Indonesia. On 1 October 1967, some young men in Makassar ransacked church buildings, schools, monasteries and offices of Christian organizations. This event was also known as the *Peristiwa Makassar* (Makassar Event). According to one journalist, the incident was sparked by a Christian school teacher who said, "Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, only marries nine of his wives, while with other wives he lives in sin." Another thing that disrupted Muslims, according to this reporter's report, was the construction of a church in front of the grand mosque in Makassar, although practically no Christians live there.²⁶⁵

The interreligious relationship in Indonesia was going reasonably well before the occurrence of Makassar event. There have been no significant physical clashes between religious groups since Indonesia gained its independence. Since the incident, as well as the Meulaboh²⁶⁶ incident in the same year, mission work activities have begun to get opposition from various Islamic parties, especially in crowded Muslim areas such as Aceh, Makassar, and West Java.²⁶⁷ The role of local and central government authorities also directly influences the development of these interreligious conflicts. The active military support for the nationalist groups that inclined toward 'neutrality' during the

²⁶⁵ Aritonang Jan S., 2004, p. 382-383

²⁶⁶ The Meulaboh event (1967) took place in April; a Methodist Church was damaged on the grounds because it was built on a predominantly Muslim region. See Melissa Courch, *Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the courts in West Java*, Routledge, 2013.

²⁶⁷ During the period of the New Order government, there were more than 600 cases of destruction of houses of worship (more than 50 percent happened between 1995 and 1998). See Daniel Dhakidae, *Cendekiawan dan kekuasaan dalam negara Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003, p. 513-516

Suharto era became a disadvantage for some Muslims who tried to take part in the political decisions of the new order government. However, because the New Order government considered Islam as a threat, Suharto preferred to embrace the Christian and the nationalist. Thus, the beginning of the new order is a 'period of defeat' for the Islamic group.²⁶⁸

5. THE ROLE OF CHRISTIANS IN THE NEW ORDER ERA

After successfully mastering the politics of government, the new order tried to strengthen their political field so that its supporters could undoubtedly win in the next election. The Elections which should be held in 1968 postponed to 1971; the government was worried about the likely victory of the coalition of Islamic parties who are struggling to realize their idea of the Islamic State. Golkar²⁶⁹, a non-political organization, was used as a political vehicle to smooth the victory of the New Order regime²⁷⁰. Within Golkar itself, there are Muslim and Christian figures, both civilian and military, who then also occupy important positions in government.²⁷¹

A large number of Christian leaders in the government and their prominent position in government have caused displeasure among some groups of Muslims; they accused the New Order government of embracing the Christian group rather than being fair to all religious groups. Much of this allegation was directed at Maj. Gen. Ali Murtopo²⁷², a figure who was considered as the brain behind the policies of the New Order. He was also known as an advisor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonprofit organization founded by the Chinese-Catholic community in 1971. This CSIS is often referred to as a think-tank of the New Order government.

²⁶⁸ Aritonang, 2004, p. 363

²⁶⁹ Golkar began with the establishment of Sekber Golkar (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*) in the late days of Sukarno's era. It was established by the Army to counter the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party in political life. In its development, Sekber Golkar transformed into a Group of Work that became one of the major party that was participating in the General Election. For more on Golkar, see David Reeve, Robyn Fallick, Iskandar P. Nugraha, Lubabun Ni'am (Eds.), Gatot Triwira (Translator), *Golkar - Sejarah yang Hilang: Akar Pemikiran dan Dinamika*, Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2013.

²⁷⁰ Aritonang, 2004, p. 373

²⁷¹ Ibid, p. 374

²⁷² According to Aminuddin, Ali Murtopo was an anti-Islamist (Islamophobia) with the fact that he was closer to Christians and Catholics rather than Muslims. Aminuddin, p. 79; Aritonang, 2004, p. 374

Van Dijk notes that one of the founders of CSIS, Sofyan Wanandi, in 1971 has been one of the PMKRI leaders (Union of Catholic University Students of the Republic of Indonesia) and since then he has close ties with notable figures such as President Soeharto and Ali Moertopo. Meanwhile, according to Adi Sasono and Hartono Mardjono, CSIS, which was led by General Benny Moerdani who was also a Catholic was very instrumental in directing government policies into anti-Islam policies from the 1970s to 1980's. This issue for many years later was raised again when Sofyan Wanandi was interviewed by Bakorstanas on January 26, 1998.²⁷³

During the 1971 election, Ali Moertopo was given the task of making Golkar the winner of the election. Thus, Ali Moertopo through a Special intelligence operation coordinated by Army leaders and the election control body intervened to several political parties that were considered to disrupt Golkar's road to winning the election. To maintain the dominance of Golkar, the government simplified political parties to only three; namely Golkar, PNI, and PPP. However, this fusion policy leads to the depoliticization of Islam.²⁷⁴ It was because the word "Islam" was no longer used as part of the party's name. Also, this policy also causing a free mass at the local level, which disturbs the communication between Islamic party leaders.

Following the crackdown of the PKI and the increasing insistence on Islamic groups to apply Islamic values to the basis of the state, the government through the military increasingly actively made joint contacts with the churches because at that time they had a common interest: Preventing Islamic groups from controlling the government.²⁷⁵ The government adviser, Ali Moertopo, who has known Beek as the leader of CSIS recruited Beek's students, Jusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie) as his assistant. Wanandi himself was the first student of Beek as well as the leading cadres of CSIS who were trained through Catholic retreat which was held secretly for decades.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ Van Dijk, Kees, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997-2000*, Leiden: KITLV, 2001, p. 132

²⁷⁴ Willis, p. 104; Hefner Robert W., 2000, p. 71

²⁷⁵ "Fear of Moslems led some of the President's advisers into the arms of Catholic Action, with the strange consequence that a Dutch Jesuit played a part in shaping the Javanese junta's political ideas." See Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 139.

²⁷⁶ Tim ISAI, in *Bayang-Bayang PKI* (Jakarta: ISAI, 1995) mentioned that: "Over the years, Joop Beek has indeed brought together and nurtured young people, especially college students, to be forged as an anti-communist force. Its main base is the PMKRI [The Catholic Student Movement of the Republic of Indonesia], which was a part of Catholic Party. PMKRI figures were also involved in the Indonesian

6. *KHALWAT SEBULAN (KHASEBUL): MILITARY-CHRISTIAN ALLIANCE*

When the PKI began to capture many masses in the grassroots, the missionaries did not just let it without a 'fight'. To stem the efforts of communism in Indonesia, the Catholic Church in rural areas has several methods applied through two different manners. The Jesuit missionary effort was then divided into two ways through two western missionaries. For Pastor John Dijkstra (1911-2003), the effort to guard against communist influence was to establish a leading counter-organization that also focuses on rural communities; therefore, he founded an organization named *Petani Pancasila dan Buruh Pancasila* (Anti-Communist Pancasila Unions of the Peasants and Workers/ Pancasila Farmer's Association). In the opinion of Dijkstra, defeating the communists must be by approaching the poor people who are also the target of the communist party. Another Jesuit missionary, Joop Beek SJ (1917-1983) preferred a top-down approach: Building influence through political power and control of power. According to him, the most potent political force at that time was the military. By working together with the military who also have a desire to fight communist, Beek managed to take advantage of his proximity to Ali Moertopo to establish CSIS.²⁷⁷

Catholic's boldness in the debate over the Jakarta Charter was due to their close relationship with the military, especially since their cooperation in the fight against communism after the 1960s.²⁷⁸ The similarity of perception given Islam as the main enemy became the tie of collaboration between the Catholic Church and the Soeharto regime. CSIS as a form of that collaboration, in addition to being used as a political kitchen of Suharto also used by a number of Catholics to gain political positions in Soeharto's government.²⁷⁹

Student Action Unity [KAMI]. With such strong influence and strong anti-communist network, it is not surprising that Beek played an important role in the anti-communist movement. Among other things, he is often cited as a link between the AD (National Army) and the CIA. "

²⁷⁷ McDonald, Hamish, *Suharto's Indonesia*, Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1981, p. 102; Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 135

²⁷⁸ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 134

²⁷⁹ Suryasmoro, Benyamin Ispandrihari, *Penampakan Bunda Maria sebagai counter discourse atas hegemoni gereja dan rezim Orde Baru*, Unpublished thesis, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University, 1999, p. 19

The increasing influence of CSIS in the New Order government has gradually become a distinct advantage for the church, especially the Catholic group that places their representatives in government. The existence of the Jakarta charter which was still the key to changing the constitution of the State has been used as a 'fearing tool' for non-Muslims.²⁸⁰ The overwhelming fear of Catholics against the Islamist groups who have fought for the realization of the Jakarta charter is also known as Islamophobia. This Islamophobia epidemic among Catholics did not just happen quickly; it was caused by the role of CSIS that socialized this phobia to the national Catholic cadres and the elite of the church through a program founded by Joop Beek, SJ in 1963, namely *Khasebul*.²⁸¹

Beek, who initially worked with Muslim groups to jointly oust communists, changed his course to be an anti-Islam figure after the communists were successfully ousted. Under the pretext of guarding Pancasila and Indonesia against the Islamization of the State, Islam became a new enemy for him. "At that time, there were people in Jakarta who wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state. Moreover, it was true. Beek was worried about this, so he used his network to counter this movement," as his former student said, Paul de Blot.²⁸² Therefore, to achieve his political goals, Beek formed a cadre movement which was subsequently instituted as *Khasebul*, the abbreviation of *Khalwat Sebulan* (one month retreat).

As a national Catholic cadre coaching program, *Khasebul* was privately conducted. From the recruitment of candidates, the implementation of education, to the sending back of the participants when the program has been completed, all conducted clandestinely. Together with several priests and bishops, he gathered youths and organized military exercises for Catholic youth and students. *Khasebul* was started at Realino Dormitory in Yogyakarta and then moved to Jakarta. Part of the fund - apart

²⁸⁰ The Jakarta Charter covers the principles of Pancasila but in different order and with great addition, the precepts of the divine plus the phrase "by mandatory implementing Islamic law for its adherents". If the Jakarta Charter passes as a benchmark of the constitution, then every Islamic person who does not practice Islamic law is fully considered against the law. (20 bawah) as previously noted, the Jakarta Charter is a pre-planned draft for the law to be established as the basis of the state. On 22 June 1945 the draft was produced by a 9-member subcommittee, covering both nationalists and Islamic leaders. This sub-commission was formed because the Islamic leaders were dissatisfied with Soekarno's speech on June 1, 1945 on the basis of the new Indonesian State in the form of five precepts, namely nationalism, internationalism or humanity, democracy, social justice, and divinity. The five precepts then known as the Pancasila.

²⁸¹ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 21

²⁸² Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 136

from Indonesia - was obtained by Beek from Holland and Germany. In 1967 the program moved to a new home in Klender, East Jakarta. According to Mathilda Maria van Thienen, a nun who worked there from 1967 to 1977, this retreat house consisted of three large block complexes with a total of 72 rooms and 144 beds. Four times a year, Beek came to this program together with hundred trainees. 8 to 10 of them are women, while the rest are men. The presence of prospective participants to the place of education in the Samadi home, Klender, East Jakarta shouldn't be known by friends and their families. If the intentions of these attendees are known by others, they will be sent home on the same day.²⁸³

Through *Khasebul*, Beek wanted to form his own 'military unit'. In the training program, the 'Beek armies' were trained for a whole month. According to Richard Tanter, a researcher from Australia, his military candidates were treated inhumanely. Often they get punches and were awakened midnight to undergo physical training. Some members of the program provided details anonymously. One of them was locked up for three days without being fed or tied to a chair in a deliberately darkened room and a snake - though not poisonous - was allowed to creep on his shoulder. There was also a trainee who tied half-naked in the tree and then smeared with mud; left overnight bitten by mosquitoes.²⁸⁴

Khasebul was a special and secret program.²⁸⁵ Participants were students, activists, and village youth recommendations of the pastor in the area. During the training period, the participants were given a new name, so they do not know each other's true identity. Before it started, participants were also given a psychological test to know each other's talents. This psychological test will be the consideration of future careers of the participants after this training program. A former program participant

²⁸³ Ibid, p. 136

²⁸⁴ Tanter, Richard, "Beek, J. van. SJ" Appendix 1 of his "*Intelligence, Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia*", Unpublished Dissertation, Monash University, 1991; also quoted by Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 25 (footnote)

²⁸⁵ Although it was done privately, but in the book named *Buku Petunjuk Gereja Katolik Indonesia Tahun 1993* on page 375 and the same book published in 1997, it was Lukas Rustam Alamsyah SJ who was named *Khasebul's* director. The writing of Lukas Rustam Alamsyah's position in this book as *Khasebul's* director shows that, although secretly and privately done, the *Khasebul* program was the official program of the Catholic Church of Indonesia.

mentioned that after doing psychotic he was said to be a great writer, and then the 'prediction' was indeed a reality.²⁸⁶

During the training period, participants were trained in several skills such as leadership, public speaking, writing, organizing, and social analysis. On the sidelines of rehearsal exercises, the participants also got a special program. This special program is a program directly arranged by Beek focusing on discipline training. In this session, they were trained in a 'rough' way such as congregation, beating each other, long daily sessions of mutual criticism, awakened in the middle of the night and little sleep time, and all physical forging pendants identical to military training. In addition, sometimes participants were told to fast all day and then to worship throughout the night. The failed participants will be punished by being sent back to their home.²⁸⁷

Participants were also indoctrinated with the teachings of the church associated with political and social issues and described models and forms of dangers that threaten the State (and the church). Cosmas Batubara, one of the former trainee, said that Beek trained participants in ways and methods against Marxism-Leninism and how to identify communism and fight it, as well as how to sabotage a meeting secretly.²⁸⁸ Although there is a rebuttal that in this training was also taught that Islam is the enemy; some former participants said otherwise. As Suryasmoro puts it in his thesis; after joining *Khasebul* program, he became paranoid towards veiled Muslim students; also toward some Muslim lecturers as well as HMI student groups in campus. He said that this training method has very effective results that make someone changed after attending this training.²⁸⁹ A former participant who was attending unfinished training assumed that "Islam is the enemy of the Catholics... and if it is needed a *Khasebul* graduate is ready to take arms to fight against Islam". A former female participant in 1984 named Damai Pakpahan decided to quit the program because it did not fit with her thinking. Her parents and siblings are Muslim, and she does not want to be hostile to

²⁸⁶ Mujiburrahman, 2006, 136-37

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 136

²⁸⁸ Cosmas Batubara, "Pater Beek Bukan Agen CIA" in Tim ISAI, *Bayang-Bayang PKI*, Jakarta: ISAI, 1995, p. 43; also quoted by Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 22 (footnote)

²⁸⁹ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 23 (footnote)

them. “If a Catholic appears to be Islamophobic, then he or she is probably a *Khasebul* graduate.” she added.²⁹⁰

On the last day of the program, Beek's relationship with the trainees suddenly became very close and intimate. Although Beek's training was very rough, hard and disciplined for the trainees; on the last day, the trainees were given the opportunity by Beek to vent and make their complaints personally. Participants become close to him and feel full confidence in him. They are willing to do everything for him, as Tanter says.²⁹¹

After the training was over, 'Beek army' was assigned to be a reliable spy for the benefit of their group. Participants who graduated build networks among them from all over Indonesia. It seems *Khasebul's* network was developed in a cell system. The system is probably similar to the work of a vertical cell system described in one of a series of books used for this programme. It was also developed by the Christian leaders such as Jozef Cardijn, the founder of the Young Christian Workers (YCW) and Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order. This system was also like the system used by Jesus for the twelve apostles to carry out the Christian mission in early Christianity. This system was used and has several purposes such as: (1) “to renew everything in Christ” or “to Christianize all aspects of society”. Christianizing all aspects, not only the theological side but also social, economic, political and cultural life; (2) “to create true Christian leaders.” Creating Christian leaders who can become influencers and have groups and militants who are ready to implement and realize their plans. Within this circle often held a discussion which discusses how to apply gospels teachings on social and political life.²⁹²

The great responsibility of each *Khasebul* alumni was to report the progress of their movement to Beek. Each participant has been taught a special code to be not known by non-*Khasebul* people. They work according to their talents that have been detected, such as teachers, journalists, politicians, and others. In short, through the *Khasebul* programme, Beek gradually “built up what amounted to a personal intelligence network”.

²⁹⁰ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 137-138

²⁹¹ Ibid, p. 138

²⁹² Ibid, p. 139

Beek passed away in 1983, and after his death, this form of military education continued. His former student continued it, a Jesuit named Lukas Rustam Alamsyah. The *Khasebul* network and training continued to work to the end of the Soeharto period and even up to the present.²⁹³ Besides some of the priests, Beek's prominent cadres in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies or CSIS have been indeed involved in the *Khasebul* training. It was not uncommon that a *Khasebul* graduate was given a job in the business institutions belong to the Catholic elites. It is also said that some of the university students who joined the *Khasebul* network were rewarded with scholarships. A rebellious person like Suryasmoro Ispandrihari would easily lose these advantages. Another person, who wanted to keep his job, did not have any choice but to hide his discontents with the network.

The educational model of the *Khasebul* program is similar to the style of intelligence education. It was said that this was influenced by the background of its founder, Beek, who was a CIA agent. Although there is indeed no evidence that Beek was a CIA agent planted by the Americans to block the flow of communism in Indonesia; his presence as an American agent was a standard issue known by both Muslims and non-*Khasebuls*.²⁹⁴ In 1971, Beek's role was also mentioned in the establishment of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In addition to being directly involved with prestigious institutions such as the New Order' CSIS, Beek, and his troops also made many political maneuvers and were closely linked to Bakin (now BIN²⁹⁵) and OPSUS²⁹⁶. In fact, there was a rumor that he was in close contact with the American intelligence agency, the CIA.²⁹⁷

In early 1989 when the *Khasebul* program entered its 55th generation which known as the "*pantai dangkal*" generation, strategies against Islam were taught by a figure like Krissantono (a member of the House of Representatives) and other CSIS researchers.²⁹⁸ For example, in one of *Khasebul* training, it was taught that the pattern of

²⁹³ The term '*Khasebul*' has been changed into '*Madha*' an acronym for '*mawas diri harian*' (daily introspection). Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 139

²⁹⁴ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 22

²⁹⁵ Indonesian State Intelligence Agency

²⁹⁶ *Operasi Khusus*, or Special Operation; Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 25 (footnote)

²⁹⁷ McDonald, 1981, p. 36

²⁹⁸ The other speakers were Cosmas Batubara, Harry Tjan Silalahi, Daoed Jusuf, J. Kristiadi, and Sudrajad Djiwandono. After the communist defeat in Indonesia in 1965, church collaborations (through

struggle to uphold the Islamic State no longer use violence, but done culturally and through legislation policies. An example was the application of the idea of the Jakarta charter embodied in the marriage law, as well as several articles in the national education law that influenced by religious values.

Political developments after the 1965 event which marked by the rising militancy of Islamic groups had united Ali Moertopo's side and the Christian elite. During the new order, there are two political strategies among Catholic leaders on how to interact with the state and Muslims, namely *minus mallum* (lesser evil) and *mayos bonnum*. *Minus mallum* means that if someone asked to choose between two bad things, he should choose the least bit bad, while *mayos bonnum* means to have many friends is more useful.²⁹⁹ About *minus mallum*, the two "bad" options offered by Ali Moertopo are "the greens"; which will be picked up by some churches and Catholic politicians between the green of army and the green of Islam. It turned out that the chosen was the green of the army to beat the (green of) Muslims. The *minus mallum* option supported by several Catholic politicians, namely: Yusuf Wanandi, Sofyan Wanandi, Harry Tjan Silalahi and Moerdopo; it also got a blessing from the hierarchy of the church.³⁰⁰

In 1971 Ali Moertopo and Beek's cadres established a think-tank named CSIS. The institution which was headed by Ali Moertopo along with Sudjono Hoemardani and Daud Yoesoef then popularly known as the Tanah Abang group. In its journey, CSIS was not just a think-tank but has become a political interest group, so its members occupied many strategic positions in Golkar and the New Order Government. For the Muslims, the political movement of the early New Order did indeed hurt. It was because Ali Moertopo group tends to be hostile towards Islam. Muslims were considered to have potentially dangerous if given a chance. Ali Moertopo (and CSIS) has a certain

CSIS) and Suharto saw that their opponents were Islamic groups who aspired to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia. In *Khasebul* education, the participants are trained and educated about the patterns of Islamic movements aimed at establishing the State of Islam and how to counter it. Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 22 (footnote)

²⁹⁹ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 24

³⁰⁰ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 23-24

'stereotype' of seeing Muslims; always identifying Islam with "*Darul Islam*". That is why they are always hostile to Islam.³⁰¹

However, the decline of the influence of CSIS in the New Order government after Soeharto slowly tried to approach the Islamic group, forcing Ali Moertopo to approach his colleagues in the military, LB Moerdani.³⁰² Moertopo's relationship with Moerdani stemmed from their initial process when both served on Trikora operations, in the liberation of Western Irian mission (1961-62). Before Moertopo put his influence in the military through Moerdani; in the second half of 1964, Moerdani was considered to have disobeyed his superiors with accusations of rallying the masses, interfering in his instructions, and uprooting the leadership of his commander. As a result, Moerdani was subjected to military discipline; General Ahmad Yani then took him out of the *Baret Merah* army.³⁰³

The dismissal of Moerdani from the military was considered as the first step of the 'de-Benny-nization' process, as well as the starting point of Soeharto's approach to Islam. The honorary military council that disarmed Moerdani from his military rank was a soldier with a *Santri* background, Major General Faisal Tanjung.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Ibid, p. 25. In the 1970s decade, the intelligence agents who were influenced by Ali Moertopo placed the position of the Islamic group as the main target of their intelligence operations. The intelligence agency has invested a great deal of resources for the penetration and manipulation of militant and radical Islamic groups. Provocation becomes a prominent tool in undertaking the operations. The method of operating is usually done by intervening at party meetings and by manipulating the existing party conventions to create a leadership crisis. See Aminuddin, *Kekuatan Islam dan Pergulatan Kekuatan di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Pustaka Pelajar, 1999, p. 132

³⁰² Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 27

³⁰³ Aminuddin, 1999, p. 195; The *Baret Merah* army is the Special Forces Command, abbreviated as Kopassus, is part of the main combat command (KOTAMA) held by the Indonesian Army. Kopassus has special abilities such as moving fast in every field, shooting precisely, reconnaissance, and anti-terror. Their tasks including Direct Action (direct attacks to destroy enemy logistics), Combat SAR, Anti Terror, Advance Combat Intelligence (Special Intelligence Operations). For more about Kopassus, see Conboy, Kenneth J., *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, 2003, Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing.

³⁰⁴ Suryasmoro, 1999, p. 32

CHAPTER IV: CHRISTIANS MISSION IN THE NEW ORDER ERA: CHRISTIANIZATION, CONFLICT, AND DIALOGUE

1. MUSLIM GROUPS ON CHRISTIANIZATION IN NEW ORDER ERA

Muslim accusations of the existence of Christianization activities began to rise based on several factors that emerged during the New Order period. Firstly, the massive conversion from Islam to Christianity during the New Order era. Secondly, the lifting of restrictions on mission work and the reopening of missionary activities by foreign workers. Thirdly, the increasingly widespread development of churches in the Muslim majority areas. And fourthly, the issues of social and health aids channeled by foreign missionaries.

As mentioned before, massive conversion into Christianity occurred because of the emergence of the MPR decision which required every Indonesian citizen to embrace only one of the five official religions of the State. The PKI followers who were Javanese *Abangan* voted to convert to Christianity by various considerations, one of which was that the church was more willing to accept and guide them. According to the report, within six years (1966-1971), more than two million Javanese converted to Christianity. Christian parties themselves claim that the 1960s were the year of the rise of Christianity in Indonesia. This is reinforced by the following data; within a year (1966-1967), Catholic population growth reached 7.45%. Also, a report reveals that in 1965 the number of people waiting for Catholic baptism exceeded the amount of parish membership available.³⁰⁵

Significant growth occurs among Protestants. For example, the membership of the Indonesian Baptist Churches increased significantly from only 1,317 to 3,391 alone in 1965. East Java Christian Church (GKJW) baptized more than 10,000 people only in one month (July-August 1966); and the Karo Batak Protestant Church baptized more than 26,000 new adherents in a period of one year (1966-67). This single conversion

³⁰⁵ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 28

among Indonesian Christians has been hailed as the largest ever conversion of religion from Islam to Christianity in the modern era.³⁰⁶

This large-scale conversion triggered various interpretations from scholars. Several explanations relate this event to various factors, both regarding the economy, social and political aspects. Government policy became the most apparent cause of other factors. Javanese *Abangan* followers preferred to convert to Christianity because there had been much tension between Islam and communism, especially since the purge of the PKI. They believed that Christianity was a less risky option than other religions.³⁰⁷ The conversion was not only happened from among the followers of Islam. Some Confucianism and Buddhism adherents who are predominantly Chinese descendants also converted to Christianity, for fear of association between China and communism.³⁰⁸

Also, the openness of Christian groups to former PKI followers and their family became an essential factor in the inclination of former PKI followers to Christianity. By the church authorities, they were nurtured, given social assistance, guided to start a new life, and spiritually nourished.³⁰⁹ As Hefner said, the conversion to Christianity by Javanese *Abangan* is an attempt to regain social and political legitimacy and also as an answer to the problem of self-confidence.³¹⁰ Regardless of the above interpretation, the massive conversion from Islam to Christianity by the Javanese *Abangan* gave rise to the overwhelming outrage from the Islamic groups. An assumption arose that Christian groups used the chaotic situation that took place during the early days of the new order to carry out their Christianization mission, by providing social and economic services

³⁰⁶ Avery T. Willis, Jr., 1978, p. 4

³⁰⁷ Haryani Saptaningtyas and Pradjarta Dirdjosanjoto, "Religious Conversions in Central Java: Struggling for Space in Two Local Communities" in *The Development of Religion/The Religion of Development*, Oscar Salemink, Anton Van Harskamp, And Ananta Kumar Giri (eds.), Delft: Eburon Publisers, 2005, p. 153-163

³⁰⁸ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 314

³⁰⁹ Hussein, Fatima, *Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inklusivist Muslims' Perspective*, Bandung: Mizan, 2005, p. 121; Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 122

³¹⁰ Hefner, Robert W., "The Political Economy of Islamic Conversion in Modern East Java", in *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse*, William R. Roff (ed.), London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 100-102

and assistance to former communist members. Furthermore, this Christian group activity was seen as an attempt to Christianize Indonesia.³¹¹

The second factor that underlies the Muslim group's assumption of the Christianization effort is the re-enforcement of mission work of foreign missionaries in various regions of Indonesia, especially in the outer islands of Indonesia. With the re-enactment of mission work of foreign missionaries, mission centers began to be established in these places with a focus on health, education, economic, and social development programs. The government's decision to allow mission work in remote areas of Indonesia was based on the conclusion that the centers established by these foreign missionaries were indirectly able to help and realize government programs such as improving the welfare of society, education, and public knowledge, and forging relationships with the outside world.

As told by Aragon, the *“Soeharto government utilized Christian missions as a tool to implement basic economic programs, especially in the peripheries. It also used the weight of non-Muslim minorities to balance itself against reformist Muslim groups who periodically threatened new order power by agitating for a Muslim state.”*³¹² The attitude of the government that tends to be tolerant to the work of Christian missions was created tensions among Muslims. By Muslim groups, mission activity was seen as a form of proselytizing and illegal Christianization because it is practiced in Muslim majority areas or done to people who have apparently embraced Islam. Because of the government's proximity to this Christian group, Christians are also accused of working together to help the government to weaken the political power of Islam.³¹³

The construction of churches and centers serving the educational, social and economic aids under Christian banners by foreign missionaries has sparked a long-running Muslim-Christian conflict because it was built in Muslim densely populated areas. At the beginning of the New Order period, there have been two significant events - events of Meulaboh and the events of Makassar - which led to the emergence of Christianization discourse among Muslims. Although in the end the church construction

³¹¹ Hussein, Fatima, 2005, p. 123

³¹² Aragon, Lorraine V., *Fields of the Lord, Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 24

³¹³ Hussein, Fatima, 2005, p. 122

was stopped and moved to an area that did not disturb the majority, this event became the trigger of a lengthy debate between Muslim groups and Christian groups.³¹⁴

Lukman Harun, a Muslim reformist activist, for example, accused Christian groups of deliberately provoking conflict by building churches in areas where there were almost no Christians. According to him, this activity is in contrast to the tolerance values that have been described in Pancasila. For him, it is not right to preach the gospel to others who apparently embrace one of the official religions.³¹⁵

The increasingly public aids from abroad through the foreign missionaries also led to the tension, as Lukman again expressed his opinion. According to him, foreign aid to religious institutions in Indonesia is a form of foreign intervention against the nation's internal affair. By capitalizing this foreign aid, he considers Christian missionary activities to Muslims as an unacceptable and illegal method.³¹⁶ The illegal method he refers here is a door-to-door visit by distributing groceries and material aids by Christian missionaries to Muslim families, especially to poor Muslims. Lukman advised the government to exercise control over foreign aids that would spark conflict through the ministry of religion, and advise the government to allow only missionary activity for people who have not yet embraced the official religions.³¹⁷

2. MUHAMMADIYAH'S ACCUSATION ON CHRISTIANIZATION

The activities of Catholic and Protestant missionaries in Java were seen as endangering the religious life of Javanese society which the majority of them have been already Muslims. Some community-based organizations such as Muhammadiyah in Central Java, and Persis in West Java, saw the attempts of Christianization by foreign and local missionaries happened. They accused the government of cooperating with Dutch missionaries to convert indigenous peoples.

On February 27, 1967, some Muhammadiyah and former Masyumi leaders established a Da'wah-based organization called *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia* [DDII]

³¹⁴ Ibid, p. 83; Aritonang, 2004, p. 383

³¹⁵ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 34

³¹⁶ Ibid, p. 33

³¹⁷ Ibid, p. 34

(the Council of Islamic Da'wah Indonesia). The purpose of DDII's is to increase Da'wah activities with a real contribution in the socio-economic field, especially in overcoming the poverty. Mohammad Natsir, a former Masyumi leader who had been banned from the political activity by the government, was made as a chairman. DDII was focusing on the Da'wah field as a counter to the widespread issue of Christianization. There were several printed media used by DDII as a means of Da'wah; such as *Media Dakwah* magazine, *Anak-anak Dakwah* magazine, *Harian Abadi*, *Suara Masjid*, *Khutbah Jumat* series and *Buletin Dakwah*. Several other Islamic-based media also participated in the campaign of anti-Christianization movement. *Panji Masyarakat* vol. 17 no. 1 (1967) reissued the details of the pamphlet, which revealed the secret Christianization movement by the church.

The Muslim group's response to the issue of Christianization was made in several ways; such as writing a book about Christianity, spreading pamphlets, articles and others. Some responses were made by direct argument and debate about Christian religious doctrines. The problem was, the evidence and excuses used by some Muslim debaters were regarded as invalid and unacceptable by Christian groups; like the use of the Barnabas instead of the four canonical gospels. According to the debaters, they prefer to use the Barnabas because it has a more authentic record of Jesus' life. The counterwork to the issue of Christianization itself was done in various ways, which will be explained below.

3. MUHAMMADIYAH: A PURIFIER FROM CENTRAL JAVA

K.H. Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah in Kampung Kauman, Yogyakarta on November 18, 1912.³¹⁸ Regarded as a purifier and reformer of Islam in Indonesia; Muhammadiyah focuses on the modernization of Islamic culture and thought in Java, especially Yogyakarta which was dominated by traditionalists at the moment. Muhammadiyah emerged as a counter organization against traditionalist Muslims, Dutch colonialism, as well as Christian missionaries. The primary factor in the establishment of Muhammadiyah was Dahlan's frustration with religious practices in the

³¹⁸ <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-178-det-sejarah-singkat.html>, retrived on 10/10/2017, 12.35 pm

Sultan's mosque. Dahlan went to Mecca; exposed to Ahmad Khatib, then went against the Sultan mosque's scholars.³¹⁹

Since its establishment, Muhammadiyah's primary focus has been on reforming Islamic thought in Indonesia. During the early days of its establishment, Muhammadiyah prioritized the reformation of the Da'wah movement; the upgrading organization is thinking with several publications from the Middle East. In those years, Muhammadiyah was still in good relations with the Christian communities. Ahmad Dahlan was establishing an excellent communication with Catholic and Protestant figures such as van Dress and van Lies, Reverend Baker, Dr. (Samuel) Zwemmer and Dr. Hendrik Kraemer. Even Kraemer regarded Dahlan as a good friend; they often had a meeting together with Reverend Baker.³²⁰

Their relationship was still well intertwined even though the Christianity in Central Java began to grow and develop. Hadji Fachruddin, Dahlan's protégé, in his article wrote that Muslims were falling behind Christian groups in educating their children due to the establishment of a Bible School in Yogyakarta with the help of the government. He argued, "If the Muslims fail to act like the Christians in this field, they were a perfect possibility that their future grandchildren would eventually become Christians as could easily be seen from the rapid growth of their educational system which would also penetrate the entire society".³²¹ This different attitude from Fachruddin serves as a hint of the future that Muhammadiyah's attitude toward Christianity will soon change. In fact, Dahlan himself was benefiting from the development of Christian community groups in Yogyakarta; he adopted missionary school's curriculum to be applied to the Muhammadiyah education system.³²²

³¹⁹ This difference was about the direction of the Kibla of the Sultan Mosque which was not really facing the Kabah. Although he was joining the *Jamaa* in this mosque, Dahlan made his own line of praying that was different from the direction that has been determined by the mosque functionary. See Menchik, Jeremy, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 39

³²⁰ Alfian, Muhammadiyah: *The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Press, 1989, p. 161

³²¹ Menchik, Jeremy, 2016, p. 40

³²² Alfian, 1989, p. 161

4. MUHAMMADIYAH'S RELATION WITH CHRISTIANITY

According to Jeremy Menchik's notes on the early Muhammadiyah relationship with Christianity in Central Java which are obtained from the Muhammadiyah's bi-monthly meeting record since August 11, 1922 to November 22, 1924 from the Indonesian National Library. Muhammadiyah's most significant interaction with the Christian community occurred in 1922 as a reaction to a speech by Samuel Zwemer in the Protestant Church. Zwemer argued that Islam has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strength lies in the number of its followers, its da'wah system, Sufism, and sameness; while its weakness lies in the literature which is debatable, such as expression of injustice to women, equality of rights only to Muslim males, and the limitation of freedom of thought. In his closing speech, Zwemer invited Muslims to return to the truth and come to Jesus.³²³

Muhammadiyah responded to Zwemer's speech by inviting Muslim leaders, Jesuits, and Dutch regents to debate together in one forum. According to a note, the debate proceeded as planned. Another source said that Zwemer did not come as he did not dare to meet and argue with Dahlan.³²⁴

With the replacement of the prime minister of the Dutch government by Abraham Kuyper, a Calvinist, a new policy emerged that benefited the church and the Dutch priests. Alexander Willem Frederik Idenburg, a new Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, made a new decision that the missionaries were exempted from taxes, getting a salary and severance from the government to go and run mission work in Indonesia. Also, the new colonial government also supported them with the establishment of new Christian schools and hospitals in Indonesia. In other words, the

³²³ Sekretariat Muhammadiyah, "Minutes, August 11–12, 1922," Muhammadiyah folder 28, INA; Wilson (1952, 121). Zwemer spoke in Yogyakarta on July 24 and 26, 1922. Zwemer's biographer reports that despite the polemical character of his speech, the audience was respectful. "In a public meeting at a large church in Djokjakarta, Zwemer spoke for a full sixty minutes on The Strength and Weaknesses of Islam. The attention was very good and at the close a Moslem leader who had been on the pilgrimage to Mecca arose and stated that he wished to thank the speaker for pointing out the weakness of Islam and stated that he would like to have a similar meeting to point out the weakness of Christianity! On many occasions the friendly spirit of Moslems in the East Indies was quite in contrast to conditions in Arabia, Egypt and other predominantly Moslem areas". Menchik, 1999, p. 40-41 (footnote)

³²⁴ Muhammadiyah's patience was especially remarkable because Zwemer's speech was in Javanese rather than Dutch. Zwemer's mission marked the beginning of an increase in missionary work targeting the Javanese. Ibid, p. 41

new Dutch government fully supported mission work in Indonesia both regarding funding and politics. In one of the articles in *Suara Muhammadiyah*, it was mentioned that Oldenburg said, "... If the Netherlands gives only the cultural fruits to the East Indies, it will not be enough. Christian missionaries should be deeply inserted into the world of the eastern people, the people of Muhammad".³²⁵

In his response, Fachruddin stated that the cooperation between the Dutch government and Christian missionaries would gradually begin to threaten the existence of Muslims in Central Java, and whole Indonesia in general. He invites all Muslims in Indonesia to be together against this danger. With the increasing activity of the Christian mission, Muhammadiyah's attitude toward Christianity slowly began to sour. Moreover, with increasing aids and supports to Christian and Catholic institutions, supports and assistance to Islamic organizations were also increasingly troubled by the colonial government. Moreover, the subsidies for the Muhammadiyah hospital construction were getting stuttered by the government through the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Furthermore, discrimination against Muslims occurred during the recruitment of civil servant too. Among some of the new recruitments, none of them were Muslims. Also, there was a difference in salary between the European workers and the indigenous workers. As well as the salary of a priest that was ten times greater than the salary of the *penghulu*.³²⁶ In its response, Muhammadiyah stated, "we, as Muslims who live in Muslim country feel disheartened to observe this situation."

The relationship between Muhammadiyah and Christianity reached its lowest point in the mid-1960s when about two million *Abangan* Muslims converted to Christianity -according to the estimation by Alwi Shihab- following the mass killing after the 1965 event. For Muslims, the attitudes of the Churches in protecting and taking care of former PKI followers were dubbed as a "fishing in the troubled water".³²⁷ Allegations of Christianization accused to the Church because of the church building in the former village of Abangan Muslims by offering educational and health aids and helping to regain self-confidence of former Communist Party followers. At the annual

³²⁵ Alexander Willem Frederik Idenburg, "Christen dan Mohammedanen," *Suara Muhammadiyah*, Trans. Hadji Fachruddin, 3:8, August 1, 1922; Menchik, 1999, p. 42

³²⁶ Religious headman.

³²⁷ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 306

Congress of Muhammadiyah in 1924 in Yogyakarta, a warning to the Christianization effort was voiced. At this Congress, Muhammadiyah leaders warned its members not to be tempted by the persuasion of missionaries which was relying on social and economic aids. In 1963 again, Muhammadiyah warned its members of the danger of Christianization after a conference in East Java held by the Protestant Churches which was accused as an annual meeting to plan the Christianization of Java within 50 years.³²⁸

The friction between Christian missionaries and the Islamic group represented by Muhammadiyah has continued to heat up after this event. Each side published apologetic books, such as "*Islam Menentang Kraemer*" (1925), "*Tuhan Yesus Dalam Agama Islam*" (1957), and "*Isa Dalam Alquran, Muhammad Dalam Bibel*" (1959). Moreover, in 1964 a pamphlet entitled "to be aware of Christian activities" which contained plans of Christianization in Java within 25 years appeared and provoked controversies. *Suara Muhammadiyah* quoted this leaflet in its edition and claimed that it was explaining a paper presented at a conference organized by the church council. This paper stated that Christians should use various means through education (by increasing the number of Christian schools, inviting Muslim children to Christian school); establishing seminaries in Muslim majority cities; building health care centers (such as clinics, hospitals and orphanages); increasing interreligious marriages (by asking obedient Christians to marry disobedient Muslim women; supplying Arabic version of Bible to Muslims who familiar with Arabic; providing financial aids to Muslim politicians; and building churches near mosques.³²⁹

As a first step, Muhammadiyah decided to send *dais*³³⁰ and religious scholars to various regions in Java, especially to the areas that became pockets of Christian groups to compete against pastors who were also sent by the church sent to these areas. A Dutch orientalist, Pijper, once said that Muhammadiyah emerged as a reaction to the

³²⁸ Ibid, p. 308

³²⁹ *Suara Muhammadiyah* vol. 25, no. 35 (1963), p. 5; Bisjron A Wardy, *Memahami Kegiatan Nasrani*, Jogjakarta: Muhammadiyah, 1964; Umar Hasyim, p. 270-273. This pamphlet was published by Bisjron A Wardy. However, the contents of the pamphlet were rejected and deemed unauthentic by Protestant and Catholic parties.

³³⁰ Islamic preachers

politics of the Dutch government who was trying to Christianize Indonesia.³³¹ By converting Indonesian to Christianity, Indonesian society will be more easily regulated by the colonial government.³³² Dahlan argued that direct fighting against Christianity through physical confrontation would not be a good choice. According to him, building Muslim awareness about the consequences of mission activities was something more effective. It was realized by building infrastructure support to the advancement of Muslim society such as school buildings, hospitals, health services, Islamic center, and others.³³³

However, after the leadership of Dahlan and Muhammadiyah was continued by his students, Fachruddin, Muhammadiyah's attitude towards Christian groups was more 'brave'. Under Fachruddin's leadership, Muhammadiyah was regarded as a "lion" for Christian groups. After the years, Muhammadiyah's attitude began to favor an open confrontation, argument and often drew direct criticism of the Christian missionary movement in Central Java.

Muhammadiyah's attitude toward Christian groups and mission work was not only seen in the field. Confrontation also occurred through government and political forums. During the discussion on the basis of the State, a prominent representative from Muhammadiyah who was later appointed as a chairman, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, persistently defended the seven words embodied in the Jakarta charter. He also demanded the implementation of Islamic law for all Indonesian citizens, although, in the end, this demand did not get approval from the committee members.³³⁴

Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah figure in the House of Representatives, explained the evidence of Christianization attempts at Muslim-majority areas, as happened in Meulaboh in 1967 where a church was built in an area which was no Christians there. In response to this event, Harun asked the government to control the building of the church, foreign aids, and the mission work. As a result, Soeharto issued a government decree 70, 78 of 1978.³³⁵ In parliament forum, M Rasyidi, another

³³¹ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 160

³³² Schröter, 2010, p. 100

³³³ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 161

³³⁴ Hakim, Lukman, *Fakta dan Data: Usaha-Usaha Kristenisasi di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Majalah Media Dakwah, 1991, p. 16-17

³³⁵ Shihab, Alwi, 1998, p. 314

Muhammadiyah's representative in parliament, also expressed his view that Christians introduced a system of "foster parents" to Muslim students who could not afford to pay for their studies, but still have a great desire to continue their education. Students who need this aids can be helped by the church if they willing to be baptized and placed together with their "foster parents" which were set by the church.³³⁶

5. PERSIS AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA

While in Central Java there was Muhammadiyah who was actively tackling the movement of Christianization, there was Persis who has the same mission in West Java. Unlike the Muhammadiyah, Persis who was established in 1923 in Bandung emerged amidst the problematic polarization of Islamic groups and the debate on the understanding of Shari'a that emerged among traditionalist, reformist and communist groups.³³⁷

However, the vast majority of its members were Sundanese. Judging from the historical side, Sundanese people were closer to Islam than Javanese to Islam. Unlike Javanese, there were hardly any Sundanese Muslims who convert to Christianity. Mission work which was started in the late 19th century by the Dutch was also considered not too successful to Christianize the Sundanese. Missionary activities in West Java eventually focused on the health assistance, education, and translation of the New Testament into the Sundanese language.³³⁸

The conflict between Persis and Christians aroused when J.J. ten Berge wrote an insulting article on the physical and attitude of the Prophet Muhammad. Together with Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam, Persis held a demonstration in Bandung and Surabaya. Persis resistance to Christian activity was more combative. The focus of their movement, at that time directed by Muhammad Natsir, was to criticize New Testament texts that were considered inconsistent and had many defects. In addition to their activity on criticizing traditional practices that are considered to deviate from the

³³⁶ Hakim, Lukman, 1991, p. 16

³³⁷ Menchik, 2016, p. 45

³³⁸ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 656

Islamic Shari'a, Persis also criticizes other groups such as Shia and Hadrami Arab who had some differences with them.³³⁹

Unlike Muhammadiyah and Persis, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)³⁴⁰ itself tries to maintain harmony between Islam and Christianity in Indonesia. NU, besides tending to criticize the Christian's insensitivity to the problems faced by Muslims as well as government injustice, also criticized the Muhammadiyah movement as they heavily preach another adherent to Islam. East Java-based NUs have their problems stemming from the reform movement brought up by reformists from the Arab peninsula. Polarization in eastern Java was not like in Central Java which was represented by Muslim / Christian, or Muslim / Communist, but more to traditionalist/reformist. NU's relationship with Christian groups itself tends to be 'in harmony'. While Christians in Central Java or western Java were colonialists who cooperated with the Dutch government and tend to be hostile to the Islamic group, the Christian congregations in East Java were often in opposition to the Dutch government; their communities were separated from Muslim-majority areas; and their teachings have been more contaminated with local and even Islamic teachings.³⁴¹

Another reason Christians did not threaten NU is that they arrived late to East Java. From 1808 to 1927, there were only a few priests in Surabaya, and they engaged in little missionary work. By 1926, there were only one hundred Catholics. Not surprisingly, once the national awakening began, the Christians of East Java were marginal figures. In sum, the Christian missionaries in East Java were inconsequential in their conversion efforts and respectful of the Muslims as demonstrated by patterns of community development and recognition. This respect stemmed in part from the development of the Christian community of East Java, which was distinctly Javanese and autonomous from the foreign missionaries.³⁴²

Although the bulk of its early writing focused on reformers, NU was also aware of a growing non-Muslim population. NU tended to criticize Christians' insensitivity to

³³⁹ Steenbrink, 1993, p. 118

³⁴⁰ With more than thirty million supporters, NU is the largest of Indonesia's Muslim organizations, typically (if simplistically) identified as "traditionalist" in its theology. Hefner (2000), preface, xii

³⁴¹ Sumartana, Th., 1993, p. 117

³⁴² Menchik, 2016, p. 50

the problems faced by Muslims and the unfair subsidization of Christians and Muslims, which again triggered the anger of Muhammadiyah. Although NU was trying to avoid a polemic against Christians, the funeral incident in Wonosobo causes them to demand the government to provide assertiveness that Islamic cemeteries should not be used to bury Christians.³⁴³

6. CHRISTIANS' RESPONSE TO THE ACCUSATION

The persistent allegations directed at the church regarding the increasingly high conversion from Islam to Christianity eventually began to be responded by Christian parties. Both Catholic and Protestant parties are clarifying and responding to the circulars and statements. The Catholic party published a circular dated 1-7 October which highlighted the perpetrators behind the Makassar event. According to them, the Makassar event was already well prepared in advance.

“It is an irony that on the first day of the week, which is the day of the *hari kesaktian Pancasila* (Pancasila Sanctity Day), has been 'celebrated' with a vandalistic event, which has been carefully planned. In an insult to Pancasila, a group of Muslim youths has been able to be burnt their fanaticism by some of their leaders. They rampaged and destroyed nine protestant churches, four Catholic churches, a monastery for nuns, a theology college, a Catholic student organization's building, two Catholic buildings, and destroyed a protestant church; ganged and wounded several Christian youths. In general, this destruction was not only done on the buildings alone, but also inside them.

Over the past few months, especially since the Meulaboh-Aceh incident, it has been increasingly apparent that there has been a general campaign launched by fanatic Islamist groups throughout Indonesia. ... not only by using false interpretations of religious teachings that are deliberately

³⁴³ See *Utusan Nahdlatul Ulama*, “Penerang Bagai Hati yang Cengkal dan Bebel dengan Beberapa Ayat Qur'an yang Diakui Benar oleh Bibel,” no. 1, December 1929, 9–16. 66; *Suara Nahdlatul Ulama*, “Surat Soal Saking Banyuwangi,” 2:4, 1928 [1347], 70. 67; *Suara Nahdlatul Ulama*, “Masalah Tanah Tilas Masjid Lan Awlad al-Kuffar,” 2:10, 1928 [1347], 400–401. 68; *Suara Nahdlatul Ulama*, “Al-I'lan – Wara wara,” 3:9, 1929 [1348], 186. 69; *Suara Nahdlatul Ulama*, “Khilqa al-As'ila wa Khilqa al-Ajwiba,” 3:11 1929 [1348], 218.

directed (for a particular purpose), also even by burning unhealthy emotions that already exist in society: jealousy, inter-tribal sentiment, chauvinism, with the 'eruption' of the Makassar event which clearly prepared in an atmosphere and settings, a strong impression has been obtained with clear evidence, and can be seen where is the direction of their campaign."³⁴⁴

Some of the attitudes of Muslim groups after this event also triggered the commentary and 'fight' from Christian groups. The demand of Muslim groups to ban the construction of churches in Muslim-majority areas and to control the foreign aid and missionary activities was regarded as suppression of religious freedom by some Christians. According to them, this is a contrary to the principles of social justice and equality of rights that are also contained in Pancasila. Moreover, in the end, the local government obeyed the request from the Muslim groups that was delivered through this Aceh Cleric Council by moving the construction of a church to another area. In response to the local government's decision to move the church building from Meulaboh to the Muslim-minority area, representatives of the Protestant party (Parkindo) and also the Catholic Party in parliament propose a parliamentary question (interpellation) on this polemic.³⁴⁵ The parliamentary question, further known as Simorangkir's question, originated from the statement of the Aceh Cleric Council dated April 18, 1967, which asked the local government to prohibit the construction of churches in West Aceh, especially in densely populated areas such as Meulaboh and surrounding areas. According to them, Aceh is a special area in which Islam and custom are one related entity. Therefore, through Simorangkir, the representative of the Protestant party in parliament, he asked several questions:

1. Does the government agree with us that the case in Meulaboh can be seen as a *destruction of the spirit of tolerance* among religious adherents in Indonesia?
2. Does the government agree with us that the case was a kind of skepticism concerning performing a pure application of the first principle of Pancasila?

³⁴⁴ Cited from Wawer, Wendelin, *Muslims and Christians in der Republik Indonesia*, 1974, Steiner, 226-8; Aritonang, 2004, p. 386-7

³⁴⁵ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 30

3. Does the government agree with us that any attitude of any group or anybody that hinders or curtails religious freedom means *a rejection of human rights respected by all of us*?
4. Does the government agree with us that if no? Three happened, it *will destroy the climate of national unity* under the supervision of the New Order?
5. Does the government agree with us that this kind of case will influence the possibility for the People's Consultative Assembly to prepare a declaration for human rights?
6. Is the government ready to take preventive or repressive steps, directly or indirectly, so that this kind of case will not occur anymore in the Republic of Indonesian state that is based on Pancasila?³⁴⁶

Simorangkir's questions were focusing on the commitment of the new order government in upholding the principles of religious freedom and human rights. By focusing the first question on the phrase "destruction of the spirit of tolerance", he asserted that the alignment of local government to the majority group could damage the tolerance which is a unique character of Indonesian. Simorangkir also questioned the government's commitment to Pancasila. Because freedom and equality of rights is one of the leading foundations of Pancasila. If the government does not heed these suggestions, it is feared that this newly formed Indonesian unity will be a victim. Simorangkir called this Aceh cleric Council's attitude as a form of violation against Pancasila and is the trigger of the rift of national unity.

A week after Simorangkir's questions, Lukman Harun also expressed his interpellation to the government. Responding to the simultaneous statements that were considered provoking, Lukman, a leader of the Muhammadiyah youth organization which was also a member of parliament, highlighted the role of foreign aid to religious organizations in Indonesia. He asked the government to exercise strict control of foreign aid channeled to Christian religious institutions in Indonesia. Because the aid was strongly indicated as an aid to the Christianization activities in Indonesia. According to him, the distribution of foreign aid which was also accompanied by the arrival of

³⁴⁶ *Interpelasi Peristiwa Meulaboh Kabupaten Atjeh Barat*. These questions are fully quoted in Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari Pesantren*, Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987, p. 568; Mujiburrahman, p. 32

foreign missionaries was an intervention on internal affairs. It was already known, he said, that foreign aid for the Christians took different forms such as money, church buildings, hospitals, means of transportation, scholarships, and food. Lukman then referred to foreign media reports, namely Time, 16 June 1967 and Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 1967 which both mentioned that Christian communities in the United States collected \$300,000 for Christian missionary activities in Indonesia.³⁴⁷

In short, Lukman's questions include two points: 1) The government to exercise strict controls over foreign aid which come to Indonesia, especially aids directed to religious organizations. It was because the Christians use unfair methods in converting Muslims through the aids that flow from foreign countries. To protect Muslims in Indonesia, he suggested the government control foreign aid. 2) Along with foreign aid, they also send foreign missionaries who are considered to be creating a future conflict between religions in Indonesia. Therefore, Lukman suggested the government impose restrictive rules on the Christian mission activities that it should only to be done to people who still do not embrace religion.³⁴⁸

Lukman asserted that missionaries often build churches in the place with no Christians at all. Lukman also accused missionaries of improper conversions by coming to the poor Muslims door-to-door by giving them food and medicine supplies. The aggressiveness of these missionaries, according to Lukman, should be regarded as a violation of the principle of tolerance upheld by Pancasila. Also, Lukman also stated that Catholic worldwide relief service in cooperation with the Indonesian Bishop Council (MAWI) provides about 30 million pounds of food and medicine to the needy Indonesian.³⁴⁹ Lukman mentions the movements of these missionaries with “*a religious expansion directed to the people who are already Muslim. It is true that the expansion is not by armed forces, but by the forces of property and materials coming from abroad...*”³⁵⁰ This question, even though addressed to the government, it was also indirectly addressed to representatives of Christian groups in parliament. In the end,

³⁴⁷ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 33

³⁴⁸ See “*Interpelasi Dalam DPRGR Tentang Bantuan Luar Negeri kepada Agama-agama atau Badan-badan Ke-Agamaan di Indonesia,*” Kiblat No.5 (Agustus, 1967), 25; The complete texts of the interpellation in Umar Hasyim, 1979, p. 293–308 and summarised in Aritonang, 2004, p. 382–383.

³⁴⁹ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 33

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 33

bringing up the statement from the general secretary of the Catholic party, this exchanging question is considered as "a war of Parliamentary Questions".

Through the minister of religious affairs, Saifuddin Zuhri, the government responded to this Simorangkir question after having contact with some other Muslims. At the opening of his answer, Saifuddin emphasized the understanding and use of the term tolerance. According to him, although religious tolerance is the foundation of Pancasila, any attempt to develop a religious life should take into account on the conditions of the subjected area. He added that it should also be considered that the condition of Muslims in general who experienced political and economic degradation after Dutch colonialism. After that long colonialism, they cannot afford to develop and expand their religious life due to the economic difficulties and lack of aids. At the same time, Muslim groups themselves were unable to follow Christian projects by building places of worship, because of their poor conditions in general.³⁵¹

He added that *“Any religious group in our state is entitled to the freedom to build places of worship and to follow the teachings of its respective religions, but it should also be considered that to use this freedom, one should not offend or hurt the feeling of the other groups. Because to use the right of freedom that exceeds its boundaries in the sense that one prefers one’s interests without considering the feelings of others is a wrong way of using freedom.”*³⁵²

The statement of the minister of religious affairs explains the real condition of the Muslims who at that time could not develop their religious life project because of the heavy economic pressures. Also, the government's answer confirms that the State cannot help the development of religious life with economic aid from their own. Therefore, the government permitted foreign aid to religious organizations in Indonesia to help accelerate the development of the community as he stated “no objection to foreign aid to religious institutions.”³⁵³ However, according to what is understood from this Saifuddin answer, the government states that tolerance in freedom of expression of the religious side is permissible provided that it not hurt the feelings of other faiths. Each of the followers of religion must keep each other's feelings.

³⁵¹ Ibid, p. 35-36

³⁵² Ibid, p. 36

³⁵³ Ibid, p. 36

Although not entirely in agreement with the government's response to restrictions on mission work and foreign aid in specific areas, Christian groups through their parliamentary factions asked parliamentarians not to continue discussions about this Meulaboh event as Suharto' delivered his speech in front of parliament two weeks after the official response.³⁵⁴ These two events at the start of the New Order era marked and a critical beginning of the relationship between Islam and Christianity in later times, with various mediations held by both government and private parties.

7. COMPROMISING BOUNDARIES: ON MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONSHIP

In Indonesia, the idea of the interfaith dialogue first appeared in 1969, initiated by Prof. Abdul Mukti Ali. In 1970, Mukti Ali attended a dialogue by the representatives of four religions (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist) organized by the World Council of Churches, in Ajaltoun, Lebanon. On that occasion, he presented the paper titled "Dialogue between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia and its Problems". In this paper, Mukti Ali revealed that interreligious dialogue in Indonesia only began in November 1969, with a pioneering substantive discussion between himself and some Catholic and Protestant friends. The discussion continued in December 1969, where Mukti Ali conveyed thoughts about dialogue, the Vatican's attitude toward non-Christians, and several other issues; as an introduction to bridge interreligious dialogue efforts.³⁵⁵

At the international level, however, culture of interreligious dialogue in the Catholic community can be traced to the appointment of Angelo Giuseppe Cardinal Roncalli as Pope John XXIII in 1958. His decision shocked the Catholic community when he asked to arrange Second Vatican Council for the Roman Catholic Church in 1962. The Pope declared the need for dialogue with other churches and opened up with ideologies outside the Christian faith.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 38

³⁵⁵ Sperber, Jutta, *Christians and Muslims, the Dialogue Activities of the World Council of Churches and their Theological Foundation*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000, p. 361

³⁵⁶ Fey, Harold C. (ed.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, Volume 2: 1948-1968, Eugene: WCC Publications, 2009, p. 322

The government took the initiative to hold a dialogue again on a national scale held for the first time in Jakarta on 30 November 1967 under the name of *Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama* (an Inter-Religious Consultation).³⁵⁷ In this meeting, President Soeharto along with the minister of religious affairs, M. Dahlan, asked participants who are religious representatives to rebuild good relations and to guard against all things that cause conflict. Therefore, he requested that adherents of the official religion not to target other members of the other adherent of an official religion. Suharto asserted that the activities of religious propagation could be carried out as long as it does not create conflict among its adherents.

“Every religion descended from a perfect God just to improve the order of human life in the world and the hereafter. Therefore, it would be contrary to the teachings of religion itself if in the implementation of the spread of religion arise divisions among humanity, therefore religion should not be enforced - nor by the government - so the government does not have the right to impose religious election on citizens. The government, on the other hand, hopes that interfaith life will work and respect each other and that no attempt will be made to impose the religion's religion on any party ...”³⁵⁸

M. Dachlan also reminded participants of President Soeharto's mandate when he and the president planned this consultation: The dispute between religious people must be ended, and people from one religion should not make other religious people as the target of their propaganda.³⁵⁹

In general, all participants in this consultation responded positively to government requests and some even proposed new ideas or concepts. M. Natsir and his Muslim colleagues proposed a draft of a Charter consisting of three points. The first, the second were accepted by the Christian representatives. However, a verse in the third point, “*not to make the [other] religious communities the target of the respective religious propagation,*” was unacceptable because otherwise the Christian mission or

³⁵⁷ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 207

³⁵⁸ Aritonang, 2004, p. 389-90; for the full quote see Umar Hasyim, p. 393-7

³⁵⁹ For full text see Hasyim, Umar, p. 398-400

evangelism or Islamic preaching can only be directed to deepen the faith of each community.³⁶⁰

The argumentation of the Christians (as well as Protestant and Catholic) to reject that draft was that Christianity is a missionary religion and that according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights all people have the right to change their religion. T.B. Simatupang was one of the Christian representatives who fought very firmly to defend the Christian position. Consequently, the meeting dispersed in an unpleasant atmosphere and did not result in a formula or code of ethics on religious propagation. This failure raised a sharp reaction among the Muslims. Essentially they saw that all difficulties in inter-religious relationships so far were caused by Christian intolerance. However, the Christians rejected this charge; they agreed to forbid all kinds of improper methods of propaganda such as persuading, seducing, forcing and offering gifts, but they could not accept that they were forbidden to obey the divine call to preach the gospel to all humanity.³⁶¹

This consultation eventually failed, and it contributed to the worsening relationship between the two religions in the future. However, according to Steenbrink, at least it encouraged the Christians and the Muslims to have deeper acquaintanceship, knowledge, and understanding of each other, and it became a starting point for further consultation and dialogue.³⁶²

In fact, the constant disappointment experienced by Islamic groups that have led to inter-religious conflicts increasingly tapered was the result of several government decisions. Started with the government policy in 1973 on the simplification (fusion) of political parties which resulted in the prohibition of the use of symbols and names of Islam as the name of political parties³⁶³; the government's proposal to change the subject of religious education in schools with a new subject named Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) in all public schools and at every level, the emergence of the anger of the Islamic group with the circulation of the text of the marriage law proposed by the government

³⁶⁰ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 207

³⁶¹ Ibid, p.208

³⁶² Ibid, p. 208

³⁶³ Aritonang, 2004, p. 377-381

related to the article allowing intermarriage³⁶⁴ and the government decision that Pancasila is the only principle of political party and public organization.³⁶⁵

Since the beginning of the New Order era, the tension between Islam and Christianity has often been characterized apologetically, especially the strategy undertaken by Muhammadiyah and Persis against some Christian leaders who wrote about Islam. This 'Media conflict' was done through mild publications such as weekly publications, pamphlets, and guidebooks. In Boland's view, some of the contents of these pamphlets and books have been far from academic standards and were written with evidence that most were still limited. Some publications such as *Kristologi* and *Sekitar Perjanjian Lama dan Baru* published by Muhammadiyah; stenciled pamphlets edited by Bisjron A Wajdy; as well as other small books were publications used to counter the writing an essay written by western missionaries about the religion of Islam.³⁶⁶

Attempts to attack each other through this publication continue to occur with the publication of several pamphlets by JAPI *Jajaran Penjiaran Islam* (Islamic broadcasters association) based in Surabaya. These stenciled pamphlets contain several titles such as: Messiah and the Cross, the Death of the Messiah and the Azhar University, Jesus in the Quran, the Trumpet of Death from the Valley of Qumran (Qumran, where the "Dead Sea Scrolls" were found, is supposed to have revealed the true origin of Christianity). There was also a pamphlet written by O. Hashem in response to a stenciled pamphlet made by Rev. Dr. J. Verkuyl, a Dutch theologian who writes for the internal Christian interest. According to Boland, these pamphlets are a cheap polemic trigger, which uses semi-scientific arguments for the sake of apology.³⁶⁷

In that kind of atmosphere that occurred among interfaith leaders, Abdul Mukti Ali, an intellectual of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga who later served as minister of religious affairs threw criticism. According to him, the apologizing attitude is a negative attitude and tend to be conservative. Because they cannot account for their opinions scientifically. This attitude will ultimately lead to a stagnation of scientific thinking and

³⁶⁴ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 210-12

³⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 213

³⁶⁶ Nugroho, Singgih, 2008, p. 200

³⁶⁷ Boland, B.J., *The Struggle Of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, 1971, Springer, p. 228

a further escalation of conflict between the Islamic and Christian parties. In such conditions, Mukti Ali formed a group called "limited group" which highlights all religious issues without fear of religious boundaries. This weekly discussion held at Mukti Ali's house in Yogyakarta which was comprised of youth figures such as Ahmad Wahib, Djohan Effendi, Dawam Raharjo, and the general chairman of HMI in Jakarta, Nurcholis Madjid.³⁶⁸

In the early to mid-New Order era (1970s), interfaith dialogue was mostly sponsored by the government. Interfaith dialogue held by private sector itself began to occur in the middle of the 1980s until the mid 1990s. Because the increasing effort for independence and democratization of interreligious dialogue, the procurement of interfaith dialogue by private institutions then is increasing. Basically, the initiators of these dialogues are those supporters of interfaith dialogue. Among Muslim group, the proponents of interreligious dialogue are mostly those who promote the non-ideological view of Islam. So as from the Christian side those who support this interfaith dialogue were from minority group. That because within the Church itself there are various groups, such as 'humanist groups' who are focusing on social issues and dialogue. The other two groups are the charismatic group that focuses on the spiritual side, and the 'ecclesia-centric' group that focuses on the internal affairs of the church.³⁶⁹

Among the Islamic intellectuals represented by members of this limited group, a growing discussion was about the relationship between Islam and politics. In the discussion it was concluded that Islam as "baseless theologically and historically" to be used as the basis for politics; and that should be proposed as an alternative to Pancasila. Eventually, the results of the discussions later published and raised tensions among the internals of HMI; forced Wahib and Djohan to withdraw from the leadership positions of HMI. While Nurcholis Madjid, at a meeting of Muslim youth organizations in the same year then, delivered a speech about the modernization of Islamic thought. According to him, secularization is not contrary to Islam, unlike secularism which is a materialistic philosophy was opposed to Islam. According to him, secularization is a kind of desacralization; which seeks to purify what is actually wrongly considered as a

³⁶⁸ Effendi, Djohan, and Natsir, Ismed (eds.), *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam: Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib*, sixth edition, Jakarta: LP3ES and Freedom Institute, 2003, p. 144

³⁶⁹ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 253

sacred. Secularization, he argues, applies accordingly to Islamic thought which is nothing sacred except God; while the human being is the vicegerent of God (*Khalifa*). As a caliph, man is asked to use reason and ratio in understanding and translating social reality.³⁷⁰

This Nurcholis Madjid's idea was not without opposition. After several presentations and media publications, his seniors at HMI such as Hamka, Muhammad Natsir, and M Rasjidi opposed his idea. However, due to the New Order era government that was disagree with the idea of Islamization and the Islamic State, it is likely that the government welcomes the idea of Nurcholis Madjid, as Boland says.³⁷¹

In line with the government, the Christians welcomed the Nurcholis Madjid's idea which was considered as a young Islamic reformer. J.W.M Bakker, a Dutch Jesuit who wrote a column in the Catholic journal "*Orentasi*" reveals that secularization is an inevitable process in the course of history. Having agreed with Madjid, Bakker asserted that religious authorities at times should be transferred to national authorities. According to him, religious authorities should welcome the process of secularization because this process can free religious and rational positions; putting them in an appropriated condition.³⁷² However, many scholars strongly opposed the idea of secularization proposed by Madjid. According to him, those who oppose didn't understand and couldn't distinguish between secularization and secularism which was mentioned as an opposite to Islam.

The interest of Protestant Christian groups with the Islamic thought reform movement initiated by Madjid and his friends was also manifested by a program called "*Seminar Agama-Agama*" (seminar of religions). This seminar which was designed to provide an understanding of the development of Islamic thought to learners from protestant students was manifested through the role of Olaf Herbert Schumann, a German minister of the Lutheran Church. Schumann was a professor of missiology at

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 255

³⁷¹ Boland, B.J., "*Discussion on Islam in Indonesia Today*" p. 43. In 1953, Dachlan Ranuwihardjo invited President Soekarno to give a lecture on the concept of the national state in relation to Islam in the hall of the University of Indonesia and the President agreed. Madjid noted that, "the resolution of the discussion was in favour of Sukarno's concept; the HMI, or at least its president, Dachlan Ranuwihardjo, preferred the national state." See Madjid, "The Issue of Modernisation", p. 147.

³⁷² J.W.M. Bakker, "Sekularisasi dalam Pandangan Ummat Islam", *Orientasi* Vol. 5 (1973), p. 46-68

Hamburg University who regularly visited Indonesia as a guest lecturer and also worked at PGI in research and development office.³⁷³

Topics of this seminar focused more on the phenomena of the development of Islamic thought such as modernization, secularization, social and political development within the Islamic group. For example, in the first meeting, they discussed books by Harun Nasution entitled "*Islam ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya*" (Reviewing Islam by its Various Aspects), as well as the diary of Ahmad Wahib who recounts the journey of his thoughts. According to TB Simatupang in his presentation, the modern Islamic movement is not a competitor for Christian thought, but it is a component of the national movement in Indonesia; so is the Christian movement that is part of the national movement in Indonesia too. Thus, Islam and Christianity are both components of a national movement that can build cooperation for the development of the nation, as he said.³⁷⁴

These above points show that the majority of Christian groups have responded positively to the emergence of the Islamic reform movement, especially after the emergence of some reformist leaders among the NU that carries the view of non-ideological view of Islam like Abdurrahman Wahid. After making many contacts and discussions with Nurcholis Madjid, Gus Dur became more active and began to fill lectures at Protestant churches in Indonesia.³⁷⁵ Gus Dur's increasing role in the NU further confirmed the stable relationship between Islamic traditionalist and Christian 'syncretic continuously'.

Christians, especially Catholics, began to be more open to others with the development of a rather strange theology, which called "*baptis rindu tidak langsung*" (a longing for baptism). The Church has argued that people who want to be baptized but have already died, he will eventually go to heaven even though he has not been baptized

³⁷³ For a short biography of Schumann, see Panitia Penerbitan, *Agama Dalam Dialog, Pencerahan, Perdamaian dan Masa Depan: Punjung Tulis 60 Tahun Prof.Dr. Olaf Herbert Schumann*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1999, p. 497-503

³⁷⁴ See T.B. Simatupang, "Sumbangan Agama-Agama Dalam Negara Pancasila Yang Membangun" in his *Iman Kristen dan Pancasila*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1984, p. 168-78

³⁷⁵ Barton, Greg, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia*, 1999, Jakarta: Paramadina & Pustaka Antara, p. 388-94. Later, in a speech in front of the Christian leaders in 1996, Wahid explained that he was regularly invited to give the lecture for the GKJW course over a period of more than seven years. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Membangun Kebersamaan Hidup Beragama", Aula, November, 1996, p. 54

with the water of baptism. This indirect Baptist asserted that a man who, if he knew he should be baptized and willing to be baptized, would still be saved by God even though he was not baptized for no reason. At the Second Vatican Council, the church argued that God offers salvation to everyone, even those who are not baptized, nor those who do not believe in a single God (polytheist and Buddhist), even those who without self-disbelief do not believe in God but seek to live by the voice of the heart. *“So what is meant by the atheist here is not who rejects the God, but who cannot believe because of the results of his research; they, if they want to live well, they can be saved.”*³⁷⁶

With the increasing openness of Christian theology, some Christian groups began to behave normally to other religious adherents. This is explicitly explained by Franz Magnis, a prominent Jesuit figure in Indonesia who is also a director of Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta:

“It certainly has strong implications for the development of the mission. A Jesuit like me, no longer facing everyone with an assumption like, "Oh, poor him! If I cannot convert him, later he will later not go to heaven ...". That fear was gone, so we felt more relaxed. Moreover, now, my mission, for example, is no longer to attract as many people as possible to the Catholic Church, just say like a political party looking for a new cadre; my mission now is more to radiate the good that Jesus brought to society. However, if anyone is interested in Jesus, we will gladly explain and happily baptize that person.”³⁷⁷

8. CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARD CHRISTIANS: A SURVEY

In this section, I will present the results of the survey data I obtained from the questioner I held in November, 2017. It is about the opinions and views of Muslim youths towards Christians and Christianity in Indonesia. The respondents from this survey were Muslim youths who were categorized according to their age and place of residence. Thus, because the majority of respondents live or have lived abroad, I expect

³⁷⁶ An interview with Franz Magnis Suseno, a prominent Jesuit figure, 6/3/2017

³⁷⁷ An interview with Franz Magnis Suseno, 6/3/2017

a more sophisticated answer than those who have never been abroad. I consider those who are living abroad to be more tolerant than those who have never been abroad. While the definition of tolerance, quoting from Menchik, is “the willingness to put up with those things one rejects or opposes”.³⁷⁸

According to Menchik, Indonesian Muslims today are arguably more tolerant to the followers of other religions such as Christianity and Hinduism than to the minority groups in Islam such as Shia and Ahmadiyah.³⁷⁹ The increased tolerance among religious people was caused by a long journey of conflict; from the heated conflicts and controversies at the beginning of the new order to the continued compromise of efforts at the end of that period. Also, the emergence of recognition on the role of Christian figures in the fight of Indonesian independence further reinforces the notion that Christianity is also part of Indonesia, no longer part of the invaders (the Dutch). Moreover, the growth of tolerance towards the adherents of official religions in Indonesia from the Muslim groups is primarily due to the increasing effect of counterwork against the Ahmadiyah (also Shiite) groups and also due to the issue of the re-establishment of communism in Indonesia.

8.1.POLITICAL FIELD

Different attitudes expressed by respondents in this survey led to the emergence of varying levels in tolerating Christians and Christianity itself. In some issues such as political issues and the public interest, respondents prefer to make a 'safe' decision. i.e., is their opinion of whether or not Christians may be regional or state leaders. Without classifying the age of the respondents, when asked about whether Christians can become the president of the State of Indonesia in the future, the majority of respondents still prefer not to allow a Christian to be a president of Indonesia (71.4%). According to some respondents because of Muslims are the majority in Indonesia, it should be a Muslim who lead the country. This 'fear' is due to the assumption that by being led by a non-Muslim, there is the possibility of 'political Christianization', as I quote from some of the reasons of the respondent. The discourse of the leader of the State according to

³⁷⁸ Menchik, 2016, p. 19

³⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 20

the eyes of *fiqih* is still a prominent discourse among Indonesian society especially those who live in urban areas. This is evidenced by the rampant suggestion to elect a Muslim leader by some religious leaders in the governor electorate for the capital city, Jakarta.³⁸⁰ As a result, in the election of the governor of Jakarta which became the most controversial election event in Indonesia, the Muslim candidate wins by 57.96%, compared with the 'Christian candidate' who got 42.04% of votes.³⁸¹

According to data from the provincial government of Jakarta, the population of Jakarta in 2016 was 10,304,408 million. 83.4% or 8,598,221 million of them are Muslims; 1,300,427 million or 12.6% are Christians (both Catholics and Protestants). While the rest are other religions adherents such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and *Penghayat*.³⁸² Although Jakarta dominated by Muslims in term of population, judging by the results from the election, not all Muslims in Jakarta considered being a Muslim as a determining factor in choosing a candidate for governor. This is evidenced by the number of votes obtained by 'Christian' candidates. Therefore, no wonder if as many as 9.2 percents of respondents answered that one day the president of Indonesia might be a non-Muslim. In fact, 8.8% of them allow a non-Muslim candidate to become president of Indonesia which in fact is the country with the largest Muslim majority in the world. This opinion is based on the political advantage that being president is the right of all Indonesian citizens, regardless of their religion. Nevertheless, Indonesia is a State founded not based on religion. Religion is not the main identity for Indonesia as a state. The rest, as much as 9.7% allow a non-Muslim candidate to become president of Indonesia by looking at the program, he/she proposed. According to one of the respondents' description, as long as his political policy prioritizes the interests of the people, for him/her, one's religion does not matter anymore.

About being a mayor, a total of 30.6% of respondents are more 'tolerant' by allowing a non-Muslim to become a mayor of big cities in Indonesia. This is based on

³⁸⁰ <https://news.idntimes.com/indonesia/rosa-fofia/rizieq-shihab-umat-islam-boleh-pilih-pemimpin-non-muslim-asal/full>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 02.00 PM

³⁸¹

<http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2017/04/30/06030941/ini.hasil.rekapitulasi.suara.putaran.kedua.pilk-ada.dki.jakarta>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 01.52 PM

³⁸² "Jakarta Population by Religion 2016", <http://data.jakarta.go.id/dataset/jumlah-penduduk-dki-jakarta-berdasarkan-agama/resource/96af31cc-633b-4a86-a0cd-17ed6e90af57>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 01.56 PM

the experience of respondents who assume that the work of non-Muslim leaders in some areas is more significant than some previous Muslim leaders who are considered incompetent. 65.5% of respondents who said “no” have the same reasons as before. Besides to the religious teachings that forbid a non-Muslim leader to lead a majority - Muslims region, it also because of the experience felt by some people related to the attitude of former Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) who is considered harmful to Muslims and often restrict religious activities in the capital city.

Various views influence these opinions. One of the respondents said that the current government leader, although led by a Muslim, prefers to divide various Muslim groups in Indonesia (11.9%). It can be seen from the attitude of the government that chose to get closer to the prominent religious organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in their efforts to dissolve the *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI),³⁸³ or during the 411 events, a demonstration demanding Ahok's imprisonment.³⁸⁴ According to the deputy General Secretary of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Tengku Zulkarnain, the government deliberately marginalized Muslims by favoring minorities. This was proven by not immediately imprisoning Ahok (although in the end Ahok was sentenced to 2 years in prison on May 9, 2017, for the case of religion blasphemy³⁸⁵); alleged criminalization of religious clerics³⁸⁶, as well as the dragging of social assistance funds for Islamic mass organizations throughout 2014.³⁸⁷

However, 35.6% of respondents firmly responded that the presumption about the government that marginalized the Islamic group and favored the minority only came from a group whose interests were undermined by a neutral government attitude. Also, according to them, until now Muslims continue to get their right to perform their religious rituals freely. Even the government also supports the activities of Muslims,

³⁸³ <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/892592/pembubaran-hti-pakai-perpu-ormas-kemenkumham-uraikan-prosedurnya>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 02.23 pm

³⁸⁴ “Presiden Jokowi memecah belah umat islam”, <http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-37910983>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 03.05 PM

³⁸⁵ <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/05/09/ahok-divonis-2-tahun-penjara-ini-komentar-presiden-jokowi>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.14 pm

³⁸⁶ <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/17/06/18/orquee-komnas-ham-kasus-rizieq-bukan-kriminalisasi-ulama>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.20 pm

³⁸⁷ <http://www.panjimas.com/news/2015/01/01/wasekjen-mui-tahun-2014-islam-sengaja-dihancurkan-pemerintah-berpihak-pada-minoritas/>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.14 PM

such as the inauguration of the Grand Mosque of Jakarta by president Jokowi.³⁸⁸ 20.9% prefer not to say; 3.3% are not sure about their answers, and 28.2% said it is possible that the current government is prioritizing minorities.

Related to the inclusion of some Christian figures in the current government, some respondents assume that Christian groups through political power gradually try to control the government (20.4%) and depose the Islamic power from the government (37.9%). In a statement cited by RMOL, Gerindra Party's chairman Arief Poyuono considers that the head of the Presidential Staff, a devoted Protestant named Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, began to take on the role and duty of a president with the move of president Jokowi to the palace of Bogor, "The current real president's is Luhut, but the head of State is still Jokowi," he stressed.³⁸⁹ Only 22.3% of respondents who said they did not believe on it and 19.4% said they did not know anything. This is based on the contrast conditions shown by Jokowi which is getting closer to the most massive Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama.³⁹⁰

8.2.ON CHRISTIANIZATION

The issue of Christianization is an old issue, which began to heat up during the early era of the new order and became one of the primary conflict triggers between Islam and Christian groups. The issue of Christianization after the 1965 incident that led to the drastic rise of new Christians became the spice of social and political competition between Islamic organizations - especially Muhammadiyah and Persis - with the church. Despite having a break, the issue of Christianization is not altogether disappearing. Allegations of Christianization reappearing again when there were issues on covert Christianization in Car Free Day event in Jakarta, 3 November 2014.³⁹¹ Based on that case and many other cases, many of the respondents thought that the Christianization movement was still rife in Indonesia. Some claim to see with their own eyes (26,2%);

³⁸⁸ "Hari Ini Presiden Jokowi Resmikan Masjid Raya Hasyim Ashari di Jakarta", <http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2017/04/15/08440741/hari.ini.presiden.jokowi.resmikan.masjid.raya.hasyim.ashari.di.jakarta>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.26 pm

³⁸⁹ <http://politik.rmol.co/read/2015/03/04/194101/Makin-Jelas-The-Real-President-Adalah-Luhut,-Jokowi-Cuma-Kepala-Negara->, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.35 pm

³⁹⁰ <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170716130510-32-228190/menilik-siasat-kemesraan-presiden-jokowi-dengan-nu>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.42 pm

³⁹¹ <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/14/11/11/nev7a1-kristenisasi-di-cfd-pemerintah-harus-berani-dan-tegas-melawan>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 3.53 pm

some agreed based on the written evidence and videos they saw on the internet (29,8%). While 6.6% of respondents assert that “Christianization” is part of the mission work of Christians It is necessary to understand because the mission is part of their effort to bring others into a religion they believe. A total of 33.5% answered that they did not know anything.

Thus, should the spread of Christianity prohibit in Indonesia because most of Indonesia citizens are Muslims? Alternatively, should the religious propagation activities in Indonesia, whether Christianity or Islam, to ask permission from the local government first? 35% of respondents say that spreading religious belief to others is a religious order and doesn't need to be prohibited by the government. Therefore, spreading the official religious teachings which are recognized by the government is not required to ask permission first (45,4%). 35.9% of other respondents confirmed that the mission work should be prohibited if not by the rules. This opinion does not refer to the government's decision number 70 of 1978 which was published by the former minister of religious affairs, Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, on the boundaries of religious propaganda. It was that religious propaganda is not allowed to be directed at someone that already embraces another religion. It is not allowed to propagate religion by (1) using persuasion or material gifts, such as money, clothes, foods, medicines; (2) spreading pamphlets, bulletins, books etc. in the areas inhabited by the people of another religion; (3) by door-to-door visiting of people of another religion for any reason.³⁹² Also, 12.1% of them perceived that missionary activities should be prohibited because it often violate religious rights, and 14.1% of them considered mission activity as a thing that often leads to conflicts among the people, especially those inhabited by Muslims. Therefore, even if not prohibited, then mission activities must be with the permission of the local government (25,1%).

In his parliamentary questions to the New Order government, Lukman Harun also mentioned missionary activities and church building in areas where there are almost no Christians.³⁹³ Should the Christian mission be done in a Christian-majority area alone; so is Islamic Dakwah only done in Muslim majority area? A total of 24.6%

³⁹² Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 213

³⁹³ Ibid, p. 214

of respondents approved the proposal for restriction of mission area because the primary source of conflict among the adherents of religion is caused by seizure of new adherents. 14.9% of them say that it is just necessary to enforce the rules that maintain the harmony of society. However, 50.8% of respondents said that missionary activities should still be allowed anywhere because *Da'wah* / Mission is a necessary command of God to be done so that more people can be saved hereafter. 9.3% of them suggested that *Da'wah* and mission activities can be done without vilifying other religious conditions. Therefore, according to the respondent's answer, before conducting religious propaganda they should investigate first about the psychological condition of the community whether this activity further will be considered disturbing the order or not.

In 1978 there was also a second decision from the ministry of religious affairs number 77/1978 about the regulation of foreign aid channeled to religious organizations in Indonesia. That (1) the overseas aid can only be executed after the approval and through the office of the minister of religious affairs; (2) overseas workers for the propagation and development of religion should be limited; and (3) religious education institutions have to prepare the successors of the expatriates in a maximum of two years.³⁹⁴ The allegations of Christianization under the auspices of humanitarian aid strengthened when the organization called World Help offered to bring 300 (kids) of Tsunami victims in Aceh to a Christian foundation in Jakarta. Although in the end KWI or PGI rejected the offer, the issue of Christianization through humanitarian aid reappearing again.³⁹⁵ Consecutively, some respondents stated that Muslims should remain vigilant on foreign aid, let alone that is channeled through Christian organizations (30%). While 47% of respondents said it is a common thing that occurs in any country, even though it is channeled through religious institution. There is no need for excessive suspicion. The remaining 23% of respondents said that although the government remains open to foreign aid, at least the government should filter out incoming aid and ask for clarification on the motive of the aid.

³⁹⁴ Aritonang and Steenbrink (eds.), 2008, p. 213

³⁹⁵ <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/55080/komunitas-kristen-indonesia-tolak-kristenisasi-ala-world-help>, retrived on 21/12/2017, 5.48 pm

9. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL JAVA'S UNIVERSITIES IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES

In this chapter, I will focus on the subject of some educational institutions in Yogyakarta that are pioneers and mediators of 'religious and cultural dialogue' in Indonesia. Here, I will discuss three institutions with different backgrounds: CRCS as an educational institution that is not affiliated with any religion, IRB as an educational institution ran by the Jesuits, and *Pesantren* Lintang Songo which is a traditional Islamic educational institution.

9.1. CRCS UGM - CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS AND CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

Interreligious dialogue in Indonesia - and indeed in some other countries - was initially developed in religious-based universities. Gadjah Mada University (UGM) for example in 2000, several majors in humanities and social sciences (such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science) have made religiously related as one of the objects of study. But no study program specifically on religious studies has been established at that time. The interdisciplinary nature of religious studies necessitated the difficulty of accommodating it in one of the existing disciplines.

In 2000 also, CRCS (Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies) was established under the name "Center for Comparative Religion". Only two years later, this name was deemed inappropriate, and changed to "Religion and Cross-Cultural". During its first establishment, there were no templates for such a program in Indonesia, and in those early years, the curriculum was continually reviewed and evaluated.³⁹⁶ According to Achmad Mursyidi, the first director of the program, the idea of establishing CRCS emerged from Alwi Shihab, and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Alwi Shihab himself is an alumnus of Temple University whose his final dissertation was about Muhammadiyah's attitude against the Christianization movement. According to him, Alwi suggested that in Indonesia, there should be an educational institution which is focusing on religious studies, such as in America and Europe universities.

³⁹⁶ Zainal Abidin Bagir "introduction", in Samsul Maarif (ed.), *Studi Agama di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2016, p. v (introduction page)

Therefore in 2000, through the approval of three ministries (Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Religion and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), CRCS as an institution under the auspices of Gadjah Mada University, was established. The laying of CRCS under UGM was based on the consideration that this institution should not be affiliated with religious universities (such as UIN, UKDW or USD). UGM is a state university that is not affiliated with any religion. UGM was chosen to avoid 'bad feelings' either from Muslim or non-Muslim.³⁹⁷

The position of CRCS which is under the auspices of Gadjah Mada University, a university without religious affiliation, has both advantages and disadvantages and quite distinctive characteristics. For Indonesian students themselves, all of whom have attended religious education at schools that separate students based on their religion, CRCS becomes a unique meeting room - both inside and outside the classroom. For most college students, with a background of undergraduate education in public and religious colleges, studying religion with classmates from different religious backgrounds is a new experience. At the same time, it is also a challenge for the teachers.³⁹⁸

The establishment of CRCS among another dilator by the increasing of conflict situation caused by the diversity that exists in Indonesia. Indonesia is known for its rich and robust civil society, including organizations and movements in the field of religious freedom advocacy. This situation is shaped by the history of Indonesia which is characterized by the vital role of religious, social organizations in the formation of nationalities. The situation of identical diversity in Indonesia which is living within the context of political freedom since 1998 puts the power of civil society at the heart of the sphere of public life. Unfortunately, the richness and strength of civil society in the advocacy of religious freedom does not produce enough reflective and conceptual knowledge of the dynamics, issue maps and response choices adopted by religious freedom advocates. As a result, there is a situation of 'stagnation' which is primarily characterized by the limited approach model and the circle or network of actors. Also,

³⁹⁷ <http://crs.ugm.ac.id/spk-community/profile>, retrived on 14/12/2017, 11.50 am

³⁹⁸ Maarif, Samsul (ed.), *Studi Agama di Indonesia: Refleksi Pengalaman*, Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2016, p. v (introduction page)

the wealth and strength of the cross-faith movement in Indonesia are not enough to characterize discourse at the global level.³⁹⁹

In the last decade, there has been an upward trend in publishing annual reports conducted by religious advocacy institutions such as Wahid Institute and Setara Institute. This annual report provides data on the occurrence and analyzing the situation of religious freedom from year to year. This annual report is considered to give a new nuance in strengthening the aspect of advocacy knowledge that has been filled by academic works. With the breakthrough of publishing an annual report that provides empirical knowledge that can describe the current state of religious conditions in society, CRCS has succeeded in initiating a more 'objective and empirical' dialogue that not only wrestled around the theological subject.

CRCS offers the concept of civic pluralism as a conceptual platform for the reflection of advocacy experiences of religious freedom. The term *Pluralisme Kewarganegaraan* (Citizenship Pluralism) is used to encourage the understanding that pluralism is concerned not only with theological-philosophical discourse on the relationship between religion, or the legal-formal debate over the right to expression of religious freedom but also to diverse perspectives in viewing the relationship between religion and the State. Also the diversity of historical situations and changes of socio-politic aspects at the local level. A mere religious factor difference is not a decisive factor in the conflict. So even when regulation and law enforcement is required, the legal approach needs to be reinforced by a "social engineering" process that supports a coexistence or harmony situation. Therefore, since 2008 CRCS has collaborated with some activists and academics who are concerned about the issue of religious freedom to run a program called Pluralism Knowledge Program (PKP). The program aims to bridge the relationship between academics and practitioners in strengthening the knowledge sector on issues of religious freedom. Knowledge products produced in the above publications are among the results of this program. This interaction with activists and academics confirming the role of CRCS in strengthening the knowledge sector through

³⁹⁹ <http://crs.ugm.ac.id/spk-community/profile>, retrived on 14/12/2017, 11.50 am

a training program that was later named the School of Management of Diversity (SPK).⁴⁰⁰

9.2. IRB UNIVERSITAS SANATA DHARMA

Sanata Dharma University (USD) is a university founded by Jesuits based in Yogyakarta. This university was established in 1955 under the name PTPG Sanata Dharma which is functioned as an educational institution for teachers. After being renamed as a university in 1993, the program named Religion and Cultural sciences for the graduate student which is a pioneering program for interdisciplinary studies in the field of humanitarian, social sciences in Indonesia. The purpose of this program is to remelt the humanitarian, social dialogue that tends to be fragmented, especially at the end of the new order era.⁴⁰¹

During the 1990s, there was a time when Indonesians were tired of the Soeharto's New Order. These conditions affect the spirit of Indonesian life in various fields, including politics. As the above explanation, the socio-political situation in the New Order era tended to change. Moreover, in the third period of the new order, with unstable economic conditions and the shift of over-governmental structures, society began to apathy against all forms of idealism and began to be apolitical. According to ST Sunardi, one of the founders of the Institute of religious and cultural sciences in USD, the desire to revive public awareness of social and cultural conditions in the midst of sluggish idealism became the first factor of the establishment of this institute.

The second reason was that this institute was trying to get closer to the issue of religiosity with culture. The relationship between religion and culture is a mutually beneficial relationship; to what extent and in what sense can religion be the driving force of cultural growth, as Sunardi said. In the 90s, research on religion and culture was based solely on projects made by the government. The research that is held because of project demand, according to Sunardi, cannot be a pioneer for the progress of research on social humanity in Indonesia. Because, with only a pivot on the needs and

⁴⁰⁰ <http://crcs.ugm.ac.id/spk-community/profile>, retrived on 14/12/2017, 11.50 am

⁴⁰¹ An interview with ST Sunardi; first director of IRB. The interview conducted on 24/10/2016, in his office.

projects held by the government, the responsibility of universities to develop the science is neglected. Moreover, research on social sciences and humanity was not comprehensive; much essential knowledge - such as Marxism - wasn't taught in Indonesia because it was not by government demand.⁴⁰²

Although founded by the Society of Jesus, USD is open to students from all religious backgrounds. Speaking about Interreligious dialogue, according to Sunardi, it has indeed co-occurred with the dynamics that progressed in this campus. Such as the availability of mosques on campus, and the acceptance from the campus on various Islamic views. The narrative of interreligious dialogue built by Mukti Ali in the 1970s is no longer used. As Sunardi said,

“The interreligious dialogue term, if not carefully used, can end in the same way as Orientalism story (and also Islamology) that has been strongly criticized by Edward W Said. In the beginning, Orientalism was 'an intellectual activity', which eventually gradually became institutionalized. In the end, Orientalists created their reality; Orientalism becomes institutionalized and serves to 'Orientalize' the east, instead become an obstacle to the relationship between west and east. So is interreligious dialogue; it was initially a discourse aimed to improve the interreligious relations, but if not carefully used, this discourse could become a new booster that only becomes a debating forum about theology. The discursive practice of interfaith relations that was once encouraged was in fact outdated.”⁴⁰³

According to Sunardi, the current problem in interreligious relations in Indonesia is not to find the ideal format for interreligious dialogue. The problem that often arises in the conflict about inter-religious tolerance is just an escape and camouflage for the real problem. Many issues are more fundamental for the social interaction of religious communities in Indonesia. In the last five to ten years, Indonesia has entered a new period and cultural change such as the coming of television, internet, and other digital media. Along with these changes, there was capitalization in various

⁴⁰² Interview with ST Sunardi, 24/10/2016.

⁴⁰³ interview with ST Sunardi, 24/10/2016.

fields. Also, the secularization, according to J.W.M. Bakker is regarded as the "un-avoided historical process" of major Islamic countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia.⁴⁰⁴ Given this secularization, the line for religions becomes increasingly blurred. In the secular society, transcendent religion entered its period of crisis and began to be threatened by intellectual and popular culture.⁴⁰⁵ Along with the increasing influence of secularization in the social aspect of humanity in Indonesia, as Syed Hussain Nasr said, the understanding of how the "kingdom of man" came to replace the "kingdom of God" in the west is a matter of the most significant import for all future religious dialogue between Islam and the other.⁴⁰⁶

Therefore, the dialogue in this reform era, Sunardi added, is a joint dialogue to overcome the hard problem. Dialogue no longer needs to gather together and discuss a problem from each theological perspective. Today's dialogue is to solve the social problems of humanity by utilizing religious values and ethics.

9.3. PESANTREN LINTANG SONGO

Since 2012, together with Sunan Kalijaga Islamic University and Duta Wacana Christian University, the Lintang Songo *pesantren* located in Wonosari sub-district routinely annually hold a "dialogue with priests" agenda called SITI (Studi Intensif Teologi dan Islam). This program is a project organized by the University of Yogyakarta to facilitate Protestant and Catholic pastors, as well as graduate students, especially those studying theology. Before coming to Lintang Songo *pesantren*, the prospective participants consisting of pastors and students had been given a glimpse of *kepesantrenan* by the organizers such as about customs and manners, also about how to dress.⁴⁰⁷

The agenda of this dialogue takes place in three stages. First, these pastors and graduate students live with the *Santri* at the *pesantren*, spending the night there. For three nights, they observed the activities of the *Santri* such as praying in congregation,

⁴⁰⁴ Mujiburrahman, 2006, p. 256

⁴⁰⁵ Şenay, Bülent, *Islam and Other Religions; Religious Diversity and 'Living Together'*, No. 9 Vol. 9, 2000, UÜİF, p. 412

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 413

⁴⁰⁷ An interview with KH Heri Kuswanto, on 23/10/2016

recitation, as well as activities such as caring for rice fields and livestock, practicing traditional music, and others. The second stage is an introduction and frequently asked questions. In this session, the *pesantren* introduces the history and activities of *pesantren* through seminars, introduces the teachings of traditional Islamic-based *pesantren*, and introduces the curriculum of *pesantren* education. Third, the agenda of "mutual exchange of knowledge". After the activities at the *pesantren*, figures from Lintang Songo are usually invited to fill seminars in place of pastors explaining Islam, *kepesantrenan*, and its thought.⁴⁰⁸

The tradition of visiting each other began to become a routine activity of various educational institutions with a religious background. Since the beginning of 2000, slowly various universities and non-profit community organizations such as competing to hold mutual visits and also live-in turns. As in January 2008, a live-in event initiated by the Wahid Institute was held for a month for Christian leaders consisting of social activists, writers, journalists and students at a *pesantren* in Yogyakarta. This activity was held to introduce the development of Islamic thought and movement that includes Islamic politics, the formalization of Islamic sharia, to the social problems of humanity. As recently as well, the Islamic boarding school, Darussalam Gontor, in September 2017 visited St. John's College. Ignatius (Kolsani). During the visit, students of comparative religion studies were introduced and invited alongside discussions about the Christianity, service, and life of Catholic priests, church relationships with non-Christian religions, and church views on culture and politics.

However, religious studies at several campuses have different approaches to study interfaith dialogue. Amin Abdullah idealized religious studies from the realm of normativity to historicity, which is to contextualize religious studies in the space of experience and practice. In this context, Geir Afdal asserts that interreligious learning is not only to understand the other as "other," but "to understand what is in between".⁴⁰⁹ Interreligious learning on campus is still in the process of discovering identity which is in the process that has not been completed. However, if reading the typology and approach of religious studies, at least can be described with three models, namely (1)

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with KH Heri Kuswanto, 23/10/2016

⁴⁰⁹ Afdal, Geir (ed.), *Researching Religious Education as Social Practice (Religious Diversity and Education in Europe)*, Germany: Waxmann Verlag GmbH, 2010, p. 614

comparative studies of religion, (2) religious studies, and (3) interreligious studies. The comparative studies approach seeks to compare and assess religious facts. Meanwhile, new elements of interreligious studies reinforce the fact that the study of religions is a communication of the various subjects involved and who meet in the experience, interpretation and religious experience.⁴¹⁰

10.RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN INDONESIA

The naming of "comparative religion" is the name of the local translation (Indonesia) of the comparative study of religion which is one of several approaches as well as the equivalent of the term "Science of Religion".⁴¹¹ Mukti Ali who introduced and simultaneously studied Comparative Religion Studies, both when IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 1960 to 1964, and when he served in IAIN Yogyakarta until 1971 served as Chairman of the Department of Comparative Religion Faculty of Ushuluddin, who later became Minister of Religious Affairs to the year 1976. Mukti Ali always advises his students to approach and understand religion by using an approach called "scientific-cum doctrine" - the scientific approach to religion, the science of religion, the scientific study of religion, or also often called the Comparative Study of Religions, Religionswissenschaft, or also *Muqaranatul Adyan*.⁴¹²

Unlike the apologetic methods used by researchers like Bakry, the approach of Abdul Mukti Ali (1923) in the comparative religion study described below is a constructive way to build up a harmonious society. However, Mukti Ali suggests that the Qur'an is a starting point and core standard for every Muslim studying comparative

⁴¹⁰ JB. Banawiratma, Zainal Abidin Bagir, etc. (eds.), *Dialog antar Umat Beragama: Gagasan dan Praktik di Indonesia*, CRCS Jogjakarta & Mizan Bandung, 2-11, P. 245

⁴¹¹ *Religionswissenschaft*; The name *religionswissenschaft* was first put forward by Fredrich Max Muller (1823-1900), a German national who in 1867, introduced *religionswissenschaft* to conduct scientific research (scientific method) against religion by using philological approach. 4 this is further emphasized by Joachim Wach, that the scientific pioneer of religious studies is Max Muller with his book *Comparative Mythology* (published 1856), then *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (published 1870), and *Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Religion of India*. 5 Similarly, Mircea Eliade in his book *The Sacred and the Profane* adds that the science of religions or comparative religion studies is a term given by Max Muller as mentioned in the introductory section of his first book entitled *Chips from a German Workshop* (London, 1867). See Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, New York: Brace & World, 1959, p. 216

⁴¹² M. Amin Abdullah, "Tinjauan Antropologis-Fenomenologis Keberagamaan Manusia : Sumbangan Pendekatan Filsafat Untuk Studi Agama-Agama" in Burhanuddin Daya, Djam'annuri, Abdurrahman (eds.), *70 Tahun H.A. Mukti Ali, Agama dan Masyarakat*, Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1993, p. 507-508

religion. For Mukti Ali, it should be reviewed about the scientific character that is not only scientific but must be supplemented by religious pluralism taking the line of *sui generis*. In understanding or doing religious research should look at religious facts with or in the light of religion or elsewhere with *cum doctrinaire*, is the religious mandate demanded by Wach, Kitagawa, also Eliade. The meaning of religious phenomena can be understood only if they are learned as religious. So the characteristics of that religion are sacred, holy, sanctified by the adherents.

The concept of "agree in disagreement" by A. Mukti Ali in the sixties is still fresh and remains the primary reference of the government in establishing and maintaining the harmony of life among religious communities in Indonesia. This concept illustrates the diversity of cultures, tribes, languages, and especially religions that coexist comfortably and peacefully, and mutual respect without hostility. In establishing the format of religious harmony, it seems that Mukti Ali departs from the principle of Islamic justice that is oriented on three things⁴¹³: First, the absolute freedom of conscience as liberation from shirk (fellowship) in the divinity and the holiness of God; second, an entirely human equation that is closely related to the conscience who wants to be free from servitude other than to God and always strives to obtain and enforce the rights of equality; and third, solid solidarity, which must depart from itself, because good and evil will have an impact on the surrounding community environment. These three things, the problem of the harmony of religious life will be achieved as well as the achievement of justice of humanity. Based on the understanding and appreciation of the comparative nature of comparative religion, the more growing and growing attention and concern about the actualization of the role of religions in creating Indonesian society in particular, and the world in general.

Ali can be called the founder of the Comparative Religion Science discipline in Indonesia. Since he was first appointed as Chairman of the Department of Comparative Religion at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta in 1961, Ali continues to campaign for the opening of the majors at various State Islamic Institutions (PTAIN) throughout Indonesia. His academic strength in this discipline and his position as Minister of

⁴¹³ Tuty Alawiyah, "Pak Mukti Ali : Pribadi Bersahaja dan Cendekiawan Rendah Hati", in Burhanuddin Daya, etc (eds.), *Op.Cit*, 1993, p. 53

Religious Affairs in 1971-1978 pushed his ideas to be practically successful. According to Karel A. Steenbrink's reading, Ali is not much polemic about where the position of Comparative Religion Science is between Theology and Science of Religion.⁴¹⁴ Nevertheless, observers agree to place the Comparative Science of Religion in the hands of Ali much closer to Theology than the Science of Religion. Among the harsh critics of Ali's theological position is B.J. Boland who mentions Ali is not a scholar of Comparative Science of Religion, but rather as a Muslim theologian. Ali is also accused of promoting the Comparative Religion Sciences out of the academic track.⁴¹⁵ In his book *Comparative Religion*, Ali posited the background of the emergence of two disciplines (Ali called it "the branch of science") within the Islamic Higher Education: Science of Da'wah and Comparative Religion. "The science of da'wah" or missiology arose because of the post-resurrection encouragement and necessity (Ali called the revolt) of communism in 1948 and repeated in 1965.⁴¹⁶ Among the prominent aspects of the early emergence of the science of da'wah is as a bastion against the ideology that perceived comes from outside Islam, at that time the context of communism. Meanwhile, the science of comparative religion becomes a stronghold to deal with other religions. This last point is important to read carefully because there are other aspects of aspects that stand out beyond that. Even more and more into its development, the position of comparative religion as a bastion of defense and dealing with other religions increasingly thinning.⁴¹⁷

Decades after the founding of the Comparative Religion Sciences, it is now almost 50 years, we can witness the progress going on. Comparative Religion still exists in the Islamic Higher Education, but new phenomena begin to emerge concerning the development of the discipline of Religious Studies both within the PTAI, Public University (PTU), as well as the College of Christian and Catholic Religions. UIN Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau builds a Comparative Religion Studies Program which has two concentrations (interest) of study: Sociology of Religion and Studies of Religions. Recently, in 2015, Protestant Christian High School (STAKPN) Ambon opened a Study Program (Prodi) of Religion and Culture. The managers mention the future of the Prodi

⁴¹⁴ Steenbrink, 1990, p. 154-6

⁴¹⁵ Banawiratma and Bagir, 2010, p. 189

⁴¹⁶ Ali, Mukti, 1988, p. 4

⁴¹⁷ Maarif, Samsul (ed.), 2016, p. 5-6

is projected to be under the Department of Religion Studies. In UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung has established S-2 and S-3 Religious Studies (written in English, sometimes written in Indonesian as *Studi Agama-agama*). While at the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) there are Religious Studies and Cross-Cultural Program, and at Sanata Dharma University, Yogyakarta there is a Study Program of Religion and Culture. UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Duta Wacana Christian University, and UGM built a consortium that organizes Prodi Inter-Religious Studies (IRS).⁴¹⁸

Although religious studies programs at state Islamic universities are still using the name of "comparative religion", many campuses have begun to campaign for the rename of the program to be more 'neutral', by changing its name to "*program study agama-agama*" or "religious studies".

⁴¹⁸ Ibid, p. 6

CONCLUSION

Christianity in Indonesia undergoes several developments and changes in methods ranging from its theological features to its missionary methods. Christianity (Protestantism) came to Indonesia through the Chauvinism teachings brought by the Dutch. However, the indigenous people were reluctant to abandon the teachings of their ancestors. The Javanese-Christianity which was popularized by Javanese-Christian leaders such as Coolen and also Kiai Sadrach (who were using local values as a teaching method) eventually got a place in the hearts of rural society. In the end, the *Indische Kerk* (the official church of the Dutch government) inevitably adopted the style of indigenous Christian leaders, utilizing local values and culture. Moreover, Christian groups who can adapt to local wisdom were better able to establish good relations with Muslim groups than Dutch Christians who were hostile to society.

Relations between Muslims and Christians themselves run very dynamically, tend to go up and down. Since Indonesia's independence, Muslim-Christian relations have focused more on mutual suspicions among their adherents. These mutual suspicions have been reflected in the emergence of recriminations between the leaders of both religions. They regarded each other as a menace against their respective religions. Among Muslim groups, allegations of Christianization arise - whether in the political or social sphere – and directed to Christian leaders. These allegations were based on activities such as the fast relief of foreign aid to Christian organizations, the rampant construction of new churches in the Muslim region, the large number of Christian leaders who appointed to such important government positions. According to the further examinations, these allegations may have been the effect of the New Order government policy in the early period of Soeharto's leadership that tended to limit the movements of the Islamic groups.

The Muslim-Christian relationship was an essential element in the socio-political dynamics of Indonesia in the New Order era, especially with some political decisions of the government that helped to enhance this interaction. The development of political relations between the government and those respective religions also has a strong influence on the relationship between them. As is known, to respond to conflicts

that occur between the two religions, the government often takes an ambiguous attitude, even not infrequently harm both parties. The lack of an in-depth study conducted by the government on the problems that occur, only solved a temporary problem, and let the actual problem to sink.

The ambiguous and opportunistic policy of the New Order government, in the end, resulted in adverse physical behavior. The destruction of places of worship, attacks on other religious groups and unhealthy competitions were the result of their fluctuating political attitude. The policy I mean here is the change of government's attitude towards the Islamic groups ranging from the anti-Islamic attitude shown in the early middle of the new order (1966-1973). The attitude of the government which began to soften against the Muslim groups (1974-1989) and the government's massive approach to modernist Islamist groups as the weakening of military support to the Soeharto's regime (1990-1998).⁴¹⁹

Because the government was still overshadowed by the fear of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the request submitted by Islamic groups to the government to strictly regulate various forms of religious activities that are considered to disturb the peace of society was not indeed granted by the government (such as rules on church building, religious propagation missions, foreign aid to religious institutions, etc.). In addition to these economic reasons, a large military force which was considered to have a significant role in controlling the government became a major obstacle to the 'flexibility' of Soeharto's government. Therefore, the Muslim-Christian relationship was strongly influenced by the complexity of emerging aspects (political, social, economic, and legal).

However, the opening up of some circles after Soeharto's descent from the presidential throne at least opened a new alternative way to the re-consolidate conflict between these two groups. Hereafter came up a group of Muslim modernists who became more open ideologically as well as more open Christian (Catholic) groups in

⁴¹⁹ Aritonang, 2004, p. 363. This grouping is arbitrary and artificial. Each observer may make his own period, as long as it has clear reasons and arguments. Bambang R. Utomo for example, divides the two new order periods based on the attitude and actions of the government against Islam. The first phase (1966-1980) he called the Confrontation Period, while the second phase (1981-1997) he called the Accommodation Period.

describing their theology. It was proved by the emergence of cooperation between the respective groups in both social and educational fields. With the openness of both parties, there are more opportunities to clarify the things that have been closed (such as allegations on Christianization and Islamization). This mutual endeavor to each other also led to the development of the study of religions in Indonesia which is increasingly getting noticed.



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4. INTERVIEWS

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An interview with KH Heri Kuswanto, chairman of *Pesantren* Lintang Songo, Yogyakarta, 23/10/2016

ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

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